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SUMMARY 
The aim of this thesis is to search for an "ethical" interpretation of equality. Although 
the current South African approach of "substantive" equality is better than mere "formal" 
equality, I fear that even substantive equality will again deny or reduce difference. An 
"ethical" interpretation of equality is a way of interpretation that radically acknowledges 
difference and otherness. 
I argue for an ethical interpretation of equality as an alternative to substantive and 
formal equality. The intersection between public space, equality and justice is essential 
to such an ethical interpretation. An ethical interpretation of equality requires that 
present South African visions of public space must be reconstructed and transformed 
continuously. This means that an ethical interpretation of equality rejects finality and 
closure in respect of public space. The visions of public space and perspectives of 
equality that I support are alert to difference and otherness. 
My understanding of justice is that it is never fully achieved in the present. Justice 
functions as a future orientated ideal. 
The "ethical" in an ethical interpretation of equality reflects an awareness of the limits 
of any present system to encompass equality and justice completely. 
Visions of public space, perspectives on equality and landscapes of justice (the 
features of the ethical intersection) form the main sections of the thesis. I discuss the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a manifestation of the 
ethical intersection between public space, equality and justice. The TRC was an 
outstanding example of reconstruction and transformation of public space. It was a 
public space where each and every individual was treated equally while concrete 
contexts, specific circumstances and difference were taken into account. The TRC as 
event was inspired by the ideal of justice. The value of the TRC as a manifestation of 
the ethical intersection is the profound effect it may have on our interpretation of 
equality by demonstrating the limits of the substantive approach. 
OPSOMMING 
Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om ondersoek in te stel na 'n "etiese" interpretasie van 
gelykheid. Alhoewel die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse benadering van "substantiewe" gelykheid beter 
is as blote formele gelykheid, vrees ek dat selfs substantiewe gelykheid weereens verskil sal 
ontken of gering skat. 'n "Etiese" interpretasie van gelykheid is 'n manier van interpretasie wat 
radikaal kennis neem van verskil en andersheid. 
Ek argumenteer vir 'n etiese interpretasie van gelykheid as 'n alternatief tot substantiewe en 
formele gelykheid. Die interseksie tuseen publieke spasie, gelykheid en geregtigheid is 
noodsaaklik vir so 'n etiese interpretasie. 'n Etiese interpretasie van gelykheid vereis dat 
huidige Suid-Afrikaanse visies van publieke spasie aanhoudend gerekonstrueer en 
getransformeer moet word. Dit beteken dat 'n etiese interpretasie van gelykheid finaliteit en 
geslotenheid met betrekking tot publieke spasie verwerp. Die visies van publieke spasie en 
perspektiewe op gelykheid wat ek ondersteun is gevoelig vir verskil en andersheid. 
Ek verstaan geregtigheid as nooit volkome bereikbaar in die teenswoordige nie. Geregtigheid 
tree op as 'n toekomsgerigte ideaal. 
Die "etiese" in 'n etiese interpretasie van gelykheid weerspieel 'n bewustheid van die onvermoe 
van enige teenswoordige sisteem om gelykheid en geregtigheid volledig te omvat. 
Visies van publieke spasie, perspektiewe op gelykheid en landskappe van geregtigheid (die 
eienskappe van die etiese interseksie) vorm die hoofafdelings van die proefskrif. Ek 
bespreek die Suid-Afrikaanse Waarheids-en Versoeningskommissie (WVK) as 'n 
manifestasie van die etiese interseksie tussen publieke spasie, gelykheid en geregtigheid. 
Die WVK was 'n uitstaande voorbeeld van die rekonstruksie en transformasie van publieke 
spasie. Dit was 'n publieke spasie waar elke individu gelyk behandel is terwyl konkrete 
kontekste, spesifieke omstandighede en verskil in ag geneem is. Die WVK as 'n gebeurtenis 
is ge'lnspireer deur die ideaal van geregtigheid. Die waarde van die WVK as 'n manifestasie 
van die etiese interseksie is die diepgaande effek wat dit op ons interpretasie van gelykheid 
kan he deur die beperkings van die teenswoordige substantiewe benadering uit te wys. 
Contents 
... landscapes of democracy, equality and justice ... 1 
Of patchwork and sauces .. .4 
Landscape as image ... 10 
The various authors and the dilemma of (re)presenting 
them, and the various sections ... 15 
Defining the impossible: ethical, interpretation and equality ... 24 
South African landscape - the "ethical" intersection of 
democracy, equality and justice ... 29 
Smoke ... 31 
1 . ... visions of public space ... 37 
Introduction ... 37 
Liberal visions ... 55 
Liberalism and gender ... 68 
Antigone's daughters ... 69 
An ethics of care and the standpoint of the concrete other ... 73 
A rationalist vision: Reconstructing the "unfinished project" ... 77 
Habermas and gender ... 87 
Rethinking the private/public dichotomy ... 87 
A critical reflection on critical theory ... 90 
A "radical democratic" vision ... 95 
Gender perspectives ... 107 
A new conception of citizenship ... 107 
The "doubly-prized world" 
A "relational" approach to citizenship 
Hannah Arendt's vision of public space 
"All sorrows can be borne if you put them into a story or 
tell a story about them": Arendt's theory of action 
Gender perspectives 
Rahel Varnhagen's salon as public sphere 
Agonistic feminism 
Towards a heterogeneous public sphere 
The public as "phantom" 
Conclusion - democratic landscapes 
2 . ... perspectives on equality 
Introduction 
"Poets as judges" 
Towards an "ethical" reading: Perspectives on deconstruction 
"The philosophy of the limit", the "ethical" and the 
ideal of community 
What deconstruction is not 
Deconstruction and the event 
Deconstruction as a strategy of delay 
The ongoing dialogue between deconstru'ction and hermeneutics 
"We have it from Aristotle that life is hard" 
"If anything is undeconstructable, it is justice" 
... 109 
... 116 
... 119 
... 122 
... 133 
... 134 
... 141 
... 147 
... 149 
... 151 
... 160 
... 160 
... 168 
... 173 
... 173 
... 180 
... 185 
... 189 
... 191 
... 194 
... 196 
The law, justice and legal interpretation: Deconstruction is justice ... 198 
Back to the future: Legal interpretation as recollective imagination ... 201 
Perspectives on the interpretation of rights (equality) ... 207 
Equality as a "social right" ... 208 
Rights in relationships 
Rights as relationships 
Republican constitutionalism 
... 211 
... 222 
... 226 
Equality: South African perspectives 
The equality clause in the interim constitution and 
in the final constitution 
Equality cases under the South African Constitution 
President of the Republic of South Africa and 
another v Hugo 
Is the majority in Hugo following an 
... 235 
... 236 
... 243 
... 244 
"instrumental aesthetic"? ... 247 
Fraser v Children's Court of Pretoria North and others ... 250 
Harksen v Lane ... 251 
City Council of Pretoria v Walker ... 257 
An ethical interpretation of equality and the TRC ... 264 
Equality: A feminist/gender perspective ... 268 
"Ethical" feminism ... 271 
"Reconstructing sexual equality" ... 281 
Conclusion - landscape of difference ... 285 
3 .... landscapes of justice ... 291 
Introduction: "landscape" as image, the ethical intersection 
and the TRC ... 291 
Landscape of constitutional language -
On bridges, roads and foundations 
Theoretical landscapes 
Rereading Arendt 
Making the future by redesigning the past 
Between vengeance and forgiveness 
South African landscapes 
The response of a writer 
The response of three activists 
The response of a poet 
The response of a dominee (pastor) 
... 306 
... 311 
... 311 
... 325 
... 327 
... 332 
... 333 
... 336 
... 345 
... 349 
The response of a researcher 
The response of a lawyer 
Landscape of care 
Conclusion - "The past is another country" 
Continuous landscapes 
Because the future, too, is another country 
Bibliography 
... 358 
... 362 
... 369 
... 383 
... 387 
... 388 
.. .402 
"The land belongs to the voices of those who live in it. My own bleak voice among them" 
- Antjie Krog, Country of my skull 
. . . landscapes of 
democracy, 
equality and 
justice 
I started this thesis during 1996 after finishing an LLM at the end of 1995. I wanted to 
explore the interpretation of equality in the "new" South Africa. In my LLM dissertation 1 
I focused on pornography and the multiple interpretations of freedom of speech. During 
my research for the LLM dissertation I jotted down a number of issues which I could not 
(1996) Rekonstruktiewe feminisme: 'n Ondersoek na die reg as "manlike" 
struktuur en die moontlikheid van transformasie met spesifieke 
verwysing na pornografie. (Reconstructive feminism: An investigation 
into the law as a "male" structure and the possibility of transformation 
with specific reference to pornography) 
1 
focus on then, but which I wanted to follow up in a later project. Jacques Derrida's2 use 
of Emmanuel Levinas'3 understanding of the "ethical", Drucilla Cornell's4 emphasis of 
the "ethical" in her understanding of feminism, Carol Gilligan's5 distinction between an 
"ethics of care" and an "ethics of justice", Seyla Benhabib's6 concept of "interactive 
universalism", and Jennifer Nedelsky's7 theory on "rights as relationships", served as 
research for the dissertation on pornography, and also became a great source of 
inspiration for my next project. I decided to call the work Towards an "ethical" 
interpretation of equality. 
As the title indicates, the aim of the study is to describe an "ethical" interpretation of 
equality. All three concepts, "ethical", "interpretation" and "equality" must be translated 
for the purposes of this (con)text. I shall not try to give a final definition or closed 
meaning here. Hopefully, the flow and ruptures of the text will help to sketch a context 
where meanings can be illuminated. Initially, I wanted to work primarily on the writings 
of Levinas8 on the ethical relationship to the other, and especially Derrida and 
I primarily relied on Derrida's text on the law and justice: "Force of law: 
The mystical foundation of authority" in Cornell (ed) (1992) 
Deconstruction and the possibility of justice 29-67. 
Levinas (1969) Totality and infinity; Levinas (1987) Time and the other; 
Llewellyn (1995) The genealogy of ethics. Emmanuel Levinas; Peperzak 
(1993) To the other. An introduction to the philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas. 
"The doubly-prized world: Myth, allegory and the feminine" (1990) 75 
Cornell law Review 644- 699; (1991) Beyond accommodation; (1992) 
The philosophy of the limit; (1993) Transformations; (1995) The 
imaginary domain. 
(1982) In a different voice. 
(1992) Situating the self; (1995) Feminist contentions: A philosophical 
exchange. 
"Reconceiving autonomy: Sources, thoughts and possibilities" (1989) 1 
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism" 7-36; "Law, boundaries and the 
bounded self (1990) Representations 162-187; "Reconceiving rights as 
relationships" (1993)Revue of Constitutional Law 1-17. 
Levinas (1969) Totality and infinity; Levinas (1987) Time and the other; 
Llewellyn (1995) The genealogy of ethics. Emmanuel Levinas; Peperzak 
(1993) To the other. An introduction to the philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas. See also Visker R (1999) Truth and singularity. Taking Foucault 
2 
Cornell's 10 reinterpretations of his concepts of the "ethical" and "the other". I still take 
their writings into account for my "ethical" investigation, but the initial focus shifted from 
these philosophical texts to include other, for example, political, legal and literary texts. 
At this point I have to turn to myself, my likes and dislikes, my interests - those things 
that influence my method as well as my (un)finished projects. After reading the first 
draft of my LLM dissertation, my supervisor told me that he had asked himself how it 
will be possible to award "an LLM in /aw for such a feminist tapestry". I am not, if it 
exists, a pure philosopher. Nor am I a political scientist or theorist. I am definitely not 
a lawyer's lawyer. I studied law for 5 years and after that I wrote the LLM dissertation 
based on some philosophy, (also legal philosophy), feminist jurisprudence and critical 
legal theory. After I started reading for this thesis, I again realised that I am unable to 
work on philosophy or legal theory in isolation. A friend and colleague, understanding 
some of my uneasiness, introduced me to the work of Hannah Arendt. 11 
Hannah Arendt started her academic career by studying philosophy under Martin 
9 
10 
11 
into phenomenology and "Oneuropese verlangens. Op weg na 'n 
provinsialisme sander romantiek" (1999) 3 fragmente 63-82. 
See generally (1976) Of grammatology; (1978) Writing and difference; 
(1982) Margins of philosophy; (1995) Points ... Interviews, 1974-1994; 
(1995) Archive fever. A Freudian impression; (1994) Spectres of Marx; 
(1997) The politics of friendship; and "Force of law: The mystical 
foundation of authority" in Cornell (ed) (1992) Deconstruction and the 
possibility of justice 29-67; "Choreographies" (1982) 12 Diacrits 76; 
"Declarations of independence" (1985) 15 New Political Science 7-15; 
"The deconstruction of actuality. An interview with Jacques Derrida" 
(1994) 68 Radical Philosophy 28-41. 
"The doubly-prized world: Myth, allegory and the feminine" (1990) 75 
Cornell Law Review 644-699; (1991) Beyond accommodation; (1992) 
The philosophy of the limit; (1993) Transformations; (1995) The 
imaginary domain. See also Cornell "Institutionalization of meaning, 
recollective imagination and the potential for transformative legal 
interpretation" (1988) 136 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1135. 
My thanks to Danie Goosen who told me about her work. For 
biographical information on Arendt see Young-Bruehl (1982) Hannah 
Arendt. For the love of the world; Ettinger (1995) Hannah Arendt Martin 
Heidegger, Kohler & Sander (eds) (1992) Hannah Arendt. Karl Jaspers. 
Correspondence 1926-1969. 
3 
Heidegger. She completed her PhD under Karl Jaspers.12 She managed to combine her 
philosophical views with political theory and contemporary issues. I was instantly drawn 
to her as a person, to her writings and to her theories. For a while I was unsure whether 
I could go on with the initial project of equality and I considered changing the title and 
topic. Living in a new democracy - South Africa after 1994 - with a new constitution, and 
experiencing transformation, helped me realise that Arendt's political theory and her 
theory on the reconstruction of the public realm were exactly what was needed for my 
"ethical" interpretation of equality. The project became a bit clearer. I wanted to work 
on the interpretation of equality because equality was so long denied in my country, 
and because equality is one of the founding principles or fundamental values of our 
constitution. 
Of patchwork and sauces 
Before I continue I pause to make a note on images. Below I shall explain my use of 
landscape as image and the reasons why I use it. I now want to return to another 
image, the image of a patchwork. I rely on this image because I think it illustrates the 
style and method of the text. As I understand it (I am utterly incompetent when it comes 
to needlework, arts and crafts) a patchwork is created by sewing together many small 
bits and pieces of material. The patterns of patchworks vary. Some have a specific 
picture, such as a farm scene, others are just a variety of pieces sewn together. For the 
first kind, a specific design is followed, and the individual pieces eventually serve the 
greater design. In the second type of patchwork, the individual pieces matter more, and 
remain noticeable. The latter is a better illustration of my text. I wrote this text by sewing 
together various, and not necessarily related, theories, philosophies and thoughts of 
various writers. 
·2 Arendt (1929) Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin. 
4 
A patchwork seldom consists of the colourful pieces only. When it is made up of blocks, 
for example, the blocks are sewn together by inserting strips or pieces of similar design. 
These "linking" pieces are important because without them there will be no patchwork, 
only a basket full of small blocks. 
Even if one does not create a specific picture by following a specific design, one must 
have a vision or an idea of how the patchwork should unfold as it starts taking shape. 
The exciting side of a patchwork in this style is that it can be in a continuous state of 
creation. One can add more colours and vary the patterns. It can also at any time be 
expanded. As a child I had a patchwork that was just large enough to cover a little girl. 
Later, as I grew up, the patchwork started getting too small. But I had become very 
attached to my patchwork and refused a new one. My mother then made extra blocks 
which she sewed onto the original patchwork to make it bigger. I am now married and 
the patchwork, big enough for a single woman, has become too small once again. 
Whether I shall get my mother to enlarge it once again, I do not know. Maybe I shall 
keep it as it is, should I have a child of my own one day. For the time being, I use it to 
cover an old coach which has become weathered. The point is that the patchwork has 
grown from its original size and altered its original purpose, but its basic idea has 
remained. 
This text is to a certain extent already the enlarged version of a previous patchwork that 
was created when I wrote my LLM dissertation. However, this is also not a final product 
but part of the creation of an even bigger patchwork. 
Since I am more comfortable in the kitchen than with a needle in my hand I would like 
to use another image as well. Unlike a patchwork, which is mainly visual, this one 
concerns our sense of taste. A common way of making a sauce is to add one ingredient 
after the other, tasting as one goes along. With some sauces, the various tastes blend 
together to leave you with a single, and often quite bland taste. You ask yourself how 
a sauce with so many wonderful ingredients can taste so bland. Yet, it happens. 
Another time your hand slips and too much of one strong ingredient spoils the whole 
5 
sauce. A good sauce, in my experience, has a threefold effect: First, one tastes a 
delicate combination of ingredients, next, if you take time, and eat slowly, and try hard, 
you can identify some of the particular tastes and ingredients (keeping in mind that 
most of the time you will not be able to identify some of the ingredients); and finally, 
having recognised the various tastes, you once more become aware of the delicate 
combination of all these tastes together. 
The idea of this text is patches and sauces. I want to create a patchwork or a sauce 
which would make a whole, but still leave the individual patches or ingredients - the 
authors and their theories - identifiable. The big picture (patchwork or sauce) is an 
ethical interpretation of equality. The various patches or ingredients are visions of 
public space, perspectives on equality and landscapes of justice. Obviously the various 
patches or ingredients again consist of smaller patches or smaller quantities of 
ingredients. I have chosen certain authors and certain theories for my patchwork. I 
attempted in each case to explain why I chose a specific author or theory and to show 
how she or he contributes to the landscape or patchwork or sauce. 
The actual focus of this work falls on the interpretation of equality. It was clear from the 
start of the political negotiations, and from the writing of the interim constitution and the 
final constitution, that the reconstruction of our country would not be an easy ride. One 
of the reasons Hannah Arendt's theory had such a big influence on my own 
understanding of and thinking about equality, is the absence of the public realm, public 
spaces and political action in South Africa during the years of apartheid. In my view, 
the reconstruction and transformation13 of South Africa from an authoritarian (even 
totalitarian) state to a democracy, and the interpretation of a justiciable bill of rights 
must occur with a simultaneous (re)creation, (re)construction and transformation of the 
public realm. What I understand under the public realm and public space will hopefully 
become clearer as the text unfolds. Suffice it to say that I do not imagine a community 
where all members adhere to one concept of the common good (the good life); but I 
The reconstruction and transformation of our visions of public space are 
discussed in Part 1 " ... visions of public space". 
6 
also do not rely on the media, the internet and cyberspace as the only possible public 
space in a new millennium. 14 Arendt's writings on Rahel Varnhagen's15 Berlin salons 
as examples of public spaces provided a starting point for my own vision. In my view, 
political and legal transformation can only occur with a strong acceptance of the 
"public" and of "political action". My own context provided me with an exceptional 
example of public space in the event of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. 
The TRC was a public event in many ways. It was foreseen in the interim Constitution; 16 
it was brought about by an Act of Parliament; 17 and it happened in the public all over 
South Africa in the form of hearings with huge media coverage. The event of the TRC 
is an astonishing example of the importance of bringing that which was private and in 
the dark into the public. 18 I shall elaborate on the TRC in the course of the thesis. Right 
now, I want to stress the importance of the TRC as a public moment in South Africa's 
history of transformation from inequality, oppression, authoritarianism and 
totalitarianism to equality and democracy. The ideals of the TRC were to reconcile, to 
find truth, to bring justice. Although I do not believe that a human commission is fully 
capable of doing any of the above, the TRC was an important public moment that 
unlocked possibilities and promises and ideals of justice for all South Africans. My 
angle on the TRC is its contribution to the recreation of public space, political action, 
equality and justice. I shall show that the event of the TRC must influence legal 
interpretation, and for the purposes of this thesis, the interpretation of equality. The 
14 
15 
16 
See for example Carpignano "The shape of the sphere: The public 
sphere and the materiality of communication"; Gamson "Taking the talk 
show challenge: Television, emotion and public spheres" and Koch 
"From kingdom to stardom" (1999) 6 Constellations 175-189; 190-205; 
206-215. 
Weisberg (ed) (1997) Rahel Vamhagen. The life of a Jewess. See also 
Ben ha bib (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 1-34. 
Act 200 of 1993, postamble. 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
For Hannah Arendt action is of value exactly because it brings that which 
is dark and private to the public realm. 
7 
initial aim of the thesis remained to seek for an "ethical" interpretation of equality, but 
with the realisation that such an interpretation will have to be sought within the 
landscapes of democracy (political action, public spaces), equality (constitutional 
protection, difference) and justice (stories, memory, TRC). 
Through my interaction with the various texts I came to identify an intersection, that I 
shall call an ethical intersection, between public space, equality and justice. For me, 
an ethical interpretation of equality is dependent on this ethical intersection between 
public space, equality and justice. In other words an ethical interpretation of equality 
will take account of public space, equality and justice. For this reason my argument will 
fall into three parts: " ... visions of public space"," ... perspectives on equality" and" ... 
landscapes of justice". The TRC was for me a manifestation of the ethical intersection 
between public space, equality and justice. I shall elaborate on this theme throughout 
the thesis. Suffice it to say now that in my view the TRC could and should influence 
legal interpretation in future and for this thesis the interpretation of equality. In 
comparison with the interpretation of and approach to equality followed by the legal 
community in general at present (formal equality and more recently substantive 
equality), the TRC followed a much more contextual approach, realising the reality of 
difference and the impossibility of ever fully achieving equality or justice in the present. 
In my search for an ethical interpretation of equality I shall investigate various visions 
of public space to find guidance for the reconstruction and transformation of South 
African visions of public space; I shall look at some perspectives on equality (the 
present South African approach included) from where an approach to an interpretation 
of equality can be developed; and I shall look at the TRC as an embodiment of the ideal 
of justice and as a manifestation of the ethical intersection between public space, 
equality and justice. 
I write in a South African context, my own context. Social, historical and political 
landscapes will have a great bearing on the road and the directions which this text will 
follow. As a woman, I argue from a marginal position, criticising mainstream male 
8 
discourse and visions. Although I do not explicitly address women's issues or women's 
equality, the thesis is definitely "feminist" inspired. The attraction to an "ethical" 
understanding of equality with a strong reliance on the fact of "difference", explains the 
vision of feminism I subscribe to, a vision of difference and the affirmation of "feminine" 
and "masculine" difference. I argue against formalistic, conceptual and instrumental19 
strains in legal thinking and believe that we should explore the imagination, storytelling, 
an "ethics of care" and relational rights in our approaches to justice. Although I 
appreciate the deconstructive insights of the impossibility of ever achieving justice20 in 
the present, I am still taking up the call to write about and explore these issues. 
Perhaps because I share Hannah Arendt's "love of the world", 21 I continue the search 
for approaches that will bring us closer to democracy, to equality and to justice. 
Exploring the value of the imagination, storytelling and relational interpretations of 
rights might bring us closer to these ideals. 
I rely on "landscape"22 as an image to illustrate aspects of the possibilities, the 
impossibilities, the happiness and the tragedies which are so much part of any 
exploration of democracy, equality and justice. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
I use these concepts generally to refer to the approach to law, politics 
and justice that relies on traditional positivist beliefs in the "rule of law", 
on the objectivity, logic and coherence of the law, on policy-orientated 
decisions that do not consider or reflect on normative/moral/ethical 
concerns. 
Cornell renames deconstruction as "the philosophy of the limit" in order 
to show deconstruction's implications for justice. I shall elaborate on this 
in Part 2 " ... perspectives on equality". See Cornell (1992) The 
philosophy of the limit. I shall also refer to Derrida "Force of law: The 
mystical foundations of authority" in Cornell (ed) (1992) Deconstruction 
and the possibility of justice 29-67. See also Caputo (1997) 
Deconstruction in a nutshell. A conversation with Jacques Derrida. 
See Young-Bruehl (1982) Hannah Arendt. For the love of the world. 
In the initial stages of the thesis I read a novel by Lettie Viljoen (1996) 
Landskap met vroue en slang (Landscape with women and snake)(own 
translation) that inspired me to use the metaphor of landscape for my 
explorations. The South African landscapes done by South African artist 
Walter Meyer also attracted me to use landscape as a way of 
approaching abstract theory. 
9 
Landscape as image 
Ons reis deur die landskap, die groat-groat nie-plek.23 
Every painting, drawing or poem is a landscape. Or a mindscape. 24 
This is my landscape. The marrow of my bones. The plains. The 
sweeping veld. The honey-blonde sandstone stone. This I love. This is 
what I'm made of. And so I remain in the unexplainable wondrous 
ambuscade of grass and light, cloud and warm stone. 25 
Die ware landskap is een van rus. 
Jy kan van skeppers en taboes vergeet 
want alles is ontplooiing, voltyds voltooi. 26 
In the next few pages I shall try to explain why and how landscape and the 
representation of landscape serve as metaphor or image for the aim of this thesis, 
namely to describe the ethical intersection between public space, equality and justice, 
and ultimately an "ethical" interpretation of equality. I rely strongly on Marilet 
Sienaert's27 description of how Breyten Breytenbach's painting and writing, text and 
image, are interrelated. Sienaert argues that with Breytenbach the interrelation between 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
"We travel through the landscape, the big-big non-place" (own 
translation). Miles in Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the 
eye 51. 
Breytenbach as quoted by Sienaert in Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten 
Breytenbach. Painting the eye 15. 
Krog (1998) Country of my skull 210. 
"The true landscape is one of rest. Forget creators and taboos, for 
everything is spread open, permanently completed" (own translation) 
Breytenbach (1995) Nege /andskappe aan my beminde (Nine 
landscapes for my beloved) (own translation). 
Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 15. 
10 
text and image is found less in the finished product than in its making. The interrelation 
between democracy, equality and justice, or between the existence of a public realm 
and an "ethical" understanding of equality, might also be found in the various 
processes, rather than in the final products. Sienaert contends that in Breytenbach's 
art the "how" dominates the "what", in other words, the process of making is far more 
important than the final product. In this regard, Breytenbach does not distinguish 
between making text (writing) and making visual images (painting). By putting questions 
of politics, public space, equality and justice (the ethical intersection between them) in 
the image of landscape, I hope to illustrate the importance of the processes inherent 
to them. According to Sienaert, African art also emphasises the process of making, 
rather than the finished product, in the sense that art cannot be seen separately from 
life itself. 28 (In Sienaert's words, art objects are not viewed only as aesthetic objects.) 
Our "solutions" to political, social, economic and legal problems should similarly be 
concerned and intertwined with the patterns of living (the process of making) and not 
be considered simply as instrumental policies (aesthetic objects). 
Sienaert29 describes the creative act of writing or painting against the background of 
ancient Oriental philosophy. According to this philosophy, human beings take part in 
the continuous creation of a universe which paradoxically has already reached 
completion: Although all things have been created and completed once and for all, they 
remain "unfixed" (open) and in a state of continuous transformation. 30 Breytenbach 
subscribes to this notion in his understanding of art. For him art is about awareness 
and communication. 
To be alert to the listener or for that matter to the person speaking to me, 
I find that one has to talk against the conventions and the perceived 
expectations. Maybe you never create anything. Maybe you can only help 
uncover the deadened feeling of being alive by peeling the eye and 
28 Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 15. 
29 Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 18. 
30 Sienaert in Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 18. 
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stripping away certainties. In other words if I don't just want to do the 
mumbo-jumbo, if I want to make you aware of the texture of what I'm 
saying, then I have to talk against the grain. 31 
Sienaert shows that inherent in painting or writing (legal interpretation), is the 
exploration and transformation of an already existing reality. If we consider the way we 
normally look at or read a landscape (public space, equality, justice), we instinctively 
attempt to "fix" (reify) the image. In trying to understand a landscape we recognise 
familiar things like mountains, streams, trees (instrumental politics, entrenched human 
rights, rule of law, balancing of rights) and so on. But, as Sienaert notes, the way we 
choose to see a landscape is always influenced by the "conventions of perspective" 
with which we are familiar. In other words, there is always an already existing 
conventional code that influences how we see and understand. 32 ("Daar skuil 'n kode 
agter alle leef sodat jy lees en weet gedig: en herken wat jy nooit ontmoet het nie"). 33 
This point is similar to the realisation that context influences our understanding and 
reading of texts, our experience of political and public life and our interpretation of legal 
rights. However, contexts are constantly changing with the effect that "fixed" concepts 
are inadequate to describe what we see, understand and experience. 
Because of the multivalence of shapes and words all conventional 
contradictions have the potential to dissolve, and unusual combinations 
can transform the known to expose the dynamic nature of the world 
around us. 34 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Breytenbach as quoted by Sienaert in Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten 
Breytenbach. Painting the eye 18. 
Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 20. 
"There hides a code behind all living that you can read and know and 
recognise that which you have never met" (own translation) Breytenbach 
as quoted by Sienaert in Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting 
the eye 20. 
Sienaert in Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 23. 
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Sienaert35 argues that the dynamic and transformative potential of an image can only 
be experienced if its inherent multiplicity is continually exposed. Likewise, the 
transformative qualities of politics and public spaces can only be experienced if their 
inherent multiplicity is continually exposed. We should constantly be involved in 
challenging fixed concepts and categories, preventing them from becoming wholly 
reified. In the legal context this refers to the constant problematisation of the reification 
of rights and rights jurisprudence. 36 
Sienaert37 distinguishes between "symbol" and "image": Where a symbol has a static 
and fixed nature, an image does not refer to any fixed content beyond its own: it is 
always open-ended and creative. The recurring images in Breytenbach's paintings 
(horses, parrots, hats etc) do not constitute some hidden message but remain 
transformative images. She notes that this is reminiscent of the "organic" nature of 
meaning in some tribal African societies. Meaning is always in the process of change 
and its interpretation will vary according to each person's unique degree of 
conditioning38 and understanding. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 23. 
See Gabel "The phenomenology of rights-consciousness and the pact 
of the withdrawn selves" (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1563-1599 and 
"Reification in legal reasoning" (1980) 3 Research in Law and Sociology 
17-43. See also generally Kairys (1997) The politics of law. A 
progressive critique; Kennedy ·Form and substance in private law 
adjudication" (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685-1778; Tush net "Truth, 
justice and the American way: An interpretation" (1979) 57 Texas Law 
Review 1307-1359; Tushnet "Anti-formalism in recent constitutional 
theory" (1985) 83 Michigan Law Review 1502-1544; Tushnet "Critical 
legal studies and constitutional law: An essay in deconstruction" (1984) 
36 Stanford Law Review 623-647; Unger 'The critical legal studies 
movement" (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561-675; Kelman "Trashing" 
(1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 293-348; Gordon "Critical legal histories" 
(1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 57-125; Trubek "Where the action is: 
Critical Legal Studies and empiricism" (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 
575-622; Simon "Visions of practice in legal thought" (1984) 36 Stanford 
Law Review 469-507 . 
Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 24. 
Tutu (1999) No future without forgiveness 204 also refers to the power 
of conditioning that should not be underestimated. I shall return to this 
point in the end note," ... continuous landscapes'', of this text. 
13 
The "meaning" of an image would imply fixation and therefore death: 
"meaning", "understanding" - these neutralize the threat of the unknown 
or the unexpected, and it is precisely through confronting the unexpected 
that the experience becomes transformative. Reality renewed. 39 
The notion of "actively confronting an image" is significant for the purposes of this 
thesis because it implies an "active experience". Sienaert40 notes the directness and 
immediacy of exposing the "multivalence of an image". This idea of actively confronting 
is similar to Hannah Arendt's insistence on "political action" in the public realm. "Human 
plurality" enables human appearance to each other. 41 The face of "the other"42 is an 
active experience that occurs in the public realm. Derrida,43 when writing on justice and 
the role of the judge, demands that the judge must actively search for the given norms 
to be reasonable, but simultaneously the judge must confront the given norms, create 
new "meaning" and transform. A judge, however, must act "immediately" because 
"justice does not wait". Judging refers to the application of the law but also to 
amendment, augmentation and creation. Sienaert44 shows that to some extent no poem 
or painting can avoid to be pointing to something with which we are familiar, but direct 
experience of an image "is" and cannot be described. This tension between familiar 
images (conventional codes) and constant change with regard to interpreting art is 
similar to the tension between freedom and textual constraint in the legal context. 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Sienaert in Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 24. 
Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 26. 
I discuss Hannah Arendt's theory of action and human plurality in Part 1 
" ... visions of public space". 
I address the concept of "the other" in Part 2 " ... perspectives on equality". 
"Force of law: The mystical foundation of authority" in Cornell (ed) (1992) 
Deconstruction and the possibility of justice 29-67. 
Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 30. 
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The various authors and the dilemma of (re)presenting them, and the 
various sections 
I have already mentioned that I will be focusing on various disciplines, theories and 
texts. I cover the writings of various authors from the various disciplines, some more 
than others but none of them in totality or completely. I rely on those aspects of their 
thinking that is most helpful to my own investigation and argument, that is the 
identification of the ethical intersection between public space, equality and justice and 
the search for an ethical interpretation and understanding of equality. 
The dilemma I face in representing the theories, the views and the arguments of the 
various authors (in creating the patchwork or cooking the sauce) is this: Because I use 
the various authors to enable me to formulate my own argument, I want to stay as close 
to their own voices as possible. I realise that my representation of an author is already 
an interpretation, but I nevertheless attempt to describe the specific point of view of 
every author as true to him or her as possible. The method of representing the 
respective authors has an obvious impact on the style, flux and fluidity of the text. The 
reader will notice breaks in the text, hear other voices speaking, using language (terms) 
other than the language used by me in telling (representing) my story. I have no ready 
solution to this dilemma. The creation of textual landscapes, like the creation of a 
patchwork, consists of the combination of various "bits and pieces". The final product 
must reflect the method and the process of creating it. I hope that the glimpse that I 
give of each author's theory is sufficient to show the inspiration and direction it provided 
for my own argument. 
In Part 1 "... visions of public space" I start of by putting forward Drucilla Cornell's45 
understanding of transformation, Anthony Kronman's46 view of judgement and Martha 
45 
46 
(1993) Transformations. 
"Living in the law" in (1987) 54 The University of Chicago Law Review 
835-368. 
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Nussbaum's47 call for the "literary imagination in public life" as introduction to the 
various visions. For me, a combination of Cornell's second meaning of transformation, 
namely transformation of individuals themselves, Arendt's48 view of public space as a 
space of "human appearance", and Kronman's understanding of judgement as the 
process of imaginatively exploring alternative ways of being, has a significant meaning 
for the reconstruction and transformation of public space. Following Cornell, Kronman 
and Arendt, one conclusion, amongst others, is that the reconstruction and 
transformation of the public realm should take place in an "imaginative" way. Traditional 
ways of looking at and thinking about "the public" should be expanded by exploring 
imaginative alternative ways of being. In this respect Martha Nussbaum's argument that 
the "literary imagination" can enhance current conceptions of public life enters the 
picture. She promotes the view that literature and the literary imagination are 
"subversive" and that literary thought can be viewed as the "enemy" of economic 
thought. 
I then critically reflect on some liberal visions of public space with reference to John 
Rawls, 49 Ronald Dworkin, 50 Bruce Ackerman, 51 Seyla's Benhabib's 52 critique on 
Ackerman and Michael Sandel's53 critique on the liberal model. I discuss the views of 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
"The literary imagination in public life" (1991) New Literary History 877-
910. 
(1958) The human condition; (1982) Lectures on Kant's political 
philosophy. 
(1972) A theory of justice and (1993) Political liberalism. 
(1977) Taking rights seriously; (1986) Law's empire and (1995) Life's 
dominion. 
(1980) Socia/ justice in the liberal state; "Why dialogue" (1989) 86 
Journal of Philosophy 8; "The Storrs lectures: discovering the 
constitution" (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1013. 
( 1992) Situating the self 95-1 04. 
(1996) Democracy's discontent. America in search of a public 
philosophy. See also (1982) Liberalism and the limits of justice. 
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Jean Elshtain54 and Carol Gilligan55 as opposing voices to the liberal vision. Secondly 
I discuss Jurgen Habermas'56 vision of public space. I repeat some of the critique on 
his model from a gender perspective, delivered by Benhabib57 and Nancy Fraser~8 
Thirdly I discuss the "radical democratic" vision of Chantal Mouffe. 59 Although I 
subscribe to her vision of public space I express an uneasiness with her gender neutral 
perspective on citizenship. In this regard I discuss the views of Drucilla Cornell60 and 
Jennifer Nedelsky61 who both in their own way argue for an affirmation of the feminine. 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
"Antigone's daughters" in Daly (ed) (1994) Communitarianism. A new 
public ethics. See also Van Haute "Antigone, heldin van die 
psigoanalise? Lacan se lesing van Antigone"(1999) 3 fragmente 83-98. 
(1982) In a different voice and Benhabib "The generalized and the 
concrete other. The Koh I berg-Gilligan controversy and feminist theory" 
in Benhabib & Cornell (eds) (1987) Feminism as critique 77-95. 
"Human rights and popular sovereignty: The liberal and republican 
versions" (1994) 7 Ratio Juris 1-13; "On the internal relation between the 
rule of law and democracy" (1995) 3 European Journal of Philosophy 12-
20; "Three normative models of democracy" (1994) 1 Constellations 1-
1 O; (1993) Moral consciousness and communicative action; "How is 
legitimacy possible on the basis of legality" and "On the idea of the rule 
of law" (1988) The Tanner lectures on human values V//1219-249, 249-
279; (1979) Communication and the evolution of society; (1984) The 
theory of communicative action vol I; (1989) The theory of communicative 
action vol II; "The French path to modernity" (1984) 33 New German 
Critique 79-102; (1987) The philosophical discourse of modernity; (1989) 
The structural transformation of the public sphere. 
( 1992) Situating the self 1 04-113. 
"What's critical about critical theory? The case of Habermas and gender" 
in Benhabib & Cornell (eds) (1987) Feminism as critique. 
(1993) The return of the political. See also Lefort (1986) The political 
forms of modem society; (1988) Democracy and political theory and 
Schmitt (1976) The concept of the political. 
"The doubly-prized world: Myth, allegory and the feminine" (1990) 75 
Cornell Law Review 644-699; (1991) Beyond accommodation; (1992) 
The philosophy of the limit; (1993) Transformations; (1995) The 
imaginary domain,· "Institutionalization of meaning, recollective 
imagination and the potential for transformative legal interpretation" 
(1988) 136 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1135. 
Nedelsky "A relational approach to citizenship" paper presented at the 
(1997) Gender and Citizenship Conference, Beirut, Lebanon; Nedelsky 
(1989) "Reconceiving autonomy: Sources, thoughts and possibilities" 
(1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 7-36; Nedelsky "Law, 
boundaries and the bounded self' (1990) Representations 162-187; 
Nedelsky "Inadequacy and disentitlement: internal barriers to women's 
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Finally I discuss Hannah Arendt's62 vision of public space. This is the vision that I find 
most attractive and that I follow and support right through the text. In respect to Arendt's 
vision of pubic space I also discuss her .work on Rahel Varnhagen's63 salons and 
Bonnie Honig's64 account of "agonistic feminism". I conclude with Iris Yodng's 
description of heterogeneous public spaces. I rely on these authors' visions of public 
space, politics and democracy in order to explore the various notions that can help me 
to form my own vision of public space, politics and democracy for a transforming South 
Africa. I do not make a study of any of the authors in totality. I choose one or two works 
of each in order to find and compare aspects of the authors' political visions that could 
be translated into my own vision. 
I use the liberal visions as a reference point from where I can turn to other visions in 
62 
63 
64 
65 
equality" paper presented at Annual Meeting of the (1991) American 
Political Science Association; Nedelsky "Challenges of multiplicity" 89 
Michigan Law Review 1591; Nedelsky "Reconceiving rights as 
relationships" (1993) 1 Revue of Constitutional La;'/ 1-17; Nedelsky 
"Judgement, diversity and relational autonomy" presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the (1996) American Political Science Association; Nedelsky 
"Meditations on embodied autonomy" (1995) 2 Graven Images 159-170; 
Nedelsky "Embodied diversity and the challenges to law" (1997) 42 
McGill Law Journal 91-117; Nedelsky "Dilemmas of passion, privilege 
and isolation: Reflections on mothering in a white, middle-class nuclear 
family" in Hanigsberg & Ruddick (eds) (1999) Mother troubles: 
Rethinking contemporary maternal dilemmas; Nedelsky "Relational 
rights in the world context" paper prepared for (1998) Women and 
Human Rights in Muslim Communities Program University of California. 
(1952) The origins of totalitarianism; (1958) The human condition; (1963) 
On revolution; (1963) Eichman in Jerusalem; "Reply to Eric Voegelin's 
review of The origins of totalitarianism" (1953) 15 Review of Politics 76; 
(1968) Men in dark times; (1968) Between past and future; (1971) The 
life of the mind. One I Thinking; (1978) The life of the mind. Two I Willing; 
(1982) Lectures on Kant's philosophy. 
(1997) Weisberg L (ed) Rahel Varnhagen. Life of a Jewess; Benhabib 
(1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 
"Toward an agonistic feminism: Hannah Arendt and the politics of 
identity" (1995) in Honig (ed) Feminist interpretations of Hannah Arendt 
135-166. See also Honig "Introduction; The Arendt question in feminism" 
and Dietz "Feminist receptions of Hannah Arendt" in Honig (ed) (1995) 
Feminist interpretations of Hannah Arendt 1-16 and 17-50. 
"Impartiality and the civic public. Some implications of feminist critiques 
of moral and political theory" in Benhabib & Cornell (eds) (1987) 
Feminism as critique 56-76. 
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response to the liberal visions. I think one can say that the South African visions of 
public space (past and present) have great similarities with liberal visions. I am critical 
of the liberal visions and turn to other approaches for guidance in our reconstruction 
and transformation. Jurgen Habermas's reconstructive theory is therefore a good place 
to start. I argue that I find his emphasis on the importance of public space (in the form 
of dialogue or discourse) positive, but I am not totally convinced by his theory. I 
therefore continue the search and investigate Chantal Mouffe's theory of "radical 
democracy'' as a suitable response to the liberal visions. I find her visions of democracy 
and citizenship, especially her emphasis on the "political" and on "antagonism", very 
useful for the reconstruction and transformation of South African public space. Finally 
I turn to Hannah Arendt's vision of public space. This is the vision from which we can 
find a way forward. I argue that an ethical interpretation of equality is situated in the 
intersection of public space, equality and justice. Hannah Arendt's vision of public 
space is the best vision for this ethical intersection. 
I specifically call for the entrance of "feminine" values in our public visions because any 
society, in my case South Africa, should reconsider the traditional visions of public and 
private and broaden these perspectives by allowing aspects of difference and 
otherness into the public. In response to every vision that I put forward I voice a gender 
critique. The gender responses that I support are in favour of the "affirmation" of the 
"feminine" and "feminine" values without being essentialist. 
My approach to equality cannot be separated from public space and justice. The main 
argument in this thesis is that public space, equality and justice are interrelated, I focus 
on the "ethical" intersection of the three. The "ethical" interpretation of equality that I 
propose lies at the intersection of all three conceptions. In Part 2 "perspectives on 
equality" I discuss aspects of deconstruction as the philosophy that provides the 
inspiration for an "ethical" interpretation of equality. I draw attention to certain aspects 
of deconstruction. In doing so, I rely on some of the notions which are a source for an 
ethical interpretation of equality, for transformation and for justice. I discuss Simon 
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Critchley's66 and Danie Goosen's67 "ethical" interpretation of deconstruction to provide 
the theoretical framework for my argument on "ethical" interpretation. Because my main 
argument revolves around ethical interpretation I focus on the commentaries on 
deconstruction that encourage an ethical reading of deconstruction. The dialogue 
between hermeneutics and deconstruction is of significance for an ethical interpretation 
as well as for the reconstruction and transformation of public spaces. I repeat John 
Caputo's68 echo of Aristotle's notion that "life is hard". According to him deconstruction 
(what he calls "radical hermeneutics") accepts this and does not seek for easy answers. 
I argue that an ethical interpretation adheres to the notion that "life is hard". 
The theories of Jantje van den Oord, 69 Martha Minovl0 and Jennifer Nedelsky1 on 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
(1992) The ethics of deconstruction. Derrida and Levinas. See also 
Caputo (1987) Radical hermeneutics. Repetition, deconstruction and the 
hermeneutic project; Caputo (1997) Deconstruction in a nutshell. A 
conversation with Jacques Derrida. 
"Verlies, rou en affirmasie. Dekonstruksie en die gebeure" (1998) 1 
fragmente 54-80; Goosen & Van der Walt "Die tragiese, die onmoontlike 
en die demokrasie. 'n Onderhoud met Jacques Derrida" (1999) 3 
fragmente 35-62. 
Caputo (1989) Radical hermeneutics. Repetition, deconstruction, and the 
hermeneutic project. 
Van den Oord (1994) Verdaagde rechten. 
I focus specifically on (1990) Making all the difference. Inclusion and 
exclusion in American law. See also Minow & Spelman "In context" 
(1990) 63 Southern California Law Review 1597-1652 
Nedelsky "Reconceiving autonomy: Sources, thoughts and possibilities" 
(1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 7; Nedelsky "Law, 
boundaries and the bounded self' (1990) Representations 162; Nedelsky 
(1990) Private property and the limits of American constitutionalism. The 
Madisonian framework and its legacy; Nedelsky "Inadequacy and 
disentitlement: internal barriers to women's equality" paper presented at 
the (1991) Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association; 
Nedelsky "Challenges of multiplicity" 89 Michigan Law Review 1591; 
Nedelsky "Reconceiving rights as relationships" (1993) 1 Revue of 
Constitutional Law 1; Nedelsky "Judgement, diversity and relational 
autonomy" presented at the Annual meeting of the (1996) American 
Political Science Association; Nedelsky "A relational approach to 
citizenship" paper presented at the (1997) Gender and Citizenship 
Conference, Beirut, Lebanon; Nedelsky "Meditations on embodied 
autonomy" (1995) 2 Graven images 159-170; Nedelsky "Embodied 
diversity and the challenges to law" (1997) 42 McGill Law Journal 91; 
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rights, difference and relationships and Frank Michelman's72 call for a republican 
constitutionalism provide a starting point for my discussion of South African equality 
jurisprudence. I shall attempt to show connections between the theories of Van den 
Oard, Minow, Nedelsky and Michelman; connections between these theories and 
deconstruction; and the significance of these theories for visions of public space and 
an ethical interpretation of equality. Again I use these texts as an introduction and 
background to our own development and transformation of equality. I do not claim to 
write on or cover the multiple materials on equality. 73 I discuss one of the first writings 
on equality under the interim Constitution which I consider to have had a huge 
influence on the present approach to equality. 74 I discuss some of the most prominent 
72 
73 
74 
Nedelsky "Dilemmas of passion, privilege and isolation: Reflections on 
mothering in a white, middle-class nuclear family" in Hanigsberg & 
Ruddick (eds) (1999) Mother troubles: Rethinking contemporary 
maternal dilemmas; Nedelsky "Relational rights in the world context" 
paper presented at (1998) Women and Human Rights in Muslim 
Communities Program University of California. 
"Law's republic" (1988) 97 The Yale Law Journal 1493-1537; "The 
subject of liberalism" (1994) 46 Stanford Law Review 1807-1833. 
In regard to gender and equality in South Africa see generally Kaganas 
& Murray "Law and women's rights in South Africa - An overview" (1994) 
Acta Juridica 1-38; Albertyn "Women and the transition to democracy in 
South Africa' (1994) Acta Juridica 39-63; O'Regan "Equality at work and 
the limits of law" (1994) Acta Juridica 84-108; Kentridge "Measure for 
measure: Weighing up the costs of a feminist standard of equality at 
work" (1994) Acta Juridica 84-108; Devenish "The legal and 
constitutional significance of the equality clause in the interim 
constitution" (1996) Stellenbosch Law Review 92-113; Rautenbach "Die 
Konstitusionele hof se riglyne vir die toepassing van gelykheid" (1998) 2 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 316-325; Romany "Black women 
and gender equality in a new South Africa: human rights law and the 
intersection of race and gender" (1996) 21 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 857-898; Wing "Black South African women: Toward 
equal rights" (1995) 8 Harvard Human Rights Journal 57-100; Murray 
(1994) Gender and the new South African legal order. 
Albertyn & Kentridge "Introducing the right to equality in the interim 
Constitution" (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 149-178. 
I also refer to L'Hereux-Dube "Making a difference: The pursuit of 
equality and a compassionate justice" (1997) 13 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 335-353; Van der Walt & Botha "Coming to grips with 
the new constitutional order: Critical comments on Harksen v Lane NO" 
(1998) 13 Suid-Afrikaanse Pub/iekregl South African Public Law 17-41 
and Freedman "Understanding the right to equality" (1998) 115 The 
South African Law Journal 243-251. 
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equality cases decided by the South African Constitutional Court. 75 
I believe that our understanding of the event of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission can benefit from deconstructive insights in respect of truth and justice. The 
ethical moment in deconstruction, as I understand it, is the realisation of the double-
handed nature of justice, the simultaneous impossibility and urgency of justice. In other 
words while we know that justice can never be fully realised in a present system we 
keep on searching for ways of realising justice. We do this because of the ethical 
imperative and the urgency of justice (Derrida in his discussion of deconstruction and 
justice repeats the point that justice does not wait). 76 The double bind of impossibility 
and urgency is a precondition for my own thesis of an "ethical" interpretation of equality. 
In Part 3 " ... landscapes of justice" I draw on the TRC to supplement the landscape 
created by the description of public space and equality. Concerning the TRC, I start of 
by discussing some theoretical responses77 that in my view contribute to our 
understanding of the TRC. I focus on the significance of the event itself for an ethical 
interpretation of equality. The most important section of Part 3 is the comparison 
75 
76 
77 
See Part 2 " ... perspectives on equality''. I refer to Fraser v Children's 
Court of Pretoria North 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC); Harksen v Lane Non 
and another 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC); President of the Republic of 
South Africa and another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) and City 
Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 153 (CC). See also Baloro 
and others v University of Bophuthatswana and others 1995 (8) BCLR 
1018 (B); Larbi-Odam and others v Members of the Executive Council for 
Education and another (North Western Province) 1997 (12) BCLR 1655 
(CC); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Justice and others 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC); S v Lawrence 1997 (10) 
BCLR 1348 (CC); S v Ntuli 1996 (1) BCLR 141 (CC). 
"Force of law: The mystical foundations of authority" in Cornell (ed) 
(1992) Deconstruction and the possibility of justice 3-67 at 27. I discuss 
Derrida's view on deconstruction and justice in Part 2. 
Honig "Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on the 
founding of a republic" (1991) 85 American Political Science Review 97-
113; Arendt (1963) On revolution; Derrida "Declarations of 
independence" (1986) 15 New Political Science 7-15; Gordon "Undoing 
historical injustice" in Sarat & Kearns (eds) (1996) Justice and injustice 
in law and legal theory 35-75; Minow (1998) Between vengeance and 
forgiveness. 
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between six South African responses to the TRC: Kader Asma I and co-authors, 78 
Andre P Brink, 79 Antjie Krog, 80 Piet Meiring, 81 Anthea Jeffery, 82 and David Dyzenhaus. 83 
The aim of the comparison is to see to what extent, if at all, the authors explored the 
"ethical" moments in the TRC. With "ethical" moments I refer to the opportunities during 
which difference and plurality were exposed and to the realisation of all involved of the 
shortcomings of the TRC, of the impossibility of finding truth, reconciliation or justice. 
Nevertheless these moments occurred with the simultaneous insight and affirmation of 
the importance of the event of the TRC because of human appearance through the 
telling of stories. I ask whether the authors are only concerned about the instrumental 
and institutional aims and whether they explore the transforming (transformation 
distinguished from evolution)84 possibilities. I do not compare Desmond TJfu's 
personal memoir of chairing the TRC directly to the other responses. Rather I use it to 
highlight his focus on how the relationship to others is central to our existence as 
human beings and the effect of this focus on the TRC. I discuss this in the section 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
Asmal, Asmal & Roberts (1996) Reconciliation through truth. A reckoning 
of apartheid's criminal governance. 
(1998) "Stories of history: reimagining the past in post-apartheid 
narrative" in Nuttal & Coetzee (eds) Negotiating the past. The making of 
memory in South Africa 29-42. 
(1998) Country of my skull. 
(1999) Chronicle of the Truth Commission. A journey through the past 
and present - Into the future of South Africa. 
(1999) The truth about the Truth Commission. 
Dyzenhaus (1998) Truth, reconciliation and the apartheid legal order. 
I explain the distinction between evolution and transformation (with 
reference to Drucilla Cornell) in Part 1. The distinction can be explained 
with reference to the South African context. If the "change" that took 
place from the past (authoritarian) to the present (democracy) means 
mere institutional change, in the sense that we have a new government 
and a Constitution, but no "real" change has occurred in the ways we 
approach politics, or public space or rights, and no change of the people 
themselves, it can be considered as evolution and not transformation. I 
shall again refer to this distinction in the context of Hannah Arendt's 
distinction between labour, work and action. See the conclusion to Part 
1. 
(1999) No future without forgiveness. 
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"landscape of care" where I address the issue of an ethics of care in respect to the 
TRC. 
It should be evident by now that the thesis consists of three main sections, namely" ... 
visions of public space"," ... perspectives on equality" and" ... landscapes of justice". 
Equality stands at the centre of the investigation. As I have already indicated the aim 
is to find an interpretation and understanding of equality suitable to the plurality of our 
society. My argument is based on the assumption that we cannot understand and 
interpret equality in isolation from public space (democracy, politics) and from justice 
(the ethical relationship with the other, the acceptance of difference, in the South 
African context noticing our differences by remembering the past, specifically the event 
of the TRC). Before elaborating on the "ethical" intersection of visions of public space, 
equality and justice I shall try to define my use of the concepts of "ethical", 
"interpretation" and "equality". 
Defining the impossible: ethical, interpretation and equality 
The ethical and ethical feminism 
"Ethical" should be distinguished from "morality". 86 Cornell describes "morality" as any 
attempt to spell out the determination of "a right way to behave", which can be 
translated into a system of rules. By contrast, the ethical relation is concerned with a 
way of being in the world that accepts divergent value systems and allows us to criticise 
the repressive aspects of competing moral systems.87 The ethical relation therefore 
focuses on the "should be" as an ideal in contrast to the "right way to behave" 
determined by morality. The ethical imperative in deconstructive thought as formulated 
86 
87 
I follow Cornell's distinction. See Cornell (1992) The philosophy of the 
limit 111. 
Cornell (1992) The philosophy of the limit 111. 
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by Jacques Derrida, 88 based on the ethical theory of Emmanuel Levinas, 89 is my source 
for the understanding of "ethical". The ethical relation to the other means to be open 
to the otherness of the other without appropriation, without making her the other of 
myself. 
Ethical in the context of the interpretation of equality implicates the acknowledgement 
of difference. Derrida's double meaning of differance, referring to "to differ" but also to 
"to defer", is crucial for an "ethical" interpretation of equality. Difference is not 
something that can be identified and dealt with. It is an inescapable continuing "fact" 
that cannot be identified and known. This can be explained with reference to the 
essentialist/anti-essentialist debate in feminism. Many women reject any affirmation of 
feminine difference because in their view it relies on an essentialist assumption that 
gives only one description of the feminine. Other feminists seek to disrupt the notion 
of one description of feminine "reality". They argue that the differences between women 
should also be realised. We can only be open to the various differences because there 
are so many, for example differences in regard to culture, ethnicity, religion, language 
and so on. The effect of difference that can not be known is that we should reconsider 
the fact of difference in each and every situation. I shall return to and continue with 
discussions on difference in Part 2 " ... perspectives on equality". The feminist argument 
in this study is based on such a contextual understanding of difference. Consequently, 
the feminist angle is an "ethical feminist" one. 
88 
89 
This is elaborated on in section 2 " ... perspectives on equality". I strongly 
rely on Critchley (1992) The ethics of deconstruction; Goosen "Verlies, 
rou en affirmasie. Dekonstruksie en die gebeure" (1998) 1 fragmente 54-
79; Derrida "Die tragiese, die onmoontlike en die demokrasie. 'n 
Onderhoud met Jacques Derrida" (1999) 3 fragmente 35-61; "The 
deconstruction of actuality. An interview with Jacques Derrida" (1994) 60 
Radical Philosophy 28-41 . 
Totality and infinity; Critchley (1992) The ethics of deconstruction. The 
work of Belgian philosopher Rudi Visker should also be noted. Visker 
criticises the ethical relationship with the other in Levinas, Visker (1999) 
Truth and singularity. Taking Foucault into phenomenology. 
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Cornell00 explains that ethical feminism seeks the possibility of a new choreography of 
sexual difference. Ethical feminism in her view does not claim to understand what 
woman is (or to give a determined description of a right way to behave), but is 
concerned with the "should be" and the "not yet" of women's story. By taking notice of 
deconstruction, ethical feminism denies that there is an essence of woman that can be 
abstracted from the linguistic representations of woman. The referent "woman" is 
dependent on the systems of representation in which woman is given meaning. The 
ideal of ethical feminism is not to create a space for women within the current system, 
but exactly to open the possibility of multiple interpretations of woman which can 
criticise the repressive aspects of the current system. "Ethical" equality for women 
should also be understood in this context. The aim of this study is not to seek "ethical" 
equality for women only, but for all members of the South African community. 
Interpretation 
The process of interpretation inspired by differance in the context of this work does not 
refer to the finding of meaning. I accept that we continuously create and recreate 
meaning. Interpretation is a process of finding, creating, augmenting and amending. 
Derrida's notion of justice as aporia91 demands that a judge, when making a decision, 
must take note of given meanings, but must simultaneously create new meanings for 
the particular case before her. Cornell's vision of legal interpretation as "recollective 
90 
91 
Cornell "The doubly-prized world: Myth, allegory and the feminine" 
(1990) 75 Cornell Law Review 644. See also Fuss (1989) Essentially 
speaking: feminism, nature and difference; Harris "Race and essentialism 
in feminist legal theory" in Heinzelman & Wiseman (eds) (1994) 
Representing women: Law, literature and feminism 106-146; Olsen 'The 
sex of law" in Kairys (ed) (1997) The politics of law 453-467; Dalton 
"Where we stand: Observations on the situation of feminist legal thought" 
(1988) Berkeley Women's Law Journal 1013; Frug "A postmodern legal 
manifesto. An unfinished draft" (1992) Harvard Law Review 1045-1075; 
hooks Talking back: Thinking feminist, thinking black; hooks Yearning: 
Race, gender and cultural politics; Morley & Walsh (1995) Feminist 
academics: Creative agents for change; Harding (1986) The science 
question in feminism. 
"Force of law: The mystical foundation of authority" in Cornell (ed) (1992) 
Deconstruction and the possibility of justice 29-67. 
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imagination"92 insists on adherence to a future-past or an imagined past when 
interpreting legal texts. 
I have already noted the dialogue between hermeneutics and deconstruction as an 
important background context. Where the hermeneutic position accepts the idea of a 
fusion of horizons93 and the possibility of finding meaning in the present and accepting 
it, deconstruction seeks to expose the impossibility of a clear and final meaning. The 
dialogue between hermeneutics and deconstruction is connected to the focus on 
political and public landscape. The hermeneutical interpretation of political and public 
life differs from a deconstructive vision. The hermeneutical picture of political and public 
life shows a public realm where concerned citizens engage in deliberation in order to 
achieve understanding. The deconstructive picture is "out of focus". Deconstruction 
aims to show the ruptures and impossibilities, the tragedies and violence in our current 
systems. Ethical interpretation seeks to be true to deconstruction's rupture, 
impossibilities and tragedies. As I have already stated an ethical interpretation follows 
the view that life is hard. 
Another feature of an ethical interpretation is that it will follow the view of rights as the 
structuring of relationships instead of erecting barriers.94 As an essential feature of this 
study, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is interpreted as an example of the 
ethical intersection of public space, equality and justice. I note the significance of the 
TRC (as an intersection of public space, equality and justice) for an ethical 
interpretation of equality in South Africa. The TRC also emphasises the necessity of 
a relational approach to rights in contrast to the traditional approach. One should seek 
for further guidelines for the possibility of an ethical interpretation of equality at the 
92 
93 
94 
Cornell (1992) The philosophy of the limit. 
This will be elaborated on in Part 2 " ... perspectives on equality". See 
Widdershoven (1990) Hermeneutiek in discussie; Van Haute & ljsseling 
(ed) (1992) Deconstructie en ethiek. See also Gadamer (1976) 
Philosophical hermeneutics; ( 1981) Truth and method. 
In this regard I refer to the views of Jennifer Nedelsky and Martha Minow 
that I discuss in Part 2. 
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intersection of political, public and ethical life. Just as justice does not exist within a 
present system, a situation where everyone enjoys full equality will never exist. But just 
as we continually should seek justice, so we continually should seek ways and 
possibilities to strive for ethical equality. 
Equality 
I understand equality in the light of the above explanations of "ethical" and 
"interpretation". Equality can only be sought in a context where difference is accepted. 
In our heterogeneous community the acceptance of difference when dealing with 
equality is essential. The distinction between formal equality and substantive equality 
has been noted by the writers of our constitution. It is argued95 that our constitutional 
provision of equality (section 8 in the interim and section 9 in the final constitution) 
provides for substantive equality. It will become clear through the flow of this text that 
I do not support the formal approach to equality and that, in this regard, I acknowledge 
that substantive equality is an improvement in the equality discourse. However, I am 
also cautious of the present approach of substantive equality. I fear that it will become 
nothing else but a new formal approach. That is why I turn to other possible 
perspectives on equality. 
I support Cornell's96 vision of "equivalent" rights. The claim for "equivalent" rights 
acknowledges difference and does not violate difference like the liberal approach to 
equality that is based on sameness. With "equivalent" rights Cornell97means a 
programme of legal reform that must recognise the equivalent evaluation of sexual 
difference. She argues that the evaluation of sexual difference could go further than the 
difference/equality divide that has hindered the progress of equality jurisprudence. 
Equality as a prominent value of our judicial, political and public processes should not 
95 
96 
97 
See Part 2 for a brief discussion on South African approaches to equality. 
(1995) The imaginary domain. 
For a detailed account of Cornell's theory of "equivalent" rights see 
"Sexual difference, the feminine, and equivalency" and "Sex-
discrimination law and equivalent rights" in (1993) Transformations 112-
156. 
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be understood as individual equality in the first place. The liberal dichotomy and 
dilemma caused by the tension between the values of equality and liberty must be 
addressed by adhering to the third cry of the French Revolution, community 
(fraternity). 98 
The argument that I develop here is that equality can only be addressed within a 
context where there is adherence to political, public and ethical aspects. It will follow 
that both equality and liberty are only possible in the context of adherence to a 
"community". I understand community as an open, heterogeneous community of 
difference. I do not subscribe to a specific meaning of equality. What I support is a 
certain way in which equality must be interpreted. Equality will mean different things for 
different people at different times and places. It can therefore not be a static concept. 
I argue that an ethical interpretation of equality will provide the best (not perfect) way 
of approaching the issue of equality and recognising difference. 
South African landscape - the "ethical" intersection of democracy, 
equality and justice 
I believe that the search for equality in contemporary South Africa must go hand in 
hand with the reconstruction and transformation of public space and political action. I 
investigate various visions of public space, concepts of democracy, citizenship and 
political action. As I have already explained, the reason for the focus on these aspects 
98 As a feminist I do not subscribe to the vision of "fraternity". From a 
postmodern perspective the critique on the cries of the French Revolution 
is obvious. I hope to show that by focusing on "community" rather than 
"fraternity" the other two cries can also be displaced. This is a theme that 
I hope to carry right through the thesis, namely the critique of the 
modernist protections of human rights inspired by the early modern 
thinkers. I accept the "double-bind" of deconstruction in this regard, 
namely that we should strive for /iberte and egalite on the one hand, 
while at the same time seeking to undermine it with the other. I illustrate 
this point also in the discussion of the three films, Blue, White and Red 
in Part 1 " ... visions of public space". 
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is that my understanding of an "ethical" interpretation of equality is only possible within 
a certain understanding of the public, namely an understanding that accepts difference, 
plurality, heterogeneity and continuous reconstruction and transformation. A rigid 
concept of the public will deny difference and heterogeneity and favour sameness. An 
ethical interpretation can not be followed in such a rigid and fixed public space. The 
theories of interpretation, rights and equality that I rely on all accept the significance 
of the public realm, in this case the event of the TRC as a public event or moment in 
the South African history of transformation. I hope to show that "ethical" equality must 
be sought at the intersection of public space (democracy, political action, 
heterogeneity), equality (with the acceptance of difference) and justice (memory, 
reconciliation, reparation). 
We need to reconstruct and transform our visions of public space. In the past and 
presently public spaces merely existed. The liberal divide between public and private 
has ruled our concepts of public space. I argue that transformation will not take place 
if our concept of the public does not change accordingly. (Note that I am not arguing 
for one final process of reconstruction and transformation. The point is that we must 
open ourselves up for continuous transformation, otherwise we shall stay the same, 
repeat the same. )99 
The perspectives on equality that I support all recognise the significance of public 
space in their approaches to equality. I argue that, together with all the other reasons 
why we need a reconstructed and transformed public space, we also need it for 
equality, or at least for the understanding or interpretation of equality that I visualise, 
an ethical interpretation. The clear link between the visions of public space and the 
perspectives of equality that I support (and that are conditional to ethical interpretation) 
99 Rosemary Coombe titled an article on legal interpretation, "'Same as it 
ever was': Rethinking the politics of legal interpretation" (1989) 34 McGill 
Law Journal 603-652. She echoes the refrain of a Talking Heads song. 
This notion of "same as it ever was" is also applicable in this regard. See 
also Coombe "The cultural life of things: Anthropological approaches to 
law and society in conditions of globalization" (1995) 10 American 
University Journal of International Law & Policy 791 . 
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is that they all accept difference, plurality, heterogeneity, open-endedness, 
relationships and so on as inevitable. The ideal of an ethical interpretation of equality 
will stay totally uncompleted without the ideal of justice. 
In regard to justice I follow the deconstructive insight that justice functions as the limit 
to present systems. Justice will thus never be achieved totally in a present system. But 
without the stories of justice any vision of public space or perspective on equality will 
stay empty and have no meaning. That is why I turn to the TRC, where the ideal of 
justice was served, to supplement the discussions on public space and equality. 
Smoke 
In this text I attempt to describe a way of interpreting equality that could continuously 
expose the impossibilities of a final answer. A way of interpretation that, although 
realising its own inevitable violence to other interpretations, will not seek to deny or to 
equalise difference and otherness, that will as far as possible take into account the 
concrete contexts and specific circumstances of an individual, that will focus on the 
relationships that form us and of which we all are part. The ethical intersection between 
public space, equality and justice is integral to an ethical interpretation of equality. 
I argue for a reconstruction and transformation of public spaces, which means that I 
want to see some form of public (community) participation and (inter)action. The 
various authors I discuss are all situated somewhere on the liberal-communitarian-
deconstruction continuum. The reconstruction and transformation of public spaces 
(and communities) are in a continuous flux somewhere on this continuum. 
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A recent film by Paul Auster100 and Wayne Whang, Smoke, visualised a certain 
conception of community that I support. The film tells the story of five characters, 
Auggie, Paul, Raschid, Ruby and Cirus. These characters are all isolated individuals 
who are, through the course of events, drawn into some or other form of connection, 
relation and community. These connections, relations and communities are visualised 
by smoke. In a conversation between Paul, Auggie and other characters Paul tells the 
story of Sir Walter Raleigh who weighed smoke. He took a cigar and weighed it. He 
then lit up and smoked the cigar but carefully kept all the ashes. Afterwards he weighed 
the ashes and the stub of the cigar. The difference between the weight of the 
unsmoked cigar and the weight of the stub and ashes was the weight of smoke. Smoke 
is something that appears to have no weight, that can not be touched. In this film there 
is smoke each and every time humans appear to each other. Although there is a great 
deal of trauma and tragedy in their lives there are moments where individuals are 
brought together and connect in smoke. The smoke can not be caught, it can not be put 
into a rational order or system, it can not be essentialised, it appears and disappears 
before you even know it. I interpret this film as saying that community or relationships 
or human togetherness are like smoke: seemingly weightless and untouchable, yet they 
do appear and bring about good things, but also disappear again. Smoke (community) 
is unfixed. 
The image of smoke also captures the spirit of an ethical interpretation of equality. An 
ethical interpretation of equality realises the necessity of the ideals of public spaces 
(community), equality and justice but does not provide a fixed or final meaning. 
Truth, reconciliation and equality 
One only has to imagine where South Africa would be today but for the 
100 Novels by Auster, amongst others, are (1985) The New York Trilogy; 
(1989) Moon palace; (1992) Leviathan; and (1999) Timbuktu. In a lecture 
for the Law and Literature elective LLB course I discussed Smoke and 
other works by Auster with a specific focus on the "deconstructive 
communitarian" moments in his work. I also placed Auster's work in the 
realm of Critical Legal Studies. In my view the CLS concepts of 
indeterminacy, fundamental contradiction and false consciousness are 
all present in his writing. 
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission in order to appreciate what it has 
achieved. Few South Africans have been untouched by it. All sectors of 
its society have been forced to look at their own participation in apartheid 
- the business community, the legal, medical, and university 
communities. 101 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission illustrates an 
innovative and promising effort to combine an investigation into what 
happened, a forum for victim testimony, a process for developing 
reparations, and a mechanism for granting amnesty for perpetrators who 
honestly tell of their role in politically motivated vioience. 102 
The significance of the TRC is self-evident. Many commentators from inside and 
outside South Africa have stated and restated the significance of the TRC process for 
the future of this country. 103 As I have mentioned earlier my angle on the TRC is its 
101 
102 
103 
Minow (1998) Between vengeance and forgiveness xii. 
Minow (1998) Between vengeance and forgiveness 3. 
There are many interdisciplinary perspectives on the TRC reaching from 
philosophy, psychology, theology, ethics to law. See amongst many 
others Bronkhorst (1995) Truth and reconciliation: Obstacles and 
opportunities for human rights; Brandon (1995) Do sleeping dogs lie?: 
The psychological implications of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa; Boraine & Levy (eds) (1995) The healing of 
a nation?; Boraine & Levy (eds) (1994) Dealing with the past: Truth and 
reconciliation in South Africa; Botman & Peterson (1996) To remember 
and to heal: Theological and psychological reflections on truth and 
reconciliation; De Kock & Godin (1998) A long night's damage: Working 
for the apartheid state; Ackerman "Tales of terror and torment: Thoughts 
on boundaries and truth-telling" (1997) 63 Scriptura 425-434; Maluleke 
"Dealing lightly with the wound of my people? The TRC process in 
theological perspective" (1997) 25 Missionalia 324-343; Gobodo-
Madikizela "Healing the racial divide?: Personal reflections on the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (1997) 27 South African Journal of 
Psychology271-272; Olckers "Gender-neutral truth: A reality shamefully 
distorted" (1996) 31 Agenda 61-67; Owens (1996) "Stories of silence: 
women, truth and reconciliation" (1996) 30 Agenda 66-72; Liebenberg 
"Die Waarheids- en Versoeningskommissie in Suid-Afrika en die 
implikasies daarvan vir 'n Suid-Afrikaanse historikerstreit en eietydse 
geskiedskrywing" (1997) 22 Journal for Contemporary History 98-114; 
Verwoerd "Continuing the discussion: reflections from within the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission" (1996) 8 Current Writing 66-85; Braude 
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contribution to the recreation of public space, political action, equality and justice. 
Ultimately I argue that the TRC was a manifestation of the ethical intersection between 
public space, equality and justice that is integral to an ethical interpretation of equality. 
I want to insist that the event of the TRC must influence our approach to rights and to 
interpretation. I shall adhere to my own insistence in my vision of an ethical 
interpretation. An "ethical" interpretation of equality entails a broader approach than the 
traditional formal approach and even a substantive one. I shall elaborate on this in Part 
2 " ... perspectives on equality". As already stated my main concern is that substantive 
equality will take on a new formalism and again negate or reduce difference to a 
formula or test. The "public" significance of the TRC is not limited to political action, but 
encompasses the public nature of the constitution itself. For me the significance of the 
TRC can be its influence on legal interpretation, the interpretation of equality in 
particular. 
"The archbishop, the private detective and the angel of history: The 
production of South African public memory and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission" (1996) 8 Current Writing 39-65; Lalu 
"Journeys from the horizons of history: text, trial and tales in the 
construction of narratives of pain" (1996) 8 Current Writing 24-38; Motala 
"The promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, the constitution 
and international law" (1995) 28 C/LSA 338-362; Gauntlett 11 "Towards 
the truth: the GBC's submissions to the TRC" (1998) Consultus 34-39; 
Whittle "The legal profession and the truth" (1997) De Rebus 506-507; 
Kollapen "Accountability: The debate in South Africa" (1993) 37 Journal 
of African Law 1-9; Liebenberg "The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa: Context, future and some imponderables" 
(1996) 11 Suid-Afrikaanse Publiekregl South African Public Law 123-
159; Sarkin 'The trials and tribulations of South Africa's Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission" (1996) 12 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 617-640; Dugard "Is the truth and reconcilation process 
compatible with international law?" (1997) 13 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 258-268; Braude "Memory and the spectre of international 
justice: A comment on AZAPO" (1997) 13 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 269-282; Moellendorf "Amnesty, truth and justice: AZAPO 
(1997) 13 South African Journal on Human Rights 283; Du Plessis 
"Observations on amnesty or indemnity for acts associated with political 
objectives in the light of South Africa's transitional constitution" (1994) 57 
Tydskrifvir Hedendaagse Romeins Hol/andse Reg 473-481; Loots "Die 
waarheidskommissie: Nurnberg-verhore of bevordering van nasionale 
eenheid" (1996) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 154-160. See also 
the cases of Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and others v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and others 1996 (8) BCLR 
1015 (CC); Truth and Reconciliation Commission v Du Preez and 
Another 1996 (8) BCLR 1123 (CC). 
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I hope that this thesis and the arguments developed here can in some way contribute 
to the conversation on South African legal, political and social transformation. The 
significance of the public realm for politics, for the law and legal transformation, for the 
community and, most of all, for our humanity, will be part of this conversation. I shall 
focus on the intersection between public space, equality, and justice. I do not have a 
specific rigid conception of the public. I do not visualise a specific institutionalised 
procedure or dialogue. I mentioned earlier that I am drawn to Arendt's vision of public 
space, in particular her understanding of Rahel Varnhagen's Berlin salons as public 
spaces and her view that a dinner in one's own private home can become a public 
space depending on the type of action, type of speech and substantive content of the 
event. The intersection between public space, equality and justice and accordingly the 
possibility of an "ethical" interpretation of equality are reflected in the Berlin salons. The 
salons were reconstructed and transforming spaces in their time where difference, 
plurality and heterogeneity were celebrated. People interacted with each other on an 
equal footing without reverting to sameness. During times of inequality and much 
injustice the salons provided for the ideal of justice to be nurtured. I argue that 
presently an "ethical" interpretation of equality with a strong reliance on public space 
and political action and speech can bring us closer to the ideal of justice. This ideal, 
this hope, was embodied by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
The TRC was an event, an intersection, an "in between" position where democracy, 
equality and justice coincided for a moment, opening many possibilities. One possibility 
is an interpretation of rights which, without negating the rule of law, can encompass 
context, particularity, story, the imagination, difference, heterogeneity and many other 
aspects crucial to "ethical" interpretation. 
But I want to put it more simply. I want this hand of mine to write it. For us 
all; all voices, all victims: 104 
104 Krog (1998) Country of my sku/1278-279. 
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because of you 
this. country no longer lies 
between us but within 
it breathes becalmed 
after being wounded 
in its wondrous throat 
in the cradle of my skull 
it sings, it ignites 
my tongue, my inner ear, the cavity of heart 
shudders toward the outline 
new in soft intimate clicks and gutturals 
of my soul the retina learns to expand 
daily because by a thousand stories 
I was scorched 
a new skin. 
I am changed for ever. I want to say: 
forgive me 
forgive me 
forgive me 
You whom I have wronged, please 
take me 
with you. 
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1 
. . . of . . v1s1ons 
public space 
Introduction 
In this part the focus falls upon the first feature of the ethical intersection of public 
space, equality and justice, namely public space. I shall discuss various "visions of 
public space" to find guidance for our visions of public space in South Africa. In my 
view, "public space" or "public realms" must be reconstructed1 and transformed. I grew 
up in South Africa between 1970-1990, a time when public space merely existed. I was 
(and still am) in the fortunate position to experience the change from authoritarianism 
and totalitarianism to democracy. Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, not much has 
Krog (1998) Country of my skull 109 notes that it is problematic to talk about 
"reconciliation" as if there used to be a time during which South Africans had good 
peaceful relationships. She suggests that "conciliation", might be a better term. The same 
argument can be used in regard to "reconstruction". Maybe we should talk about 
"constructing" public space instead of reconstructing. I chose to use reconstruction. 
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been done about reconstructing2 South African public space. The same goes for the 
transformation3of public space. For example, current conceptions of public space which 
exclude the"feminine", must be transformed. 4 In the same way that law cannot be 
separated from politics, legal transformation cannot take place without political 
transformation. 5 My exploration of visions of public space is inspired by the ideal of 
legal transformation. The reconstruction and transformation of public space go hand 
in hand with political and legal transformation. As features of the ethical intersection 
between public space, equality and justice, that is integral to an ethical interpretation 
of equality, the reconstruction and transformation of public space are also necessary 
for my argument of an ethical interpretation of equality. I shall elaborate on my 
argument of an ethical interpretation of equality through the course of the text. 
With "reconstruction" I mean that public spaces should be created and recreated. The 
media, for example, can assist in reconstruction by focusing on important political issues 
and making them part of the public discourse. The wide media coverage that the TRC 
received assisted in the reconstruction of public space. 
With transformation I mean that the present conceptions (visions) of public space must 
change. The liberal distinction between "the good" and "the right", for example, must be 
challenged. It will become clear through the text that I support the notion of a continuous 
transformation. In other words our visions of public space must be in a constant state of 
transformation and must not become static and rigid. Transformation is an important 
addition to reconstruction because reconstruction by itself might portray the notion of fixity, 
that a public space must be reconstructed and will remain like that once and for all. 
Reconstruction is a notion usually associated with "modern" thought. Jurgen Habermas 
is an example of a reconstructive thinker. I shall elaborate on his theory below and explain 
why I am not comfortable with it. 
The transition in South Africa from an authoritarian to a new democratic government 
brought about an expansion of representatives in parliament. For example there are many 
more women representatives at present than there were in the past. I argue, however, that 
the mere inclusion of women is not enough to bring about the notion of transformation that 
I support. With the inclusion of "the feminine" in public space I mean that the dominant 
values should be challenged, undermined and supplemented with other values. I do not 
follow an essentialist view of the feminine, in other words I am not saying that all women 
are the same and subscribe to the same values because of their nature or biology. I argue 
for difference. The "feminine" represents for me a potential disruptive voice that can 
challenge the dominant vision of public space and accordingly expand our visions of public 
space. 
In regard to the notion of law that cannot be separated form politics I follow the insights of 
American Realists and Critical Legal Studies. Although I do not discuss any of these 
theories explicitly in the text the theories of American Realism and Critical Legal Studies 
provide the background for my search for transformation. See generally Horwitz (1992) 
The transformation of American law and Kairys (1997) The politics of law. A progressive 
critique. 
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In the next few pages, I draw on the views of Drucilla Cornell, Hannah Arendt and 
Anthony Kronman in search of inspiration for the reconstruction and transformation of 
public space in a South African context. I believe that their views can contribute to our 
own discourse on the reconstruction and transformation of public space. 
I find Drucilla Cornell's6 use of "transformation" helpful in forming my vision of the 
reconstruction and transformation of public space. Cornell identifies two meanings of 
transformation. The first refers to such a "radical restructuring" of a system (political, 
legal or social) that the identity of the system itself is altered. The second meaning 
focuses on the change of individuals themselves in order to be open to new 
(transformed) worlds. Cornell argues that a feminist perspective focuses on the second 
meaning of transformation. A feminist perspective, accordingly, believes that 
transformation is only possible if individuals themselves can transform. In this regard 
she distinguishes transformation from evolution. Evolution means change within a 
system without adherence to an "outside" of the system, in other words mere 
institutional change without regard to the transformation of individuals. The 
transformation of public space (and legal, political and social systems) that I foresee 
must be different from evolution. Transformation must not occur only at an institutional 
level but must also encompass the transformation of individuals. The distinction 
between evolution and transformation is of great importance in our own context of 
change. When I refer to the transformation of South African public spaces I mean 
transformation and not mere evolution. 7 In other words transformation of institutions as 
well as individuals. The TRC, because it aimed at restoring humanity and human 
dignity, contributed to the transformation of individuals. 
Following Cornell's argument my vision of reconstruction and transformation is a 
feminist one. I want to see change of institutions as well as individuals in the 
institutions. A significant part of this transformation for me is a transformation of the 
(1993) Transformations 1. 
See in this regard Cornell (1992) The philosophy of the limit , (1993) Transformations. 
Note her criticism on Stanley Fish, who argues that the transformation of a legal system 
is impossible, in (1992) The philosophy of the limit 144-14 7. 
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traditional sex/gender relationships. I find the recognition of difference very important 
for the transformation of sex/gender relationships. The concept of difference is central 
to an ethical interpretation of equality. The reconstruction and transformation of public 
spaces should acknowledge and even promote difference. The interpretation of and 
approach to equality that I support emphasise difference and reject sameness. The 
ideal of justice in my view similarly must regard difference as integral to justice. I regard 
difference as the most important aspect of public space, equality and justice, that 
assists in forming the ethical intersection between the three. The multiple voices that 
we heard in the public spaces of the TRC exposed the reality of difference. 
The vision of public space that I find the most inspiring is Hannah Arendt's vision. In her 
vision of political space, Hannah Arendt drew a distinction between labour, work and 
action. The public realm is for Arendt the place where humans "appear" to each other, 
where that which is "dark" is brought into the "light". Distinguished from labour and 
work, action is the only space where humans can act spontaneously. The public realm 
is the only space where humans/individuals can truly act in alternative ways of being. 
The public sphere is the place where stories can be told when humans interact with 
each other. We can learn from Arendt's vision of public space in our attempt to 
reconstruct and transform public space. In Part 3 " ... landscapes of justice" I argue that 
the event of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission can be seen as an 
example of Arendt's vision of action. The TRC provided a public space for South 
Africans to act in public by telling their stories, by interacting with fellow South Africans 
and by bringing that which was private and dark to the light of the public. In her later 
life, Hannah Arendt worked on "judgement" in an effort to combine her philosophical 
thought with her political theory of action. In modern society the public realm is not 
situated in a particular space, but appears in multiple spaces. Judgement that takes 
place in these multiple public spaces can be a manifestation of action. 8 I shall argue 
that the TRC was also a space where action in the form of judgement took place. Each 
and everyone that was confronted with the stories told before the TRC, (the media 
(1978) The life of the mind. One I Thinking; (1978) The life of the mind. Two I Willing. She 
was working on a third volume on judging but died before it was finished. The initial 
writings were taken up in (1982) Lectures on Kant's political philosophy. 
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assured that nearly no one living in South Africa with a television, with access to 
newspapers, to the internet, who had conversations with family, friends and colleagues 
could escape the event of the TRC) had to make a judgement on what was told and 
heard. 
Following Arendt's vision of judgement as a form of action in modern society, 
Kronman's understanding of judgement contributes to how we conceive of judgement. 
Anthony Kronman, 9 in his discussion of judgement as a "virtue", relies on "alternative 
ways of being". Our visions of public space are dependent on how we go about 
judgement and reflective thinking. Kronman describes judgement as the process of 
"deliberating about and deciding personal, moral and political problems". He believes 
that good judgement entails more than the application of a general rule and explains 
that we are most often in need of good judgement in situations where genuine 
dilemmas force us to choose between or accommodate conflicting interests and 
obligations which cannot be resolved by the application of a rule. Kronman is of the 
view that neither deduction nor intuition is adequate for the process of judgement. He 
refers to the choice that a person makes when she decides to follow a career in law. 
This process of choice entails judgement. In judging between the various alternatives, 
one must explore all the alternatives in one's imagination. This means that one should 
make an effort to see and feel what it would be like to choose between the various 
alternatives. He argues that this effort would be similar to our everyday attempts to 
understand the experience of other people. The "imaginary self' I shall become when 
reflecting on all the alternatives will be a stranger to me. According to Kronman, one 
will have to rely on the imagination in this process of choosing. 
So to grasp the possibilities before me, even when they are only different 
ways of living my own life, I need the same sort of imaginative powers 
that are required to make sense of someone else's situation or 
experience. What is needed, above all else, is a certain measure of 
9 
"Living in the law" (1987) 54 The University of Chicago Law Review 835-876 at 84 7. 
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compassion, in the literal sense of "feeling with". I must make the effort, 
in choosing a life for myself, to feel along with each of the persons I might 
become the special cares and concerns, the risks and opportunities, that 
give the experience of that possible future self its own distinctive shape. 10 
Kronman argues that in making choices we should make an effort to grasp in our 
imagination each of the alternatives. The various alternatives must be entertained 
sympathetically, but at the same time detached. The process of deliberation consists 
of the combination of opposite-seeming attributes, like sympathy and detachment. 
Deliberation is neither deduction nor intuition, but the compassionate survey of 
alternatives viewed simultaneously from a distance. Those whose deliberation and 
judgement we regard highly are those who are best able to meet these conflicting 
requirements and endure the often considerable tension between them. The endurance 
of tensions is specifically important for judgement in our visions of public space and 
democracy. This view of judgement is connected with the understanding of 
transformation that I support. Judgement in this sense can only take place in a public 
space where humans are free to act and engage in speech and where individuals 
themselves can be transformed. As I have mentioned, the TRC also highlighted the 
necessity of good judgment. Victims who were confronted by their perpetrators had to 
make a judgement whether they will forgive or not. The Amnesty Committee considering 
the many amnesty applications had to make a judgement on whether a perpetrator will 
be granted amnesty or not. All South Africans are confronted by the issue of judging 
the process of the TRC. I believe that Kronman's understanding of judgement can help 
us in making judgements regarding the TRC, but also regarding the judgement of 
public, political, social, economic and legal issues in general. I shall refer to Tutu's11 
view that we should realise the extent of "conditioning" in Part 3. The implication of 
Tutu's words are that when we judge somebody we should, as far as possible, take her 
concrete context and specific circumstances, in other words difference, into account. 
10 
11 
Kron man "Living in the law" (1987) 54 The University of Chicago Law Review 852. See 
also Morrison (1993) Playing in the dark: Whiteness and the literary imagination. 
(1999) No future without forgiveness. 
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For me, a combination of Cornell's second meaning of transformation, namely 
transformation of individuals themselves, Arendt's view of public space as a space of 
"human appearance", and Kronman's understanding of judgement as the process of 
imaginatively exploring alternative ways of being, has a significant meaning for the 
reconstruction and transformation of public space. Following Cornell, Kronman and 
Arendt, one conclusion, amongst others, is that the reconstruction and transformation 
of the public realm should take place in an "imaginative" way. Traditional ways of 
looking at and thinking about "the public" should be expanded by exploring imaginative 
alternative ways of being. In this respect, I think, Martha Nussbaum's 12 argument that 
the "literary imagination" can enhance current conceptions of public life, should enter 
the picture. She promotes the view that literature and the literary imagination are 
"subversive" and that literary thought can be viewed as the "enemy" of economic 
thought. The novel, in her view, can be used to express moral and normative values. 
Literature can accordingly make a valuable contribution to public life. 
In South Africa we presently experience the possible contribution of literature in public 
life through the multiple responses to the TRC that follow a literary style and endorse 
the significance of the imagination. I shall refer to some of the responses in Part 3. 
Nussbaum argues that literature should be encouraged in courts and in law schools. 
We should create a space for 
[A]n imagination that will steer judges in their judging, legislators in their 
legislating, [and] policy-makers in measuring the quality of life of people 
both near and far. 13 
She contends for a public space where we can have something more than mere 
rational facts. Her vision encourages a shift from the traditional, formalist or 
instrumental approach to the public, to a literary one. She reacts against the attempt 
12 Nussbaum "The literary imagination in public life" (1991) New Literary History 877-910. 
13 Nussbaum "The literary imagination in public life" (1991) New Literary History 879. 
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to reduce everything to economics and seeks to emphasise the importance of 
normative considerations. Our responses to the TRC should also emphasise the 
normative aspects and not reduce the event to an instrumental formalist process. 
According to Nussbaum the novel can be used as a means to other ways of imagining 
the world. She uses the Dickens' novel Hard Times 14 to illustrate the contrast between 
the economic and the literary worlds. The economic norm of rationality should be 
displaced by other normative views of rationality. 
Nussbaum highlights three features of "economic rationality" (the traditional liberal 
approach) and the novel's reaction to it. Economic rationality emphasises the 
importance of facts; it views the novel as "mere fables about women and men"; and it 
negates "fancy and wonder''. In the reconstruction and transformation of public space, 
economic rationality can be challenged and undermined by displacing the importance 
of facts and emphasising the significance of fables (stories) and of "fancy and wonder". 
Nothing but Facts15 
Nussbaum identifies four aspects of the economic utilitarian, or liberal, mind. First, the 
economic utilitarian mind reduces qualitative differences to quantitative differences. 
This reduction is accomplished by focusing only on abstract or universal aspects and 
negating the concreteness of human beings. Secondly, the economic mind is 
concerned about the well-being of a group and not about individuals. 
Lives are drops in an undemarcated ocean; and the question how the 
group is doing is a question whose economic resolutions requires 
effacing the separate life and agency of each. 16 
Thirdly, the economic mind believes that is possible to find a clear and precise solution 
14 
15 
16 
Dickens (1969) Penguin edition. 
Dickens (1969) Hard times 4 7. 
Nussbaum "The literary imagination in public life" (1991) New Literary History 884. 
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to any human problem. 
[T]he economic mind finds it easy to view the lives of human beings as 
a problem in (relatively elementary) mathematics that has a definite 
solution - ignoring the mystery and complexity that are within each life, 
in its puzzlement and pain about its choices, in its tangled loves, in its 
attempt to grapple with the mysterious and awful act of its own morality. 17 
The fourth characteristic of economic rationality is that it views human beings as 
motivated only by self-interest in all their actions with the effect that altruistic and other-
regarding action is ignored. The novel shows us that the economic mind is blind. 
[B]lind to the qualitative richness of the perceptible world; to the 
separateness of its people, to their inner depths, their hopes and loves 
and fears; blind to what it is like to live a human life and to try to endow 
it with a human meaning. Blind above all to the fact that human life is 
something mysterious that demands to be approached with faculties of 
mind and resources of language that are suited to the expression of that 
complexity. 18 
Mere fables about men and women 
Nussbaum maintains that when we read a novel we are reading a story about people 
that we can relate to. Reading the novel makes us aware of their "concrete lives", the 
"shapes of their bodies", their "facial expressions" and the "sentiments of their hearts''. 
We see that as humans they share certain common problems and common hopes and 
we see how they act upon them in concrete situations. By reading a story the reader 
participates with the characters, cares about their projects, their hopes and their fears. 
17 Nussbaum "The literary imagination in public life" (1991) New Literary History 885. 
18 Nussbaum "The literary imagination in public life" (1991) New Literary History 888. 
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The reader is encouraged to interpret and evaluate, to be both affectionate and critical. 
In imagining things that do not really exist, the novel, by its own account, 
is not being "idle" for it is helping its readers to acknowledge their own 
world and to choose more reflectively in it. 19 
In South Africa, the stories told in the public spaces of the Truth Commission showed 
us how confrontation with concrete humans and their stories can contribute to a more 
reflective, sympathetic and ethical response to the tragedies of our own past. I shall 
return to this point in Part 3 " ... landscapes of justice". 
Nussbaum contrasts the novel with economic texts and argues that the person 
brought up solely on economic texts is not encouraged to think of workers, for example, 
as human beings with their own stories to tell. The novel makes us aware of the equal 
humanity of members of social classes other than our own. Economic texts, on the 
other hand, focus on abstract facts and are detached from human beings. This vision 
reminds us of Arendt's reliance on "human plurality", 20 that encompasses the equality 
and the distinctness of all human beings. 
"Reason through the tender light of Fancy' 21 
To Nussbaum, 22 "fancy" is necessary for the formation of "moral ability". Moral and 
normative considerations are essential to her conception of the "good life" (the common 
good). By contrast, the economic approach shies away from normative and moral 
considerations. The distinction between "fancy" and the economic view reflects the 
19 Nussbaum "The literary imagination in public life" (1991) New Literary History 891. 
20 I shall elaborate on Arendt's theory on action and her view on plurality below. 
21 Dickens (1969) Hard times 223. 
22 
'The literary imagination in public life" (1991) New Literary History 896. 
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tension between a communitarian (civic republican) and a liberal approach to politics. 
Nussbaum argues that the omission of moral ability impoverishes personal and social 
relations. She links "fancy" to charity and generosity and to human sympathy. In order 
to show humanity one must be able to go further than the facts. The novel shows how 
one can go further with the imagination. For Nussbaum,23 going further than the facts 
involves "charity". The ability to see a face in the moon or talk to a star needs the 
imagination. The imagination prepares us for life and teaches us how to be more 
humane, sympathetic and charitable. 
Nussbaum makes the important point that all humans, insofar as we interact morally 
and politically, are projectors, makers and believers of fictions and metaphors. The 
economist engages in fiction-making as much as the novelist does. This is similar to 
the Critical Legal Studies'24 insight that the liberal interpretation of the law is as political 
as the critical (postliberal) reading. However, the narrow economic view misrepresents 
the complexity of human beings and human life. A political and legal approach that 
focuses only on facts and logical, objective rules misrepresents the complexity of 
human beings and human life - the "false consciousness" to which Critical Legal 
Studies refers. 
Nussbaum pleads for a situation where public life is characterised by a government that 
knows that every citizen has a complex history of her own and acknowledges their 
separateness and qualitative difference. Again, the novel encourages such a sense of 
human community. It highlights the concreteness of individuals while making the reader 
23 
24 
Dickens (1969) Hard times 54. 
See amongst others Kennedy "Form and substance in private law adjudication" (1976) 89 
Harvard Law Review 1685-1778; Tushnet "Truth, justice, and the American way: An 
interpretation" (1979) 57 Texas Law Review 1307-1359; Tushnet "Anti-formalism in recent 
constitutional theory" (1985) 83 Michigan Law Review 1502-1544; Tush net "Critical Legal 
Studies and constitutional law: An essay in deconstruction" (1984) 36 Stanford Law 
Review 623-64 7; Unger "The critical legal studies movement" (1983) 96 Harvard Law 
Review 561-675; Gordon "Critical legal histories" (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 57-125; 
Trubek "Where the action is: Critical Legal Studies and empiricism" (1984) 36 Stanford 
Law Review 575-622; Kelman "Trashing" (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 293-348; Simon 
"Visions of practice in legal thought" (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 469-507. See also 
Sloterdijk "Cynicisms - The twilight of false consciousness" (1984) 33 New German 
Critique 190-206. 
47 
aware of common passions, hopes and fears. The novel is "particularistic" but not 
"relativistic" because it recognises human needs that transcend boundaries of time, 
place, religion and ethnicity. 
The reconstruction and transformation of our vision of public space should thus be 
enhanced by the imagination. In public discourse and in the judgements we make we 
must consider human features like human functioning and human capability as more 
important than utility. We need to listen to normative and moral considerations and not 
mere facts, structures and institutions. I argue that an imaginative approach which can 
lead to greater sympathy and humanness in public life will contribute to an "ethics of 
care". 25 In transforming our visions of public space an "ethics of justice" should be 
supplemented by an "ethics of care". An "ethics of care" can make a valuable 
contribution to the reconstruction and transformation of public space and democracy, 
specifically because it takes into account the concrete circumstances and differences 
of each and every individual, without assuming sameness and universality. In Part 3 I 
shall highlight how an ethics of care was present in the TRC. 
A great part of my story in this thesis· is the decline of the public realm and the various 
reactions to it. The disappearance of homogeneity and of one general understanding 
of the "common good" are generally held to be the reasons for the decline. 
Contemporary visions of public space can be viewed in the light of the distinction 
between "premodern", "modern" and "postmodern" conceptions. 26 
The distinction between premodern, modern and postmodern is problematic, but I follow 
it nevertheless. By doing this I am not subscribing to a chronological notion of 
development, but I apply well-known labels in order to explain my argument. Hopefully 
my own position towards the distinctions will become clearer. 
25 
26 
I discuss the distinction between an "ethics of care" and an "ethics of justice" below. 
It must be noted that the distinctions and labels attached to the various strands of thinking 
are problematic. The lines between them are not static and the content of these 
approaches vary. However, I follow the distinctions to situate the various thinkers in certain 
traditions of thought so that I can explore them and compare them with each other. 
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"Premodern", or at least some communitarian or civic republican 27 conceptions, adhere 
to the possibility of one general belief in the "common good". They endorse normative 
considerations. "Premodern" approaches subscribe to a natural law that searches for 
justice outside the boundaries of an institutionalised, human-made system. The public 
realm plays a central role in "premodern" approaches as a place where the members 
of a homogenous community gather. "Premodern" conceptions of public space is 
criticised from many sides. 28 The obvious flaw of these conceptions in contemporary 
societies is that a homogenous community is a precondition for the "premodern" 
conception. I shall argue that it is possible to follow a communitarian or civic republican 
vision without accepting the belief in one "common good". 
"Modern" (liberal) approaches are identified by the rise of the rational, autonomous 
individual. The emphasis shifts to the individual at the expense of the community. 
"Modern" approaches to law subscribe to positivism, in other words, a strong belief in 
the rational ability of individuals to pass legislation, establish institutions and structures 
and create procedures. Under "modern" approaches, the public realm loses its 
importance. 29 The "absent" public space in my own context was and still is a modern 
one. I hope it is obvious that I am critical of modern approaches. 
"Postmodern" approaches reject the belief in rational individuality and seek to expose 
the limits of human-made, rationally based institutions, structures, procedures and 
27 
28 
29 
See generally Daly (ed) (1994) Communitarianism. A new public ethics. 
Communitarian theory is criticised from the liberal (modern) perspective, from the 
perspective of rational thinkers, like Habermas, attempting to reconstruct modernity and 
from postmodern perspectives. I shall highlight aspects of these critiques in the discussion 
of the various visions of public space. See also amongst others Demaine (ed) (1996) 
Beyond communitarianism. Citizenship, politics and education and Peters & Marshall 
(1996) Individualism and community: Education and social policy in the postmodern 
condition. 
The liberal (modern) approach to politics and justice will be discussed under the liberal 
vision of public space. See generally Rosen (1989) The ancients and the modems: 
Rethinking modernity and Habermas (1987) The philosophical discourse of modernity: 
Twelve lectures. 
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beliefs. The conversation on values returns in the postmodern context. 30 
I am aware of the manifold problems of any attempt to reconstruct public space, yet I 
argue that an attempt must nevertheless be made. It must be done in the full awareness 
of the flexible boundaries between the private and the public and it must accommodate 
difference (heterogeneity). 31 In the next sections, I shall further explore "modern", 
"postmodern" and "premodern" visions. 
I start off by looking at visions that can be called liberal or legalistic (modern) because 
these visions symbolise the current state of affairs in the South African context. These 
visions rely strongly on formalist or positivist procedures in the public realm. They 
consider normative considerations as more private. They draw a distinction between 
law and politics. The task of the judge in the liberal legal system (as functionary of a 
process taking place in a public space) is to find the law within a logical, coherent set 
of rules and to apply it to the facts. Normative considerations, which are "private" can 
not be taken into account. The previous (and with a few exceptions, probably the 
current) South African visions of public space coincide with this approach. If this 
conception of public space is unsatisfactory (which I think it is), which other 
conceptions of public space are there to compare to this one? In the modern concept 
the feminine has been excluded from public space. Now, in the reconstruction and 
transformation of public space, people who have been excluded should be included. 
This should be done in a non-essentialist manner. Those who have traditionally been 
"other" to institutional public life should enter with the intention to undermine and 
disrupt the traditional model. Difference is central to the reconstruction and 
30 
31 
Winter "Human values in a postmodern world" (1994) 6 Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities 233-248; Singer "The player and the cards: Nihilism and legal theory" (1984) 
94 Yale Law Journal 1-70; Minda (1995) Postmodern legal movements. Law and 
jurisprudence at century's end; Gold (ed) (1993) Moral controversies: Race, class and 
gender in applied ethics. 
See also Charlesworth "The public/private distinction and the right to development in 
international law" (1992) Australian Yearbook of International Law 190-204. 
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transformation of public space. I take a cue from Elshtain's32 article in which Antigone 
is presented as an example to women who enter the public and corporate world. I also 
note and support Gilligan's33 description of "a different voice" and the distinction 
between an "ethics of care" and an "ethics of justice". 
I continue the discussion of the liberal visions by discussing Habermas'34 rationalist 
attempt to reflect on normative values. Habermas is a modern (liberal) thinker 
attempting to reconstruct the "modern project". I believe that we should investigate his 
theory in order to see what it can contribute to the South African reconstruction and 
transformation of public space (and politics in general). Habermas strongly relies on the 
possibility of a "procedural dialogue" between individuals in "an ideal speech situation" 
through which they can reflect on normative issues. He provides for a public space in 
his procedure of "discursive ethics". He further subscribes to the "rule of law" and 
believes that legality can be the basis of legitimacy. Although I am attracted to 
Habermas' attempt to reconstruct public spaces by procedural dialogue I argue that I 
am uncomfortable with Habermas. I find his answers too easy. We need to continue the 
search for inspiration. I note, and support, Seyla Benhabib's35 and Nancy Fraser's'6 
critiques on Habermas' theory form a gender perspective. 
The third vision that I discuss is Chantal Mouffe's37 of "radical democracy". Mouffe 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
"Antigone's daughters" in Daly (ed) (1994) Communitarianism. A new public ethics 335-
344. 
(1982) In a different voice. 
"Three normative models of democracy" (1994) 1 Constellations 6. See also Habermas 
"Human rights and popular sovereignty: The liberal and republican versions" (1994) 7 
Ratio Juris 1-13 and Benhabib "Deliberative rationality and models of democratic 
legitimacy" (1994)1 Constellations 26-52. 
( 1992) Situating the self 1 08. 
"What's critical about critical theory" in Benhabib & Cornell (1987) Feminism as Critique 
31-56. 
(1993) The return of the political. 
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situates herself as beyond "modern" and "postmodern" approaches. She confronts the 
tension between the importance given to "modern" rights like liberty and equality and 
the problems attached to them. Her vision is more sensitive to difference and to the 
limits of rational systems than the "modern" visions, such as Habermas. Although I 
voice some critique on her gender neutral approach to citizenship, I argue that we can 
draw a lot from Mouffe's visions of community and public space. I contrast Drucilla 
Cornell's38 call for "ethical" feminism and its implications for the reconstruction and 
transformation of public space as well as Jennifer Nedelsky's39 argument that our 
concept of citizenship should include women's experience with Mouffe's claim to a 
gender neutral citizenship. 
Finally, I shall look at Hannah Arendt's40 vision of public space. She is often criticised 
for reverting to premodern conceptions and for idolising the Athenian model of public 
space. Hannah Arendt's vision of public space is the vision that excites me the most, 
that I suggest that we must explore for our own processes of reconstruction and 
transformation. I shall concentrate on a reading of Arendt that situates her with thinkers 
who expose the limits of closed systems. Her insistence on action and speech within 
the public realm provides space for reconstruction and transformation of the public 
space itself together with the transformation of the humans acting within it. With 
reference to Arendt's work on Rahel Varnhagen, 41 I also focus on the entry of 
women/females/the "feminine" into public spaces. I argue that such an entry can act as 
a disruptive force to the traditional conception of public space. I note Bonnie Honig's42 
feminist application of Arendt's theory which she calls "agonistic feminism" and argue 
that such a vision of feminism can contribute to the reconstruction and transformation 
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of public space by undermining traditional concepts of women. 
I noted in the introduction that the way public space is conceived is integral to the 
interpretation of rights, and in particular for this work, an ethical interpretation of 
equality. The "ethical"' interpretation that I suggest is underpinned by the fact of 
difference and otherness, without attempting to equalise or universalise the difference. 
An "ethical" interpretation of equality, while similar to the concept of substantive 
equality, stretches beyond substantive equality. I am cautious of substantive equality 
because I think it can too easily be formalised and institutionalised. An "ethical" 
interpretation accepts the impossibility of fully achieving equality in any present system. 
An "ethical" interpretation of equality is dependent on a vision of public space that is 
radically committed to heterogeneity, difference, multiplicity, particularity. Public space 
"is" not. It is a vision, a description in continuous flux and transformation. Hannah 
Arendt described the public realm as an "in between" between individuals. It is a vision 
of the public as an "in between" that contributes to an "ethical" interpretation of equality 
because an ethical interpretation of equality is concerned with difference and 
openendedness. Like an "in between" vision of public space is open to continuous 
transformation, an ethical interpretation is not a final closed interpretation. In Part 2, " ... 
perspectives on equality", I shall explain the concept of justice that I support, namely 
that justice can never be fully realised in a present system. An "in between"43 vision of 
public space and an ethical interpretation of equality accept that justice can never be 
fully realised in the present. In Part 3, " ... landscapes of justice", the event of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be positioned in Arendt's description 
of an "in between" space. 
43 My understanding of "in between" will become clearer through the flow of the text. I 
basically understand the "in between" as an unfixed space. But the "in between" appears 
in more instances. For example, I do not subscribe to either a premodern concept of public 
space or a postmodern one; In Part 2 I shall search for a similar "in between" space 
between hermeneutics and deconstruction; In Part 3 I shall place the TRC in an "in 
between" space because it does not fall in any of the given categories of responses to 
mass atrocities, because it can be interpreted in multiple ways; and I think the tension 
between textual constraint and interpretative freedom also creates a space for an "in 
between". Jacques Derrida's use of the "aporia" contributes to my understanding of the 
"in between". I shall elaborate on the "aporia" in Part 2. 
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But the world and the people who inhabit it are not the same. The world 
lies between people, and this in-between ... is today the object of 
the greatest concern and the most obvious upheaval in almost all the 
countries of the globe. Even where the world is still halfway in order, or 
is kept halfway in order, the public realm has lost the power of illumination 
which was originally part of its very nature ... the withdrawal from the 
world need not harm an individual; . . . but with each such retreat an 
almost demonstrable loss to the world takes place; what is lost is the 
specific and usually irreplaceable in-between which should have formed 
between this individual and his fellow men. 44 
44 Arendt "On humanity in dark times: Thoughts about Lessing" in (1968) Men in dark times 
4. 
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Liberal visions 
In this section I shall attempt to paint the general picture of the liberal vision. I shall 
refer generally to the most basic features of modern thought. I refer briefly to the well 
known reconstructive attempts of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. I describe the view 
of another liberal thinker, Bruce Ackerman, and the critique delivered by political 
theorist Seyla Benhabib on his thought. For me Rawls, Dworkin as well as Ackerman 
fail to describe a vision of public space or politics that can contribute to the 
reconstruction and transformation of our public space. Their theories are based on 
assumptions of neutrality, are disembedded, disembodied and positivist. I then draw 
on Michael Sandel's critique on the liberal vision of public space. I find Sandel's critique 
interesting because he opposes liberal thinking from a liberal perspective. He argues 
that American public life can be enhanced by focusing on civic republican theories. His 
arguments should be noted in our own search for a reconstructed and transforming 
public space. Before I raise objections against the liberal vision from a gender 
perspective I discuss a recent decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court that I 
consider a positive development of and contribution to current visions of public space. 
The main reason for addressing these liberal visions of public space is to set a 
reference point for comparing the other visions that I shall raise. Another reason is 
because the liberal visions represent the current and past South African concept of 
public space. 
As a general proposition, it can be stated that the shift from "premodern" to "modern" 
was, amongst other things, a shift from a strong belief in normative values, morality, 
metaphysical beliefs and community to the appearance of the individual. In the move 
to the individual, human plurality came to be acknowledged and the premodern 
common belief in what constituted the "good life" or the "common good" was rejected. 
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In early modern thought, the emphasis fell on the individual and on the social contract45 
between the individual and the "state". Here, we need not concern ourselves with the 
various constructions of the social contract. Suffice it to say that moral deliberations 
were excluded from the early modern approaches to public space. The vision of public 
space was accommodated in the social contract where the "state" agreed to protect the 
individual from interference by other individuals. In other words the individual was 
regarded as a separate, isolated autonomous subject with no connection to others and 
involved in no relationships. The individual was regarded as wholly private. A concept 
of the individual as part of a community and accordingly, as participant in public life, 
was absent. The effective result was an enormous expansion of the private sphere that 
led to the decline and perhaps even the disappearance of the public sphere. 
Contemporary liberals are faced with the dilemma of excluding normative 
considerations, and many solutions have been offered. John Rawls, 46 for example, 
follows in the footsteps of the early social contract theorists. He relies on a social 
contract between individuals who agree on the basic principles for a just society. The 
basic principles of justice, according to Rawls, are equal liberty and the distribution of 
unequal social goods to the greatest advantage of the most unprivileged people in 
society. The individuals reach agreement from an original position where all are in a 
state of "neutrality" and "equality". They act from behind a veil of ignorance, which 
means that they are uninformed about their status, position and abilities in society. 
Rawls believes that because they are rational beings, individuals under these 
circumstances will agree on these principles. Rawls' model is criticised from various 
perspectives that need not be discussed here. 47 The most important critique for the 
reconstructed and transforming vision of public space that I support is that Rawls' 
45 
46 
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See generally Hobbes (1651) Leviathan and Locke (1690) Two treatises of civil 
government. 
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Democracy, feminism and political theory. 
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model works with an abstract, disembodied and disembedded individual. This stands 
in contrast to my concern with the concrete context, specific circumstances and 
difference of the individual. 
In his model of "law as integrity", Ronald Dworkin48 (another well-known liberal thinker), 
attempts to expand the narrow formalist and positivist approach that focuses only on 
the applications of rules. His concept is based on the belief that a set of normative 
principles already exists as the foundation of the legal and political system. Dworkin 
distinguishes between various types of communities, amongst others, "rulebook 
communities" and "communities of principle". "Rulebook communities" correspond to 
the positivist (Dworkin uses the term "conventional") approach to law. "Communities of 
principle" correspond to Dworkin's model of "law as integrity". Dworkin believes that 
through his notion of "constructive interpretation" a judge will be able to find the best 
possible answer (fit) and the most just answer (the best justification). He compares legal 
interpretation and adjudication to a chain novel. Like the writer of a chain novel the 
judge will choose the interpretation that will provide the best fit and the best 
justification. As with Rawls, Dworkin is criticised from various perspectives. 49 In my 
view, the most obvious problem with Dworkin is his firm belief that a rational human-
made system, like a legal system, can ensure the achievement of justice. This is in 
contrast with the concept of justice that I support, that justice is never fully realised in 
the present, justice is the limit of present systems, justice is in the beyond. 
Another liberal thinker struggling with the question of normative values in the public 
sphere is Bruce Ackerman. 50 Benhabib51 labels his model of public life as "legalistic". 
48 
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Ackerman proposes a model of "liberal dialogue". In his view, a political culture of 
public dialogue is based on certain kinds of "conversational constraints". Neutrality is 
for him the most significant of these constraints because neutrality ensures that no 
one's conception of the good can be placed above another's. Ackerman explains that 
his model of public dialogue is based, "not on some general feature of the moral life, 
but upon the distinctive way liberalism conceives of the problem of public order". 52 He 
asks how different groups who do not share the same conception of the good can 
coexist in a reasonable way. He answers that citizens in a liberal state must be guided 
by a "Supreme Pragmatic Imperative". 
According to Benhabib,53 Ackerman seeks a justification of the "Supreme Pragmatic 
Imperative" that will not fall into the traps which traditionally affect moral liberal 
philosophies, for example Rawls' theory of social justice. These traps are trumping; 
relying on a translation manual neutral enough; and asking the parties to rely on a 
transcendental perspective. Ackerman explains the traps as follows: Trumping means 
asserting a supreme moral view over others. Relying on a translation manual violates 
the sense of the "good" of one of the parties. Asking the parties to assume a 
transcendental perspective, such as the ideal speech situation or original position, or 
veil of ignorance54 makes the differences abstract and forces the parties to the public 
dialogue to subscribe to moral truths which they do not hold. 
Ackerman suggests "conversational constraint''. 
When you and I learn that we disagree about one or another dimension 
of the moral truth, we should not search for some common value that will 
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trump this disagreement; nor should we try to translate our moral 
disagreement into some putatively neutral framework; nor should we seek 
to transcend our disagreement by talking about how some hypothetical 
creature would resolve it. We should simply say nothing at all about this 
disagreement and try to solve our problem by invoking premises that we 
do agree upon. In restraining ourselves in this way, we need not lose the 
chance to talk to one another about our deepest, moral disagreements in 
countless 0th.er, more private, contexts. Having constrained the 
conversation in this way, we may instead use dialogue for pragmatical 
productive purposes: to identify normative premises all political 
participants find reasonable or, at least, not unreasonable.ss 
Benhabibs6 criticises Ackerman's pragmatic justification of "conversational restraint" 
because it is not morally neutral: She argues that "conversational restraint", as other 
models, trumps certain conceptions of the good life by making them private and by 
pushing them off the agenda of public debate. Benhabib agrees with Ackerman that 
conventional views of morality cannot be accepted as the moral foundations of a liberal-
democratic state. Conventional views of morality will not be impartial and accordingly 
will be inadequate to deal with different normative considerations. But this does not 
mean that the debate about different conceptions of the good life should be excluded 
from the public arena. In other words, the fact that we cannot find a translation manual 
neutral enough does not mean that we should exclude all moral considerations from the 
public sphere. The pragmatic justification of "conversational restraint" also transcends 
by asking the parties to the conversation to agree to say nothing about their 
fundamental disagreements. Benhabibs7 disagrees with Ackerman's belief that his 
concept of conversational constraint is less loaded than Rawls' idea of the veil of 
ignorance. I support Benhabib's critique. We can no longer hide behind the abstract 
assumption of neutrality in order to deny moral considerations that can affect the 
55 Ackerman "Why dialogue?" (1989) 86 Journal of Philosophy 16-17. 
56 ( 1992) Situating the self 97. 
57 (1992) Situating the self 98. 
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concrete circumstances of individual lives and society in general. 
Benhabib58 questions the "moral epistemology" of Ackerman's model because it 
implicitly justifies a separation between the public and the private that is harmful to 
certain groups. She explains this moral epistemology as follows: The liberal idea of 
conversational constraint presupposes that the primary groups to the conversation 
already know what their deepest agreements are, even before they have started the 
conversation. They seem to know beforehand, for example, whether the nature of the 
particular problem concerns moral, religious or aesthetic issues as opposed to matters 
of distributive justice or public policy. The liberal theorist argues that while it is 
legitimate to discuss issues of distributive justice, matters of morality and religion 
should not be discussed. However, who makes the decision whether issues are issues 
of "justice" or issues of morality and religion (the "good life")? For example, are 
abortion, pornography and domestic violence questions of justice or of the good life? 
Benhabib argues that the liberal theorist is not in the "possession of any moral 
dictionary that would enable her to classify certain issues as issues of justice and 
others as issues of the good life". We need unconstrained public dialogue to help us 
define the nature of the issues that we are debating. The agenda of the public debate 
should not be defined. Citizens must feel free to debate any of their moral concerns in 
the public sphere. In Benhabib's view, the liberal principal of "dialogue neutrality" in the 
public sphere is too restrictive when applied to the "dynamics of power struggles in 
actual political processes", because all struggles against oppression in the modern 
world start off by redefining, reconstructing and transforming the public/private 
boundary. I agree with Benhabib's argument that the liberal principle of "dialogue 
neutrality" is too restrictive. In our own reconstruction and transformation of public 
space the public discourse should be as wide and unrestricted as possible. 
Taking the argument a step further, Michael Sandel59argues that American public life 
is "rich with discontent." He identifies two fears that lie behind this disquiet, namely fear 
58 (1992) Situating the se/f 98. 
59 (1996) Democracy's discontent. America in search of a public philosophy 3. 
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for the loss of self-government and the fear for the erosion of the community. He argues 
that the reason for the current state of political arguments can be found in the public 
philosophy that inspires them. The current state of public life, according to Sandel, 
amounts to a "procedural republic". 
The political philosophy by which we live is a certain version of liberal 
political theory. Its central idea is that government should be neutral 
toward the moral and religious views its citizens expose. Since people 
disagree about the best way to live, government should not affirm in law 
any particular vision of the good life. Instead, it should provide a 
framework of rights that respects persons as free and independent 
selves, capable of choosing their own values and ends. Since this 
liberalism asserts the priority of fair procedures over particular ends, the 
public life it informs might be called the procedural republic. 60 
He explains that he does not see liberalism as the opposite of conservatism, but as the 
tradition of thought that emphasises individual rights. American politics is based on the 
liberal tradition of thought inspired by the likes of Locke, 61 Kant,62 Mill63 and Rawls.64 
Sandel65 notes that it is quite recently that American public life started to rely so heavily 
on liberal thought. 66 He compares the liberal approach to republican political theory. 
' Republican political theory subscribes to the notion of sharing in self-governance, in 
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other words participation in politics. While the idea of participation is not in itself in 
conflict with liberal thought, in republican political theory sharing in self-governance 
and participation has another dimension. 
It means deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and 
helping to shape the destiny of the political community. But to deliberate 
well about the common good requires more than the capacity to choose 
one's ends and to respect other's rights to do the same. It requires a 
knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern for 
a whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake. To 
share in self-rule therefore requires that citizens possess, or come to 
acquire, certain qualities of character, or civic virtue. But this means that 
republican politics cannot be neutral toward the values and ends its 
citizens espouse67. 
Sandel identifies the aspiration to neutrality as the centre of liberal thought. Liberal 
political theory supports the idea that government should be neutral on the question of 
the good life. He contrasts this approach to Aristotelian and ancient political theory, 
where the aim of politics was to "cultivate the virtue, or moral excellence of citizens". 
He explains that instead of promoting a particular conception of the "good life", liberal 
political theory puts its trust in "toleration", "fair procedures" and "respect for individual 
rights". Sandel discusses two alternative approaches to neutrality, the utilitarian view 
and the Kantian one. The utilitarian view is based on the theory of John Stuart Mill,68 
who subscribes to the principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number". Kant, 69 
on the other hand, reacted against the instrumental defence of utilitarian thought. 
Sandel70 explains that Kant rejected utilitarianism because it could not serve as a basis 
67 (1996) Democracy's discontent. America in search of a public philosophy 6. 
68 See amongst others (1861) Utilitarianism. 
69 See generally (1964) The critique of judgement. 
70 (1996) Democracy's discontent. America in search of a public philosophy 9. 
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for morality; did not respect the dignity of individuals; and treated humans as means to 
the happiness of others and not as ends in themselves. He notes the argument of 
contemporary Kantian liberals that utilitarianism also fails to address the distinction 
between persons. 
Sandel explains that Kantian liberals depend on an account of rights that is not based · 
on utilitarianism and that does not support any particular conception of the "good". They 
accordingly draw a distinction between the "right" and the "good", in other words, 
between a framework of basic rights and liberties and the conceptions of the good that 
people might pursue within such a framework. The state may support a fair framework, 
but may not support a particular conception of the good. To Sandel, this commitment 
to a fair, neutral framework in itself rests on a value orientated choice, namely the 
choice not to affirm a particular conception of the "good". This is a powerful argument 
against liberals who claim that they succeed to be free from all normative and moral 
and value orientated choices. Sandel describes the priority of the "right" over the "good" 
as follows: 
First, individual rights cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the general 
good; and second, the principles of justice that specify these rights 
cannot be premised on any particular vision of the good life. What 
justifies the rights is ... that they constitute a fair framework within which 
individuals and groups can choose their own values and ends, consistent 
with a similar liberty for others. 71 
Kantian liberalism supports a certain conception of the self that is often questioned. 72 
The Kantian self is a self-choosing subject, autonomous and independent of others. 
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Sandel notes that this vision of the self is accepted because of its powerful liberating 
vision (it is free and independent, unencumbered, "self-originating"), and because it 
makes a strong case for equal respect (it seems to be blind to differences and to look 
beyond them). However, this concept of the self does not truly reflect human 
experience. In my view neither the utilitarian nor the Kantian approach to neutrality can 
positively contribute to the reconstruction and transformation of South African public 
space, if anything the current support of these approaches should be exposed and 
undermined. 
Referring to the later Rawls73 and Rorty, 74 Sandel introduces the "minimalist liberals". 
Minimalist liberalism argues that neutrality can be separated from the Kantian 
conception of the self. They concede that we are not free and independent and 
unencumbered in the private realm. They insist, however, that we must detach 
ourselves from any such private obligations in the public realm. 
However encumbered we may be in private, however claimed by moral 
or religious convictions, we should bracket our encumbrances in public 
and regard ourselves, qua public selves, as independent of any particular 
loyalties or conceptions of the good. 75 
Although minimalist liberals distinguish themselves from the Kantian conception of the 
self as an independent, unencumbered and "self-originating" human being it fails to 
incorporate the reality of dependance into their visions of the public. In my view it does 
not mean anything that they differ with the Kantian conception of the self if it stays at 
an abstract and theoretical level. In other words minimalist liberals still rely on a neutral 
public space where independent isolated individual pursue their own interests. 
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If the liberal model in all its forms are flawed where could we turn to? Several authors 
have argued for a revival of civic republican theory. Sandel76 refers to two misgivings 
in this regard: some doubt whether it is possible; others say it is not desirable. The 
former argue that it is unrealistic to aspire to republican self-government in the modern 
world because they regard republican ideals as "nostalgic".The latter maintain that 
republican theory is exclusive and coercive because republican citizenship requires 
certain virtues. The implication is that republican citizenship is discriminatory (for 
example, Aristotle barred women, slaves and aliens from the public sphere). Sandel 
argues that the republican ideal does not necessarily have to be discriminatory. He 
refers to the democratic versions of republican theory during the Enlightenment. 
According to Sandel, 77 the second misgiving (coercion) can be a stronger objection to 
republican theory because of the task of cultivating virtue. He refers in this regard to 
Rousseau's78 account of the formative task of the legislature so as to "change human 
nature, to transform each individual". Sandel, however, argues that "civic education" 
can also take place in less harsh forms. He refers in this regard to Tocqueville's 
account of citizenship. 79 SandeP0 describes the shift that has occurred from the 
republican tradition where self-government was an activity rooted in a specific place 
(the public realm) to modern politics where self-government requires a multiplicity of 
settings. He warns against two kinds of corruption of civic virtue. The one is the 
tendency to fundamentalism which he describes as "the response of those who cannot 
abide the ambiguity associated with divided sovereignty and multiply-encumbered 
selves". 81 The other is the danger of becoming "story less selves, unable to weave the 
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various strands of their identity into a coherent whole". 82 He argues that the loss of 
storytelling will lead to the total disempowerment of the subject, but at the same time, 
that such a disempowerment is impossible. His vision for public life lies in the 
"reparation" of civic life. 
Since human beings are storytelling beings, we are bound to rebel 
against the drift to story lessness. But there is no guarantee that the 
rebellions will take salutary form. Some, in their hunger for story, will be 
drawn to the vacant, vicarious fare of confessional talk shows, celebrity 
scandals and sensational trials. Others will seek refuge in 
fundamentalism. The hope of our times rests instead with those who can 
summon the conviction and restraint to make sense of our condition and 
repair the civic life on which democracy depends.83 
Sandel's warning of becoming "story less selves" is a powerful statement. The event 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission surely contributed to the revival of 
storytelling and stories in South African public life. I believe that the type of critique 
delivered by Sandel on the liberal vision of public space and his comments on civic 
republicanism can be helpful in the reconstruction and transformation of our visions of 
public space. 
The multiple nature of public life and public discourse was manifested in a recent case 
before the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 84 The question in the case was whether 
regional shopping centres, or malls, must permit the distribution of leaflets on "societal 
issues". The plaintiff, New Jersey Coalition, a collection of groups opposed to US 
military intervention in the Middle East, sought to distribute leaflets at very large 
regional and community shopping centres in which they urged the public to persuade 
members of Congress to vote against such military intervention. All the defendants 
82 (1996) Democracy's discontent. America in search of a public philosophy 350. 
83 (1996) Democracy's discontent. America in search of a public philosophy 351. 
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were enclosed malls that permitted and encouraged on their premises a variety of non-
shopping activities, some of which involved speech, politics and community issues. 
They claimed to prohibit issue-oriented speech and the distribution of leaflets because 
such speech and distribution conflicted with their commercial purpose. The trial court 
decided in favour of the malls on the grounds that their property was dedicated solely 
to commercial uses inconsistent with political speech. On appeal, the trial court's 
decision was confirmed. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court decided in favour of the coalition. It was held that the 
right of free speech embodied in the state constitution required regional shopping 
centres to permit the distribution of leaflets on societal issues subject to reasonable 
conditions. The New Jersey Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that suburban 
shopping centres have substantially displaced the downtown business district of the 
State of New Jersey as places of commercial and social activity. The court referred to 
decisions where states found their constitutional free-speech-related provisions 
effective, regardless of "state action" and ruled that shopping centre owners cannot 
prohibit free speech. The court referred to Schmidt.85 where it was held that a private 
university that had invited the public to participate in discussions of current and 
controversial issues could not prohibit a member of the public from distributing leaflets 
and selling political materials on its campus. In Schmidt three factors were identified 
which had to be considered in determining the existence and extent of state free speech 
rights on privately-owned property: the nature, purposes, and primary use of such 
property; the extent and nature of the invitation to the public to use the property; the 
purpose of the expressional activity in relation to both the private and public use of the 
property. It was decided that the outcome depends on a consideration of all three 
factors and ultimately on a balancing between the rights of private property owners and 
the free speech rights of individuals. The court found that each of these factors and 
their ultimate balance support the conclusion that the distribution of leaflets at shopping 
centres is constitutionally permitted. The court's assessment of the third factor - the 
compatibility of free speech and the use of the property - recognises the significance 
85 State v Schmidt, 84 N.J. 535 (1980). 
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of free speech within the public realm. The fact that free speech and the downtown 
business were compatible for more than 200 years, was proof enough that the 
distribution of leaflets in shopping centres should be allowed. The court argued that if 
free speech is to mean anything in the future, it must be exercised at shopping centres. 
Where private property rights are exercised in a way that drastically curtails the right 
of freedom of speech in order to avoid a relatively minimal interference with private 
property, the property rights must yield to the right of freedom of speech. 
This decision in New Jersey coalition can be seen as a positive contribution to the 
reparation of civic life. Modern society must be in a position to create public spaces 
whenever and wherever they appear. The Aristotelian or republican ideal can be 
recreated in circumstances of such political and human action. The traditional 
private/public divide will be softened by this recreation. The liberal assumption of 
neutrality will likewise be undermined. The South African society is becoming a greater 
society of consumers by the day - the spaces of consumption, for example shopping 
malls as the modern metaphor for the ancient piazza, should simultaneously become 
public spaces where there is a potential for political action and free speech. 86 
Liberalism and gender 
Above I raised some of the general problems with the liberal visions of public space. 
Another troubling aspect of the liberal visions is that they acknowledge and highlight 
only one of the many versions of the self, namely a male version. In this section, I offer 
two critiques from a gender perspective against the liberal visions of public space. The 
one is based on Antigone, the other on the idea of an "ethics of care" and the 
"standpoint of the concrete other". 
86 See Frug "The city as a legal concept" (1980) 93 Harvard Law Review 1057. 
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Antigone's daughters 
Antigone is the third of Sophocles' Thebian plays. 87 The events leading to Antigone are 
the death of her father Oedipus and the strife between her two brothers, Eteocles and 
Polynices, who killed each other. Creon, who after these events becomes king of 
Thebes, declares that whilst the body of Eteocles, who defended the city, may be 
buried, the body of Polynices should remain unburied. Antigone speaks to her sister, 
lsmene: 
0, lsmene, what do you think? Our two dear brothers ... Creon has given funeral honours to one, 
And not to the other; nothing but shame and ignominy. Eteocles has been buried they tell me, in 
state, With all the honourable observances due to the dead. But Polynices, just as unhappily fallen 
- the order Says he is not to be buried, not to be mourned; To be left unburied, unwept, a feast of 
flesh For keen-eyed carrion birds. The noble Creon! It is against you and me he has made this 
order. Yes, against me. And soon he will be here himself To make it plain to those that have not 
heard it, The punishment for disobedience is death by stoning. So now you know. And now it is the 
time to show Whether or not you are worthy of your high blood. 
Antigone then asks her sister to help her bury their brother. She says that they will be 
defying the "holiest laws of heaven" if they do not bury their brother. lsmene responds: 
I do not defy them [the holiest laws of heaven]; but I cannot act Against the state. I am not strong 
enough . ... Do not breathe a word. I'll not betray your secret. 
And then Antigone's words: 
Publish it. To all the world! Else I shall hate you more. 
87 Sophocles (1947) (Penguin edition) The Thebian plays. 
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Antigone then buries her brother in defiance of Creon's decree. When Creon is told, he 
asked her whether she knew that she was disobeying his order. 
Creon: And yet you dared to contravene it? 
Antigone: Yes. The order did not come from God. Justice, that dwells with the gods below, knows 
no such Jaw. I did not think your edicts strong enough to overrule the unwritten unalterable Jaws 
of God and heaven, you being only a man. They are not of yesterday or today, but everlasting, 
though where they came from, none of us can tell. Guilty of their transgression before God I cannot 
be, for any man on earth I knew that I should have to die, of course, with or without your order. If 
it be soon, so much the better. Living in daily torment, as I do, who would not be glad to die? This 
punishment will not be any pain. Only if I had let my mother's son lie there unburied, then I could 
not have borne it. This I can bear. Does that seem foolish to you? Or is it you that are foolish to 
judge me so? 
Creon: Go then, and share your love among the dead. We'll have no woman's law here while I 
live. 
In an article, "Antigone's Daughters", Elshtain88 illustrates her conception of the public 
sphere and feminine civic virtue using Sophocles'89 story of Antigone. Antigone defied 
the decree of Creon and insisted on burying her slain brother as was required by family 
honour. For Antigone the family tradition and her belief in "God's law" took precedence 
over public law. In Greek mythology religion (the belief in the gods) is an indication of 
certain moral beliefs. I interpret Antigone's reliance on what she calls "God's law" as a 
reliance on certain normative beliefs. Family tradition was accordingly influenced by 
these normative beliefs. Elshtain argues that modern women, as "Antigone's 
daughters", should bring the values of family and community life and normative 
considerations into the public sphere. 
88 In Daly (ed) (1994) Communitarianism. A new public ethics 335-344. 
89 Sophocles (194 7) (Penguin edition) The Thebian plays. 
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Elshtain90 notes that most feminist theories seek to transform women into public 
persons, with a public identity. Such a public identity demands that public issues take 
precedence in cases of conflict with private lives. The effect of this would be that the 
private has to be absorbed as completely as possible into the public. Women, formerly 
the private beings, would be "uplifted" to the status of the man {public being) in order 
to gain public identity. In practice, the shift in the social identities of women amounts to 
an identification with the state and the accompanying competitive terms of civil society. 
Feminists want to acquire a public identity for women because they view women as 
"victims of deliberate exclusion from public life and forced imprisonment in private life". 
Since the public world was seen as the only sphere within which individuals make "real" 
choices, the private world was associated with "powerlessness", "necessity" and 
"irrationality". 
Liberal feminists encouraged women to enter the public sphere and to "empower 
themselves from their long history of oppression and exclusion". They argued for 
women to acquire the right to vote, to be allowed in the realms of public office, 
education and employment. Feminists who rejected liberal feminism embraced 
difference and reflected critically on women's identification with the role of the (public) 
male. They made the point that it is also oppressive to regard women's private role as 
only oppressive. Postliberal feminists suggest that feminists should challenge rather 
than accept the present public world. Elshtain believes that women participate in the 
suppression of tradition (heritage) when they fully identify with the present public 
order. 92 
90 
91 
92 
"Antigone's daughters" (1994) in Daly (ed) Communitarianism. A new public ethics 337. 
Three waves/strands of feminisms are identified. The first wave (liberal feminism) seeks 
equal rights for women. These claims are based on neutrality. In the second wave the 
issue regarding sameness and difference are raised. Cultural and radical feminist theories 
are part of the second wave. The third or postmodern wave accepts the fact of difference 
not only between men and women but also amongst women themselves. See generally 
Frug (1992) Postmodern feminism; Olsen "The sex of law" in Kairys (1997) The politics of 
/aw453-467. A progressive critique ; Nicholson (ed)(1990) Postmodernismlfeminism; 
Kristeva "Women's time" in Keohane (1981) Feminist theory 31-53. 
"Antigone's daughters" (1994) in Daly (ed) Communitarianism. A new public ethics 339. 
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The question of female identity and the state looks different when viewed from the 
standpoint of Antigone, who challenged Creon's decree that dishonoured her family. 
According to Elshtain, instead of being perceived as excluded from legitimate public life, 
Antigone should be seen as an "active historic agent", a participant in social life who 
located the heart of her identity in a world bounded by the demands of necessity, 
sustaining the values of giving and preserving life. This sphere of the historic female 
subject generated its own imperatives, inspired its own songs, stories and myths.93 
To reconstruct public identity by including only traditional, liberal visions of public 
identities, to the exclusion of Antigone's voice (that is, the voice of the private sphere 
and tradition), would prevent multiple identities from appearing in the public sphere. 
Elshtain identifies the question of contemporary feminist and identity politics as how to 
hold on to a social location for "contemporary daughters of Antigone", without at the 
same time insisting that women accept traditional terms and revert to the same old 
stereotypes. 
This is a central concern of this thesis. The "double-bind" of affirming the feminine whilst 
undermining it is similar to my vision of reconstruction and transformation of public 
space. Although the liberal instrumental approach to politics and the public sphere is 
inadequate, the communitarian or civic republican tradition can also not be accepted 
unconditionally. Likewise, "liberal", "radical" and "cultural" approaches to feminism have 
inadequacies. An "in between" position will be sought where the boundaries between 
male and female, public and private, can be softened. It is in this "in between" space 
where an ethical interpretation of equality will ultimately be placed. In 2 " ... perspectives 
on equality" I repeat the concern that women should not be incorporated into a present 
system but should disrupt it by bringing their different voices and multiple voices to the 
fore. 
93 Elshtain "Antigone's daughters" (1994) in Daly (ed) Communitarianism. A new public 
ethics 341. 
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Elshtain94 argues that women can explore, articulate and reclaim the public and the 
private world and reaffirm the standpoint of Antigone through a "socialist" feminist 
awareness. She sees a rigid distinction between the public and the private as 
misleading. "The world of Antigone" is a social location that accommodates 
heterogeneous identities. By seeing human beings through a many-layered, complex 
social world, the transformation of identities as well as transformations of the public and 
private spheres will become possible. Elshtain favours a communitarian approach that 
can involve a multiplicity of interrelated but autonomous social spheres and 
incorporates a vision of human solidarity that does not require uniformity and 
consensus. 
Elshtain delivers a powerful critique of the liberal vision of public life as well as of 
women and feminists who accept this model uncritically. Her vision broadens the liberal 
vision by making space for other voices. In my view we should take regard of Antigone's 
voice (Elshtain's vision) in our own processes of reconstruction and transformation. We 
should regard Antigone's voice not as representative of women or of "the feminine" but 
as a disruptive force signifying difference. 
I shall now turn to Carol Gilligan's95 distinction between an "ethics of care" and an 
"ethics of justice". 
Ethics of care and the standpoint of the concrete other 
Carol Gilligan,96 in reaction to the studies on the moral development of persons done 
94 
95 
96 
"Antigone's daughters" (1994) in Daly (ed) Communitarianism. A new public ethics 341. 
(1982) In a different voice. 
(1982) In a different voice. 
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by Lawrence Kohlberg,97 argued that women's and men's conceptions of the "good life" 
differ and that our understanding of moral theory could be enriched by expanding it to 
include the moral view98 of women. Gilligan came to the conclusion that Kohlbergs's 
theory is only valid to measure the development of persons in regard to rights and 
justice. She distinguishes between an "ethics of justice" and an "ethics of care" and 
argues that women's moral development should be measured in terms of the latter. 
Women, according to Gilligan, are more context-bound, involved in relationships and 
stories. The female moral orientation is more inclined to take the position of the other, 
to act sympathetically and empathetically. 99 In a "postconventional" (postmodern, 
postliberal) culture these qualities should be viewed as strengths and not as 
weaknesses. 
The contextuality, narrativity and specificity of women's moral judgement 
is not a sign of weakness or deficiency, but a manifestation of a vision of 
moral maturity that views the self as a being immersed in a network of 
relationships with others. 100 
According to Benhabib, 101 universal moral theory in the Western tradition can be seen 
as "substitutionalist". This vision of moral theory sets the experience of a specific group 
(white males) as a paradigm for human experience. Benhabib argues for an "interactive 
universalism" that acknowledges plurality of modes of being and differences among 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
(1984) Essays on moral development. The psychology of moral development. 
Gilligan's theory of ethics of care will not be discussed in detail. For an elaborated 
discussion see Van Marie (1996) Rekonstruktiewe feminisme: 'n Ondersoek na die reg as 
"manlike" struktuur en die moontlikheid van transformasie met spesifieke verwysing na 
pornografie LLM-dissertation 11-30. 
See also Kline "Complicating the ideology of motherhood" and "Racism and patriarchy in 
the meaning of motherhood" in Fineman and Karpin (eds) (1995) Mothers in law: Feminist 
theory and the legal regulation of motherhood. 
Benhabib "The generalized and the concrete other. The Kohlberg-Gilligan controversy and 
feminist theory" in Benhabib & Cornell (eds) (1987) Feminism as critique 78. 
Benhabib "The generalized and the concrete other. The Kohlberg-Gilligan controversy and 
feminist theory" in Benhabib & Cornell (eds) (1987) Feminism as critique 78. 
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humans. Western moral theory makes a strong distinction between "justice" and the 
"good life". This distinction was created by modern social- contract theorists like 
Hobbes, Locke, and much later Rawls, who strived to defend privacy and autonomy. 
The public private-divide was strengthened by this distinction. 
In the modern (conventional, liberal) tradition, moral theory was limited to the concept 
of the "generalised" other that views the individual as a rational being entitled to the 
same rights and duties we would want for ourselves. The concept of the "concrete" 
other, on the other hand, views the rational human being as an individual with a 
concrete history and identity. Gilligan, Benhabib102 and others03 argue for a moral 
theory where the "concrete" other is also taken into account. Kohlberg and Rawls are 
criticised because they take only account of the "generalised" other in their theories. For 
example, the choices that Rawls refers to in his original position are abstract choices 
made by disembedded and disembodied selves. Choices made from the position of the 
"concrete" other will take into account 
[H]ow I as a finite, concrete, embodied individual, shape and fashion the 
circumstances of my birth and family, linguistic, cultural and gender 
identity into a coherent narrative that stands as my life's story. 104 
With regard to the "generalised" other and the "concrete" other the one should not be 
replaced by the other. The concept of the "concrete" other should function as a critical 
position that can add to the concept of the generalised other. Benhabib argues that this 
102 
103 
104 
'The generalized and the concrete other. The Kohlberg-Gilligan controversy and feminist 
theory" in Benhabib & Cornell (eds) (1987) Feminism as critique; (1992) Situating the self. 
Larrabee (1993) An ethic of care. Feminist and interdisciplinary perspectives; 
Sevenhuijsen (1996) Oordelen met sorg. Feminischtische beschouwingen over recht, 
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feminist ethics; Held (1993) Feminist morality; Held (1995) Justice and care. Essential 
readings in feminist ethics; Baier (1995) Moral prejudices. Essays on ethics; Tronto (1993) 
Moral boundaries. A political argument for an ethic of care; Assister (1996) Enlightened 
women. Modernist feminism in a postmodern age. 
Benhabib "The generalized and the concrete other. The Kohlberg-Gilligan controversy and 
feminist theory" in Benhabib & Cornell (eds) (1987) Feminism as critique 89. 
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view enhances a "communicative ethic of need interpretations". 
One consequence of this communicative ethic of need interpretations is 
that the object domain of moral theory is so enlarged that not only rights 
but needs, not only justice but possible modes of the good life, are moved 
into an anticipatory-utopian perspective. 105 
Gilligan's distinction between an "ethics" of care" and an "ethics of justice" is significant 
for the South African context. In regard to visions of public space, equality and justice 
the distinction between care and justice, as well as between the concrete and the 
general other must be taken into account. An "ethics of care" and the concept of the 
concrete other form an inherent part of an ethical interpretation of equality that relies 
on difference. In Part 3 I shall again refer to an ethics of care in regard to the TRC. 
105 Benhabib "The generalized and the concrete other. The Kohlberg-Gilligan controversy and 
feminist theory" in Benhabib & Cornell (eds) (1987) Feminism as critique 93. 
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A rationalist vision: Reconstructing the 
"unfinished project" 
After painting a general picture of the various liberal visions and the main points of 
critique I turn to the theory of Jurgen Habermas who is a "reconstructive" thinker. His 
reconstruction is focused on the "unfinished project of modernity". It is necessary, I 
think, to explore Habermas' theory to see whether it can contribute to the reconstruction 
and the transformation of South African public space. Where the liberal visions that I 
discussed above focused on the value of neutrality, Habermas focuses on the value of 
rationality. 
Bernstein106 situates Habermas in a specific historical context and argues that the 
discovery of Nazism was a formative experience for Habermas as adolescent. 
The painful awareness of "the ghastliness", of a "collectively realized 
inhumanity", a sharp sense of "rupture", were the traumatic experiences 
of the young Habermas. A question began to take shape - a question that 
has haunted Habermas ever since: how could one account for the 
"pathologies of modernity"?107 
Although Habermas realised the danger of "instrumental rationality" that was spreading 
to all spheres, economic, social and political, of the modern world, he argued that 
rationality has other more significant aspects. Bernstein explains: 
106 
107 
(1991) The new constellation. The ethical-political horizons of modernity/postmodernity 
202. 
(1991) The new constellation. The ethical-political horizons of modernitylpostmodernity 
202. 
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Habermas argued that this monolithic portrait of the totalitarian character 
of Enlightenment rationality was overdrawn. It failed to do justice to those 
philosophic and historical tendencies - also rooted in the Enlightenment -
that gave rise to democratic public spaces in which a different type of 
communal rationality was manifested. 108 
His model of "communicative action" is founded on a distinctive type of rationality and 
action that relies on mutual understanding and consensus. In his theory of 
"communicative action", Habermas distinguishes between the different types of 
"instrumental", "strategic", "systems" and "technological" rationality and his own vision 
of "communicative", "dialogical" rationality. He draws a further distinction between 
"communicative" and "purposive-rational" action. Bernstein 109 explains that 
"rationalisation" in regard to purposive-rational actions means "increasing efficiency" 
or the "consistency of rational choices". "Rationalisation" in Habermas' communicative 
action means "overcoming such systematically distorted communication in which action 
supporting consensus concerning the reciprocally raised validity claims ... can be 
sustained in appearance only, that is counter factually". 110 
Bernstein argues that Habermas's reconstructive project is not only of theoretical value 
but also has practical consequences for ethical and political life. 
It directs us to the normative task of overcoming those material obstacles 
that prevent or inhibit undistorted and non-coerced communication. 
Positively stated, it means working toward the cultivation of practices that 
bring us closer to the ideal of seeking to resolve conflicts through 
108 
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110 
(1991) The new constellation. The ethical-political horizons of modernity/postmodernity 
203. 
(1991) The new constellation. The ethical-political horizons of modernity/postmodernity 
204. 
(1991) The new constellation. The ethical-political horizons of modernity/postmodernity 
204; Habermas "Historical materialism and the development of normative structures" in 
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discourses where the only relevant force is the "force of the better 
argument" .111 
Bernstein, 112 however, voices a criticism against Habermas' reliance on science. 
If a theory of communicative action and a universal pragmatics are 
supposed to be scientific theories that are hypothetical, fallible, and 
refutable, then what would be the consequences if such a theory were in 
fact refuted or falsified .... Habermas gets himself entangled in these and 
related aporias the more he insists on the scientific status of the theory 
of communicative action and a universal pragmatics. . . . Despite his 
manifest break with Kantian tradition of transcendental argument, he 
nevertheless leads us to think that a new reconstructive science of 
communicative action can establish what Kant and his philosophic 
successors failed to establish - a solid ground for communicative 
ethics. 113 
He suggests an alternative reading of Habermas that calls attention to the "moral-
political intention". His reading understands Habermas's project as an interpretative and 
hermeneutic one. Bernstein draws attention to Habermas' "pragmatic voice" and his 
practice of "interpretative dialectics". 
Habermas, in reaction to Richard Rorty's114 critique of modernity and philosophy, argues 
as follows: 
Modernity is characterised by a rejection of the substantive rationality 
111 
112 
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114 
(1991) The new constellation. The ethical-political horizons of modernity/postmodernity 
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typical of religious and metaphysical world views and by a belief in 
procedural rationality and its ability to give credence to our views in the 
three areas of objective knowledge, moral-practical insight, and aesthetic 
judgement. What I am asking myself is this: Is it true that this (or a 
similar) concept of modernity becomes untenable when you dismiss the 
claims of a foundationalist theory of knowledge?115 
Habermas agrees with Rorty116 and other thinkers that philosophy's roles of "usher" and 
"judge" are problematic. However, he believes that philosophy should retain its claim 
to reason and play more modest roles of "stand-in (usher)" and "interpreter". He is of 
the opinion that philosophy can definitely gain from pragmatics and hermeneutics. 
Instead of focusing introspectively on consciousness, these two points 
look outside at objectifications of action and language. Gone is the 
fixation on the cognitive function of consciousness. Gone too is the 
emphasis on the representational function of language and the visual 
metaphor of the "mirror of nature". What takes their place is the notion of 
justified belief spanning the whole spectrum of what can be said ... rather 
than just the contents of fact-stating discourse. 117 
According to Habermas, this does not mean that any claim to rationality must be 
rejected. For him, beliefs can be judged as valid only when they are based on 
agreement that is reached by argumentation. The "reconstructive sciences" explain the 
assumed universality of rational experience, judgement, action and linguistic 
communication by looking at the "intuitive knowledge" of competent subjects. To 
understand the "life world" requires a cultural tradition that covers the whole spectrum. 
Philosophers could, by taking on the role of interpreters on behalf of the life world, 
"refurbish its link with the totality". To be able to do that philosophers should also take 
115 Habermas (1993) Moral consciousness and communicative action 3-4. 
116 See generally (1979) Philosophy and the mirror of nature. 
117 Habermas (1993) Moral consciousness and communicative action 10. 
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on the role of "guardians of rationality"118. 
Habermas119 explains his "proceduralist view" of democracy and deliberative politics 
with reference to the problems he has with both the liberal and republican views. 
According to the liberal view, (following Locke), the function of politics is to protect the 
individual against intrusion from other individuals and the state. Habermas describes 
the liberal function of politics as "bundling together and pushing private interests 
against a government apparatus specializing in the administrative employment of 
political power for collective goals" .120 In the republican view, politics has more than a 
mere "mediating function". It is "the reflective form of substantial ethical life". The liberal 
view emphasises a citizen's negative rights against the state and other citizens. These 
rights include the citizen's protection from interventions. Habermas argues that political 
rights have the same structure and meaning as these negative rights, with the effect 
that they give citizens the opportunity to assert their (private) rights by, for example, 
taking part in elections. Political rights in the liberal view does not extend beyond 
elections whereby parliamentary bodies and government are formed. In the liberal view, 
these bodies represent "the political". 
In the republican view, citizens are not determined by their negative (private) rights. 
Political rights in this view are positive rights that guarantee the possibility of political 
participation. The function of the state in the republican view is not only to protect equal 
private rights but to guarantee "an inclusive opinion- and will-formation in which free 
and equal citizens reach an understanding on which goals and norms lie in the equal 
interest of all". 121 These opposing views of citizenship, and the republican reaction 
against the classical concept of the legal person indicate a controversy about law itself. 
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While in the liberal view the point of a legal order is to make it possible 
to determine in each case which individuals are entitled to which rights, 
in the republican view these "subjective" rights own their existence to an 
"objective" legal order that both enables and guarantees the integrity of 
an autonomous life in common based on mutual respect. 122 
Habermas shows that the disagreement about the concept of citizenship and about the 
law expresses a deeper disagreement about the "nature of the political process". In the 
liberal view, the political process takes on the metaphor of the market. The processes 
of "will- and opinion-formation" in the public sphere is nothing but various groups 
competing for power. In the republican view, these processes are aimed at public 
communication oriented to mutual understanding. 
The republican view is closer to the "original" meaning of democracy because it makes 
provision for the "communicative conditions" necessary for political opinion- and will-
formation. The liberal model of market competition focuses on a choice of optimal 
strategies and preference, with the result that "politics loses all reference to the 
normative core of a public use of reason". 123 Habermas is critical of the "communitarian" 
reading that contemporary republicans give to public communication and the move 
towards "an ethical constriction of political discourse". Politics may not be reduced to 
ethics. He places his view of procedural politics in contrast to both the liberal and 
republican view. 
[D]iscourse-theoretic interpretation insists on the fact that democratic will-
formation does not draw its legitimating force from a previous convergence of 
settled ethical convictions, but from both the communicative presuppositions that 
allow the better arguments to come into play in various forms of deliberation, and 
from the procedures that secure fair bargaining processes. Discourse theory 
122 
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breaks with a purely ethical conception of civic autonomy. 124 
Habermas makes a distinction between questions of "ethics" and questions of "justice". 
For him, questions of justice are not dependent on a specific community and an 
adherence to one conception of the "good life". In contemporary plural societies political 
interests and values will be in conflict and need to be balanced. In his vjew, this 
balancing cannot be done through ethical discourses. The balancing and bargaining 
between competing norms and interests rely on a regulation of fair terms that must be 
agreed upon beforehand. 
[O]ne can understand the complex validity claim of legal norms as the 
claim, on the one hand, to compromise competing interests in a manner 
compatible with the common good and, on the other hand, to bring 
universalistic principles of justice into the horizon of the specific form of 
life of a particular community. 125 
Discourse theory takes elements from both the liberal and republican views and 
integrates them in "an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making" .126 The 
proceduralist view accommodates both universalist human rights and the concrete 
ethical experience of a specific community in the rules of discourse and forms of 
argumentation. "[T]he normative content [of the discourse] arises from the very structure 
of communicative actions". 127 
Benhabib 128 views Habermas' proceduralist theory as a better model of public space 
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than the liberal one, but criticises his rigid distinctions between "justice" and the "good 
life", "needs" and "interests", "values" and "norms". She argues that public space in this 
model is viewed as the creation of procedures whereby all affected by general social 
norms and by collective political decisions can have a say in their formulation, 
stipulation and adoption. Although Habermas also believes that legitimation in a 
democratic society can only result from a public dialogue, he does not subscribe to the· 
liberal "constraint of neutrality". Public dialogue is judged according to the criteria 
represented by the idea of practical discourse. 129 Benhabib130 describes it as follows: 
The public sphere comes into existence whenever and wherever all 
affected by general social and political norms of action engage in a 
practical discourse, evaluating their validity. In fact there may be as many 
publics as there are controversial general debates about the validity of 
norms. Democratization in contemporary societies can be viewed as the 
increase and growth of autonomous public spheres among participants. 
According to her, the model of a plurality of public spaces can overcome the dichotomy 
of majoritarian politics versus constitutional guarantees because of its proceduralist 
nature. Habermas' discourse model of legitimacy and discursive view of public space 
present normative dialogue as "a conversation of justification taking place under the 
constraints of the ideal speech situation". The normative constraints of the "ideal 
speech situation" or of practical discourses that Habermas relies on are the conditions 
of "universal moral respect" and "egalitarian reciprocity". Benhabib believes that these 
conditions can overcome the dilemmas of simple majoritarian political outcomes. Most 
discourse theorists struggle with the problem of how to uphold "unconstrained dialogue" 
without having majoritarian decision procedures destroy civil liberties and rights. 
Benhabib argues that the normative constraints of discourses must be formulated as 
"constraints whose fairness and appropriateness can themselves become topics of 
129 
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debate". 131 
The discourse theory of legitimacy and public space can transcend the traditional 
opposition of majoritarian politics versus liberal guarantees of basic rights and liberties 
to the extent that the normative conditions of discourses are, like basic rights and 
liberties, rules of the game. These rules of the game can be contested within the game 
but only insofar as one first accepts to abide by them and play the game at all. 
Benhabib132 argues that this formulation corresponds more to the reality of democratic 
and public speech in democracies than the liberal model of constitutional conventions. 
In democratic politics nothing is really off the agenda of public debate, but 
there are fundamental rules of discourse which are both constitutive and 
regulatory in such a manner that, although what they mean for democratic 
give and take is itself always contested, the rules themselves cannot be 
suspended or abrogated by simple majoritarian procedures. 133 
Habermas, in his "reconstructive" project, strongly relies on rationality in order to set up 
a procedural model of politics (or a theory of discourse ethics or communicative action). 
He integrates aspects of the liberal and the republican views of politics into his own 
view. Although he is critical of the liberal tendency of instrumentalism, he subscribes 
to some modern assumptions of universalism. He believes that republican theory is in 
a better position to "preserve" democracy but criticises its reliance on "ethics". His 
proceduralist theory integrates universal assumptions with community-specific 
experience. Habermas rejects foundational claims and all "grand narratives", but 
nevertheless affirms the claim to dialogical reason. He argues that Continental 
philosophy tends to "dramatise" the dangers of instrumental and objective reason. 134 His 
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position on modernism and postmodernism is similar to his procedural theory, which is 
situated in between liberalism and republicanism. This tendency to situate oneself 
between various strands of thinking stands in the Hegelian tradition of dialectic 
thought. 135 
There is something attractive to me in Habermas's view because he takes normative 
issues seriously. He stands critical towards the liberal model of politics and the formalist 
approach to law. He strongly b~lieves in the possibility of rational procedure to address 
normative issues in a post-traditional society. 
But, Habermas's comfort with rational procedures makes me uncomfortable. Although 
I appreciate his rejection of instrumental politics and his attention to normative 
questions, his answers come too easily for me. It might be said that the aim of 
"reconstructive" thought is to do exactly that (reconstruct) and that it cannot afford to 
undermine its own project. In other words, if rationality is the basis of Habermas's 
theory, he cannot afford to question it. If this theory could be more aware of "the tragic" 
and the "impossible" and of the paradox of possibility within impossibility, it could have 
a greater effect on South African political life. The term "reconstruction" is very popular 
in this country and one must concede that a great part of this reconstruction will be 
dependent on the possibility and availability of "rational" procedures. But reconstruction 
should also encompass the reality of destruction, failure, malcommunication and 
irrationality. The possibility of rephrasing this reconstructive project in a paradox should 
be considered - that irrationality can be seen as a condition for (a revised concept of) 
rationality, destruction a condition for reconstruction and ma/communication a condition 
for communication. 
135 The Hegelian tradition is associated with "dialectical" thought. In dialectical thought all 
problems are explained in terms of a thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis. See Benhabib (1986) 
Critique, norm and utopia. 
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Habermas and gender 
I have already mentioned that a significant part of any reconstruction and transformation 
of public space will have to address the past and present exclusion of women. Any 
theory on public space will have to be accountable to gender perspectives. I already 
mentioned my uneasiness with Habermas' theory. To add to this uneasiness I do not 
think that his discourse ethics or theory of communicative action take the concrete 
circumstances of women and the reality of difference into account seriously. Below I 
shall discuss the gender perspectives of Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser on 
Habermas' theory. 
Rethinking the private/public dichotomy 
Benhabib136 notes that the distinction between the public and the private has for many 
years been a central point in feminist theory. The argument goes that this distinction 
has confined women to the private sphere and kept them out of the public. The activities 
of the private sphere, like housework, reproduction and nurturing, have been 
considered matters of the "good life". These activities have been accepted as "natural" 
and "immutable" aspects of human relations and as such remained "pre-reflexive" and 
"inaccessible" to discourse analysis. A great part of the "women's struggle" was focused 
on making these private issues public. 
Benhabib137 points to at least three sides of privacy or the "private" in modern political 
thought. First, the private has been understood as the sphere of moral and religious 
conscience. The effect of this was that moral matters were relegated to the private 
sphere and were considered inappropriate for discussion in the public sphere. 
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Individuals should make their own choices about right and wrong in the private sphere. 
Secondly, economic freedoms were established as privacy rights. Privacy in this context 
means non-interference by the state in the economical relations and non-intervention 
in the free market of labour-power. The third meaning of privacy relates to the "intimate 
sphere", the domain of the household, the daily needs of life, of sexuality and 
reproduction. Modern enlightenment and liberation took place in the public sphere only, 
and questions of justice were accordingly restricted to the public sphere. This liberation 
was indeed a male liberation and had little or no effect on the females who were 
relegated to the "intimate sphere." 
As male bourgeois citizen was battling for his rights to autonomy in the 
religious and economic spheres against the absolutist state, his relations 
in the household were defined by non-consensual, non-egalitarian 
assumptions. Questions of justice were from the beginning restricted to 
the "public sphere" whereas the private sphere was considered outside 
the realm of justice. 138 
Of course, during the past few decades this image has changed considerably. Women 
entered the public sphere, gained the right to vote, and entered the labour market. 
However, Benhabib139 argues that contemporary moral and political theory continues 
to neglect the transformations that took place in the private sphere. She identifies two 
consequences of the practice of conflating religious and economic freedoms with the 
freedom of intimacy, and addressing them as matters of "privacy" or as "private 
questions" of the "good life": The one is that contemporary normative moral and political 
theory, including Habermas's discourse ethics, ignores the issue of "difference". The 
other is that power relations in the intimate sphere are treated as though they do not 
exist. Women's work in the private sphere has never been economically valued, with 
the result that the rules governing the sexual division of labour in the family have been 
placed beyond the scope of justice. 
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Women must make that which were considered "private issues" "public" by bringing 
them into public discourse. The line between the public and the private and, 
accordingly, between issues of justice and matters of the good life must be 
renegotiated. 
Benhabib concedes that any theory of the public and the public sphere presupposes 
a distinction between the public and the private. The traditional way of separating the 
private from the public sphere has accepted and legitimised the suppression of women 
and denied difference. Benhabib criticises Habermas in this regard for his rigid 
boundaries between matters of "justice" and matters of the "good life", between "public 
interests" versus "private needs", and between "privately held values" and "publicly 
shared norms". She argues that discourses should be "radically open" and participants 
should be able to bring any matter under critical scrutiny and questioning, so that we 
cannot predefine the nature of the issues discussed as being "public" ones of "justice" 
or "private" ones of "the good life". 
Distinctions such as between justice and the good life, norms, values, 
interests and needs are "subsequent" and not prior to the process of 
discursive will formation. As long as these distinctions are renegotiated, 
reinterpreted and rearticulated as a result of a radically open and 
procedurally fair discourse, they can be drawn in any number of ways. 140 
Benhabib141 predicts that Habermas, as well as the liberal thinker, might argue that this 
position could lead to the "corrosion of the rights of privacy" and the "total intrusion of 
the state into the domain of the individual". She argues that the "discourse model" can 
accommodate challenges to the public/private distinction because it is based on a 
strong assumption of individual autonomy and consent. The renegotiation of the 
private/public dichotomy should not be done in a way that can be harmful to the basic 
concept of autonomy. Benhabib believes that the premises of discourse ethics allow us 
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to question the traditionalist understandings of the public/private dichotomy while 
simultaneously prohibiting the redrawing of the dichotomy in ways which may harm the 
autonomy of individuals involved. 
Benhabib142 argues that Habermas' model of the public sphere could be complemented 
by a critical feminist theory of the public sphere. She suggests a "feminisation of 
practical discourse by challenging unexamined dualisms between justice and the good 
life, norms and values, interests and needs from the standpoint of their gender context 
and subtext" .143 
A critical reflection on critical theory 
Nancy Fraser144 approaches Habermas's model of communicative theory from Karl 
Marx's definition of "critical theory" as "the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes 
of the age". She admires the "straightforward political character" of the definition. In her 
view, a critical social theory should look at the aims and the activities of those 
oppositional social movements with which it has a "partisan though not uncritical 
identification". As an example, Fraser mentions the struggles against the subordination 
of women, which figured among the most significant of this age and which deserve to 
be addressed by critical social theory. She examines Habermas's theory in the light of 
this approach and asks, in respect of gender, what is critical and what is not in 
Habermas's social theory. She poses the following questions: 
[l]n what proportions and in what respect does Habermas's critical theory 
clarify and/or mystify the bases of male dominance and female 
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subordination in modern societies? In what proportions and in what 
respects does it challenge and/or replicate prevalent ideological 
rationalizations of such dominance and subordination? To what extent 
does it or can it be made to serve the self-clarification of the struggles and 
wishes of the contemporary women's movement?145 
Fraser argues that because Habermas says virtually nothing in The Theory of 
Communicative Action146 on gender, the work must be read from the standpoint of "an 
absence". She reconstructs his work in order to see how he would have looked at 
matters of feminist concern had he addressed them. 
Fraser147 looks at Habermas's account of the relations between the public and private 
spheres of life in classical capitalist societies and tries to reconstruct the unthematised 
gender context. She agrees with Benhabib that Habermas's model has some genuine 
critical potential but argues that the unthematised gender context should be 
reconstructed to realise this potential to the fullest. Fraser148 submits that the private-
sphere relations between economy and family as mediated by the roles of worker and 
consumer are underlaid by gendered roles. In male-dominated, classical capitalist 
societies, the role of the worker is a masculine role that is also connected to the role as 
breadwinner. The struggle for a family wage, when viewed in this light, was 
[A] struggle for a wage conceived not as a payment to a genderless 
individual for the use of labour power, but rather as a payment to a man 
for the support of his economically dependant wife and children. A 
conception which legitimized the practice of paying women less for equal 
145 
146 
147 
148 
Fraser "What's critical about critical theory" in Benhabib & Cornell (1987) Feminism as 
critique 32. 
Habermas (1984) The theory of communicative action. 
"What's critical about critical theory" in Benhabib & Cornell (1987) Feminism as critique 
40. 
"What's critical about critical theory" in Benhabib & Cornell (1987) Feminism as critique 
42. 
91 
or comparable work. 149 
In Fraser's view, the masculine subtext of the role of the worker must be held 
responsible for the ill-treatment of women in the workplace and the work done by 
women. The other role, linking economy and the family, that is, the role of the 
consumer, has a feminine subtext. The consumer as the worker's companion is 
feminine. The sexual division of domestic labour assigns to women the (unpaid and 
usually unrecognised) work of purchasing and preparing goods and services for 
domestic consumption. In the same way the role of the citizen which connects the state 
with the public life-world of political opinion and will-formation, is also a gendered role, 
the one of the male. For Fraser, 150 the reason for women's exclusion from the public 
sphere is not only the fact that they did not receive the right the vote until the twentieth 
century. The exclusion of women from the public sphere has much deeper strains. She 
notes Habermas's argument that the citizen is centrally part of the political debate and 
public will-formation. Citizenship in Habermas' view depends on the participation and 
opinion- and will-formation of citizens in the public sphere. Fraser argues that this 
participation and opinion- and will-formation are exclusive to men and that women and 
femininity are excluded. She explains the point with reference to marital rape. The fact 
that marital rape is still not accepted as a crime in many societies, with the result that 
a wife is legally subject to her husband, means that she is not accepted as an individual 
who can give consent, form her own opinion and so on. Fraser quotes Pateman, saying 
that 
[W]omen find their speech ... persistently and systematically invalidated 
in the crucial matter of consent, a matter that is fundamental to 
democracy. [But] if women's words about consent are consistently 
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reinterpreted how can they participate in the debate among citizens?151 
Fraser152 argues that the gender blindness of Habermas's model prevents him from 
understanding important features of the public/private dichotomy, of economy, family, 
citizenship etc. She argues that once the gender-blindness of Habermas's model is 
overcome, it is clear that feminine and masculine gender identity run like "pink and blue 
threads" through the public sphere of paid work, state administration and citizenship, 
as well as through the private sphere of family and sexual relations. A gender-sensitive 
reading of these connections has important theoretical and conceptual implications. It 
shows that male dominance is "intrinsic" rather than "incidental" to capitalism and to 
modernism. She argues that it is not correct to understand male dominance as 
"lingering forms of premodern status inequality". She views male dominance as 
"intrinsically modern" because many aspects are based on the distinction between 
public and private, and the separation of "waged labour" and female child-rearing and 
the household. 
Fraser argues that a critical social theory of capitalist societies needs gender-sensitive 
categories. Concepts such as worker, consumer, and citizenship must be understood 
not as mere economic and political (scientific, rational and logical) concepts but as 
"gender-economic" and "gender-political" concepts. Fraser argues that the 
reconstruction of Habermas's model has normative implications because it would lead 
to the transformation of "male-dominated capitalist societies" and gender. 
As long as the worker and the child rearer roles are such as to be 
fundamentally incompatible with another, it will not be possible to 
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universalize either of them to include both genders .... Thus, changes in 
the very concepts of citizenship, child rearing and unpaid work are 
necessary, as are changes in the relationships among the domestic, 
official-economic, state and political-public spheres. 153 
These perspectives do not reject Habermas's theory totally but show how it can be 
broadened by a gender perspective. Although I agree that aspects of his theory are very 
powerful and can not be merely rejected, I shall continue the search for inspirational 
visions of public space. 
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A "radical democratic" vision 
Having discussed two modern approaches to public space (the liberal visions and 
Habermas) I now turn to another approach, namely Chantal Mouffe's154 "radical 
democratic" vision. Mouffe approaches the concepts of radical democracy, liberalism, 
citizenship, pluralism, liberal democracy and communitarianism from an "anti-
essentialisf' perspective, in other words she seeks to displace static approaches and 
understandings and to open these concepts to multiple interpretations and meanings. 
She describes her own position as beyond modernism and postmodernism. In her view, 
current liberal discourse that is based on individualist and rationalist thinking negates 
"the politicaf' and is inadequate to address democracy in contemporary society. Two 
arguments central to her vision of "radical democracy" are the significance of "the 
politicaf' and the "reality of antagonism". 
Mouffe notes that the collapse of Communism has brought about many particularisms 
and new antagonisms that challenge Western universalism. She describes the current 
conception of contemporary politics as "rationalist, universalist and individualist"155 and 
advances two reasons why the current conceptions of democracy are inadequate to 
address the challenge of particularisms to universalism: They do not recognise the 
specificity of the political and they do not realise the important role of antagonism. 
Mouffe relies on Carl Schmitt's156 critique of liberal democracy for her own vision of 
"radical democracy". She argues that by placing emphasis on the friend/enemy 
relationship in politics, Schmitt brings to light the link between the political and an 
element of hostility among human beings. Mouffe reformulates the friend/enemy relation 
154 (1993) The return of the political. See also Mclaren (1997) Revolutionary multiculturalism: 
Pedagogies of dissent for the new millennium and Giroux (1993) Living dangerously: 
Multiculturalism and the politics of difference. 
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in her anti-essentialist critique. 
When we accept that every identity is relational and that the condition of 
existence of every identity is the affirmation of a difference, the 
determination of an "other" that is going to play the role of a "constitutive 
outside", it is possible to understand how antagonisms arise. In the 
domain of collective identifications, where what is in question is the 
creation of a "we" by the delimitation of a "them", the possibility always 
exists that this we/them relation will turn into a relation of the friend/enemy 
type; in other words it can always become political in Schmitt's 
understanding of the term. 157 
Mouffe rejects the "instrumental" approach to politics. For her the political cannot be 
limited to a certain institution or sphere but must be understood as "inherent to every 
human society" 158. Her main focus is on creating (and maintaining) a pluralistic 
democracy under the reality of antagonism. She distinguishes between "enemy" and 
"adversary". 
It requires that, within the context of the political community, the opponent 
should be considered not as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an 
adversary whose existence is legitimate and must be tolerated. We will 
fight against his ideas but we will not question his right to defend them. 
The category of the "enemy" does not disappear but is displaced. 159 
Her vision of "radical democracy" relies on the notion of a "radical democratic 
citizenship" that can provide an identification with "a common political identity among 
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diverse democratic struggles". 160 Although she is critical of the liberal individualist 
conception, she is also wary of communitarianism because of its rejection of pluralism 
and its reliance on one substantive conception of the "common good". 
Mouffe argues that the idea of "pluralism" must be "radicalised". For this radical 
pluralism, the ideas of "rational", "individual" and "universal" need to be 
reconceptualised. They need not be rejected but their plurality, "discursively 
constructed" nature and inherent power must be realised. She distinguishes the vision 
of "radical pluralism" from the postmodern conception of the "fragmentation of the 
social, which refuses to grant the fragments any kind of relational identity". 161 She also 
reacts against Habermas's model of communicative theory. She believes that his 
reliance on a "regulative ideal" of "free and unconstrained communication" puts the 
democratic projects at risk. For her "radical democracy" or "radical plurality" contains 
a paradox. 
[S]ince the very moment of its realization would see its disintegration. It 
should be conceived as a good that only exists as good as long as it 
cannot be reached. Such a democracy will therefore always be a 
democracy "to come", as conflict and antagonism are at the same time its 
condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of its full 
realization. 162 
Mouffe stands critical towards contemporary liberal thought and finds it inadequate to 
address democracy in current societies because of its negation of "the political" and 
antagonism. She is against the instrumental-political vision of liberal thought and the 
insistence on neutrality. She is also critical towards the communitarian belief in one 
substantive meaning of the "common good". Although she reacts against certain 
aspects of modernity (liberal thought), she also has difficulties with postmodernity. She 
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situates her vision of "radical democracy" beyond the approaches. of liberalism, 
communitarianism, Habermas as well as postmodernity. She describes her vision of 
"radical democracy" as a "democracy to come". She rejects neither modernity nor 
postmodernity but accepts the double-bind in her vision. In other words, "radical 
democracy" is both modern and postmodern. Her emphasis on anti-essentialism 
distinguishes her from other visions that tend to capture "truth". 
According to Mouffe, "radical democracy" pursues Habermas' "unfulfilled project of 
modernity" without being essentialist. In order to understand her vision of "radical 
democracy" as both modern and postmodern, her understanding of modernity and 
postmodernity should be highlighted. She defines modernity "at the political level" and 
argues that the "fundamental character of modernity" is the "advent of the democratic 
revolution" .163 Postmodern ism is for her "a recognition of the impossibility of any 
ultimate foundation or final legitimation that is constitutive of the very advent of the 
democratic form of society and thus of modernity itself." 164 To her, the questioning of 
rationalism and humanism does not mean a total rejection of modernity. What must be 
rejected is the Enlightenment project of self-foundation. The matter must be conceived 
in a different way. 
To be capable of thinking politics today, and understanding the nature of 
these new struggles and the diversity of social relations that the 
democratic revolution has yet to encompass, it is indispensable to 
develop a theory of the subject as a decentred, detotalized agent, a 
subject constructed at the point of intersection of a multiplicity of subject 
positions between which there exists no a priori or necessary relation and 
whose articulation is the result of hegemonic practices. Consequently, no 
identity is ever definitely established, there always being a certain degree 
of openness and ambiguity in the way the different subject positions are 
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articulated. What emerges are entirely new perspectives for political 
action which neither liberalism, with its idea of the individual who only 
pursues his or her own interest, nor Marxism, with its reduction of all 
subject positions to that of class, can sanction, let alone imagine. 165 
This vision has the effect that universalism is not rejected, but particularised. The 
debate amongst feminists in regard to whether feminism should totally embrace 
postmodern theory and reject modern theory is relevant to this point. Benhabib, in 
reaction to the three characteristics of postmodernism, the death of the subject, the 
death of history and the death of metaphysics, 166 has argued that feminism as a political 
theory still needs a concept of the subject, and of history and of metaphysics. 167 She is 
in favour of an interactive universalism that should supplement the present 
substitutionalist universalism. 168 An interactive universalism acknowledges every person 
as a concrete person with particular needs. 
It is such a particularised universalism that might contribute to the reconstruction and 
transformation of South African public space. The notion of an interactive and 
particularised universalism is true to my vision of an "in between" public space, it does 
not fully embrace modernism or postmodernism. This means that we need not totally 
reject modernist concepts like democracy, equality and justice. We must, however, 
reinterpret them by following such a particularised approach. An ethical interpretation 
of equality insists on adhering to concrete contexts and specific circumstances when 
addressing issues of equality and difference. 
Mouffe explains that the revival of the Aristotelian concept of practical reason 
(phronesis) can be understood in light of the challenges to universalism. She argues 
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that Kant's philosophy gave rise to a scientific, universal kind of practical reason that 
opened the way for positivism. 169 She refers to Gadamer's 170 view that the Aristotelian 
vision of practical reason is better for judgement as well as for the comprehension of 
the relationship between the universal and the particular. Mouffe argues that the "false" 
choice between "universal-criterion" and the "rule of arbitrariness" must be avoided. The 
choice between universalism and relativism is false because the absence of a 
scientifically correct answer does not mean that it is impossible to form a reasonable 
opinion. Mouffe agrees with Hannah Arendt, who identified the political sphere as the 
realm of opinion and not as that of truth. 171 
To assert that one cannot provide an ultimate rational foundation for any 
given system of values does not imply that one considers all views to be 
equal. ... It is always possible to distinguish between the just and the 
unjust, the legitimate and the illegitimate, but this can only be done from 
within a given tradition, with the help of standards that this tradition 
provides, in fact, there is no point of view external to all tradition from 
which one can offer a universal judgement. 172 
Mouffe concedes that the emphasis "radical democracy" places on the particular and 
on tradition in some way intersects with conservative thinking. (She explains that this 
is why Habermas insists that postmodern thought is conservative.) She argues, 
however, that tradition must be distinguished from traditionalism. Tradition can be 
important for "radical democracy" if the inherent open and indeterminate character of 
the democratic tradition is emphasised. 
For Mouffe "radical democracy" is beyond liberalism as well as communitarianism or 
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civic republicanism. Although she wants to retain aspects of the civic republican 
tradition, she distinguishes between the various strands. Mouffe criticises Sandel173 
(and Alasdair Maclntyre)174 for defending premodern conceptions of politics without 
distinguishing between "the ethical" and "the political". Radical democracy in Mouffe's 
view can provide us with a better conception of politics than either liberalism or civic 
republicanism. 
Our societies are confronted with the proliferation of political spaces 
which are radically new and different and which demand that we abandon 
the idea of a unique constitutive space of the constitution of the political, 
which is particular to both liberalism and civic republicanism. 175 
She argues that we need to create new "subject positions" because both the liberal 
conception of the "unencumbered self' and the communitarian/civic republican 
conception of the "unitary situated self' are deficient. For her, the problem lies in the 
conception of the "unitary subject". She criticises communitarianism and civic 
republicanism for assuming only one community with one conception of the "common 
good". 
But we are in fact always multiple and contradictory subjects, inhabitants 
of a diversity of communities (as many, really, as the social relations in 
which we participate and the subject positions they define), constructed 
by a variety of discourses, and precariously and temporarily sutured at 
the intersection of those subject positions. 176 
At some points, I find Mouffe's criticism and interpretation of the communitarian/civic 
173 (1982) Liberalism and the limits of justice. 
174 See generally Macintyre (1984) After virtue. 
175 (1993) The return of the political 20. 
176 (1993) The return of the political 20. 
101 
republican vision too harsh. Even though she distinguishes between the lines of 
thinking, and associates herself more with some of their authors than with others, all 
these theories remain open to interpretation. I believe that some of the authors she 
interprets as naively subscribing to one community and one substantive "common 
good", can be read and interpreted as more open to heterogeneity than she may 
concede. 
Mouffe refers to Sandel's critique of Rawl s's prioritisation of "the right" over "the good". 
She agrees with Sandel that Rawls gives an inadequate explanation, but disagrees with 
Sandel's conclusion that Rawls's deficiency is proof of the superiority of a politics of the 
"good" over a politics of defending rights. Kantian liberals believe, first, that individual 
rights are more important than the "common good", and further that the principles of 
justice can be totally separated from a particular conception of the "good life". 
Communitarians believe that it is impossible to prioritise the "right" over the "good" 
because it is only through participation in the community that the "good" is defined and 
we can have a sense of right and an understanding of justice. 177 Mouffe rejects Sandel's 
conclusion that we should reject the priority of justice and return to a politics based on 
moral order. For her, what really is at stake, is the consideration of contemporary 
politics in a non-instrumental manner. 
Mouffe's double-handed approach is reflected in her view of morality and politics: To 
account for politics in a non-instrumental manner entails assuming everything involved 
under the notion of a "political good", while respecting the separation between morality 
and politics. Mouffe argues that neither Sandel nor Rawls makes this distinction 
adequately. Sandel fails because he works from an Aristotelian framework that does not 
separate politics from morality. Rawls reduces politics to an instrumental activity. The 
positivist distinction between fact and value had the effect that many questions of a 
political nature, such as that of justice, were regarded as moral questions and have 
accordingly been relegated to the moral domain. Mouffe178 argues that liberalism has 
177 
178 
(1993) The return of the political 31. 
(1993) The return of the political 33. 
102 
an inability to think of the political. It is important to re-ask the question of the common 
good and of civic virtue, but in a modern way. 
In discussing Waltzer's communitarianism, Mouffe follows her double-handed approach 
of criticising individualist liberalism without abandoning the positive aspect of rights and 
pluralism. She see in Waltzer's communitarianism an approach that manages to criticise 
liberalism without rejecting its positive aspects. Waltzer relies on a "complex equality" 
that recognises difference: 
[Complex equality] requires that different social goods be distributed, not 
in a uniform manner but in terms of a diversity of criteria which reflect the 
diversity of those social goods and meanings attached to them. 179 
Mouffe discusses the civic republican ideal in America that strives to correct the 
inadequacy of liberalism. She distinguishes between the Aristotelian and the 
Machiavellian civic republican tradition. Mouffe prefers the Machiavellian tradition 
because it distinguishes between politics and morality and because it recognises the 
central role of conflict in the preservation of liberty. She favours a civic republican 
approach that does not negate the individual in favour of the citizen. In this regard, she 
refers to Skinner's re-evaluation of the republican conception of citizenship and of 
liberty. Skinner180 rejects Berlin's181 assertion that the positive concept of freedom is 
anti-modern and finds in the republican tradition a negative concept of liberty that does 
not negate political participation and civic virtue. 
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In a recent newspaper article, 182 Xolela Mangcu argued that Berlin's distinction between 
positive and negative freedom has practical application in our current South African 
political context. White people, according to the writer, subscribe to the concept of 
negative freedom, while black people subscribe to the concept of positive freedom. 
Mangcu maintains that the ANG came to power on the promise of positive freedom for 
black South Africans, while the constitution also provides for all the classic liberal rights 
(negative freedom). The writer predicts a major political realignment, should poor whites 
together with poor blacks turn to the government for socio-economic help. An increasing 
number of middle-class blacks might join whites in their claim for liberal protections 
(negative freedoms). The writer calls for "a new political ethos that transcends the 
familiar political categories of left and right". It is unnecessary and even destructive to 
choose between modern opposites like national and local; public and private; liberty 
and community. Along the same lines as Mouffe, Mangcu proposes that we need both 
opposites. He quotes the American historian Alan Brinkely's words: 
We need a vigorous government and a healthy market. We need strong 
national institutions and strong local ones. We need a healthy public 
world and a healthy private one. Above all, we need both liberty and 
community, for neither is sustainable without the other. 183 
Mangcu argues for "a new political idiom that would be broader than political 
differences" and that would "foster identification with a set of national ideals that cut 
across the fault lines of race, class and ethnicity". I am not sure what to make of this 
call. If it means a negation of differences (race, class and sexuality), it is a dangerous 
one that does not adhere to the double-bind of liberty and community. Mangcu 
concludes by saying that Mbeki's African Renaissance could be such a "unifying 
philosophy, if democratically and pluralistically articulated". If "democratic" and 
"pluralistic" here can be interpreted in Mouffe's idiom, the call for an identification with 
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a set of national ideals can reflect her concept of radical democratic citizenship; if not, 
Mangcu's vision will be flawed because it will amount to an equalising of multiple 
perspectives, thereby reducing and violating difference. 
The reconstruction and transformation of South African public space can benefit from 
Mouffe's vision of "radical democracy"and "radical particularity". The value of the liberal 
tradition should be affirmed with the value of the civic republican tradition, while their 
shortcomings are simultaneously exposed and displaced. It is significant to note that 
where Habermas situates himself in between the liberal and the republican vision, 
Mouffe situates herself beyond them. I believe that our reconstructed and transforming 
visions of public space should also seek a space beyond the liberal and republican 
visions. 
Mouffe184 strives for a model of politics where, without affirming a single concept of the 
"common good", one can still talk about a political community. She relies on Oakeshott's 
distinction between societas and universitas. Oakeshott argues that these medieval 
associations can represent alternative versions of the modern state. Universitas refers 
to an association where a common interest is shared. Societas, on the other hand, is 
not an association with a common purpose, but one where there is loyalty. Mouffe 
argues that Oakeshot's description of societas is adequate to describe contemporary 
political association. 
Indeed it is a mode of association that recognizes the disappearance of 
a single substantive idea of the common good and makes room for 
individual liberty. It is a form of association that can be enjoyed among 
relativ~ strangers belonging to many purposive associations and whose 
allegiances to specific communities are not seen as conflicting with their 
membership of the civil association. 185 
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Mouffe argues that in order to belong to the political community, we need to accept a 
"specific language of civil intercourse, the respublica that creates a common political 
identity that is not one substantive idea of the common good, but a 'public concern'." 
The political community that is created is a community "without a definite shape or a 
definite identity and in continuous re-enactment." In terms of this view, citizenship is a 
common identity of multiple persons, all engaged in different activities and bound 
together by their common recognition of a set of ethical-political values. Mouffe explains 
that since citizenship is a political concept, competing forms of identification will be 
linked to different interpretations of the respublica. She argues for a "common political 
identity as radical democratic citizens" that implicates a "collective identification with a 
radical democratic interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality". Many 
elements of her vision of "radical democracy" become relevant and converge in her 
concept of "radical democratic citizenship". The latter relies on the rejection of the 
unitary subject, or in other words, it relies on multiple subject positions that must be 
conceived in an anti-essentialist manner. The radical conception of citizenship ties in 
with the current debates about modernity and postmodernity, and the critique of 
rationalism and universalism. Mouffe's vision of public space is a "radical democratic" 
vision which leads to a "radical democratic citizenship". 
South Africa as a young democracy, where for the first time ever al South Africans can 
be full citizens, can benefit from such a "common political identification" described by 
Mouffe. As a heterogeneous society we need to reject a unitary conception of the 
subject and make space for multiple subject positions. The various stories and different 
voices that came to the fore in the event of the TRC are great examples of how multiple 
subject positions can be articulated. 
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Gender perspectives 
Below I shall raise three accounts of feminism. The first account is Mouffe's where she 
applies her vision of radical democracy to feminist politics. Secondly, I refer to Drucilla 
Cornell's insistence on the affirmation of the feminine in an anti-essentialist way. Thirdly 
I repeat Jennifer Nedelsky's view that we need to acknowledge the feminine in our 
concepts of citizenship. 
A new conception of citizenship 
Mouffe186 describes her approach to feminist politics as an "anti-essentialist approach 
informed by a radical democratic project". She argues that an essentialist approach is 
inadequate to answer questions concerning democracy, plurality and oppression. For 
Mouffe the deconstruction of identities is a necessary condition for her vision of radical 
democracy which is committed to liberty and equality. 
It is only when we discard the view of the subject as an agent both 
rational and transparent to itself, and discard as well the supposed unity 
and homogeneity of the ensemble of its positions, that we are in a 
position to theorize the multiplicity of relations of subordination. 187 
She argues that it is impossible to understand the subject only in one homogenous way. 
The subject must be approached as a plurality, dependent on the various subject 
positions through which it is constituted. This plurality does not involve the coexistence 
of a plurality of subject positions but the constant subversion and over-determination 
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of one by the others. To Mouffe 188 such a constant subversion is extremely important 
for an understanding of feminist and other contemporary struggles. 
Mouffe states that the question of what feminist politics should be has to be phrased in 
completely different terms. Most feminists have been divided by looking either for 
"specific demands" or for "specific values". Liberal feminists have focused on acquiring 
rights for women in order to make them equal citizens but without challenging the 
dominant liberal model of citizenship and politics. Other feminists (cultural and 
relational), who criticised the liberal feminists, argued that the present conception of the 
political is a male one and that women's interests cannot be accommodated within such 
a framework. 
Mouffe189 suggests the construction of a "new conception of citizenship". In her 
conception of citizenship, sexual difference will become irrelevant. 
I want to argue that the limitations of the modern conception of citizenship 
should be remedied, not by making sexual difference politically relevant 
to its definition, but by constructing a new conception of citizenship where 
sexual difference would become effectively irrelevant. 190 
Mouffe emphasises the significance of rights for a modern conception of citizenship. 
The need for political participation and belonging to a political community must not be 
neglected. She argues for a concept of citizenship that identifies with the political 
principles of modern pluralist democracy, liberty and equality. In this vision the 
public/private distinction is not rejected but constructed in a different way. Mouffe 
explains that if citizenship is identified with the ethical-political principles of modern 
democracy (liberty and equality) there can be as many forms of citizenship as there are 
interpretations of those principles. She wants to create a collective political identity for 
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the different groups - women, workers, gays, blacks - that are struggling for liberty and 
equality. 
Mouffe argues that the absence of a female essential identity and of a pre-given unity 
does not preclude the construction of multiple forms of unity and common action. 
"Partial fixations" can take place and precarious forms of identification can be 
established around the category "women" that can provide the basis for a feminist 
identity and a feminist struggle. She argues that feminist politics should not be 
understood as a separate form of politics designed to pursue the interests of women, 
but rather as the pursuit of feminist ideals within the wider context of articulation and 
demands. Feminisms should not pursue a given form of feminist discourse that can 
"really" capture the "true essence" of womanhood. The aim should rather be to show 
how feminisms can enhance the possibilities for an understanding of women's multiple 
forms of subordination. 
I believe that Mouffe's vision of "radical democracy" is a positive contribution to our own 
reconstruction and transformation of public space. I do not subscribe fully to her view 
of feminist politics. An anti-essentialist approach to feminism and gender does not need 
to rely on a neutral vision of citizenship. Below I shall discuss Drucilla Cornell's 
affirmation of the "feminine" and Jennifer Nedelsky's "relational approach to citizenship". 
Both authors follow an anti-essentialist approach but do not accept Mouffe's reliance 
on neutrality. 
The "doubly-prized world" 
Cornell focuses on a central dilemma facing feminism, namely how to affirm the 
feminine without reverting to stereotypical, essentialist, naturalist images of women. 
Cornell argues for a "feminine voice" and a "feminine reality" that can be identified and 
linked to the lives of "actual" women. The problem, however, is that all accounts of the 
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feminine seem to reset the trap of rigid gender identities, deny the real differences 
among women, and reflect the history of oppression and discrimination rather than an 
ideal to which we ought to aspire. She argues that one way to resolve this dilemma 
might be to return to the "significance" of the feminine. Cornell refers to the words of 
Emily Bronte: "this world is hopeless without, the world I doubly prize". She suggests 
that we must give a new twist to Bronte's lines to describe the feminine. 
The world doubly prized is the world stranger than the facts that opens us 
to the possibility of a new choreography of sexual difference, through an 
allegorical account of the Feminine as beyond any of our current 
stereotypes of Woman. 191 
Cornell argues that feminist theory demands the retelling of the myths of the feminine 
as an "imaginative universal". Her "ethical" approach to feminism implies that "Women" 
cannot be reduced to a mere descriptive account of the way women are or have been. 
Although it is important to break the silence that has kept women's stories from being 
heard, we should also explicitly recognise the "should be" (in other words the ethical 
dimension) inherent in accounts of the feminine. Cornell suggests "ethical" feminism as 
an alternative to both "liberal" and "radical" feminism. She argues that ethical feminism 
explicitly recognises the "should be" in representations of the feminine and rests its 
claim for intelligibility and coherence of "woman's story" not on what woman "is", but on 
the remembrance of the "not yet" recollected in both allegory and myth. 
Cornell turns to Derrida's 192 philosophy of language (deconstruction) to explain her 
understanding of the essentialist/anti-essentialist debate. 
Deconstruction undermines the attempt to establish language as a pure 
191 
192 
Cornell 'The doubly-prized world: myth, allegory and the feminine" (1990) 75 Cornell Law 
Review645. 
Camel refers to Derrida (1982) Margins of philosophy. In Part 2 " ... perspectives on 
equality" I shall discuss aspects of deconstruction. 
110 
medium that simply accepts sense and brings it to conceptual form. 193 
Deconstruction shows that there is no "essence of woman" that can be abstracted from 
the linguistic representations of woman. The referent woman is dependent on the 
systems of representation in which she is given meaning. We cannot separate the 
"truth" of woman from the "fictions" in which she is represented and in which she 
portrays herself. These fictions in which we confront her always carry within them the 
possibility of multiple interpretations. There is no outside referent, such as nature or 
biology, or a ground of feminine identity in which this process of interpretation comes 
to an end. 
Cornell argues that Derrida seeks a "new choreography of sexual difference" but 
explains that he is wary of any attempt to introduce a "new concept of representation" 
of woman to replace the ones we now have. Such a new representation would again 
turn her into an "object of knowledge". Derrida emphasises that there is no ultimate 
feminine concept of woman that can be identified once and for all. But it is also 
important to note that Derrida does not proclaim the "truth" of woman as "absence" .194 
This in direct contrast to Lacan, who only experiences woman as "absence", as "lack". 
Cornell explains that Derrida does not rely on any rigid representation of women. 
However, this does not mean that there are no stabilised gender representations 
enforced in social conventions. Without such stabilised representations it would be 
impossible to give a critical account of the treatment of the feminine, and of women, 
within law. Cornell argues that it would be a mistake to conclude that all interpretations 
of the feminine are equal. The criteria for judgement are both ethical and political. She 
explains: 
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Does one interpretation rather than another expand and enhance the 
Woman as "seen", so as to lift the stereotypes that justify the continuing 
oppression of women?195 
Cornell argues that there is an "ethical risk" inherent in a gender-neutral position. 
Traditionally, ethics has been understood as a universal position that can be reached 
by all subjects independent of their sex or gender. Derrida argues as follows in this 
regard: 
One could, I think, demonstrate this: when sexual difference is determined 
by opposition in the dialectical sense ... one appears to set off "the war 
between the sexes"; but one precipitates the end with victory going to the 
masculine sex. The determination of sexual difference in opposition is 
destined, designed in truth, for truth; it is so in order to erase sexual 
difference. The dialectical opposition neutralizes or supersedes ... the 
difference. However, according to surreptitious operation that must be 
flushed out, one insures phallocentric mastery under the cover of 
neutralization every time. These are now well known paradoxes. 196 
Cornell argues that the only escape from this paradox is to work against the order of 
repression within the hierarchy. For this reason, Derrida positions himself through the 
feminine. To open metaphysical oppositions, one cannot simply deny their existence 
in already established "neutral" discourse. There must be an intervention into the 
hierarchical structure of opposition. But this intervention will not simply pass, because 
the oppositions will continually re-assert themselves. Cornell explains: 
We never just "get over it". We cannot settle down once and for all. In that 
sense, deconstruction is interminable, there cannot be a clear line 
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between "phase one" and "phase two". 197 
Cornell's ethical feminism criticises "radical feminism", as represented by Catherine 
MacKinnon.198 MacKinnon accepts the Lacanian framework that teaches us that the law 
and the legal system cannot be separated from the "Law of the Father", through which 
gender identity is established. MacKinnon's position is that we can only achieve legal 
equality if we challenge the very basis of sexual difference. For her, the feminine self 
is the one who is objectified. Femininity is a trap in which we willingly fall in our distorted 
desire to lose and to be objectified. 199 In her words: 
I'm saying femininity as we know it is how we come to want male 
dominance, which most emphatically is not in our interest. 200 
The man is the one who in MacKinnon's view dominates and objectifies. But why is it 
the end of the world to be objectified, asks Cornell. Is the problem really objectification 
or the system of gender representation that defines the masculine and the 
corresponding self as the one who dominates? To MacKinnon, all heterosexual 
intercourse is a form of oppression. Cornell, on the other hand, refers us to Bataille's201 
reminder that eroticism demands nothing less than the "risk of self'. She argues that 
MacKinnon does not successfully distinguish the inherent value, ability and risk to the 
self involved in eroticism from the specific feminine position of being objectified. This 
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MacKinnon cannot do as long as she re-casts the subject as seeking freedom, not 
intimacy, in sex. As long as the masculine view of the self as "not objectified" is 
accepted, women, if they are objectified, cannot be individuals. In terms of this view of 
the individual or the subject, the body becomes the "barrier" behind which the self hides, 
and the weapon - the phallus - asserts itself against others. Cornell argues that the 
feminine self as it is celebrated in myth, "lives" the body differently. 
The body is not an erected barrier, but a position of receptivity. To be 
accessible is to be open to the other. To shut oneself off is loss of sexual 
pleasure. 202 
Viewing the body this way, being objectified is not the end of the world. Cornell refers 
to words in Elizabeth Bishop's poem, "One Art": "It's evident /the art of losing's not too 
hard to master/ though it may look like ... disaster". She argues that even if one loses 
the self in some forms of objectification or sex, it is important to remember that there are 
more important things to do than maintaining the self against others. Empowerment is 
not and should not be the ultimate goal in all relationships. Cornell argues that the 
identification of empowerment as the sole political goal of feminism, shows how 
profoundly we remain under the sway of masculine symbolism. 203 We must seek a new 
idiom in which we can speak of feminine desire. We should not deny male power, but 
we must not make the masculine our world by insisting that we are only what men have 
made us to be. Cornell reminds us of Helene Cixous's words: 
She is a woman, heaven knows,/What is the difference? It isn't only the 
sex,/ It's the way that love loves, above walls, despite armour, after the 
end of the world,/ But I don't know how to say it. 
Cornell replies: "I don't know how to say it either. But if there is a reason to keep writing, 
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it is for the sake of trying to say it."204 
Ethical feminism is a deconstructive approach to the questions of woman, the feminine, 
socially constructed oppositions, and so on. By recognising the "should be" inherent in 
accounts of the feminine, and by remembering the "not yet" which is recollected in both 
allegory and myth, ethical feminism does not again describe woman in a rigid way, but 
keeps her open to multiple interpretations. Just as the legal system is not a closed 
system which has its origin in itself or in some other identified institution, patriarchy or 
the sex-gender system is not a closed system with its origin in, for example, biology or 
nature. Deconstruction which seeks to disrupt the present or the given without at the 
same time seeking to replace the "old" with a "new", ensures the possibility of 
transformation and the possibility of justice. 
Our visions of public space need transformation, not evolution. This transformation 
would entail an understanding of the theory and praxis of notions such as 
deconstruction, differance, and ethical feminism. We should make space for the 
reconstruction of myth to tell multiple stories of the feminine and of woman. In the words 
of Cornell: 
Feminism calls us all to wake up and to see "the doubly prized world" 
which might be ours. The world ... is doubly-prized, not only as a 
disruptive power of difference, but also as the opening of the space of the 
feminine so "her story" can be told, in all its suffering and pain, as well as 
in all its glory". 205 
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A "relational" approach to citizenship 
Jennifer Nedelsky206 notes that, historically, equality and citizenship have excluded 
many. She goes on to say that the history of exclusion is not only "historical blind 
spots", but part of the conceptual framework of citizenship and equal rights. This leads 
to a certain tension in the struggle for equality and citizenship. 
This built in exclusion has meant that everywhere in the world women 
struggling for equality face a tension in their strategies: to call upon 
traditional conceptions of citizenship and equal rights to challenge the 
existing subordination and exclusion of women is to call upon a tradition 
deeply implicated in that very exclusion and subordination; but to fail to 
do so seems to abandon a tool ... that has been used throughout the 
world in emancipatory struggles. 207 
Nedelsky argues that "the reconception of citizenship must go together with a 
reconception of rights". For this reconstruction of citizenship (and rights) we need to 
adopt another conception of the self. The conception of the self that underlies the 
dominant (liberal) conception of citizenship, perceives the self as an "autonomous", 
"rational" agent which asserts its "self-determination" by choosing its relationships and 
obligations. Nedelsky explains that this conception of the self gives rise to a set of 
claims about the rights needed for self-determination and rational agency. She argues 
that the liberal conception of the self excludes the experience of women and is also 
"culturally specific". Constructive relationships allow autonomy: 
The self is a fundamentally relational self, which requires constructive 
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relationships for any of its potential to be fully realised. 208 
She believes that a relational view of the self can address the exclusionary nature of 
the conception of citizenship. Any conception of citizenship and of rights must be 
founded on a vision of the self. 
Some conception of the nature of the human self must ground one's view 
of the rights to which people are entitled and the ways in which 
membership 1n national communities should be structured and 
conceived. 209 
Nedelsky argues that the concept of the relational self could avoid the exclusion of 
cultural specificity. It could also incorporate women's experience of "complex 
interconnectedness" in the concept of citizenship. She emphasises the necessity of 
investigating the concrete contexts of individuals. 
As soon as we want to know anything at all specific about the actual 
rights people should enjoy, we need to turn to the concrete particulars of 
their situation. It is here that the feminist insistence on context and 
particularity instead of abstract universality is crucial. 210 
Nedelsky argues that the approach followed by theorists like Virginia Held,211 Sarah 
Ruddick212 and Joan Tronto, 213 amongst others, can be fruitful in the reconstruction of 
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the traditional conception of citizenship. She does not find them to be essentialist. She 
believes that the knowledge, experience, insight and emotional connections that women 
gain from mothering, should not be excluded from the public realm. 214 To make 
citizenship a reality we should address the particulars of a person's context and 
situation. Nedelsky says that the particulars of a person's context at present, and for the 
foreseeable future, will not only differ in respect of class, education and so on, but it will 
also differ in respect of sex and gender. 
The perspectives of Cornell and Nedelsky are significant for how we conceive of the 
feminine and of woman in the reconstruction and transformation of public spaces. 
Although Mouffe's emphasis on an anti-essentialist approach must be remembered, 
ways of affirming gender (and other) differences must be explored to prevent the 
recurrence or mere continuance of neutral exclusion. In the next section I shall put 
forward Hannah Arendt's vision of public space. 
214 See also Nedelsky "Dilemmas of passion, privilege and isolation: Reflections on mothering 
in a white, middle-class nuclear family" in (1999) Hanigsberg and Ruddick (eds) Mother 
troubles: Rethinking contemporary maternal dilemmas. 
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Hannah Arendt's vision of public space 
We can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past and 
simply call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a 
dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion. The subterranean 
stream of Western history has finally come to the surface and usurped the 
dignity of our tradition. This is the reality in which we live. And this is why 
all efforts to escape from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a 
still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are vain. 
215 
In this section, the final section on visions of public space, I turn to Hannah Arendt for 
guidance and inspiration for the reconstruction and transformation of public space. For 
me, Arendt can not be pinned down to a premodern, modern or postmodern approach. 
Moments of all three of these approaches can be found in her theory. She is indeed 
situated in an "in between" position. 
To appreciate Hannah Arendt's vision of action and speech in the public realm, we need 
to understand her views on totalitarianism. In The origins of totalitarianism, she adopted 
a "fragmented" approach to history and to the "event of totalitarianism". In the three 
sections subtitled "Antisemitism", "Imperialism", and "Totalitarianism", she described the 
elements of totalitarianism. In the final section she gives her account of totalitarianism 
which forms an important background to The human condition, where she explains her 
theory of action and her view of public space. 
Arendt regards Nazism and Stalinism as essentially similar, both being totalitarian 
events. To her, Nazism was not a specifically German phenomenon, but one which, in 
215 Arendt (1951) The origins of totalitarianism xxxi. 
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terms of modern developments could also be linked to Stalinism. 216 Canovan217 notes 
that by doing this Arendt was moving in the same direction as other intellectuals who 
sought to connect Nazism with modernity, thereby deflecting blame from specifically 
German traditions. For example, according to the Frankfurt School, totalitarianism is the 
outcome of a "dialectic enlightenment" engendered within the rational, liberal, capital 
west itself. Although Arendt supported some of the views of the Frankfurt School,218 she 
also shared the views of those who put the blame for Nazism on the rejection of 
enlightenment and democracy and the worship of Romantic nature. She attributed the 
collapse of humanistic enlightened civilisation to capitalist-imperialistic practices in 
particular. 
This tension in Hannah Arendt's thinking on the nature of Nazism is characteristic of all 
her writings. In Benhabib's view, Arendt can be seen as both modernist and anti-
modernist.219 Canovan,220 again, argues that Arendt's concern as a political theorist was 
to challenge the ways in which "conceptual packages" are put together. She argues that 
by making distinctions within modernity Arendt drew the battle lines in different places. 
She placed less emphasis on the influence of ideas, than on totalitarianism as an event. 
What is unprecedented in totalitarianism is not primarily its ideological 
content but the event of totalitarian domination itself. 221 
To Arendt totalitarianism was not simply a form of tyranny, but something new and 
unprecedentedly terrible. 
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Suffering of which there has always been too much on earth, is not the 
issue, nor is the number of victims. Human nature as such is at stake. 222 
She characterises totalitarianism as "absolute" or "radical" evil. 223 The totalitarian 
assault on human nature is an attempt to destroy the human qualities that distinguish 
human beings from animals, namely their individuality and their capacity to act. She 
describes being human as being one of a plurality of individuals each of them different, 
each of them capable of starting something new. Totalitarian leaders seek total 
domination. Human spontaneity has to be destroyed to reduce human beings to 
predictable members of a herd so that they will not upset the system. According to 
Arendt, totalitarians believe that everything is possible. They aspire to omnipotence, the 
price of which is necessarily human plurality and spontaneity, and thus human nature 
itself. The totalitarian belief rests on the destruction of human unpredictability on the 
one hand and on delusions of human omnipotence on the other. Totalitarian leaders 
believe that everything is possible without believing in human freedom and 
responsibility, not even their own. To Hannah Arendt totalitarianism is 
[A]n attempt to exercise total domination and demonstrate that everything 
is possible by destroying human plurality and spontaneity at all levels, 
and ironing out all that is human and contingent to make it fit a determinist 
ideology. 224 
Further, 
[T]he totalitarian belief that everything is possible seems to have proved 
only that everything can be destroyed.225 
222 Arendt (1951) The origins of totalitarianism 433. 
223 Arendt (1951) The origins oftotalitarianism 433. 
224 Canavan (1992) Hannah Arendt. A reinterpretation of her political thought 27. 
225 (1951) The origins of totalitarianism 433. 
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"All sorrows can be borne if you put them into a story or tell a story 
about them": Arendt's theory of action 226 
Hannah Arendt developed her theory of action and speech in The human condition, 
which appeared in 1958, seven years after The origins of totalitarianism. In The human 
condition she expanded her earlier vision on human beings' capacity to act, and 
pluralism. She distinguished between the public and the private spheres, and between 
three human activities: work, labour and action. Labour corresponds to life, to being 
alive. The slave is captured in the condition of labour, ruled by necessity. Work 
corresponds to the world, to that which is tangible. The merchant is immersed in the 
condition of work and is ruled by materialism. Action corresponds to culture, history and 
to the human world of plurality. The citizen is in the condition of action and is free to 
interact and to engage in speech. Action and speech distinguish humans from animals. 
Arendt identified human plurality as the basic condition for action and speech. Plurality 
has the twofold character of equality and distinction. Humans are equal because if they 
were not they would have been unable to understand each other. Humans are distinct 
because if they were the same they would not have needed speech or action to make 
themselves understood. Human distinctness is not the same as "otherness". 227 Although 
it is an important aspect of plurality, "otherness" is found only in the "sheer multiplication 
of inorganic objects". Only humans can express variations and distinctions and 
communicate them. 
[O]therness . . . and distinctness . . . become uniqueness, and human 
plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings.228 
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Arendt (1958) The human condition 175. 
I shall discuss the concept of the "other" in Levin as and Derrida in Part 2 " ... perspectives 
on equality". 
Arendt (1958) The human condition 176. 
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This unique distinctness is revealed through speech and action. Speech and action, as 
distinguished from physical appearance (labour) rest on initiative, from which no human 
can refrain and remain human. Arendt argues that this cannot be said of labour or work. 
We insert ourselves into the world by our words and our deeds. This insertion is like a 
second birth, not forced upon us by necessity, like labour, and not prompted by utility, 
like work. By referring to the Greek archein and Latin agere, she explains that "to act", 
in its most general sense, means to take initiative, to set something into motion. In the 
nature of beginning, something new is started, something which cannot be expected 
from whatever may have happened before. Inherent in all beginnings is the element of 
"startling unexpectedness".229 
The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical 
laws and their probability, which for all practical everyday purposes 
amounts to certainty; the new therefore always appears in the guise of a 
miracle. The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected 
can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely 
improbable. 230 
It is by acting and speaking that humans show who they are, that they reveal their 
personal identities, that they appear to each other in the human world. This appearance 
is different from physical identities, which appear without any activity of their own. The 
disclosure of "who" someone is, distinguished from "what" she is, is implicit in 
everything a person says and does. This revelatory quality of action and speech comes 
to the fore where people are with others, in "sheer human togetherness". Because it 
discloses the agent together with the act, action needs for its full appearance "the 
shining brightness we once called glory". This is only possible in the public realm. 
Action loses its specific character without the disclosure of the agent in the act. It 
229 
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Arendt's vision of action can be compared with Derrida's conception of the "event". I shall 
discuss Derrida's "event" in section 2 " ... perspectives on equality". 
(1958) The human condition 178. 
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becomes merely one form of achievement among others, no less a means to an end 
than making is a means to produce an object. Whenever "human togetherness" is lost, 
when people are only for or against other people, action loses the quality of 
transcending mere productive activity. Arendt refers to the example of modern warfare: 
Where people are only for or against other people, they go into action to achieve certain 
objectives for their own side and against the enemy. Speech in this situation becomes 
mere talk and in the absence of action reveals nothing. 
Action without a name, a "who" attached to it is meaningless, whereas an 
art work retains its relevance whether or not we know the master's 
name.231 
She argues that the monuments to the "Unknown Soldier" bear testimony to the need 
for glorification, for finding a "who". The frustration of this wish and the unwillingness 
to resign oneself to the brutal fact that the agent of the war was actually nobody, 
inspired the erection of monuments to the "unknown". These soldiers who could not 
disclose themselves by their action were not robbed of their achievement, but of their 
human dignity. 
Arendt explains that action and speech happen between people. She identifies specific, 
objective, worldly interests which lie between people and bind them together. Most 
action and speech are concerned with this "in between". In addition to the disclosure 
of the agent in acting and speaking, most words and deeds are also about some worldly 
objective reality. There is also a subjective "in between", which consists of deeds and 
words which originated exclusively in people's acting and speaking to one another. This 
subjective "in between" is not tangible, but no less real than the world of things we 
visibly have in common. Arendt calls this intangible (subjective) "in between", the "web 
of human relationships", which is the realm of human affairs (public realm). Disclosure 
of the who through speech or the setting of a new beginning through action, always falls 
into an already existing web. Because of this already existing "web of human 
231 ( 1958) The human condition 180-181 . 
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relationships", with its innumerable, conflicting wills and contentions, action never 
achieves its purpose, but gives birth to "stories" which may be told and retold. In this 
regard Arendt argues for a "fragmented" view of agency and of the subject. 
Although everybody started his life by inserting himself into the human 
world through action and speech, nobody is the author or producer of his 
own life story. In other words, the stories, the results of action and 
speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is not an author or producer. 
Somebody began it and is its subject in the twofold sense of the word, 
namely, its actor and sufferer, but nobody is its author.232 
An assessment of Arendt's "fragmented" approach to the subject would depend on 
whether her vision is being regarded as modern or postmodern. One of the main 
aspects of postmodern thought is "the death of the subject". Arendt's insistence on 
human action and speech can be interpreted as modernist. Her "fragmented" view of 
the subject clearly rejects a vision of an omnipresent subject. She argues that every 
individual life between birth and death can be told as a story with beginning and end 
which is the pre-political and prehistorical condition of history, "the great story without 
beginning and end". The reason why each human life tells a story and why history 
ultimately becomes the storybook of humankind, is because both are the outcome of 
action and speech. When one considers history, one finds that its subject, humankind, 
is an abstraction which can never become an active agent (omnipresent subject). 
Although an agent can set the whole (life) process in motion, he/she is never the author 
of its eventual outcome. 
Arendt notes that the specific content as well as the general meaning of action and 
speech are so indissolubly tied to the living flux of acting and speaking, that it can be 
represented and "reified" only through a kind of repetition, the imitation or mimesis. She 
explains this repetition with reference to Greek tragedy where only the actors and 
speakers who re-enact the story's plot can convey the full meaning. 
232 Arendt (1958) The human condition 184. 
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In terms of Greek tragedy, this would mean that the story's direct as well 
as its universal meaning is revealed by the chorus, which does not imitate 
and whose comments are pure poetry, whereas the intangible identities 
of the agents in the story, since they escape all generalization and 
therefore all reification, can be conveyed only through an imitation of their 
acting. This is also why the theatre is the political art par excellence; only 
there is the political sphere of human life transposed into art. By the same 
token, it is the only art whose subject is man in his relationship to 
others.233 
Action and speech are never possible in isolation. It needs the surrounding presence 
of others. As fabrication needs the surrounding presence of nature and of the world, so 
action needs the web of the acts and words of other people. 
Since action and speech always establish relationships, they have an inherent tendency 
to force open limitations and cut across boundaries. Because action and speech can 
open limitations and cut across boundaries, human institutions and laws are not closed 
and static and are renewed by new generations. 
The fences inclosing private property and insuring the limitations of each 
household, the territorial boundaries which protect and make possible the 
physical identity of a people, and the laws which protect and make 
possible its political existence, are of such great importance to the 
stability of human affairs precisely because no such limiting and 
protecting principles rise out of the activities going on in the realm of 
human affairs itself. 234 
The limitations of the law are thus never reliable safeguards against political action and 
speech. Likewise, the boundaries of a territory are never entirely reliable safeguards 
233 Arendt (1958) The human condition 188. 
234 Arendt (1958) The human condition 191. 
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against action from without. In this argument Arendt clearly situates herself against a 
liberal modern approach to law and politics. She identifies the boundlessness of action 
as merely the other side of its tremendous capacity for establishing relationships. While 
the various limitations and boundaries we find in the body politic may offer some 
protection against the inherent boundlessness of action, they are helpless in respect 
of the inherent unpredictability of action and speech. This unpredictability is not simply 
a question of inability to foretell all the logical consequences of a particular act, but 
arises out of the story which is an inevitable result of action, even though it is not the 
actor but the storyteller who perceives and "makes" the story. This unpredictability of 
action is closely related to the revelatory character of action and speech in which one 
discloses one's self without being able to know beforehand whom one reveals. 
Action can result in a finished product only on condition that its own authentic non-
tangible and always utterly fragile meaning is destroyed. Arendt draws on the pre-
philosophic Greek remedy for this "frailty", namely the polis. The polis had a twofold 
function: it was intended to give permanence, and immortality. Human life in the polis 
seemed to assure that the most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the 
least tangible, the deeds and stories which result from them, would become 
imperishable. The organisation of the polis is a kind of "organised remembrance", 
assuring mortals that their passing existence and fleeting greatness will never lack 
being seen and being heard. Thus, the "political" realm rises directly out of acting 
together. Action and speech find themselves in the most intimate relationship to the 
public part of the world common to us all, but it is the one activity which constitutes it. 
It is as though the wall of the polis and the boundaries of the law were 
drawn around an already existing public space which, however, without 
such stabilizing protection could not endure, could not survive the 
moment of action and speech itself. 235 
The polis is not the city-state in its physical location but the organisation of the people 
235 Arendt (1958) The human condition 198. 
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as it arises out of acting and speaking together. The true "space" of the polis lies 
between people living together for the purpose of action, no matter where they happen 
to be. 236 Action and speech create a "space" between people at any time, at any place. 
It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word. The "space of 
appearance" comes into being whenever people act or speak together. This action and 
speech precede all the various forms in which the public realm can be organised (such 
as institutionalised forms of government).The "space" does not always exist, and 
although all people are capable of action and speech, most of them do not live in the 
space of action and speech all the time. 
Arendt notes that the modern age is not the first to consider action, speech and politics 
in general as useless and idle. Since ancient times people have been frustrated by the 
"unpredictability of action's outcome, the irreversibility of the process and the anonymity 
of its authors". 237 People have sought a substitute for action in order to escape the 
complexities following the plurality of agents. They seek for an activity where one 
person isolated from others "remains master of his doings from beginning to end". 238 
This is regarded by Arendt as an attempt to replace acting with making. The 
consequence of this argument is that democracy and the "essentials" of politics, action 
and speech are threatened. For her, the attempt to do away with plurality will lead to the 
abolition of the public realm itself: 
The most obvious salvation from the dangers of plurality is monarchy, or 
one-man-rule, in its many varieties, from outright tyranny of one against 
all to benevolent despotism and to those forms of democracy in which the 
many form a collective body so that the people "is many in one" and 
constitute themselves as a "monarch". 239 
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She observes that all tyrannies have in common the banishment of the citizens from the 
public realm, insisting that they should mind their "private" business while "the ruler 
should attend to public affairs". 240 
Another feature of modern politics is the "process" character of action. The central 
concept of the two new sciences of the modern age, natural and historical science, is 
the concept of process. Arendt argues that only because we are capable of acting, of 
starting processes on our own, can we conceive of both nature and history as systems 
of processes. 241 While the strength of the production process lies in the end product, 
the strength of action can never be exhausted in a single deed. 
[W)hat endures in the realm of human affairs are these processes, and 
their endurance as unlimited, as independent of the perishability of 
material and the mortality of men as the endurance of humanity itself. The 
reason why we are never able to foretell with certainty the outcome and 
end of any action is simply that action has no end. 242 
Arendt reminds us of the "lost treasures" of our tradition of political thought under 
conditions of modernity. The "loss of public space" is one of the biggest. She views "the 
rise of the social" as a reason for the decline of public space. The social sphere 
replaced both the private and the public sphere. The "social" denies the plurality of the 
human world because it reflects only the material (tangible) world. As a result of the 
transformation of the private and the public sphere into the "social", economic 
processes, which were confined to the private realm, became public matters. She sees 
in this process the occluding of the political by the social. The public space of politics 
is transformed into a "pseudo" space of interaction in which individuals no longer act 
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but merely behave as economic producers, consumers and urban city dwellers. With 
the "rise of the social" something meaningful has disappeared, namely human plurality, 
action and speech. 
Benhabib243 notes that Arendt is often criticised for the idealised picture of Greek 
political life on which she bases her idea of public space. Her critics argue that the 
agonistic244 political space of the polis was possible only because women, slaves and 
non-citizens were excluded from it. Only a few could enjoy the leisure of politics 
because all the others made it possible for them to do so. Does this critique against 
Greek political life mean that the recovery of the public space under conditions of 
modernity is necessarily an elitist and anti-democratic project? Can the demand for 
universal political emancipation and the universal extension of citizenship rights - that 
have accompanied modernity since the American and French revolutions - be 
reconciled with a recovery of the public space? 
Benhabib245 argues that Arendt should not be read only or primarily as an agonistic 
thinker because Arendt also devoted much space in her work to analysing the 
"prospects of politics under conditions of modernity". Arendt's account of public space 
must be understood in the light of her "odd methodology", namely her use of storytelling 
to explain political thought. Benhabib views Arendt's use of storytelling as an "exercise" 
of thought. Benhabib maintains that if one approaches Arendt's account of politics and 
her account of the "decline" of the public realm in particular from this angle, it seems 
less "nostalgic". Benhabib describes Arendt's account of politics as "an attempt to think 
through history in sedimented layers of language", despite certain nostalgic moments 
in her thinking. To Benhabib, Arendt's thinking reveals two strands: The one stands in 
the tradition of "fragmentary historiography", inspired by Walter Benjamin; 246 the other 
243 (1992) Situating the se/f90. 
244 I return to the phrase "agonistic" below. 
245 (1992) Situating the self 89-95; (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt. 
246 See (1968) l/luminations. Essays and reflections. 
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is inspired by the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, 247 in terms of which 
memory is the "mimemic recollection of the lost origins of phenomena as contained in 
fundamental experience". Arendt's account of the "loss" of public space can be typified 
as "nostalgic". Benhabib argues that Arendt uses the concept of public space in The 
origins of totalitarianism in a non-nostalgic manner, where she compared constitutional 
government to public space - and the absence of public space with totalitarianism. 
Tyranny is like a desert; under the conditions of tyranny one moves in an 
unknown, vast, open space, where the will of the tyrant occasionally 
befalls one like the sandstorm overtaking the desert traveller. 
Totalitarianism has no spatial topology: it is like an in band, compressing 
people increasingly together until they are formed into one. 248 
Benhabib249 sees in Arendt's concept of "public space" in her theory of totalitarianism 
a different focus from the one prevailing in The human condition. She describes the 
contrast between Arendt's views of public space with the terms "agonistic" and 
"associational". 
According to the "agonistic" view, the public realm represents the space of appearances 
where moral and political greatness, heroism and preeminence are displayed and 
shared with others. The "agonistic" space is a competitive space. Ultimately this space 
is where one seeks a guarantee against the futility of all things human. 
For the polis was for the Greeks, as the res publica was for the Romans, 
first of all their guarantee against the futility of individual life, the space 
protected against this futility and reserved for the relative permanence, if 
247 See generally Heidegger (1962) Being and time. 
248 (1992) Situating the se/f92; Arendt (1951) The origins of totalitarianism 466. 
249 (1992) Situating the se/f93. 
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not immortality, of mortals. 250 
The "associational" view of public space suggests a space that can emerge whenever 
and wherever people come together to act. Public space is the space where freedom 
and action can appear. In this approach, public space can be a private dining room in 
which people gather, a forest or a field. Arendt describes this view of public space in her 
work on Rahel Varnhagen's salons. The salons became public spaces because of the 
power and action that were displayed there through speech and action. Used in this 
sense, public space is not confined to a certain geographical space, but emerges 
wherever there is a space for human plurality, action and speech, or wherever humans 
can appear to each other. 251 
The distinction between the "agonal" and "associational" models of public space 
corresponds to the distinction between Ancient Greek and modern experience of 
politics. The agonal space in the Greek polis was made possible by a morally 
homogenous and politically egalitarian community where women, slaves and non-
citizens were excluded. Under these conditions, agonistic action could take place and 
the public agenda of debate could be predefined. Benhabib argues that the modern 
public space was extended by, for example, the emancipation of workers who made 
property relations a public issue, and by the emancipation of women who brought the 
family and so-called private sphere issues into the public realm. She believes that the 
"agonistic" model cannot accommodate and is not suited to the modern, extended public 
space. Cultural questions of "self- and other-representations" have also been put on the 
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I place the TRC in an Arendtian conception of public space because of the human 
appearance that was involved. In public spaces people can act, display their plurality and 
appear to each other because they are freed from the necessity and materiality of labour 
and work. Humans appear to each other by telling stories and by acting spontaneously 
and unpredictably. These acts are. in contrast with the routine and predictability that are 
associated with labour and work. I argue that what made the TRC a public space is exactly 
the possibilities for spontaneous action. It is for this reason that I am critical of responses 
to the TRC that emphasise the institutional, instrumental, legal process and negate the 
human presence. I shall elaborate on this in Part 3. 
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modern public agenda. None the less, Benhabib252 notes that "the struggle over what 
gets included in the public agenda itself is a struggle for justice and freedom". 
For me Arendt's vision of public space that is based on her theory of action and speech 
is very suggestive for our own process of reconstruction and transformation. The fact 
that she can not be pinned down to a certain approach and escapes labelling makes 
her theory so much more open for further investigation, exploration and possible 
application. Arendt rejected the instrumental neutral politics of the liberal model and 
through her theory of action and speech provided a strong alternative. However, she 
was not caught up in a rationalist proceduralist approach like Habermas (although he 
must have drawn from her thought). There are moments of civic republicanism in her 
thought but she cannot be described as totally premodern or civic republican. I consider 
Mouffe, who is concerned with the deconstruction of rigid identities and anti-
essentialism, close to Arendt's own vision of politics and public space. Arendt's work 
on Rahel Varnhagen contributes significantly to the discourse on gender in public 
space. 
Gender perspectives 
Below I shall focus on Arendt's biography on Rahel Varnhagen and her descriptions of 
the Berlin salons. I find her view of the Berlin salons of exceptional significance for the 
reconstruction and transformation of South African public space. I shall also turn to 
Bonnie Honig's argument that Arendt's theory of action gives rise to an "agonistic" 
252 (1992) Situating the Self 94. Benhabib identifies what she refers to as Arendt's 
"phenomenological essentialism", as problematic for the application of her theory today. 
Arendt defines public space as that space in which only a certain type of activity, namely 
action and speech, as opposed to work and labour, can take place. She relegates certain 
types of activity, like work and labour, to the private realm alone and ignores that work and 
labour, insofar as they are based on power relations, could become matters of public 
dispute. 
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feminism. 253 
Rahel Varnhagen's salon as public sphere 
Between 1929-1933, Hannah Arendt wrote a biography of Rahel Varnhagen, entitled, 
The life history of a German Jewess from the romantic period. Rahel Varnhagen was 
born in Berlin on May 19, 1771. She was the eldest child of a well-off merchant, Marcus 
Levin. After her father's death in 1790, her brother took over the family business and 
provided Rahel and her mother with a regular income. Between 1790 and 1806 Rahel 
held a salon254 in Jagerstrasse. During these years she had a series of love affairs with 
aristocrats from various European origins. With Napoleon's invasion of Berlin on 
October 27, 1806, Rahel's salon and circle of friends broke up. After the death of her 
mother, Rahel met Karl August Varnhagen and moved to Teplitz. After being baptised 
in 1814, she married Varnhagen. They resettled in Berlin in 1819 and from 1821 to 
1832 she again held her Berlin salon. Rahel died on March 7, 1833. 
Arendt's reconstruction of Rahel's story is based primarily upon the unprinted letters 
and diaries from the Varnhagen collection in the Manuscript Division of the Prussia·n 
State Library. Arendt wanted to tell Rahel's story as she herself "might have told it". 
("What interested me solely was to narrate the story of Rahel's life as she herself might 
253 
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have told it.")255 Benhabib256 argues that in approaching Arendt's story of Rahel's life, 
there are manifold layers of reading and interpretation. During the time when Arendt 
was working on the Rahel story, her own understanding of Judaism in general and her 
relationship to her own Jewish identity were undergoing profound transformations. 
Arendt's thought shifted from the egalitarian, humanistic Enlightenment ideals of Kant, 
Lessing and Goethe toward a recognition of the indelible fact of Jewish difference within 
German culture. Her story of Rahel Varnhagen tells us about the "paradoxes" of Jewish 
emancipation between the breakdown of the ghetto and the emergence of the 
nineteenth-century Christian modern nation-state. 
Arendt's use of the pariah and the parvenu in describing this episode of German Jewish 
social history is of great significance. The parvenu is someone who becomes like the 
others of the dominant culture by erasing difference and assimilating to dominant 
trends. The pariah is the outsider and the outcast who either cannot or chooses not to 
erase difference.257 Arendt admired Rahel for being a pariah who transforms difference 
from being a source of weakness and marginality into one of strength and defiance. In 
a letter addressed to Pauline Wiesel, Rahel wrote: 
We have been created to live the truth in this world ... We are alongside of 
human society. For us no place, no office, no empty title exists! All lies have 
some place; eternal truth, proper living and feeling ... has no place! And thus we 
are excluded from society. You because you offended it ... I because I cannot 
lie and live along with it. 258 
Arendt notes: "One had to pay for becoming a parvenu by abandoning the truth, and 
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this Rahel was not prepared to do."259 
Benhabib identifies Rahel's Jewish identity and Arendt's own understanding of her 
identity during the 1930s as the central hermeneutic motifs in the biography. For Arendt 
Rahel had remained a Jew and a pariah. Only because she clung to both conditions did 
she find a place in the history of European humanity. 260 An additional dimension to the 
Rahel story that leads more directly to future themes in Arendt's political philosophy 
(her theory of action, for example), is Arendt's description of a certain form of "romantic 
inwardness". Rahel once said: "Everyone has a destiny who knows what kind of destiny 
he has." Arendt believed that this concept of destiny reduced Rahel to a certain 
passitivity, to a certain refusal to choose and to act. Arendt found that the fact that Rahel 
wanted to live life as if it were a work of art was the great error she made. Rahel once 
commented: "But to me life itself was the assignment."261 In Rahel's words "What am I 
doing? Nothing. I am letting life rain upon me,"262 Arendt finds a "wordless" sensibility 
here to which she objects. She is opposed to the "apolitical" quality of romantic 
introspection that leads one to lose a sense of reality by losing the boundaries between 
the private and the public, the intimate and the shared. The world is the missing link 
between Rahel Varnhagen and her contemporaries and Arendt's own search for the 
recovery of the public world. 
To live life as if it were a work of art, to believe that by "cultivation" one 
can make a work of art of one's own life, was the great error that Rahel 
shared with her contemporaries ... 263 
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Benhabib264 explains that the qualities displayed by "romantic inwardness" were quite 
the opposite to those required from actors in the political/public sphere. Arendt believed 
that "romantic introspection" blurred the boundaries between the public and the private 
sphere. In Arendt's view, "romantic inwardness" eliminated the distinction between 
one's own perspective and the perspectives of others. "Romantic inwardness" thus 
eliminated the ability to judge the world from different points of view, which is a very 
important aspect of political action. "Romantic inwardness" fosters the soul rather than 
sustaining the world. Fundamental to political action is an interest in the world and a 
commitment to sustain it. 265 
Rahel's search for a place in the world was not only defined by her Jewish identity and 
romanticism, but also by her gender. Arendt argues that she attempted to gain a place 
in the world by using "typically female strategies". She sought assimilation and 
recognition through love affairs, courtships and eventually marriage with a gentile male. 
By giving herself to the right man, Rahel had hoped to attain the "world" that was denied 
her as a Jew and as a female. To Arendt, Rahel and her contemporaries failed to create 
a world in their lifetime. One exception was between 1790 and 1806, when a small 
number of Jews entered the world of genteel society. Through their salons Rahel and 
other Jewesses created brief moments of public life, of living in the world. 
Benhabib266 notes that Rahel Varnhagen's "moment of glory" coincided with the brief 
period in German cultural history when the Enlightenment, the ideals of the French 
Revolution, the spirit of Prussian reforms and German Romanticism, came together in 
the public sphere provided by the salon. The Jewish women who ran the salons were 
daughters and wives of well-off Jewish merchants and intellectuals. Benhabib identifies 
three contributions that the salons made to these social activities: First, Jewish women 
emancipated themselves from traditional patriarchal families. Secondly, they helped to 
create high culture by creating a social space where writers, artists, as well as civil 
264 Ben ha bib (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 11. 
265 Benhabib (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 11. 
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servants and aristocrats could gather to exchange ideas, view texts, mix, mingle, see 
and be seen. In this respect the salons created spaces for intelligentsia in a city that at 
the time lacked public spaces such as a university, a parliament, and a generous court. 
Thirdly, the salons created spaces where people from various classes, religious groups 
and sexes could mix. New forms of social interaction and intimacy were developed 
accordingly. 
The Berlin salons can be compared to the French salons. Benhabib267 mentions three 
characteristics of the French salons: They were social spaces where individuals from 
different and traditionally segregated groups, ranks and classes could mix and mingle. 
They were social events where literary and artistic works were read and discussed. And 
they were social processes through which individuals of a hierarchical ancien regime 
learned new and non-hierarchical, more fluid forms of self and other presentation. She 
describes the salons as social experiments of a period in transition from the old to the 
new in pre-revolutionary Europe. Although gatherings with the characteristics of salons 
had existed in classical Greece and in twelfth-century French courts, it is only with the 
beginning of the Renaissance that they became more regularised. With the emergence 
of modern civil society, the salons became a recurring feature of social interaction, 
which Hertz describes as follows: 
The word salon came into use to describe a public room that began to 
appear in wealthy European homes between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries as the "great hall", which had been the centre of medieval family 
life, gradually lost its private character and four-poster beds were moved 
into separate rooms. The great hall, now called the salon, was a lavishly 
decorated public space where the piano was played, feasts served and 
guests received. 268 
I am interested in how the private/public dichotomy was "lived out" in these spaces. 
267 (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 16. 
268 Hertz (1988) Jewish high society in old regime Berlin 14. 
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Benhabib notes that even though the salons of early modernity were confined to 
specific places, the forms of social interaction that they encouraged were not confined. 
The public reveals and conceals at the same time; it is only in the 
withdrawal from the public into the sheltered space of a two- or three-
person relationship that one can also move inward, toward who one really 
is. In this respect as well, the salon is a fascinating space; unlike an 
assembly hall, a town square, a conference room or even simply the 
family dinner table, the salon, with its large, luxurious, and rambling 
space, allows for moments of intimacy; in a salon people are with each 
other but must not always be next to each other. Salons are amorphous 
structures with no established rules of entry and exit for those who have 
formed intimacy; in fact it may be a sign of good manners to foster and to 
allow the formation of intimacy among members of the salon. What is 
important here is the fluidity of the lines between the gathering as one and 
the gathering as many units of intimacy and how the salons can be both 
public and private, both shared and intimate. 269 
In the salons the written and spoken word often flowed into each other. 270 Letter writing 
became prominent. Benhabib shows that letter writing in the late eighteenth century was 
closely related to the emergence of a new form of individuality and self-understanding 
in European culture. Letters had a quasi-public, quasi-private quality and became the 
preferred "feminine" pattern of prose. Women discovered a medium through which they 
could communicate from the intimate toward the public. 
Women through their letters, appear to re-create themselves as texts, 
thus overcoming their own silencing in the major texts of the tradition, 
which as educated upper-and middle class females, they would have had 
to read. The letter form, like the salon, is a transgressive mode: it is a 
269 (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 17-18 (my emphasis). 
270 Benhabib (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 18. 
139 
mode in which boundaries are crossed, erased, renegotiated, and re-
created. 271 
The kind of public spaces created by the salons contradicts Arendt's "agonistic" vision 
of the public sphere in The human condition. Benhabib notes a number of contrasts and 
similarities between the Greek polis and the salons. The polis excluded women, 
amongst others, while the salons were dominated by female presence. The public 
spaces in the polis were serious, the salons were playful. The public space of the polis 
was governed by visibility and transparency, the salons were governed by visibility but 
not transparency- on the contrary, self-concealment and pretending to be quite other 
than one was, were the norms. The common features are that both the salon and the 
polis were based on the assumption of equality among the people who interact and both 
of them enabled the creation of bonds among their members. Both the polis and the 
salon contributed to the formation of "civic friendship" among a group of citizens or 
among a group of private, like-minded individuals who could gather for a common 
political purpose. 
The salons are a good example of transformed and transformative public spaces, in 
other words, they were not only transformed public spaces themselves, but contributed 
to other transformations in society as well. Deborah Hertz argues that the salons were 
indeed typically female forms of the public sphere. 
That the home could be a public as well as a private place was obviously 
one reason why salons were organized by women. The synthesis of the 
private and the public salons was evident in the curious, bygone way that 
guests arrived at the door ... That social institutions like salons should 
ever have appeared in pre-industrial Europe, even intermittently, came to 
be seem quite odd. It was odd that private drawing rooms should have 
been public places, odd that in an age when women were excluded from 
educational and civic institutions, even wives of rich and powerful men 
271 Benhabib (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 19. 
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should lead intellectual discussions among the most learned men of their 
cities. It was odd that men and women should have had important 
intellectual exchanges during centuries when the two sexes generally had 
little to say to each other and few public places in which to say it. 272 
Rahel Varnhagen's salon was a space of social interaction where for a brief moment a 
"piece of the world" was recovered. It was a space where desire for difference and 
distinctness could assume an "inter-subjective reality", in other words it was a space 
where human action could take place. It was a space where the private/public 
dichotomy was problematised by the presence of difference and by the primarily female 
presence. The salon as a public space presents an example how difference and a 
feminine presence can contribute to the reconstruction and transformation of public 
space. 273 
Agonistic feminism 
Commenting on Arendt's political theory from a feminist perspective, Bonnie Honig274 
describes her as neither a "theorist of gender'' nor a "woman theorist", but as a "theorist 
of an agonistic and performative politics". To Honig "agonistic" feminism presupposes 
not an already known and unifying identity of "woman", but "differentiated, multiple 
beings that are always becoming, always calling out for amendment". 
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For Honig275 "resistibility" is a precondition of Arendt's politics. She notes that in 
Arendt's view, "identity" is the "performative production" and not the "expressive 
condition or essence of action". Honig says that the value of Arendt's theory for feminist 
politics lies in her rejection of an expressive, identity-based politics. Honig276 uses the 
American Declaration of Independence to explain her understanding of Arendt's action 
that gives effect to an "agonistic feminism". For Arendt the real source of the authority 
of the American constitution was not the "constative"277 moment but the "performative". 
Honig notes that Arendt opposes attempts to conceive of politics as the expression of 
shared identities such as gender, race, ethnicity or nationality. She views the self as a 
"complex site of multiple identities that are always performatively produced". 
From Arendt's perspective, a political community that constitutes itself on 
the basis of a prior, shared, and stable identity threatens to close the 
spaces of politics, to homogenize or repress the plurality and multiplicity 
that political action postulates. 278 
Arendt's emphasis of difference and plurality made her wary of any assertion of 
homogeneity in "women's experience" or in "women's ways of knowing". Honig argues 
that Arendt would have been critical of any feminist politics that relies on a universal 
definition of woman that would silence differences and pluralities. 
This type of feminist politics can be extremely fruitful to our processes of transformation 
and reconstruction of sex-gender relations. Voices that have been silenced by the 
authorities of the past should not again be silenced and violated by the mere 
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acceptance of one way of being as the norm (for example, the standard of the white, 
middle class male, or of the black male or of the white power-seeking female). 
Towards a heterogeneous public sphere 
In the previous sections I have discussed four visions of public space, namely liberal 
visions, Habermas' vision, Mouffe's vision and Arendt's vision. Before I conclude my 
discussion on the various visions of public space I shall add the perspectives of two 
other authors to the picture. Iris Young exposes the flaws in the modern approaches to 
public space, in particular its emphasis on impartiality in the public. Her argument that 
public spaces could be more inclusive if the concrete contexts of individuals are noticed 
is valuable for our own reconstruction and transformation. Seyla Benhabib uses the 
phrase "the public as phantom" to make the point that the public always comes back. 
The notion of the public as phantom is suited for our present and future conceptions of 
public space. 
In an article entitled "Impartiality and the civic public", Iris Young279 puts forward the 
view that contemporary politics should break with modern traditions of moral and 
political life. Emancipatory politics must develop a conception of normative reason that 
does not oppose "reason" to "desire" and "affectivity''. Young criticises the deontological 
tradition's assumption that normative reason is "impartial" and "universal". She says that 
279 
"Impartiality and the civic public" Cornell & Benhabib (eds) (1987) Feminism as critique 57-
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the "ideal of impartiality" expresses what Adorno calls "the logic of identity" or Derrida 
calls "the metaphysics of presence". This ideal of impartiality denies and represses 
difference and expresses the ideal of unity, which generates an oppressive opposition 
between reason and desire. Young argues that the theoretical and practical exclusion 
of women from the public sphere is a manifestation of the civic public's will to unity, 
which leads to the exclusion of those aspects of human existence "that threaten to 
disperse the brotherly unity of straight and upright forms". 280 An emancipatory 
conception of public life, in her view, must ensure the inclusion of all persons and 
groups, not by claiming a unified universality but by explicitly promoting heterogeneity 
in public life. 
Young argues that the ideal of impartiality removes people from their "actual" contexts 
of living and moral decision-making, to a situation where they could not exist. She refers 
to Michael Sandel's argument that "the ideal of impartiality requires constructing the 
ideal of a self that is abstracted from the context of any real persons: the deontological 
self is not committed to any particular ends, has no particular history, is a member of 
no communities, has no body". 281 
The "logic of identity" seeks to unify concrete particulars by relying on an "essence" 
which eliminates otherness and reduces the specificity of situations and the difference 
among moral subjects. 
In modern moral discourse, being impartial means especially being 
dispassionate: being entirely unaffected by one's judgement. The idea of 
impartiality thus seeks to eliminate alterity in a different sense, in the 
sense of the sensuous, desiring and emotional experiences-that tie me to 
the concreteness of things, which I apprehend in their particular relation 
to me. Why does the idea of impartiality require the separation of moral 
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reason from desire, affectivity and a bodily sensuous relation with things, 
people and situations? Because only by expelling desire, affectivity and 
the body from reason can impartiality achieve its unity.282 
Young283 argues that the "logic of identity" generates dichotomy instead of unity. She 
notes that the move to bring particulars under a universal category creates a distinction 
between "inside" and "outside". The dichotomy between reason and desire is reflected 
in modern political theory in the distinction between the "universal public" realm of the 
state and the "particular private" realms of needs and desires. Modern normative 
political theory aims to embody impartiality in the public realm. 
Young focuses on the unique public life that developed in the eighteenth century. The 
space of the city itself changed during this time to create more openness, vast 
boulevards, coffee houses and salons284 where people from different classes mingled 
in the same spaces. Young refers to Habermas's argument that "the function of the 
public life of the mid-nineteenth century was to provide a critical space where people 
discussed and criticized the affairs of the state in a multiplicity of newspapers, coffee 
houses and other forums".285 Young describes the public life in this period as seemingly 
"playful and sexy". Sexes and classes, discourse and play, the aesthetic and the 
political were all mixed in this "wild public". Young sees the republican philosophy of a 
universalist state expressing an impartial civic public as a reaction to this differentiated 
public. To her, Rousseau's political philosophy was the "paradigm of this ideal of the 
civic public", a reaction to the public life of the eighteenth century. 
The civic public expresses the universal and impartial point of view of 
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reason, standing opposed to and expelling desire, sentiment and the 
particularity of needs and interests.286 
Young287 notes that in modern political philosophy a concept of the public realm that 
expresses impartiality and universality and excludes partiality and desire is 
emphasised. The effect of this (modern political philosophy) was that women, because 
they are the "caretakers of affectivity, desire and the body", were excluded from the 
public realm. Modern normative reason with its political expression in the idea of the 
"civic public" has unity and coherence because it expels all difference (such as the 
specificity of women's bodies and desire, the difference of race and culture etc). 
Young288 argues that while Habermas's idea of a communicative ethics provides the 
most promising starting-point for an alternative conception of normative reason, it 
remains inadequate because he retains a commitment to impartiality and reproduces 
in his theory of communication an opposition between reason and desire. Habermas 
retains an universalistic understanding of normative reason and therefore finds that 
norms must express shared interests. In doing so, he again expels and devalues 
difference. 
The distinction between public and private as it appears in modern political theory 
expresses a will for homogeneity to the exclusion of many persons and groups. We 
need to transform the public/private distinction in such a way that it does not correlate 
with an opposition between reason and desire, or universal and particular. Young 
defines public as that "what is open and accessible". 289 The feminist slogan, "The 
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personal is the political", does not deny a distinction between public and private, but it 
does deny a social division between public and private spheres. Instead of defining 
privacy as what the public excludes, privacy should be defined as that aspect of her life 
that any individual has a right to exclude others from. She notes that two principles that 
follow from the "personal is the political", are, first, that no social institutions or practices 
should be excluded as being the "proper'' subject for public discussion and expression, 
and secondly, no person, actions or aspects of a person's life should be forced into 
privacy. We should strive for a new kind of public where persons, aspects of their lives 
or topics of discussion are not excluded and where "aesthetic" as well as "discursive" 
expression are encouraged. 
In such a public, consensus and sharing may not always be the goal, but 
the recognition and appreciation of differences, in the context of 
confrontation with power. 290 
The public as "phantom" 
[W)here once there was a public sphere of action and deliberation, 
participation and collective decision making, today there no longer is one; 
or if a public sphere still exists, it is distorted, weakened, and corrupted 
as to be a pale recollection of what once was. 291 
Benhabib292 argues that all theories concerned with the public space have a "what was 
then and what no longer is" quality to them. She perceives the public as a "phantom" 
that will not go away. Even after the many "funeral rites" it has gone through, it comes 
290 
291 
292 
Young "Impartiality and the civic public" in Benhabib & Cornell (eds) (1987) Feminism as 
critique 76. 
Benhabib (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 204. 
Benhabib (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 204. 
147 
back to haunt conscience and memory. This idea of the public as "phantom" reminds 
one of Derrida's notion of the "ghost of justice" that is always haunting us.293 
According to Benhabib the "public" has lost its "metaphorical anchoring" in some form 
of body and has become "desubstantialised" or "decorporealised". She uses the 
example of e-mail, where those communicating neither see nor hear each other's voices 
and are present only as senders and receivers of electronic messages. The new public 
has no space in particular but is constituted by an "anonymous" public conversation 
taking place in multiple spaces in society. Today's citizen has become the "faceless" 
speaker and listener in "anonymous" public conversation. Benhabib asks whether an 
"anonymous" public conversation can be the medium through which democratic 
deliberation can take place. She notes that access to public means of communication 
has increased while the quality of public debate and reasoning have decreased. Radio 
and television talk shows have not encouraged public deliberation either. 294 Rather, 
[T]he public sphere is filled with the voices of resentment, prejudice, and 
unanalysed opinions that are exposed to others, more often than not, in 
acts of exhibitionist defiance. The more impersonal the public 
conversation has become, the more the temptation is increasing to "let it 
all hang out"; the line between intimacy and publicity has been 
corroded. 295 
Benhabib explains that the "regulative ideal" of democracy presents the notion of 
collective public deliberation. This regulative principle needs the idea of an 
"autonomous" public sphere where "self-governance through the deliberation of a 
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community can take place". Benhabib296 argues that there exists a "hiatus" between 
the regulative ideal of democracy and the increasingly desubstantialised carriers of the 
public conversation of mass society which transforms the "regulative ideal" of 
democracy into a "constitutional fiction". 
Benhabib shows that although the principle of the "sovereign deliberative body" of 
citizens (in other words public participation and discourse) is and always has been 
problematic the "phantom" of the public will not go away. She explains that the public 
is not only a "sociological quantity" but a "norm" and a "principle". In the name of the 
public we can criticise the fairness of outcomes, we can decide whether decisions are 
just, and whether deliberations are wise. She says that we require a "transgression" (by 
forcing so-called private issues into the public) and "remapping" (I think these two terms 
correspond with my terms of transformation and reconstruction) of the public and the 
boundaries associated with it. The challenges to democratic politics under conditions 
of social complexity also require "innovative institutional designs". It is necessary to 
revitalise the public sphere and to make it possible for citizens to put forth their "social 
imaginary", their utopian hopes for the future. The public sphere has a crucial role in 
moulding the identities of anonymous citizens in nation-states facing complex social 
relations. 
It is essential that the public sphere in a democratic community allows equal access to 
all groups and individuals within civil society to represent themselves in public. By 
entering the public and representing itself to others every social, cultural and political 
group can make itself present in the public. This process of self-representation and 
articulation in the public is a way through which the "civic imagination" can be 
cultivated. To present reasons in public forces one to think from the "standpoint" of 
others to whom one is trying to tell your story, presenting your point of view. Benhabib 
identifies the ability to take the "standpoint" of others and to see the world from their 
perspective as a crucial "civic virtue". (The ability to see things from other points of view 
is especially important in a diverse society like our own.) 
296 (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 205. 
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Benhabib297 compares the public sphere in a democratic community with the pupil of the 
eye: When its vision is murky, cloudy or hindered, the sense of direction of the political 
is also impaired. 
297 (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 211. 
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... conclusion 
democratic landscapes 
In this part I have discussed various visions of public space. I repeat that the reason for 
this discussion is because public space is a significant feature of the ethical intersection 
between public space, equality and justice that is integral to an ethical interpretation of 
equality. At this stage we should recall the image of landscape that presents a horizon 
for the various visions. I justified the use of landscape as an image in the Introduction, 
"landscapes of democracy, equality and justice". I said that my main reason for using 
landscape as image is the varied nuances of interpretation and differences of emphasis 
associated with landscape(s). I argue that our own conception of democracy, the 
political and the public should be informed and greatly influenced by such a recognition 
and awareness of varied nuances of interpretation and differences. In other words we 
should not strive for a rigid concept of democracy, the political and public spaces. I said 
that an ethical interpretation of equality insists on such an open and unfixed vision of 
public space where difference is accepted and not reduced or violated by putting it in 
an instrumental procedure or test. I focused on the possibilities for the reconstruction 
and transformation of public spaces and turned to the various visions for guidance. In 
the next part(" ... perspectives on equality") I shall argue that the right to equality must 
be interpreted in a "web of human relationships" and that ethical interpretation cannot 
be separated from the reconstruction and transformation of public space in South 
African society. 
I want to expose the relationship (together with the ethical intersection between public 
space, equality and justice) between democracy, politics, public space, equality, 
interpretation and justice. A certain conception of democracy or politics will influence 
the visions of public space and vice versa. These conceptions and visions will again 
influence our approach to and understanding of interpretation, equality and justice. 
Our visions of political reconstruction and transformation are interconnected with legal 
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transformation. As the political landscape transforms, the legal system undergoes 
parallel transformation. 
A few years ago a film trilogy, Three colours Blue, White and Red, appeared on our 
movie circuit. Each of these movies symbolised a colour of the French flag, and each 
one of them represented one of the three cries of the French Revolution, namely, 
liberty, equality and community (fraternity). 298 The theme of Blue was liberty, White, 
equality and Red community. In the third of the trilogy, Red, all the characters of the 
previous films come together at the end of the movie after they have been rescued from 
an accident on a ferry. Various themes can be drawn from these films. One possibility 
is that the achievement of liberty and equality is impossible without the 
acknowledgement of the third cry of the revolution, community. It is through our 
involvement in the community and our relationships with others that liberty and equality 
can be achieved. 
The impossibility of community manifests itself simultaneously with the affirmation of its 
necessity. The moment or the event where the people in the film are brought together 
in some sort of community is an event of trauma. It is an accident. This theme links 
republican ideas of public participation and community life to deconstruction's insights 
with regard to the event, violence, trauma and mourning. I shall discuss aspects of 
deconstruction and deconstructive accounts of community in Part 2. 
The fact that the three films take place in three different countries with different political 
and public landscapes is not incidental. Blue, with the theme of freedom, 
takes place in Paris. White, where the theme is equality, takes place in Paris and in 
Poland: Red is about the story of a friendship that develops in Geneva. Kieslowski299 
said in an interview that he especially wanted to focus on the theme of community in 
298 
299 
In the Introduction to the thesis I explained the use of "community" instead of "fraternity". 
I do not believe that these two concepts are synonyms. Particularly the use of "fraternity" 
during the French Revolution probably meant exactly that, brotherhood. I believe that the 
call for fraternity can be rephrased in the concept of "community". It should be self-evident 
that the concept of "community" that I rely on is a heterogeneous one. 
Kieslowski is a well known Polish director. He died shortly after the making of this trilogy. 
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Switzerland because of the total absence of community in Switzerland. It is interesting 
that the place where the accident, "the event", occurs, is the English channel. The 
passengers leave the European continent, on their way to Britain. They are removed 
from their home countries, their own private spheres and their roots when the event of 
community happens, without them knowing it. The viewer notices the connections 
between the stricken passengers. Can it be that community takes place precisely when 
we are not aware of it? Community in this understanding is not something that we can 
positively create, but that will happen. Community is made possible through the event, 
the accident, the unpredictable and the unexpected. I shall pick up on this view when 
I discuss aspects of deconstruction in Part 2. For Derrida, for example, a condition of 
the event of community and unity is disunity. This view has major implications for the 
idea of reconstructing and transforming the public sphere, community life, democracy 
and justice. It highlights the necessity of an anti-essentialist approach (we should recall 
Mouffe's radical democratic vision here) to public spaces, community, democracy and 
justice. 
I introduced this part with a discussion of Cornell's understanding of transformation. 
Transformation in her view means the transformation of a system on one level, while on 
a deeper level it means the changing of individuals so that a system may transform. 
Cornell distinguishes transformation from evolution, the latter being mere institutional 
change. I followed the second meaning of transformation, as distinguished from 
evolution, for the reconstruction and transformation of public space that I envisage. I 
then referred to Arendt's view of judgement as a form of political action in modern times 
where public spaces are not situated in particular geographical spaces. I compared 
Cornell's understanding of transformation and Arendt's view of judgement as a form of 
action with Kronman's view of judgement as an act of deliberating and reflecting on 
various ways of being. Kronman's view of judgement encompass the notion of 
transformation because it acknowledges various ways of being. 
I argued that the process of reconstruction and transformation should also embrace the 
imagination in its vision and turned to Nussbaum's view concerning the "literary 
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imagination in public life". The views of Cornell, Arendt, Kronman and Nussbaum were 
an initiation (background or framework) for the further discussions of visions of public 
space. I argue that South African public space needs to be reconstructed and 
transformed in a way that entails "real" change (transformation) and not mere 
institutional change (evolution). I believe that visions that are imaginative (for example 
to take the concrete life stories of individuals into account) will be more appropriate to 
promote reconciliation and transformation than mere instrumental and institutional 
processes. 
In Part 3 I shall argue that the TRC process emphasised the significance of the 
imagination by recognising stories and memories. Through the stories we tell we 
remember the past by imagining it. 
I used the liberal vision to set the scene for the discussion on the various visions of 
public space and highlighted the liberal commitment to neutrality. I mentioned the liberal 
attempts of Rawls, Dworkin and Ackerman to "reconstruct" politics and to provide some 
kind of normative consideration in the public realm. I do not think that any of them 
succeeded in breaking with either liberal or positivist thought. For the reconstruction 
and transformation of South African public spaces I find Rawls' reliance on an "original 
position" and "veil of ignorance", Dworkin's theory of "constructive interpretation" and 
Ackerman's "conversational constraint" inadequate. I repeated Sandel's argument that 
liberal politics is the reason for "democracy's discontent" and for the impoverishment 
of politics and public life. 
I raised two critiques on the liberal vision from a gender perspective, namely the voice 
of Antigone reclaiming "feminine" values and the vision of an "ethics of care". These 
critiques affirmed to a certain extent why the liberal visions are not suited for my vision 
of a reconstructive and transforming space. The liberal vision's reliance on procedures, 
neutrality and justice is not sensitive to normative considerations and different 
perspectives coming from other voices (like the feminine) and from an ethics of care. 
The liberal vision is not part of the ethical intersection between public space, equality 
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and justice that is integral to an ethical interpretation of equality, because the liberal 
vision of public space is in contrast with the whole notion of an ethical interpretation of 
equality. An ethical interpretation of equality insists on taking account of difference, 
plurality and otherness. In other words the focus on particular contexts is of great 
importance in an ethical interpretation of equality in contrast with the liberal vision's 
assumptions of neutrality and universality. 
I then turned to Habermas' proposal of his theory of discourse ethics or communicative 
theory as an alternative to both the liberal and the civic republican/communitarian 
models of politics and public space. I expressed discomfort with his strong belief in 
rationality and the possibility of rational procedure in his vision of public space. I noted 
Benhabib's and Fraser's critique on Habermas from a gender perspective. Although 
Habermas realises the need of the political and of a concept of public space he 
approaches these concepts in a modernist way and accepts the basic liberal 
assumptions of neutrality and universality. 
I then put forward Mouffe's vision of "radical democracy" and her insistence on anti-
essentialism and antagonism. Her view that we cannot totally reject universalism but 
must make it more particular is of great significance. Mouffe's view provides major 
possibilities for the reconstruction and transformation of our vision of public space. I am 
critical of her claim to neutrality in regard to sex/gender issues. In this regard I 
contrasted the views of Cornell and Nedelsky, who both support an affirmation of 
"feminine" difference in their own way, with Mouffe's views. 
Finally, I discussed Hannah Arendt's vision of political action and speech as it is 
intertwined with her vision of public space. Arendt's distinction between labour, work 
and action and their correlation with the private and public spheres provide a structure 
(framework) for reconstruction and transformation. Her account of the "rise of the social" 
gives us a starting point for reconstruction and transformation. I argue that during the 
years of apartheid white South Africa had virtually no experience of action and speech 
according to Arendt's understanding. The state of politics during those years was akin 
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to totalitarianism. Most people acted with a "herd-like mentality" and were drawn down 
by the necessity of the life-processes (labour) and the materialism (tangibility) of work. 
This would at least be a reflection of the experiences of (most) white South Africans. By 
contrast a vast number of black South Africans were involved in a political struggle that 
reflected moments of action and speech. My concern is that the political enthusiasm 
that characterised resistance politics of the past might have disappeared in the process 
of institutionalised politics. 
I commenced this part by supporting a vision of transformation that is distinguished from 
evolution. I believe that Arendt's distinction between labour, work and action in their 
relation to the private and the public, provides the best framework for the distinction 
between transformation and evolution. 300 Evolution that involves a mere change of the 
system is related to the private sphere and the human conditions of labour and work. 
Evolution takes place in nature, in the life process (labour). Evolution also takes place 
in the human condition of work. Transformation, that entails the transformation of 
individuals, depends on the human condition of action and speech in the public realm. 
The transformation of politics and of a public vision can only take place in 
circumstances where human plurality, unpredictability and spontaneity can step forward. 
In my view, Hannah Arendt's vision still provides the best framework for the 
reconstruction and transformation of our own visions of public space. 
In Part 3, where I identify the TRC as a manifestation of the ethical intersection between 
public space, equality and justice, I shall argue that the TRC as a public space 
contributed to the transformation, and not mere evolution, of South African public space. 
Mere evolution in this regard would have meant an institutional process that was aimed 
at dealing with the past by finding truth for record purposes, or by a process of blanket 
amnesty. The TRC focused on the finding of truth through the telling of stories by the 
victims and perpetrators in order to transform individuals by restoring their humanity and 
300 Off course these distinctions are not clear cut. In present times the work place has 
become a public space where contentious political issues are raised. Although Arendt's 
distinctions can be and must be problematised, I nevertheless follow her distinction as a 
framework for my argument. 
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human dignity. 
Our conceptions of public space must be reinterpreted. Arendt's understanding of public 
and private does not necessarily refer to specific places, such as the market 
place versus the private home. The division is fluid and in a constant state of flux. That 
which is private in one place may be public in another, and that which is private today 
may become public tomorrow. I have argued that liberal (modern) politics and liberal 
legal theory contributed to the "decline of the public sphere", public participation and · 
community life. This "decline" must be addressed, but a type of communitarian 
approach which aims at a single substantive "common good" is not the solution. 
Through its adherence to human plurality, unpredictability and spontaneity, Arendt's 
"public" accommodates the fluidity and fluctuations. 
The affirmation of the "feminine" in the public sphere may be a way of disrupting the 
traditional vision as well as the traditional content of the public realm. Arendt's 
descriptions of Rahel Varnhagen's salons in Berlin draw our attention to the 
transforming possibilities of public spheres where the distinctions between public, 
private and intimate are not rigid but in a constant state of flux. Listening to the voice 
of Antigone helps us to displace and disrupt the male model of public space that is 
accepted as norm. Expanding the current concept of justice with a focus on care can 
enhance normative considerations and also judgement. Accepting that this is "a doubly 
prized world" can help feminists and all those who want to transform sex and gender 
identities to look further than stereotyped and essentialist affirmations of "woman". 
Addressing the singularity of woman in our concept of citizenship can enrich our vision 
of public life and political participation. 
This part was concluded with Iris Young's argument for a heterogeneous public space 
and Benhabib's contention that the public, although it might have died, keeps coming 
back as a "phantom". 
I conclude with two South African examples which in my view could contribute to the 
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reconstruction and transformation of public space. The first is an address given by 
Judge Mahomed Navsa301 at the 21st anniversary of the law faculty of the University of 
the Western Cape. The judge argued that there are times when judges must be heard 
beyond the courtroom to "nurture" public confidence in the law. 
We are in the throes of transformation and it is uncomfortable .... Haunted 
as we are by our terrible past, our public debates about court decisions 
are often informed by race, emotion and politics .... The truth is that we 
have not yet, as a nation, fully developed the confidence to apply the 
constitution properly. Our new constitutional jurisprudence is still in its 
infancy. We are engaging in debates that other nations have experienced 
and conducted for decades. In respect of some questions there appear 
to be no complete solutions. Traditionally judges avoided engaging in 
public debate. They talk through their judgements and occasionally 
academic writings. The rationale for this approach is that the dignity, 
independence and impartiality of their office demand that they avoid 
public controversy. But judges, both here and abroad have recognised 
that, where the judiciary is in a position because of its experience and 
particular skills to enhance the public's understanding of the 
administration of justice and its place in the constitutional order, it should 
do so .... The judiciary must be more public-friendly. It must promptly 
release into the public domain full reasons for decisions. We should, all 
of us, nurture in our public a proper and informed understanding of the 
importance of an independent and strong judiciary ... We should have 
confidence that an informed public will ensure that the independence and 
strength of the judiciary is maintained rather than constantly weakened. 
We should take heed of justifiable public criticism of the judiciary. 302 
301 
302 
Judge of the High Court of South Africa. 
"Why justice must be more people-friendly" (1999) The Sunday Independent September 
5. 
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The other event which contributes to public dialogue and public participation is the 
centenary of the Anglo-Boer South African War. 303 The celebratory response to this 
event has, surprisingly, become an important public space for the discussion of our 
country's past. The way in which it has managed to draw the previously ignored into the 
process represents a significant step on our road to transformation. Groups and 
individuals which have traditionally been excluded and marginalised from the War 
stories, for example, blacks and women, have been included in the retelling of stories. 
Such a disclosure of humans in public spaces through the telling of stories contributes 
to the reconstruction and transformation of our public spaces in an imaginative way. 
Hoe onthou 'n land sy geskiedenis? Hoe probeer 'n mens iets begryp van 
'n oorlog so ingrypend soos die wat vanaf 1 O Oktober 1899 tot 31 Mei 
1902 tussen die Boererepublieke en Brittanje gewoed het en wat veel 
verder as die twee vegtende groepe mans op die slagveld gestrek het? 
Een van die betroubaarste maniere is om stories daaroor te vertel. 304 
303 
304 
This war was fought between the two Boer republics (Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek and 
the Republic of the Orange Free State), and Britain from 1899-1902. 
Ferreira (ed) (1998). Boereoor/ogstories: 34 verha/e oor die oor/og van 1899-1902 (34 
stories on the Boer war 1899-1902)1. (How is the memory of a country preserved? How 
can one attempt to comprehend a war such as the one that was fought between 11 
October 1899 and 31May1902 between the Boer republics and Britain, that exceeded the 
two groups of fighting men on the battle fields. One of the most reliable ways is to tell 
stories about it.) (Own translation) 
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2 
. . . perspectives on 
equality 
Introduction 
In this part I explore some perspectives that can provide us with an horizon in the 
formulation of an ethical interpretation of equality. In the previous part, I argued that the 
reconstruction and transformation of public space is a precondition for such an ethical 
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interpretation. Following Arendt, I emphasised the significance of human disclosure 
through story-telling (action and speech) for reconstruction and transformation. In this 
part, I focus on equality. I have already mentioned the significance of the intersection 
between public space, equality and justice for an ethical interpretation of equality. 
Because of this intersection, the approach which I follow with regard to equality is 
similar to the visions of public space that I support. My interpretation of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, which I explain in Part 3, will again be similar to my 
approach to public space and equality. 
A significant feature of the reconstruction and transformation of public space is the 
room it can create for the telling of stories and for the acceptance, even celebration, of 
human plurality, differences and heterogeneity. (The event of the TRC created such a 
space for the telling of stories and celebration of difference). This feature of a 
reconstructed and transformed public space is essential for an ethical interpretation of 
equality. An ethical interpretation of equality is an interpretation that "radically" 
acknowledges the inescapable fact of difference. An ethical interpretation of equality 
does not seek to "accommodate" difference. The ethical dimension lies precisely in the 
understanding that such an accommodation is impossible. Difference can not be 
defined and enclosed in a definition or provided for in a specific test. I argue that 
"substantive" equality, despite the fact that it goes a step further than "formal" equality, 
disregards the ethical dimension of equality and difference. Through its assumptions 
of generality and universality, any institutionalised approach to equality aimed at 
defining difference or providing for difference (for example, the Harksen1 test), will fail 
to prevent the exclusion or the reduction of difference. 
An ethical approach to equality needs a "slowness", a "strategy of delay", a careful 
reading. I understand "ethical" as an openness towards difference and the acceptance 
of the impossibility of ever fully knowing each other's differences. The ethical 
imperative demands us to seek the less "violent", in other words exclusionary or 
reductionist, interpretation of equality, in theory and in practice. The fact that we can 
Harksen v Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC). 
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never reach perfect equality does not mean that we should abandon the project. 
However, we should realise the limitations of seeking equality in the economy of daily 
life. An ethical understanding of equality demands a double-handed approach, seeking 
ethical interpretation within the system of rights and law and at the same time realising 
the impossibility of such an equality. The ethical moment lies outside our current 
system, beyond our daily economies. The ethical is that which does not exist within the 
system, that which is almost impossible to describe. I am interested to see whether one 
can catch glimpses of these ethical moments2 in an ethical interpretation of equality. 
An ethical perspective on equality realises the shortcomings of any attempt to 
understand or identify difference, and accordingly to address it. This realisation, 
however, does not imply a nihilistic acceptance of the present situation which entails 
that we must revert to the neutral assumption of sameness. An ethical perspective on 
equality insists that we go to trouble with difference, that we seek for answers, that we 
believe in the ideal of equality and the promise of justice. It forces us to go beyond 
conventional methods of enquiring and to disregard the limits of present systems. The 
vision of public space (and community) that I support, is one where human plurality, 
differences and heterogeneity can appear in a spontaneous and unpredicted manner. 
The concepts of community and citizenship must continually escape definition and 
closure to ensure the openness of public spaces. Of course, in present systems - our 
symbolic order - these visions and concepts are enclosed in definitions. Quite often 
they become reified. We must expose, undermine and disrupt this reification exactly for 
what it is, namely man made things. Aspects of the philosophy of deconstruction 
contain ideas for such a disruption of all present man made systems. Deconstruction 
considers justice as the limit to all present systems. An ethical interpretation of equality 
is situated at the intersection between public space (political theory, democracy), 
equality (institutionalised, constitutionalised rights) and justice (memory, forgiveness, 
promises, truth, reconciliation) and is inspired by the philosophy of deconstruction. 
2 The focus on the TRC in Part 3 " ... landscapes of justice" has the same aim, to understand 
and read - even though pure, unconditional forgiveness is impossible - the TRC as a 
political, public and ethical event and look for possible traces or spectres of the 
forgiveness and truth which only exist in the beyond. 
162 
Although I shall address justice in Part 3, " ... landscapes of justice", the perspectives 
on deconstruction, equality and feminism are all related to the ideal of justice. The 
spectre of justice is present in the following perspectives. 
I focus on various perspectives that in my view contribute to an ethical interpretation 
of equality. The first section focuses on perspectives of deconstruction that are 
significant for an ethical perspective on interpretation and equality and therefore 
significant for the ideal of justice. I start of as an introduction with Drucilla Cornell's3 
renaming of deconstruction as the philosophy of the limit. I think that the renaming of 
deconstruction as the philosophy of the limit clarifies the value of deconstruction for an 
ethical interpretation of equality in that it shows the limit of present systems to fully 
achieve justice or provide for equality. I then turn to Samuel Critchley's4 and Danie 
Goosen's5 comments on Jacques Derrida'Sl use of deconstruction, his focus on the 
"event" and the term central to deconstruction, differance. I also highlight the "ethical"7 
which is inherent to deconstruction. (The purpose of discussing these authors is to give 
a brief theoretical explanation on deconstruction because I experience deconstruction 
as the inspirational source for ethical interpretation). 
I also focus on the dialogue8 and difference between deconstruction and hermeneutics 
because the various visions of public space, politics, community, legal systems, the law 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Cornell (1992) The philosophy of the limit. 
Critchley (1992) The ethics of deconstruction. 
Goosen "Verlies, rou en affirmasie. Dekonstruksie en die gebeure" (1998) 1 fragmente 
54-79. See also Goosen and Van der Walt "Die tragiese, die onmoontlike en die 
demokrasie. 'n Onderhoud met Jacques Derrida" (1999) 3 fragmente 35-61. 
See generally (1974) Of grammatology; (1978) Writing and difference; (1982) Margins of 
philosophy; "Choreographies" (1982) 12 Diacrits 76; (1995) Points ... Interviews, 197 4-
1994; (1995) Archive fever. A Freudian impression; (1994) Spectres of Marx; (1997) The 
politics of friendship; "The deconstruction of actuality. An interview with Jacques Derrida" 
(1994) 68 Radical philosophy 28-41. 
Critchley (1992) The ethics of deconstruction; Van Hauten en ljsseling (red) (1992) 
Deconstructie en ethiek. 
Widdershoven & De Boer (red) (1990) Hermeneutiek in discussie. 
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and justice can be situated within the hermeneutics/deconstruction debate. The 
dialogue between a hermeneutical interpretation and a deconstructive reading is 
therefore relevant to the reconstruction and transformation of public space, equality, 
justice and "ethical" interpretation. I argue that there is no interpretation that is either 
purely hermeneutical or deconstructive. An "ethical" interpretation of equality requires 
that the tension between hermeneutics and deconstruction is preserved. I conclude the 
section on deconstruction by highlighting its significance for legal interpretation and for 
an ethical interpretation of equality in particular. With reference to Derrida's9 argument 
on "justice" and Drucilla Cornell's10 understanding of legal interpretation as "recollective 
imagination", I show how a deconstructive perspective can influence interpretation and 
legal transformation in general, and an ethical interpretation of equality in particular. 
In the next section I consider certain perspectives on rights and interpretation. I discuss 
the perspectives of Jantje Van Den Oard, 11 Martha Mi now, 12 Jennifer Nedelsky, 13 and 
Frank Michelman 14 on rights and interpretation. Their arguments can greatly contribute 
to our understanding of and approach to interpretation and equality. Although their 
arguments are by no means similar there are significant points of connection between 
the various perspectives that I shall show. In my view these authors reflect aspects of 
deconstructive thought. I shall identify some deconstructive moments in their theories. 
I start of with Jantje van den Oord's deconstructive approach to equality. She identifies 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
"Force of law: The mystical foundations of authority" in Cornell (ed) (1992) Deconstruction 
and the possibility of justice 29-67. 
(1992) The philosophy of the limit and (1993) Transformations. 
(1994) Verdaagde Rechten. 
(1990) Making all the difference; Minow & Spelman "In context" (1990) 63 Southern 
California Law Review 1597-1652. 
"Reconceiving autonomy: sources, thoughts and possibilities" (1989) 1 Yale Journal of 
Law and Feminism 7-36; "Law, boundaries and the bounded self' (1990) Representations 
162-187; "Reconceiving rights as relationships" (1993) 1 Review of Constitutional Studies 
1-17. 
"Law's republic" (1988) 97 The Yale Law Journal 1493-1537. See also "The subject of 
liberalism" (1994) 46 Stanford Law Review 1807-1833. 
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the distinction between the inside and the outside and applies it to equality and 
difference. Using the same method she argues that equality should be approached as 
a social right. Martha Minow supplements Van den Oord's argument by focusing on 
differences. She argues that we should consider the relationship in which differences 
are made and that we should especially be aware of the various power relations. Mi now 
identifies three approaches that are followed with regard to difference, namely the 
"abnormal-persons" approach, "rights analysis", and the "social-relations" approach. 
She supports the last-mentioned which is attentive of deconstructive thought. 
Jennifer Nedelsky takes the argument a step further and argues that we should 
understand and structure rights in relationships and not as barriers or limits or 
boundaries as the liberal approach does. Her approach to the interpretation and 
structuring of rights flows from her view of the experience of the "self'. She reflects on 
the experience of "self' and rejects the liberal story of the autonomous isolated 
individual as a myth. Her rejection of the fully present subject (autonomous, isolated 
individual) is similar to a deconstructive approach of a fragmentary subject. For her, 
relationships are the source of autonomy. The final perspective is that of Frank 
Michelman. In his analysis of a case decided by the US Supreme Court, Bowers v 
Hardwick, 15 he argues for a "republican constitutionalism". He says that in our 
interpretation of constitutional provisions, we need to take note of the public sphere, 
public discourse and public interest. He describes another way of understanding 
privacy. I argue that Michelman's perspective ties the other perspectives (Van den 
Oord's description of the "inside" and the "outside"; Minow's focus on difference and 
Nedelsky's emphasis on relationships) together by bringing public space explicitly into 
the picture. By focusing on public space "republican constitutionalism" crosses the 
intersection between public space, equality and justice. In think Michelman's 
understanding of "republican" can be regarded as "deconstructive". He is critical of the 
liberal model of politics and the law, but does not fully embrace republican theory as 
it is traditionally understood. He gives new content to republican theory by exposing 
some of the misunderstandings of the past and reformulating it. 
15 478 us 186 (1986). 
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The third section consists of a few South African perspectives on equality. I start of by 
referring to an early article by Albertyn and Kentridge16 on the equality clause in the 
interim constitution. I discuss this article because in my view it provided a starting point 
and reference point for the interpretation of the constitutional protection of equality. In 
my view the Constitutional Court equality decisions were until now greatly influenced 
by the Albertyn and Kentridge equality analysis in deciding equality cases. I briefly refer 
to an address that was delivered by Canadian judge L'Heureux-Dube17 where she 
translated the question of equality into an issue of language and explained the 
Canadian approach of substantive equality. I discuss the most prominent equality 
cases, 18 in my view, which were decided by our courts, and reflect on the various 
judgments. I apply Pierre Schlagg's 19 distinction between an "analytical" and an 
"instrumental" aesthetic, to the Constitutional Court's approach to equality. I also 
consider to what extent the current (absence of) public space influences the decisions 
of the Constitutional Court. 
Finally, I turn to two feminist perspectives on equality. I am concerned in this section 
as to which feminist perspective will be suitable for the South African context of 
reconstruction and transformation. I briefly refer to Julia Kristeva's20 early article on the 
state of feminism in Europe during the seventies and eighties and compare it to South 
Africa. I then discuss Drucilla Cornell's21 "ethical" feminism and its implications for an 
16 
17 
18 
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20 
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"Introducing the right to equality in the Interim Constitution" (1994) 10 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 149-178. 
L'Heureux-Dube "Making a difference: The pursuit of equality and a compassionate 
justice" (1997) 13 South African Journal on Human Rights 335-353. 
President of the Republic of South-Africa and another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) 
Fraser v Children's Court of Pretoria North 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC); Harksen v Lane 
1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC);City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC). 
"Rights in the postmodern condition" in Sarat & Kearns (eds) (1997) Legal rights. Historical 
and philosophical perspectives 263-304. 
"Women's time" in Keohane et al (1981) Feminist theory 31-53. 
"The doubly-prized world: myth, allegory and the feminine" (1990) 75 Cornell Law Review 
644-699; (1991) Beyond accommodation; (1992) The philosophy of the limit; (1993) 
Transformations; (1995) The imaginary domain. Abortion, pornography and sexual 
harassment. 
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"ethical" interpretation of equality and Christine Littleton's22 review of the practical 
approaches to equality and difference. Cornell disrupts the traditional approach to 
"difference" because she writes from a "deconstructive" angle. She echoes Cassandra's 
criticism on Aeneas that it is better to be loved by Dido than to found the Roman 
empire. I support her vision of ethical feminism in my vision of public space as well as 
in the ethical interpretation of equality. Christine Littleton23 distinguishes a symmetrical 
and asymmetrical approach to equality. She favours an asymmetrical approach of 
"acceptance". Littleton uses the very important term, "phallocentrism", which includes 
not only biological maleness but also "cultural" maleness. Her critique on 
"phallocentrism" is similar to Antigone's24 voice against her sister lsmene, who would 
not dare to oppose the powers that be. The feminist arguments of both Cornell and 
Littleton contribute to an "ethical" interpretation of equality because they realise the 
difficulties of difference. 
As a prelude to the various perspectives on deconstruction, I return to Martha 
Nussbaum's25 vision of the literary imagination in public life, 26 which already provided 
an horizon for the earlier part on visions of public space. This time, I want to consider 
her call for "poets as judges", because poets have a greater capacity to consider a 
person's concrete life story. I address this view because, like the call for the "literary 
imagination in public life", I think the call for "poets as judges" must be repeated and 
listened to in the South African context. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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"Reconstructing sexual equality" (1987) 75 California Law Review 1279 and in Smith (ed) 
(1993) Feminist jurisprudence 110-135. 
"Reconstructing sexual equality" in Smith (ed) (1993) Feminist jurisprudence 110-135. 
I discussed this in Part 1 " ... visions of public space". 
I discussed her call for the literary imagination in public life in Part 1. 
See also Gates (1997) Cultural and literary critiques of the concepts of race and Morrison 
(1993) Playing in the dark: Whiteness and the literary imagination. 
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"Poets as judges" 
Each one of those persons and each one of those houses and each one 
of those families is different, and they each have a story to tell. Each of 
those stories involves something about human passion. Each of those 
stories involves a man, a woman, children, families, work, lives.27 
Nussbaum28 argues for "poets as judges" because she believes that poets are better 
equipped for the task of judging than judges. The poet-judge judges according to 
normative considerations that differ from conventional judging models. The poet will be 
a good judge because she will be aware of fairness and of history. Nussbaum's view 
of judgement and the literary imagination is based on the Aristotelian notion of practical 
wisdom and practical judgement. Judgement should be made with an awareness of 
concrete situations. She refers to Whitman's29 argument that poets will be better judges 
because they would take greater notice of the concrete life circumstances of people 
and would not rely only on abstract principles. A judge, like the poet, who takes notice 
of people's specific contexts and the complexities of human life, has a greater affinity 
for fairness and for the influence of history. To be just to a person one should notice 
every detail of her life. With reference to three court cases, Nussbaum shows the role 
that the literary imagination, as an approach that focuses on the concrete context, can 
and should play in adjudication. The imagination, sympathy and humanity are essential 
qualities for a judge, and generally for each citizen and participant in public life. 
Nussbaum's first case is Hudson v Palmer. 30 Palmer was a prisoner who served a 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Nussbaum "Poets as judges: judicial rhetoric and the literary imagination" (1995) 62 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 1477-1519. See also Nussbaum (1995) Poetic justice. 
The literary imagination in public life. 
Nussbaum "Poets as judges: judicial rhetoric and the literary imagination" (1995) 62 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 14 77 -1519. 
Nussbaum "Poets as judges: judicial rhetoric and the literary imagination" (1995) 62 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 1478. 
468 us 517 (1984). 
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sentence for forgery, grand larceny and bank robbery. He brought the case against 
Hudson, a police officer who had searched his cell and damaged some of his goods. 
Palmer alleged that the search was done in order to harass and humiliate him. He 
argued that Hudson intentionally destroyed some of his legitimate personal property 
and that this amounted to a deprivation of property without due process of law. The 
majority of the court decided that a prisoner does not have "a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his prison cell"31 and that he is not entitled to protection against 
unreasonable searches. Justice Stevens, for the minority, did not agree with the 
majority view. He argued that maliciously motivated searches and intentional 
harassment of prisoners "cannot be tolerated by a civilized society". 32 Nussbaum 
argues that his decision, although not literary in the sense of being "stylistically 
impressive", embodies some of the general characteristics of her vision of the"poet-
judge". The judge confronts and recognises Palmer's individuality and concrete context. 
He shows respect towards the prisoner's humanity and dignity. 
Rather than treating the prisoner simply as a body to be managed by 
institutional rules, he treats him as a citizen with rights and with a dignity 
that calls for respect. 33 
The second case is Carr v Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corporation. 34 
Mary Carr was the first woman who worked in the tinsmith shop of the gas turbine 
division of General Motors. She resigned after 5 years, as a result of unbearable sexual 
harassment. She sued General Motors for compensation. On appeal, Justice Posner 
decided in Carr's favour. Nussbaum points out that the judge gave great attention to the 
31 
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Nussbaum "Poets as judges: judicial rhetoric and the literary imagination" (1995) 62 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 1497; 468 US 517 (1984) at 519. 
Nussbaum "Poets as judges: judicial rhetoric and the literary imagination"(1995) 62 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 1497; 468 US 517 (1984) at 528. 
Nussbaum "Poets as judges: judicial rhetoric and the literary imagination" (1995) 62 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 1500. 
Nussbaum "Poets as judges: judicial rhetoric and the literary imagination" (1995) 62 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 1502; 32 F3d 1007 (7th Cir 1994). 
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concrete circumstances of the plaintiff. However, the appellate court found errors in the 
findings of fact of the lower court. Nussbaum comments as follows: 
When we speak of "facts" in this case, we must be aware that these are 
not "facts" as distinct from values and evaluation. There is no dispute 
about the incidents that occurred in the tinsmith's shop. What is in 
dispute is their human meaning - how intimidating they were, how 
adversely they affected the climate in which Carr worked. The relevant 
facts, then, are human facts of the sort the literary judge is well equipped 
to ascertain. 35 
Justice Posner observed that there is a distinction between "merely vulgar and mildly 
offensive" and "deeply offensive and sexually harassing" behaviour. He drew the 
distinction to arrive at a better understanding of the effect of the behaviour on Carr. 
Nussbaum notes that without having disregarded the facts and the law, Judge Posner 
acted imaginatively and sympathetically. 
In Bowers v Hardwick, 36 Hardwick was arrested for violating Georgia's sodomy law. 
Hardwick brought a suite to invalidate the sodomy law. The court had to decide whether 
the alleged right to sodomy was protected by the constitution. The court came to the 
conclusion that homosexuals had no constitutional right to engage in sodomy. 37 
Nussbaum asks how a literary approach would have influenced the outcome of the 
decision. She describes the judge's language as "distancing language", and how it 
illustrates the refusal to acknowledge the humanity that is hurt and infringed by the law 
in question. The judge kept the human story at a distance and described the events as 
if they did not really happen to a person, or could ever happen. The court clearly 
35 
36 
37 
Nussbaum "Poets as judges: judicial rhetoric and the literary imagination" (1995) 62 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 1503. 
478 us 186 (1986). 
Recently the South African Constitutional Court decided that sodomy is not a crime under 
South African law. See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Justice and Others 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC). 
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followed a "non-narrative" approach. The effect was to distance the court from the 
person's real context. Hardwick's humanity was denied and he was described as a 
hardened criminal. 
Nussbaum admits that a judge is always restricted by the text of a statute, by precedent 
and by history. The literary imagination cannot have an influence on every case, while 
the law should be applied in every case. 38 However, the literary imagination can play 
a role in many cases. For example, In Hudson, Palmer's concrete context was 
acknowledged in the literary approach; In Carr the literary approach was applied to 
determine the gravity of the harassment; and in Hardwick the judge could have 
acquired a better vision of the situation and the role of fundamental freedoms in society 
if the case was approached with literary imagination and the concrete context had been 
acknowledged. 
In order to be fully rational a judge must be capable of literary imagination 
and sympathy. She must educate not only her technical capacities but 
also her capacity for humanity. This means, I think, that literary art is an 
essential part of the formation of the judge - and, more generally, of the 
formation of citizenship and public life. 39 
I find Nussbaum's vision of "poets as judges" very significant for my argument of an 
ethical interpretation of equality. I have already mentioned the importance of judgement 
in Part 1. I referred to Hannah Arendt's work on judgement where she attempted to 
describe judgement as a form of action in contemporary societies. Judgement is not 
38 
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The tension between freedom and constraint in adjudication and the reality of legal 
indeterminacy have been focus points for Critical Legal Scholars. Critical Legal Scholar, 
Peter Gabel ("The phenomenology of rights-consciousness and the pact of the withdrawn 
selves" (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1563-1599; "Reification in legal reasoning" (1980) 
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only for judges, each and every individual is confronted with judgement in their daily 
lives. However, I want to emphasise the importance of judicial judgements (decisions) 
and how it can contribute to the process of reconstruction and transformation. We need 
our judges when they make decisions in regard to equality (but also in general) to act 
as "poet-judges" and take notice of the concrete circumstances of a person in order to 
show greater humanity and understanding, in order to give a better judgement. I want 
to repeat the significance of judgement for the Truth Commission that I have already 
indicated in Part 1. The commissioners, the researchers, the judges on the Amnesty 
Committee, and also the public were and are all engaged in judging. The necessity to 
act as "poet-judges" is of particular importance in the context of the TRC. Nussbaum's 
vision of the "poet-judge" also contributes to an ethical interpretation of equality 
because the "poet-judge" will take care not to exclude or reduce difference and 
otherness. I think that Nussbaum's "poet-judge" can also benefit from certain 
perspectives on deconstruction. 
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Towards an "ethical" reading: Perspectives on 
deconstruction 
In this section I discuss aspects of the philosophy of deconstruction that serve as an 
inspiration for my main argument in this text, namely an ethical interpretation of 
equality. I am by no means attempting to write in an authoritative voice on 
deconstruction or to cover even the most important texts. In highlighting the aspects 
that I consider to be the most important for my argument of ethical interpretation I rely 
on the voices of a few authors and commentators. I do believe that present (modern) 
conceptions of public space, politics, the law, justice, legal interpretation and many 
others can be greatly challenged and undermined and maybe even altered by taking 
note of the philosophy of deconstruction. What I am doing in this section is to explain, 
firstly, for myself and secondly, for the reader, the aspects of deconstruction that are 
relevant to my argument. I start off, as a means of an introduction to the philosophy of 
deconstruction, with Drucilla Cornell's renaming of deconstruction as the philosophy 
of the limit; her explanation of the "ethical" that is relevant for an ethical interpretation 
of equality and Cornell's and Derrida's deconstructive accounts of community. 
"The philosophy of the limit': the "ethical" and the "ideal of community" 
"The philosophy of the limit" 
Drucilla Cornell40 renames deconstruction as the "philosophy of the limit" in order to 
focus on what deconstruction "actually is" and to articulate its significance for law. In 
her view, deconstruction, reconceived as "the philosophy of the limit", exposes the 
40 (1992) The philosophy of the limit 1. 
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"quasi-transcendental"41 conditions of any system, including a legal system as a 
system. She relates the renaming to Charles Peirce's42 notion of "secondness". 
"Secondness" indicates the impossibility of concepts to capture meaning. "Secondness, 
in other words, is what resists,"43 implying that reality cannot be fully interpreted and the 
real can never be completely captured. Cornell observes that Derrida's engagement 
with "secondness" is foundational to his interest in the relationship to the Other. She 
argues that Derrida does not attempt to describe the limit as an "oppositional cut" 
between the inside and the outside because the force of differance prevents any 
system from encompassing its Other or its excess. "The Otherfor Derrida remains other 
to the system."44 
Cornell gives two reasons for renaming deconstruction as the philosophy of the limit. 
The one is to emphasise the significance of understanding justice as the limit to any 
system of positive law. The understanding of justice as the limit to any system of 
positive law is very relevant in our present context of reconstruction and transformation 
where many of the problems of the past are exposed. We must realise that in order not 
to repeat the past, present (and future) systems must be left open and unfixed. In other 
words we must realise that it is impossible to capture justice within a system, justice is 
the limit to the system. An ethical interpretation of equality captures this insight that 
justice will never be completely achieved in any present system. 
41 
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Her other reason for renaming deconstruction as the philosophy of the limit is to change 
the terms of the debate between thinkers of "modernity" and "postmodernity". I have 
already mentioned, in Part 1, that we can not refer to the concepts "modern" and 
"postmodern" unproblematically. Cornell's discussion on this issue is important for the 
"in between" position that I subscribe to. This position does not literally mean that I take 
a position between two strands, merely that I do not necessarily subscribe to one 
specific strand. I understand Mouffe's position of being "beyond" modernity and 
postmodernity as along the same lines as Cornell's position. Cornell argues that the 
traditional understanding of the concept of postmodernity implies a progression from 
the "premodern" to the "modern" to the "postmodern", which presupposes a 
"teleological"45 notion of historical development. She says that Habermas, for example, 
makes a distinction between the modern and the postmodern that is based on the 
"teleological" development from mythos to logos. This development implies a 
separation of the "Right" from the "Good". The move from mythos to logos is for 
Habermas the key aspect of modernity, where questions of justice are separated from 
questions of the "Good". 
According to Cornell, Derrida and Levinas46 both reject the belief that there exist 
normative criteria that can be used to distinguish historical periods from one another. 
This rejection does not mean that their work is a-historical, or that they deny 
transformation. They merely question a rigid historical periodisation. Cornell argues 
that in contrast with Habermas the above thinkers concentrate on the connections 
between the periods. Habermas needs to distinguish between periods in order to 
defend what is an "enlightened" political order. (I have discussed Habermas's 
understanding of modernism as the "unfinished project of modernity" in Part 1 ). Cornell 
identifies what she calls "an ethical configuration" of the writing of Derrida, Levinas and 
45 
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Teleological in this sense implies a development or progress aimed at a specific purpose 
from premodern to modern to postmodern. 
(1982) Ethics and infinity; (1987) Time and the other, Llewelyn (1995) The genealogy of 
ethics. Emmanuel Levinas; Peperzak (1993) To the other, Critchley (1992) The ethics of 
deconstruction. Derrida & Levinas; and Visker (1999) Truth and singularity. Taking 
Foucault into phenomenology. 
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Lacan. 47 She notes that Derrida, Lacan and Levinas all reject the idea that the 
movement from mythos to logos can be completed. This does not mean that there is 
no content to the term "postmodern". Cornell suggests that "postmodern"48 should be 
understood as an allegory and that it represents an ethical insistence on the limit to 
positive descriptions of the principles of modernity. This emphasis on the limit is crucial 
for legal transformation. 
The "ethical" relationship 
Cornell's distinction between morality and the ethical relationship is crucial for my own 
understanding of the "ethical". She explains: 
For my purposes, "morality" designates any attempt to spell out how one 
determines a "right way to behave", behavioural norms which, once 
determined, can be translated into a system of rules. The ethical relation, 
a term which I contrast with morality, focuses instead on the kind of 
person one must become in order to develop a nonviolative relationship 
to the other. The concern of the ethical relation, in other words, is a way 
of being in the world that spans divergent value systems and allows us 
to criticize the repressive aspects of competing moral systems. 49 
Cornell describes the "ethical relation" as a focus less on following rules than on the 
development of an attitude of tenderness toward otherness. 50 The significance of 
47 
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See generally Lacan (1977) Ecrits: A selection; Mitchell & Rose (eds) (1985) Feminine 
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ethical in ethical interpretation is exactly concerned with such an "attitude of tenderness 
toward otherness" in contrast with a focus on rules that in my view both formal and 
substantive approaches to equality follow. 
Community 
Cornell51 argues that the "philosophy of the limit" can transform present conceptions of 
community that emphasise unity and "full presence". The deconstructive accounts of 
community should be noted in our own conceptions of a South African community. This 
deconstructive vision of community ties in with the previous discussion on community 
and public space in Part 1. 
The power of communalism as a dream lies in the chance of uncovering 
or having revealed to us a different way of belonging together, which 
does not revert to classic individualism and which is also not just the 
identification of the individual with the community in mass society. 52 
For her, the ideal of community expresses the recognition of the sameness that marks 
each one of us as an individual and thus as both different and the same. In the 
recognition of the connection between sameness and difference, belonging together 
can be understood without an essentialist understanding of connection. Cornell's 
understanding of community is close to Chantal I Mouffe's vision that I discussed in Part 
1. 
The philosophy of deconstruction exposes how the mere existence of "community" 
draws boundaries between an inside and an outside, whereby some are inevitably 
51 
52 
tradition. She notes that for Derrida there can be no self-enclosed tradition, ethical or 
otherwise which will not show the economy of differance. The conventions of a community 
cannot be shown to be a closed totality. The ethical message in Derrida and Adorno 
reminds us to care for difference. This care for difference does not attempt to grasp what 
is other as one's own. Cornell argues that the danger of certainty is that it prevents oneself 
to open up to the other and to listen truly, to risk the chance of being wrong. 
(1992) The philosophy of the limit 60. 
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excluded. Derrida53 says that deconstruction insists on multiplicity, heterogeneity and 
difference. From a deconstructive perspective the "privilege granted to unity and totality 
and community is a danger for responsibility, decision, ethics and politics". Derrida 
therefore insists that the unity must be prevented "to close itself, to close up". This does 
not mean that we have to destroy unity. 
He refers to the example of culture and argues that cultural identity 
[l]mplies a difference within the identity. That is, the identity of a culture 
is a way of being different from itself; a culture is different from itself. 
Once you take into account this inner and other difference, then you pay 
attention to the other and you understand that fighting for your own 
identity is not exclusive of another identity, is open to another identity. 
And this prevents totalitarianism, nationalism, ethnocentrism and so on 
and so on. 54 
Derrida argues that to grant privilege to "gathering" (association and unity) and not to 
dissociation will have the effect of leaving no room "for the other, for the radical 
otherness of the other, for the radical similarity of the other". 55 For him separation, in 
contrast to unity is the "condition" of my relation to the other. The other can be 
addressed only to the extent that there is a separation and a dissociation. Dissociation 
is also the condition for community. Dissociation is also the condition for a state. 
[A] state in which there would be only "unum" would be a terrible 
catastrophe. And we have had, unfortunately, a number of such 
experiences. A state without plurality and a respect for plurality, would 
53 
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See "The Villanova roundtable" in Caputo (1997) Deconstruction in a nutshell. A 
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Derrida "The Villanova roundtable" in Caputo (1997) Deconstruction in a nutshell. A 
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be, first a totalitarian state and not only is this a terrible thing, but it does 
not work. We know that it is terrible and that it does not work. Finally it 
would not even be a state. It would be, I do not know what, a stone a 
rock, or something like that. Thus, a state as such must be attentive as 
much as possible to plurality, to the plurality of peoples, of languages, 
cultures, ethnic groups, persons and so on. That is the condition for a 
state. 56 
As I have already mentioned an ethical interpretation of equality consists of visions of 
public space, equality and justice. How we conceive of "community" is therefore related 
to an ethical interpretation of equality. I argue that we can benefit from deconstruction's 
emphasis of separation and dissociation in contrast to unity. In "unity" the radical other 
and difference are excluded. An ethical interpretation of equality seeks to address the 
exclusion of the other and difference in its approach. 
I shall now turn to some theoretical aspects concerning deconstruction, its ethical 
imperative, deconstruction as a strategy of delay and the dialogue between 
hermeneutics and deconstruction. I shall be addressing Samuel Critchley's and Danie 
Goosen's commentaries on Jacques Derrida. Here and there I shall turn to Derrida 
himself. I shall refer to Samuel ljsseling's57 reading of deconstruction as a "strategy of 
delay" which I regard crucial for ethical interpretation. I shall mention aspects of the 
dialogue between hermeneutics and deconstruction because it is relevant to legal 
interpretation, as well as to the issue of modernity and postmodernity: I shall then refer 
to Caputo's view that we must return to the notion that "life is hard". His argument is 
also very relevant to legal interpretation. I believe that an ethical interpretation 
acknowledges life's difficulty. I shall conclude this conversation with a discussion on 
a possible effect of deconstruction on the law and legal interpretation. 
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There are certain terms, concepts and phrases that are part of any discussion and 
conversation on deconstruction. It is impossible to provide dictionary definitions and 
meanings for them. They must be understood in a certain context. However, I shall try 
to make these terms as clear as possible without reducing them to simple definitions. 
The notion of justice can not be separated from the understanding of deconstruction 
that I follow. Hopefully this connection between deconstruction and justice will become 
clearer through the various discussions in this section. I have already referred to 
Cornell's formulation of justice as the limit to any system. I explained that Cornell 
renames deconstruction as the philosophy of the limit because she thinks that it will 
then be easier to understand what is meant by deconstruction. If justice is the limit to 
any system and deconstruction is renamed as the philosophy of the limit, it follows that 
deconstruction is justice. Derrida himself says it in more or less the same words. I shall 
refer to his view on deconstruction as justice below. Some of the other terms that are 
frequently used in the conversation on deconstruction are double reading, double bind, 
alterity, differance, the event, the other, the promise and the arrival. 
What deconstruction is not 
Samuel Critchley58 says that it is easier to describe deconstruction in terms of what it 
is not. Deconstruction is not something negative, in other words, it is not a process of 
demolition. Deconstruction does not presuppose a reduction of entities to their 
"essential" elements. It is not critique. It is not a method or way that can be used in 
interpretative activities. It cannot be reduced to a methodology or a technical 
procedure. Deconstruction is not an act that can be produced and controlled by a 
subject and it is not an operation that works on a text or an institution. Critchley59 
explains: 
58 Critchley (1992) The ethics of deconstruction 21. 
59 (1992) The ethics of deconstruction 22. 
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All ontological statements of the form "Deconstruction is x" miss the point 
a priori; for it is precisely the ontological presuppositions of the copula 
that provide one of the enduring themes of deconstruction. 
Critchley refers to Derrida's claim that deconstruction "takes place", which means that 
it cannot be defined. How does deconstruction "take place"? It takes place during the 
reading of a text. As a textual practice it is "double reading". This means that there are 
at least two layers of reading. The first will usually be the "dominant interpretation" of 
a text in the guise of a commentary. The second layer is within and through the 
repetition, by opening a text up to blind spots within the dominant interpretation. In his 
reading of a text, Derrida60 seeks to expose the blind spots, the spaces between the 
writer's intentions and the text, between the writer's commands and her failures to 
command a language. 
How does a deconstructive reading take place? Derrida observes that the signifying 
structure of a deconstructive reading cannot simply be produced through the "respectful 
doubling of commentary". Commentary "has always only protected, it has never 
opened, a reading". 61 Critchley explains that Derrida uses the word "commentary" to 
refer to the "reproducibility" and "stability" of the dominant interpretation of a text. 
Commentary is always already interpretation. Derrida does not believe in the possibility 
of a pure and simple repetition of a text. This does not mean however that one must not 
be true to the text. Derrida explains "Otherwise, one could indeed say just anything at 
all and I have never accepted saying, or being encouraged to say, just anything at 
all."62 In other words a deconstructive reading must remain within the limits of textuality. 
This can be explained with reference to the tension in legal interpretation between 
textual constraint on the one hand, and the freedom of a judge to interpret on the other. 
60 (1976) Of grammatology 158. 
61 Derrida (1976) Of grammatology 158. 
62 (1976) Of grammato/ogy 58. 
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Ronald Dworkin63, although he does not represent deconstructive thought at all, 
recognises the tension between textual constraint and freedom in his argument of legal 
interpretation as a chain novel. He explains that what judges do when they interpret the 
law is similar to the writers of a chain novel. Like the writers in the case of the chain 
novel are free to be creative and imaginative on the one hand and are constrained by 
what happened in previous chapters on the other, judges are similarly free to interpret 
creatively and imaginatively while being constrained by the law, legal texts and legal 
precedent. Closer to deconstructive thought is the legal critique of the Critical Legal 
Studies.64 
CLS scholar Karl Klare65 in a recent article explains the tension between textual 
constraint and judicial freedom in the South African context. He shows the significance 
of legal indeterminacy for legal transformation in South Africa. He argues that 
indeterminacy and the tension between freedom and constraint that traditionally has 
been thought of as a dilemma, should be made a virtue.66 South African lawyers should 
accordingly re-examine their analytical and argumentative methods. Klare67 argues that 
because there is no total constraint (in other words the text is always open for 
interpretation), adjudication can be a site of "law-making activity". He argues that to be 
63 
64 
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Review 561-675; Gordon "Critical legal histories" (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 57-125; 
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a conscientious judge in the new South Africa means to fulfil the values of dignity, 
equality and freedom. The values of dignity, equality and freedom, however, must be 
interpreted and given meaning in different context. Judges will still experience the 
tension of freedom and constraint. 
But judges still, and will always, confront the conflicting pulls and tensions 
. . . of freedom and constraint. On the one hand, there is a grand 
constitutional text replete with broad phrases and redolent with 
magnificent hopes to overcome past injustice and move toward a 
democratic and caring society. Yet, on the other, just about everyone 
takes for granted that adjudication is not and cannot be infinitely plastic 
and open-ended ... a commitment to legal constraint (evoked in the 
mantra "rule of law") seems to be a foundation of the democratic 
enterprise. 68 
Back to deconstruction it must be asked how a reading can remain within the limits of 
textuality without merely repeating the text in the manner of a commentary. The answer 
is by following a double reading: 
If the first moment of reading is the rigorous, scholarly reconstruction of 
the dominant interpretation of a text, its intended meaning ... in the guise 
of a commentary, then the second moment of reading, in virtue of which 
deconstruction obeys a double necessity, is the destabilization of the 
stability of the dominant interpretation. It is the moment of traversing the 
text which enables the reading to obtain a position of alterity or exteriority, 
from which the text can be deconstructed. The second moment brings the 
text into contradiction with itself, opening its intended meaning, ... onto 
an alterity which goes against what the text wants to say or mean. 69 
68 
69 
"Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism" (1998) 14 South African Journal on 
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Critchley (1992) The ethics of deconstruction 27. 
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Critchley explains that the second moment, the "moment of alterity" must be shown to 
arise necessarily out of the first moment of "repetitive commentary". By following the 
path of repetition, one inevitably crosses the path of something wholly other, something 
that cannot be reduced to what the text or tradition wants to say. Deconstruction thus 
can be understood as a double reading that operates within a double bind of belonging 
to a tradition, language, and a philosophical discourse while at the same time being 
incapable of belonging to it. 
If legal interpretation can merely accept the notion of a double reading and a double 
bind it will be able to show greater understanding to difference and otherness. It is such 
a double reading and double bind that ethical interpretation seeks to be true to. 
Deconstruction's ethical imperative 
According to Critchley70 the textual practice of deconstructive reading should be 
understood as an "ethical demand". He identifies three waves of the reception of 
deconstruction. The first was its literary reception by scholars like Paul de Man, JH 
Miller, Bloom and Hartman. The second wave was the philosophical reception. Both 
paid little or no attention to the ethical moment, which is essential to a deconstructive 
reading, and which anticipates the third wave. Critchley distinguishes deconstructive 
ethics from the traditional concept of ethics as a branch or a region of philosophy. 
The ethics of deconstruction does not mean that ethics has its origin or foundation in 
deconstruction, or that the relation between ethics and deconstruction is one of 
inference or derivation. It does not mean that the meaning of deconstruction is so clear 
that one can draw implications and applications. It does not mean that ethics can be 
derived from deconstruction or that it is a superstructure on an infrastructure or a 
second critique from a first critique. Critchley formulates the ethics of deconstruction 
as a pattern of reading that has an ethical structure, in other words, deconstruction 
takes place ethically. 
70 (1992) The ethics of deconstruction 1. 
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The third wave, beyond literary and philosophical appropriation, is the one in which 
ethical (and political) questions are uppermost. 71 The ethical demand in deconstruction 
has significant implications for legal transformation and interpretation. 
Deconstruction and the event - Danie Goosen 
Goosen, in reaction to the critique that considers deconstruction as nihilistic, describes 
deconstruction as "the event". 72 The event in this regard refers to a "traumatic" moment 
where the subject is overcome by the "singular other". He argues that deconstruction, 
because of its focus on the traumatic event, is characterised by experiences of loss and 
fragility. But, deconstruction, because of its special relationship with the future does not 
leave us with feelings of loss and mourning. It affirms the future with a yes. He explains 
that it is significant to realise that rational thought can never gain access to the event 
in the present. We know the event only indirectly, from a distance. The event refers to 
that which comes from "outside" to destabilise and disrupt our own symbolic order (that 
is, a system that seeks to systematise our reality). The event refers to the broken 
moments between our symbolic orders and reality, which cannot be bridged. If symbolic 
orders seek to force an identity between themselves and reality, the event disrupts this 
false identity. For example, deconstruction seeks to remember the disruption between 
reality and language. 
Goosen73 argues that the ethic-political dimension of deconstruction exists exactly in 
remembering this break between reality and language. He calls this a "politics of 
remembrance". In a "politics of remembrance" the "present" presence of the event is not 
71 
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stated. Rather the incapability of symbolic orders to bridge reality is remembered. To 
practise a "politics of remembrance" may mean to be open, even "hospitable", to the 
event. Goosen74 explains that deconstruction is interested in the occurrence of the 
event itself and not the reasons for it. Deconstruction creates an openness for the event 
to take place before it is rationally tied in and explained by the symbolic order. For 
Goosen, hospitableness towards the event translates into a political idiom as the vision 
of a "democracy always to come". Justice exists in the hope that the borders of existing 
systems can be deconstructed and opened up for the coming of the event, the coming 
of democracy. This formulation is similar to Cornell's renaming of deconstruction as the 
philosophy of the limit and her remark that justice is the limit of any system. 
Goosen explains differance as an indication of the event, especially the event of 
language. Differance can have two possible meanings: to differ and to defer (postpone). 
Because of differance meaning is always removed from the present to the future. The 
effect of differance is that finality is always postponed because of the disruptions of the 
symbolic order. The subject, therefore, finds herself in a context of incompleteness, 
insecurity and ambiguity. A promise can be used to explain the meaning of differance. 
Differance moves the meaning of language, or the coming of the event, or the fulfilment 
of a promise to the future. Goosen75 notes the paradox inherent in differance and the 
promise. The event and also differance can take place as long as it is not taken up in 
a rational symbolic structure; the promise of language is only a promise as long as it 
is not fulfilled. To make a promise is to situate oneself in an "in between" space, 
between being and not being. Deconstruction defends this "in between" space (or state) 
because it is a space gracious towards unfinality and openness. Goosen76 argues that 
deconstruction defends the "in between" also because it creates room for the other. 
This description of an in between space is related to the discussion in Part 1 here I 
supported Hannah Arendt's vision of public space. She considered public space as 
such an "in between". I shall return to the deconstructive account of the promise in Part 
74 Goosen "Verlies, rou en affirmasie. Dekonstruksie en die gebeure" (1998)1 fragmente 58. 
75 Goosen "Verlies, rou en affirmasie. Dekonstruksie en die gebeure" (1998)1 fragmente 73. 
76 Goosen 'Verlies, rou en affirmasie. Dekonstruksie en die gebeure" (1998)1 fragmente 73. 
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3 where I focus on the significance of the promise in the TRC. I describe the TRC also 
as an "in between" space. 
Following the explanation of the event, differance and a promise we can say that justice 
is to be open towards that which is excluded by the violence of language. Justice also 
means to be open for the singularity of things, in other words the event, that can 
surprisingly occur "from" the future. 77 In response to the accusation that differance (and 
accordingly deconstruction) are evading the pressing needs of the present, especially 
political and ethical ones (needs concerning justice), Derrida argues that there is no 
conflict between differance and the pressing urgency of present need. 
Differance points to a relationship ... a relation to what is other, to what 
differs in the sense of alterity, to the singularity of the other - but "at the 
same time" it also relates to what is to come, to that which will occur in 
ways which are in appropriable, unforeseen, and therefore urgent, 
beyond anticipation: to precipitation in fact. The thought of differance is 
also, therefore, a thought of pressing need, of something which, because 
it is different, I can neither avoid or appropriate. The event and the 
singularity of the event - this is what differance is all about. 78 
Derrida explains that differance involves an opposite movement that takes place "at the 
same time", in other words a double movement. The notion of taking place at the same 
time and a double reading (movement) is relevant to ethical interpretation where the 
ideal of justice is nurtured while at the same time the impossibility of fully achieving 
justice in the present is realised. 
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In reply to the question what he means by "the event", Derrida answered that it is 
another name for experience, which is always experience of the other. To prevent the 
happening of the event will be to shut oneself off from the future. Derrida refers in this 
regard to "absolute arrivals": 
Absolute arrivals must not be required to begin by stating their identity; 
I must not insist that they say who they are, and whether they are going 
to integrate themselves or not; nor should I lay down any conditions for 
offering them hospitality, ... with an absolute new arrival, I ought not to 
propose contracts or impose conditions ... it actually goes far beyond 
morality, and even further beyond law and politics. 79 
An arrival must be something absolutely different. It must be something that cannot be 
explained or predicted rationally. If we knew it was coming, such knowledge would 
anticipate the future and deaden it in advance. (Like a promise is only a promise as 
long as it is unfulfilled) Derrida mentions that the arrival of someone I am waiting for 
may also astonish and surprise me every time and be new every time. The crucial point 
is that there can be no event without surprise. In Part 3 I shall argue that the event of 
the TRC was a public space where action took place because there was room for 
spontaneous and unpredictable action, in other words surprise. 
In regard to the new arrival the "messianic" characteristic of deconstruction must be 
noted. Derrida explains the term "messianic" as a Messianic experience that will only 
be determined a posteriori, by the event. The messianic reference to an arrival that may 
turn up and of whom we know nothing in advance, is inherently part of justice and of the 
event. 
The understanding of deconstruction and differance as an event and its implications for 
justice is crucial for the story of the political, the public and the ethical that I attempt to 
develop in this text. The search for an ethical understanding of equality is dependent 
79 Derrida "The deconstruction of actuality" (1994) 68 Radical philosophy 32. 
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on the deconstructive "hospitableness" to the event of the future. The public moment 
of the TRC, which is integral to an ethical interpretation of equality, relies on the 
absolute new arrival that astonishes and surprises. Notions of a "democracy to come" 
and a justice that does not exist, are crucial for South Africa's processes towards 
transformation and reconciliation, which must (can) never be completed. As the promise 
of language is broken the moment it is fulfilled, the processes of transformation and 
reconciliation will become impossible the moment they are perceived to be completed 
or to have succeeded. It is for this reason that the various responses to the TRC are 
of significance. I believe that the TRC should be approached in such an open, future-
orientated way. 
Below I shall put forward Samuel ljsseling's reading of deconstruction as a "strategy of 
delay". I have already mentioned that an ethical interpretation of equality follows such 
a "strategy of delay", a slowness when considering issues of equality and difference. 
Deconstruction as a strategy of delay - Samuel ljsseling 
ljsseling80 describes deconstruction as a "strategy of delay". He argues that Derrida 
draws our attention to the "unsaid" and that he focuses on the open places in the text. 
The unsaid, the open places, relate to context, which is central to a deconstructive 
approach. The reader/listener should pay attention to the moment of the discussion or 
text. The context can never be comprehended fully, or closed off. Derrida uses the idea 
of iterability which means that every word can be taken out of one context and placed 
in another, which will function in another way and create different meanings. The 
principle of mimese, which is related to iterability, implies that a word with one meaning 
can be moved to another context to have a different meaning. Because of the 
importance of context, and the amb.iguity and fluidity of meaning, meaning can never 
80 
"Jacques Derrida: een strategie van de vertraging" in Widdershoven en De Boer (1990) 
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be found. It always escapes us with the result that a multiplicity of meanings is created. 
This does not mean that one should not try to create a meaning or to understand. The 
double bind of deconstruction demands that we seek to produce meaning while "at the 
same time" realising that it is impossible to understand fully. Significantly, ljsseling81 
notes that Derrida advises us to be careful when reading. 
He argues that for Derrida the "quasi-transcendental" can be seen in that which is not 
thought and not said. This unthought and unsaid is part of the "economy" of being 
human. The unwritten creates conditions for the production and the understanding of 
a text. The open spaces in one text form the condition for the creation of new texts that 
can be written in the margins of the existing text or in the open spaces of other texts. 
The economy of a text is an aspect of the impatience and haste of human existence. 
It attempts to achieve the biggest possible effect with the smallest possible effort. 
ljsseling mentions that Derrida presupposes a "delay" when he reads. He uses delay 
as another word for differance. This means that if one only concentrates on that which 
is physically in the text, one negates judgement. The ethical imperative of 
deconstruction and Derrida's ethical moments are highlighted in the delay. For Derrida, 
to interpret a text means to judge. Responsibility is captured in an inescapable double 
bind - although we know that we can not comprehend the context fully, and therefore 
can not judge, we know that we must. The responsibility lies in the knowledge that we 
must judge although we can not. "The strategy of delay" takes notice of that which 
cannot be known, the "other of knowing". It focuses on that which can not be 
systematised, predicted and foreseen. It awaits the event of a new arrival, of a surprise. 
ljsseling argues that the strategy of delay is not a method to be followed, it is rather a 
way of reading and writing texts that creates an openness for the event. 
Below I shall discuss the dialogue between deconstruction and hermeneutics. This 
81 
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dialogue is of significance for an ethical interpretation of equality, but also relevant to 
the reconstruction and transformation of public space and community. 
The ongoing dialogue between deconstruction and hermeneutics - H 
Kimmerle, V Vasterling and S ljsseling 
The dialogue between deconstruction and hermeneutics connects with the above 
discussion on a strategy of delay and the one below on the philosophy of facticity. The 
main point is that hermeneutics tends to subscribe to an easy or more comfortable 
position than deconstruction. The dialogue between the two, in my view, relates to the 
various approaches to equality - formal or substantive approaches in contrast with an 
ethical interpretation. 
According to Kimmerle, 82 Gadamer83 and Derrida both make use of "the game" to 
describe language events. In Derrida's case it is not a question of an ontological game. 
The disruption of tradition is part of the dynamics of the game. He explains that the 
infatuation with history is not taken up in a general theory or methodology. Derrida's 
deconstruction does not have the same level of generality as Gadamer's hermeneutics. 
In Derrida's language game the person who wants to understand and the one that must 
be understood are often not playing the same game. Derrida focuses more explicitly 
than Gadamer on the importance of text by emphasising the divisions and breaks in 
interpretation and understanding. 
Kimmerle argues that in the hermeneutical tradition, where unity is treasured, these 
divisions and breaks cannot be accepted. He notes that Gadamer himself sees 
82 
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resemblance between hermeneutics and deconstruction because of the understanding 
of history through the interpretation of language events. An important difference 
between hermeneutics and deconstruction or between Gadamer and Derrida, is that 
deconstruction (Derrida) does not create or find a "fusion of horizons" or a "third 
position". This does not mean that deconstruction negates meaning. Meaning is made 
possible by the problematisation of understanding or the problematisation of finding 
meaning. For Kimmerle this is Derrida's "hermeneutical moment". He notes that 
although Derrida is more radical than Gadamer they both acknowledge a 
"metaphysical" realm. 
Vasterling84 shows the difference between Gadamer and Derrida in their vision of 
language. Gadamer works with a present autonomous reader/writer (subject). For 
Derrida the language itself is autonomous. He argues that their similarity lies in the fact 
that they are both occupied with "conditions of being". Classical hermeneutics searches 
for concrete "real" conditions. Deconstruction insists on the fact that nothing can be 
fully comprehended or marginalised. Vasterling sees a crucial difference between 
hermeneutics and deconstruction in the farmer's belief in the possibility of finding truth 
and the latter's scepticism towards any final closed understanding of "truth". 
ljsseling formulates one of the possible definitions of deconstruction as 
[H]et zich rekensschap geven van de conteksts zonder grens, de mees 
levendige en de breedst mogelijke aandacht voor de contekst, en 
derhalve een voortdurende beweging van recontekstualisatie. 85 
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ljsseling86 notes that context also plays a crucial role in traditional hermeneutics where 
it is accepted that the meaning of a certain word, sentence, fragment of a text or text 
as a whole relies on the context for its meaning. ljsseling argues that although Derrida 
is continually busy with interpretation, he does not stand in the hermeneutical tradition. 
Hermeneutics focuses on already constituted meaning. Deconstruction is interested in 
the process of the production of meaning and in "the event" that is taking place during 
this process. To move in the margins of a text is therefore of the utmost importance. 
ljsseling argues that the relationship between hermeneutics and deconstruction is more 
complicated than suggested by hermeneutics. Although every text has its context, there 
is also a break between every text and its context. This break forms part of the process 
of the production of meaning. Derrida does not foresee a circle of communication or a 
dialectic, but rather a break with it and difference. For him there is not just one context 
but always a multiplicity of contexts. As has been said above, no context can ever be 
marginalised or closed. 
Deconstruction as a radical hermeneutics focuses on the breaks and differences in 
texts, interpretation and understanding. It accepts the incompleteness of present 
understanding. The crucial difference between deconstruction and hermeneutics is that 
hermeneutics accepts a certain meaning in the present and lives with it. Deconstruction 
insists that the present understanding must be disrupted and problematised. 
Deconstruction's ethical imperative lies precisely in this refusal to accept present 
meaning as final and complete. This refusal gives effect to a utopianism or messianic 
hope, which results in the ideal of a democracy to come, and of justice in the beyond. 
As I shall show, an ethical interpretation of equality combines this reach into the future 
with memory. 
86 ljsseling "Derrida over teksts en conteksts" in Van Hauten & ljsseling (reds) (1992) 
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"We have it from Aristotle that life is hard" - John Caputo 
The belief that life is hard and that philosophy must be true to this is related to 
ljsseling's understanding of deconstruction as a strategy of delay. Because life is hard, 
one can not go through it quickly and inattentively. The same holds for interpretation. 
Referring to Heidegger's87 argument that philosophy must become a "hermeneutics of 
facticity", Caputo88 pleads for a reading of life which could restore "tactical existence" 
to its original difficulty. A hermeneutics of facticity will follow the opposite course from 
a "metaphysics of presence", which has been making life light and easy. From the start, 
metaphysics has been giving us eloquent assurances about Being and presence. In 
Caputo's own words 
[A] hermeneutics of facticity, convinced that life is toil and trouble (Sorge}, 
would keep a watchful eye for the ruptures and the breaks and the 
irregularities in existence. This new hermeneutics would try not to make 
things look easy, to put the best face on existence, but rather to recapture 
the hardness of life before metaphysics showed us a fast way out the 
back door of the flux. 89 
Philosophy, for Caputo, must begin by putting Being as "presence" in question. He 
argues that in metaphysics the question is always foreclosed, but in "radical 
hermeneutics" the disruptive force of the question is contained. Radical hermeneutics 
is therefore for the "tough". Caputo focuses on the radicalisation of hermeneutics that 
starts with Heidegger. Derrida, in Caputo's view, drives hermeneutics to its most 
extreme and radical formulation and pushes it to its limits. The essence of 
87 See generally Heidegger (1962) Being and time. 
88 (1987) Radical hermeneutics 1. 
89 Caputo (1987) Radical hermeneutics 1. 
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hermeneutics is to create the opening, not to find a resolution. To Caputo, Derrida is 
the turning point in hermeneutics, the point where hermeneutics is pushed to the brink. 
He views Gadamer's90 philosophical hermeneutics as an attempt to block off the 
radicalisation of hermeneutics and to return to the fold of metaphysics. Caputo argues 
that it is essential not to see radical hermeneutics as an exercise in nihilism. Radical 
hermeneutics describes the "fix" we are in. The point of radical hermeneutics is to make 
life difficult, not impossible. Caputo91 refers to certain breaking points in the habits and 
practices of everyday life where the flux is exposed and the fixed constructions of 
everydayness come tumbling down. 
Something breaks through because the constraints we impose upon 
things break down .... What breaks down in the breakthrough is the spell 
of conceptuality, the illusion that we have somehow or another managed 
to close our conceptual fists around the nerve of things, that we have 
grasped the world round about, circumscribed and encompassed it. 92 
The notion of "life is hard" must be pursued in an ethical interpretation of equality. The 
purpose is not to make interpretation (rights, rules, the law) impossible, but to put us 
on our guard against easy answers and quick fixes, and to avoid blind trust in a present 
human-manufactured system of rules and regulations. The ethical imperative in 
deconstruction lies in the restoring of life's difficulty, in the opening of presence without 
closing it again. Ethical interpretation seeks to expose the breaking points. 
At this point we must turn to Derrida's vision on law and justice. 
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"If anything is undeconstructable, it is justice" - Jacques Derrida 
Derrida93 argues that justice is undeconstructable. Law, on the other hand, is 
deconstructable. To him, justice is the best word to describe the affirmative experience 
of the coming of the other as other. The openness of the future is related to justice that 
is undeconstructable and never achievable within a system, and to a democracy to 
come. 
Justice requires us to prevent certain events (or arrivals) from coming to 
pass. Events are not good in themselves, and the future is not 
unconditionally desirable .... But it will always be possible to show that 
what we are opposing, what we would hypothetically prefer not to 
happen, is something which, rightly or wrongly, is thought of as 
obstructing the horizon, or simply forming a horizon (the word means 
limit) for the absolute coming of what is completely other, for the future 
itself.94 
Justice in Derrida's view is not the same as law and it is broader and more fundamental 
than human rights. Justice is also not the same as distributive justice and it is not the 
same as respect for the other as human subject in the traditional sense of the word. 
Justice is the experience of the other as other and the fact that the other is permitted 
to be other. This presupposes a gift without exchange, without reappropriation, without 
jurisdiction. Derrida argues for "the return of a little hope" within society by striving for 
the ideal of justice. An "insurgence" in the name of justice is bound to return and will 
give rise to critiques which are inspired by Marxism.95 This "insurgence" believes that 
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Derrida "The deconstruction of actuality" (1994) 68 Radical philosophy 36. 
Derrida "The deconstruction of actuality" (1994) 68 Radical Philosophy 36. 
Derrida 'The deconstruction of actuality" (1994) 68 Radical Philosophy 39 argues for a 
new and completely different interpretation of Marx's philosophy. See also Derrida (1994) 
Spectres of Marx. 
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something is wrong and does not accept the new world order which is currently being 
shaped. 
Derrida describes justice as "incalculable. You cannot calculate justice. Levinas says 
somewhere that the definition of justice - which is very minimal but which I love, which 
I think is really rigorous - is that justice is the relation to the other. That's all". 96 Derrida 
continues and says further that the law can always be improved. Laws can be replaced 
by other ones, constitutions can be written, institutions created. Each time a legal 
system is replaced by another one it is a kind of deconstruction. The fact that the law 
can be deconstructed is a condition for historicity, revolution, morals, ethics and 
progress. But justice is what gives the impulse and the movement to improve the law. 
Justice can never be "calculated". The law can be "calculated", for example, a judge 
can see whether a person has obeyed a certain rule or not. But justice is not only a 
matter of knowledge or theoretical judgement. A responsible judge must therefore 
reinvent the law each time. She cannot simply apply the law as a coded programme to 
a given case. A judge must "reinvent in a singular situation a new judgement 
relationship". The call for justice is therefore never fully answered. No one can say, "I 
am just". Unlike law, economics or social security, justice cannot be calculated. Justice 
should go beyond calculation. This does not mean that we should not calculate, but we 
must realise that there is a point beyond which calculation must fail. 97 
The search for an "ethical interpretation" of equality must take notice of 
deconstruction's ethical imperative and its implications for politics, public space, the law 
and justice. Although the South African political and legal system has experienced 
change over the past few years the limits of present systems must be exposed. Judges 
must judge with responsibility. They should not make mere calculable decisions but 
should rather adhere to the concrete circumstances of each and every situation. An 
96 
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"The Villanova roundtable" in Caputo (1997) Deconstruction in a nutshell. A conversation 
with Jacques Derrida 17. See Levin as (1969) Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority 
89. 
"The Villanova roundtable" in Caputo (1997) Deconstruction in a nutshell. A conversation 
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ethical interpretation of equality notes the "practical" effect of deconstruction on the law, 
justice and legal interpretation. Although many scholars argue that deconstructive 
theory cannot address justice because justice demands reconstructive approaches, in 
my view deconstruction has a great capacity to address justice because it "is" 
inherently ethical. The concept of justice in this thesis does not primarily entail 
programmes of social security or human rights or economic upliftment. I subscribe to 
the understanding of justice as something that can never be fully achieved within a 
present system of law and rules and regulations. This does not mean that justice is 
impossible to strive for. The fact that the impossibilities of present programmes and 
systems to fully achieve justice are exposed does not negate the validity and necessity 
of those programmes. A deconstructive approach requires a double-handed approach, 
in other words one must be an "activist" of sorts and a "deconstructionist" of sorts at 
the same time. All our actions and movements in public and private life should be 
regulated by the "ideal of justice". Our relations towards the other and all others 1must 
be driven by the ethical imperative to be just. The demand that we must be open tb the 
radical other without making her the other of myself is a demand for justice. 
Below I shall first discuss first Derrida's notion that "deconstruction is justice" and the 
implications of it for legal interpretation. I shall then turn to Cornell's theory of "legal 
interpretation as recollective imagination". Both these perspectives are important for 
an ethical interpretation of equality. 
The law, justice and legal interpretation: Deconstruction is just~ce -
Jacques Derrida 
Derrida's98 later writings on the law, politics and justice illustrate the ethical dimehsion 
98 
"Force of law: The mystical foundations of authority" in Cornell (ed) (1992) Deconstruction 
and the possibility of justice 3-67. See also Derrida (1997) The po/Wes of friends/tlip. 
198 
in deconstruction. He distinguishes between law and justice. According to him, law, that 
comprises rules and regulations, can be calculated. A judge can look to see whether 
the provisions of a certain act have been adhered to. In each and every case there are 
certain facts, procedures, rules and regulations that should be followed. But such a 
process can never be enough. Each and every case demands a judge to go further. 
Deconstruction undermines the legal system that claims to find authority in its own 
functioning. To appeal to a present reality as the basis for justice denies future 
possibilities for legal reform. To identify an existing state of affairs with justice, is to 
impose silence on the other who does not have a voice in the present system. The 
divide between law and justice is a divide between "what is" and "what ought". Justice 
is the limit to the legal system that identifies its own norms as justice. 
To Derrida justice operates as aporia. Aporia refers to the "in between", the space 
between the inside and the outside, an entrance or an exit. In the first place there is an 
aporia between norm and rule, in other words between what ought to be and what is. 
When a judge is called to judge she must not only state what the law "is", but must also 
confirm its value as it "ought to be". The judge is caught in a paradox. While she must 
judge according to law she must also adhere to the singularity of each case. Although 
many legal scholars might respond to this by saying "of course, that is how the law and 
legal interpretation and judgement work in any case", my response will be to refer them 
back to Caputo's theme of facticity. "You might think that you are adhering to the 
concrete circumstances, and that you are noticing difference and singularity, but be 
careful, to regard singularity or radical otherness, is easier said than done." The ethical 
moment in deconstruction lies in the realisation of the difficulty and the tragedy that the 
paradox of judging entails. 
In short, for a decision to be just and responsible, it must, in its proper 
moment if there is one, be both regulated and without regulation: it must 
conserve the law and also destroy it or suspend it enough to have to 
reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation 
and the new and free confirmation of its principle. Each case is other, 
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each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation 
... [if] the judge is a calculating machine ... we will not say that he is just, 
free and responsible. But we also won't say it if he doesn't refer to any 
law, to any rule or if, because he doesn't take any rule for granted beyond 
his own interpretation, he suspends his decision, stops short before the 
undecidable or if he improves and leaves aside all rules, all principles.ss 
The second aporia is the "undecidable". 
There is apparently no moment in which a decision can be called 
presently and fully just: either it has not yet been made according to a 
rule, and nothing allows us to call it just, or it has already followed a rule 
... which in turn is not absolutely guaranteed by anything; and, moreover, 
if it were guaranteed, the decision would be reduced to calculation and 
we wouldn't call it just. That is why the ordeal of the undecidable that I 
just said must be gone through by any decision worthy of the name is 
never past or passed, it is not a surmounted or sublated (aufgehoben) 
moment in the decision. 100 
The third aporia is created by the urgency of justice. Justice cannot wait. We must 
judge in the present, but we cannot judge because the ideal (justice) is not present. A 
mere norm should never be justified as justice. This will in any event be prevented by 
the "performative" inherent in the act of interpretation. 
Paradoxically, it is because of this overflowing of the performative, 
because of this always excessive haste of interpretation getting ahead of 
itself, because of this structural urgency and precipitation of justice that 
the latter has no horizon of expectation (regulative or messianic) ... 
SS 
100 
Derrida "Force of law: The mystical foundations of authority" in Cornell (ed) (1992) 
Deconstruction and the possibility of justice 23. 
Derrida "Force of law: The mystical foundations of authority" in Cornell (ed) (1992) 
Deconstruction and the possibility of justice 24. 
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Perhaps it is for this reason that justice, insofar as it is not only a juridical 
or political concept, opens up for /'avenirthe transformation, the recasting 
or refounding of law and politics. "Perhaps", one must always say, 
perhaps for justice. 101 
A deconstructive approach to law distinguishes rigidly between law and justice, 
between what presently is and what in the future ought to be. The aporias ("in 
between") influence each and every legal decision. A judge must apply the law, but at 
the same time question the law's validity. All judgments will therefore remain undecided. 
This does not negate the necessity of judgement in the present. The utopianism 
inherent in deconstruction keeps the promise of justice alive. There is always a future 
for legal reform because the present system can never encompass justice. 
Back to the future: Legal interpretation as "recollective imagination" -
Drucilla Cornell 
Cornell102 puts forward a notion of legal interpretation as "recollective imagination". This 
entails the rethinking of the relationship between the past (as embodied in the 
normative conventions which are passed down through legal precedent) and the 
projection of future ideals through which the community seeks to regulate itself. She 
relies on Charles Peirce's conception of pragmatism for her understanding of legal 
interpretation as recollective imagination. Peirce103 reconceptualises the relationship 
between retrospective and prospective aspects of legal interpretation and accordingly 
highlights the importance of imagination in the enunciation of legal and normative 
101 
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Derrida "Force of law: The mystical foundations of authority" in Cornell (ed) (1992) 
Deconstruction and the possibility of justice 27. 
(1993) Transformations 23-44. 
Hartshorne and Weiss (eds) (1960) The collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 
1931-1934 vol v. 
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ideals. His pragmatism can contribute to the development of a concept of agency that 
is consistent with the active role of the judge in the process of legal interpretation as 
recollective imagination. 
The critique against many neopragmatists is that they reduce the process of 
interpretation to strategic programmes and policies. Ronald Dworkin, 104 for example, 
has criticised this version of pragmatism: it ignores the past in favour of visions for the 
future. Principles and rights in this vision are only strategically useful for the 
actualisation of an ideal community. Dworkin argues that the pragmatist, when judging, 
only looks at what is in her own vision best for the future. For Dworkin legal pragmatism 
involves the worst kind of subjective interpretation because each judge attempts to 
impose her best vision of the future. Cornell argues that Peirce's pragmatism does not 
turn to the future in the sense that it reduces rights and principles to strategic legal 
instruments in order to create the best possible community. Peirce accepts the paradox 
that one can only look at the future by relying also on the past. This is why Cornell uses 
the phrase of "recollective imagination" to capture this paradox. 
Interpretation is retrospective because we always begin the process of interpretation 
within a pregiven context. The process is also prospective because it involves 
elaboration of the "would be's" inherent in the context itself. For Peirce the meaning of 
a norm or proposition is ascertained through an imaginative enterprise. 
We imagine ourselves in various situations and animated by various 
motives; and we proceed to trace out the alternative lines of conduct 
which the conjectures would leave open to us. We are, moreover, led by 
the same inward activity to remark different ways in which our conjectures 
could be slightly modified. The logical interpretant must, therefore, be in 
a relatively future tense. 105 
104 
105 
(1986) Law's Empire 151-175. 
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In legal interpretation we rely on an "as if' that is oriented toward the future in that a 
proposition is projected onto a future situation in order to draw out its meaning. 
Cornell106 argues that our understanding of a right is led by the same process. 
Dworkin's notion of "law as integrity" is not "more relentlessly interpretive" than 
pragmatism. Peirce's insistence on the future is not instrumentalist as Dworkin argues. 
It does not deny the text in favour of an instrumentalist vision of the future, nor does it 
deny the past because it accepts that we are in a pregiven context. The "past" is always 
offered to us within competing frameworks and since not any single framework is a pure 
account of what actually was, we cannot prefer one over the other. The "past" is not 
there for us to collect. When interpreting we must look at all the frameworks to guide 
us through the legal problems confronting us now. The past can never be known and 
fully recollected other than through interpretation. 
The past in other words, grasps us. We cannot grasp it. ... The past is 
there, but not finished. 107 
Thus, the past can only be given meaning within an interpretational framework that is 
future-oriented. There can be resolutions within any given interpretative framework. But 
these resolutions can only be conditional since reinterpretation is always possible. Past 
legal precedent can likewise only be understood as a body of conditional meanings. 
The very effort to guarantee continuity of the "spirit" of the law demands 
that we restate the normative message of the legal text. What we pass 
on, however, cannot be the letter of the law, as if there were a plain 
meaning that is simply there to be excavated, but instead must be its 
spirit. In this sense ... the enunciation of the legal principle inherent in the 
judge's decision implicates the "should be" .... The very statement of what 
the law is implicates the "should be" because it depends on justification 
of a particular interpretation since there can be no pure statement of what 
106 (1993) Transformations 28. 
107 Cornell (1993) Transformations 30. 
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the law "is". There can be no acritical reference to the past in the law that 
does not imply justification. 108 
Three realms of legal interpretation 
Cornell109 goes on to identify three realms of legal interpretation: the Good, or the "Law 
of the Law"; 110 the Right, or the "moral law'' of the self-legislating subject; and the 
principles inherent in an existing legal system. The Good, the Right, and the principles 
inherent in an existing legal system describe codes of human interaction within a legal 
system and cannot be reduced to mere rational categories. 
Cornell then proceeds to three stories of legal interpretation. The first story is told by 
Hegel where the Good is given to us in "Absolute Knowledge" and therefore fully 
revealed. The other two stories are two (of the many) versions of the postmodern story. 
The one version comes from Stanley Fish, who represents the Good only as absence. 
In this version there is no horizon of the Good to which one can appeal for guidance 
when evaluating competing legal interpretations. The other version is Derrida's 
deconstructive vision. In the deconstructive one the Good is irreducible to negative 
theology. The projection of the Good is essential to the possibility of legal 
interpretation. The Good is the as of yet unrealised potential of the nomos and can 
therefore not be conceived as the truth of a self-enclosed system which perpetuates 
itself. 111 The Good is beyond any of its current justifications. 
Thus, the deconstructive emphasis on the opening of the ethical self-
transcendence of any system that exposes the threshold of the "beyond" 
of the not yet is crucial to a conception of legal interpretation that argues 
108 
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Cornell (1993) Transformations 30-31. 
(1992) The philosophy of the limit 92. 
The Good is understood in two ways: First, as universal in the wide or strong sense; and 
secondly, as the universal within a given legal system conceptualised as an indeterminate 
nomos. 
The deconstructive critique against communitarianism should also be understood in this 
context. The closure upon which communitarianism insists, cannot be. 
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that the "is" of Law can never be completely separated from the 
elaboration of the "should be" dependent on an appeal to the Good. 
Ethical alterity is not just the command of the Other, it is also the Other 
within the nomos that invites us to new worlds and reminds us that 
transformation is not only possible, it is inevitable. 112 
Cornell argues that deconstruction, renamed by her, as we have seen, to the 
"philosophy of the limit", reminds us that the meaning of the "ethical" is necessarily 
displaced into the future because the Good is not fully present. A conception of time 
is central to legal interpretation since legal interpretation should be focused on the 
future. She explains that the deconstruction of the traditional conception of time - a 
conception that privileges the present - can help us understand why justice is 
irreducible to the pregiven norms of any legal system. 
According to Cornell legal interpretation is transformation. 113 When we interpret we must 
remember that we are responsible for the direction of that transformation. We cannot 
escape the responsibility implicit in every act of interpretation. Interpretation always 
involves both discovery and invention because there can be no simple "origin" of legal 
meaning. Legal interpretation is always "conditional". The "philosophy of the limit" 
emphasises the necessity of invention. This invention entails a judge's "responsibility 
toward memory". Remembering involves not an accurate repetition of legal norms, or 
simply a recovery of the past, but a turn towards the future by remembering the past. 
She notes that the act of memory involved in judging involves the paradox of 
"remembering the future". The future of the "not yet" remains other to the present. The 
future is distinguished from the present, which merely reproduces itself. Justice, 
whether understood as the limit to the present system, or as the voice of the other that 
cannot be silenced, is the opening of the beyond that makes "true" transformation 
possible. Without an appeal to the beyond, transformation would not be transformation 
but evolution, that is mere continuation. For Cornell the very concept of evolution of the 
112 
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system implies the privileging of the present. 
It is appropriate to return to Cornell's double-handed interpretation of transformation, 
that I discussed in " ... visions of public space" (the first part of this work). The one 
interpretation means change radical enough to restructure any system so that the 
identity of the system is itself altered. The other asks the question what kind of 
individuals we would have to become in order to open ourselves to new worlds. I argue 
for a transformation of the South African legal system in both senses. This means that 
the system itself should be altered radically, but also that the members of the South 
African community should be open to new worlds. Cornell's vision of legal interpretation 
that must involve both the past (memory) and the future (because the present is 
incapable of avoiding violence, being unethical to the Other) is very important to my 
vision of ethical interpretation. Ethical interpretation in the South African context must 
involve memory - remembering the past (this is why I insist on the significance and 
value of the Truth and Reconciliation as an event); transformation, that must involve the 
change and disclosure of individuals by disrupting the "full presence" of the present 
(legal system, community, interpretation of equality); and the idea of a democracy, 
justice, equality "to come". 
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Perspectives on the interpretation of rights 
(equality) 
In this section I shall discuss the perspectives on interpretation and equality of a few 
authors. I chose to focus on these authors for a specific reason. For me all these 
perspectives encompass something of what I see as an "ethical moment", in other 
words I think that all these theories in their own way can contribute to my picture of 
ethical interpretation. These authors have certain similarities amongst themselves but, 
as I interpret them, they also have connections with the above conversation on 
deconstruction. I know that I must be very cautious when I say this. In the first place the 
authors themselves might not agree that their theories are deconstructive and secondly 
serious followers of deconstruction might accuse me of "violation" and unresponsibility. 
That said, I argue that the authors below focus on the same "in between" space that 
deconstructive theory describes. They are all conscious of the limit of present systems 
to fully encompass justice, in other words they subscribe to a continuous process of 
interpretation, of seeking equality, democracy and justice. The authors below are all 
sceptical of the modern rationalist view of the self (the subject). In my view they accept 
the notion of a "fragmentary" self. Their theories address, context, relationships, public 
life and community. They are concerned with difference and the other. 
I start of with Jantje van den Oord's approach to equality as a "social right". She 
explicitly applies deconstruction and the philosophical writings of Jacques Derrida in 
a legal context. I see her theory as a good place to start because her theory is the 
closest to the previous discussion on deconstruction and is also the beginning of a 
more legal orientated enquiry. 
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Equality as a "social right" - Jantje van den Oord 
Jantje van den Oord114 notes that the discourse on equality has for a time focused on 
the tension between formal equality (where equality is protected on the basis of 
sameness), and substantive equality (where difference is accepted and incorporated 
in the approach). She applies Derrida's philosophy of deconstruction to equality. She 
argues that the opposition between equality and difference is closely related to the 
similar opposition between that which is inside the law and that which is outside. She 
argues that a deconstruction of the inside/outside opposition shows that inside/outside 
as well as centre/margins are intertwined. (The opposition between inside and outside 
occurred also earlier in the discussion of community, unity and disunity.) 
The outside forms a structural condition which allows us to speak of an inside. (With 
regard to community it was said that the notion of community (inclusion of some) is 
based on the exclusion of others). The opposition between outside and inside is 
constantly shifting. (This is also true for the community). Van den Oard argues that the 
significance of the "intertwining" of inside and outside for the relationship between 
equality and difference is that it would be in vain to push difference (the other of 
equality}, to the margins or outside the law in order to secure the unity and generality 
of law. (This is why I subscribed to the idea of an open heterogeneous community that 
is continuously transforming). Difference remains within the law and continues to 
disrupt law from within, time and time again. She argues that a deconstructive approach 
makes the relationship between inside/outside and equality/difference undecidable. 
This undecidability is at the same time a condition for the creation of meaning and 
disrupts meaning. 
Van der Oord shows the critical implications of deconstruction for the law. By 
emphasising equality as the norm, the law oppresses equality's other (difference), but 
114 Van den Oard (1994) Verdaagde Rechten. (Doctoral thesis submitted at the University of 
Utrecht.) 
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the law must at the same time allow the other to operate within law as an innovative 
and disruptive force. Van den Oard argues that a deconstructive view does not 
consider rights, such as the right to equality, as contributing to any general value, but 
considers it as a promise that can never be definitely fulfilled. 115 The fulfilment remains 
deferred, delayed or adjourned. She notes that the desire for transformation, equality 
and justice must be kept open as a promise. 116 
Van den Oord117 also applies a deconstructive strategy to the distinction between 
classic and social rights in order to explain the relation between difference and equality. 
In her view equality can be understood as both a "classic" and "social" constitutional 
right. In the traditional approach, equality protects citizens from the state and the state 
must abstain from interference in society. (This is true of course for any classic right, 
not only for equality). In this approach individual rights are emphasised; group-
membership such as sex is not taken into account and differences are neglected. In an 
interpretation of equality as a social right, the state must intervene in social relations 
in order to realise equality. The latter approach allows for a substantive interpretation 
of equality. Van den Oard notes that the traditional approach has maintained a rigid 
dichotomy between classic and social rights. 
In the traditional approach classic rights are regarded as general and abstract rights 
which protect the individual against the state. Because social rights demand further 
elaboration by the state, it is argued that they are not "real" rights. Social rights are then 
perceived as the other of the "normal" or "original" rights. Van den Oard argues that the 
115 
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disruptive force of social rights must be emphasised in order to deconstruct the 
opposition between social and classic rights. Here she applies Derrida's term of the 
"logic of supplement". The "logic of supplement" refers to the power relation between 
opposites, with one of the poles (the original/centre) being privileged. The other (the 
supplement/margin) is defined in terms of the original and is therefore derivative. 
Following Derrida, she argues that the "self-sufficient" original/centre is a myth. There 
can only be an original/centre at the expense of the supplement/margin as the other. 
Van den Oord explains that the word "supplement" can have at least two meanings: It 
can mean something which is added to an already complete and self-sufficient thing, 
and it can mean something that is added to something in order to complete it. In the 
first meaning the supplement is a simple exterior of the original, while in the second 
meaning the supplement compensates for a lack of the assumed whole of the original. 
The two meanings of "supplement" are usually considered contradictory. A 
deconstructive approach demands that we combine them. Thus where social rights are 
usually considered necessary in order to realise classical rights, they undermine the 
full presence of the original classic rights. The result is that the supplement becomes 
a structural condition for the original. The supplement not only makes the original 
possible, but at the same time fractures and undermines its self-presence. 
Van den Oord puts forward an interpretation of equality as a social right. By showing 
that the relationship between equality and difference is undecidable, she creates room 
for the other, which allows us to discuss equality again and again. Because of their 
heterogeneity, social rights 118 escape a closed definition and resist the oppositional 
logic. Difference becomes a disruptive force to formal equality and, accordingly, 
another way of preventing closed definition and resisting oppositional logic. 
Van den Oord's theory is of particular value because she applies deconstruction 
convincingly to the very crucial issue of equality. Her analyses of the inside and the 
118 See also De Vos "Pious wishes or directly enforceable human rights?: Social and 
economic rights in South Africa's 1996 constitution" (1997) 13 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 67-101; "The economic and social rights of children and South Africa's 
constitution" (1995) 10 Suid-Afrikaanse Publiekreg/South African Public Law 233-259. 
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outside and how it relates to equality and difference, between the original and the 
supplement and how it relates to classic rights and socio-economic rights and her 
references to the other, difference and undecidability and law make the abstract theory 
of deconstruction concrete in the context of the legal concept of equality. However, it 
seems to me as if she uses deconstruction (and the key phrases like the other, 
undecidable, difference) as a pure structure or a technique. Maybe I can express my 
sense better in terms that I used earlier. I fear that Van den Oord, although she applies 
the theory of deconstruction so adequately, reflects something of a disembeddedness 
and disembodiment. This does not negate the significance of her approach but 
encourages me to continue my search for other perspectives. 
Below I shall highlight Martha Minow's approach to equality and difference. Minow, in 
contrast with Van den Oord, follows a more contextual and relational and less abstract 
approach. The crux of her argument, I argue, is similar to Van den Oord's approach, 
that we should displace the traditional approach to equality by focusing on difference. 
Minow's approach of rights in relationships provides a further perspective to the 
question of the interpretation of and approach to equality. 
Rights in relationships - Martha Minow 
"Instead of making differences, let us make all the difference"119 
Minow120 observes that legal analysis simplifies, categorises, classifies and identifies 
one thing as "like the others", and the other as "unlike the others". Although this seems 
harmless, it is not, because when we classify we create certain categories with 
consequences. Minow argues that classifications can express and implement prejudice, 
racism, sexism and anti-Semitism. The effect of classifications can be an intolerance 
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for difference. Minow does not deny the reality of difference, but is cautious about the 
way we make distinctions. She says that we should be wary not to use classifications 
as if there is a natural way for things to be. 
According to Mi now boundaries 121 figure prominently in legal assumptions about the 
self and about society. She shows how traditional legal rules presume that there is a 
clear and knowable boundary between each individual and all the others. 122 (Minow's 
use of boundaries here is related to Van den Oord's analysis above of the inside and 
the outside). Although legal rules seem to avoid labels because it emphasises the 
individual, it contributes to labelling by favouring a view of certain and clear boundaries 
rather than of relationships. Law has accordingly neglected ongoing relationships 
between people, and has failed to resolve the meaning of equality for people defined 
as different by society. Minow123 argues that the concept of boundary depends on 
relationships: relationships between the two sides drawn by the boundary and also 
relationships between the people who recognise and affirm the boundary. From this 
starting point, connections between people are the precondition for boundaries. We 
can therefore not make a choice between boundaries and connections, or between 
individualism and relationships. Rather we should consider which kind of relationships 
we should enhance. Differences can be treated similarly as a function of relationships. 
(Again Minow's argument is similar to Van den Oord's analysis. Minow, in my view, is 
reflecting the deconstructive insight of undecidability. By arguing that it is not about 
making a choice between boundaries (individualism) and connections (relationships) 
she disrupts dialectical (opposing) thought). She suggests that instead of treating 
differences as the private, internal problem of each different person, they can be 
treated as a feature of communal life. 
121 
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In short, Minow124 advocates a shift in focus from the distinctions between people to the 
relationships within which we notice and draw distinctions. She rejects both the claim 
that we must abandon rights as illusory or insufficient and the claim that we must 
preserve existing forms of rights as protections of individual autonomy. In her view, 
embedding rights with relationships offers another and more promising alternative. She 
says that we should be self-conscious about the concepts we use and their effects on 
what we think we know and who we are. 
A scholar's ... focus on people who are "different" or who seem marginal 
is itself a way to remake the meaning of difference. Making central what 
has been marginal remakes the boundaries of knowledge and 
understanding and sheds new light on the whole; we are constituted by 
what and how we know even as we constitute what we know as we know 
it.125 
Minow126 states that the dilemmas of difference appear unresolvable because the risk 
of discrimination accompanies both efforts to ignore and to recognise difference in 
equal treatment and special treatment. The problem lies in the fact that difference is 
stigmatised. If to be equal means to be the same, to be different accordingly means to 
be unequal or even "deviant". All distinctions are made from the starting point of some 
claimed "normality". Difference gives rise not only to a relationship of equality and 
inequality, but to one of superiority and inferiority as well. 
To be different is to be different in relationship to someone or something 
else - and this point of comparison must be so taken for granted, so much 
the "norm", that it need not even be stated. 127 
124 
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Five unstated assumptions 
Minow identifies five unstated assumptions with regard to difference: First, we often 
assume that differences are intrinsic, rather than viewing them as expressions of 
comparisons between people on the basis of their particularity. Secondly, we adopt an 
unstated point of reference when assessing others in order to determine who is different 
and who is normal. (The unstated point of comparison, which is particular and not 
general, promotes the interest of some and not others, but remains unstated because 
those who are described as different do not have the power to select the norm in terms 
of which the comparison is made.) Mi now notes that a reference point for comparison 
purposes is central to equality because equality asks: "equal compared with whom?" 
·Thirdly, we treat the person making the comparison as someone without a perspective 
instead of as someone with a particular situated perspective. Fourthly, we assume that 
the perspectives of those being judged are either irrelevant or already taken into 
account through the perspective of the judge. Finally, there is an assumption that the 
existing social and economic arrangements are natural and neutral. 128 
Minow argues that if the assumptions behind the difference dilemmas are exposed and 
debated, the tension between formal, predictable rules and individualised judgements 
will reflect the relationships and patterns that influence the negative consequence of 
difference. The realisation that difference arises in relationships and in dynamic 
contexts introduces new possibilities for change. 129 
Institutional difference 
Minow130 observes that the question of difference is symptomatic of a particular way of 
perceiving the world. Because of the institutionalisation of difference, challenging the 
assumptions in regard to difference will require more than "fresh thinking by 
individuals". In her view it is fairly easy to make alternative assumptions in the place of 
128 Mi now (1990) Making all the difference. Inclusion, exclusion and American law 7 4. 
129 See Brennan 'The influence of cultural relativism on international human rights law: 
Female circumcision as a case study" (1989) Law and Inequality 367-373. 
130 (1990) Making all the difference. Inclusion, exclusion and American law 199. 
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the previously mentioned unstated ones: One can attempt to understand difference in 
a particular context; the people who assign difference can take the perspective of 
others into account; the relationship between the status quo and the assignment of 
difference can be renovated. To make these assumptions concrete, however, is a more 
difficult matter. The problem of institutional difference is off course also relevant for the 
South African context. Although transition from an authoritarian state to a democracy 
has occurred many of the perceptions of the previous order are deeply embedded in 
institutions. 131 
Minow uses paid pregnancy and parental leave from work as a concrete example of 
dealing with relationships of difference. 132 The traditional approach was that employers 
either made no provision, or that they allowed pregnancy leave as a form of special 
treatment for women employees. In the first option, the woman is not accommodated 
at all; in the second she is, but pregnancy becomes equal to disability. Another 
approach 133 was to afford men and women the same opportunities to combine work and 
family. Minow argues that this view begins to address the problems of difference, 
because it challenges the association of sameness with equality, and difference with 
inferiority or disability, and introduces a new "female" norm. It asks why an individual 
worker must bear responsibility for differing from the norm. She frames the problem of 
pregnancy as not just a problem for women who are pregnant, but also for men who 
have family responsibilities, for employers who miss out on skills of people involved in 
child rearing, and for the wider community with an interest in reproduction and child 
rearing, on the one hand, and in production at the workplace, on the other. 
According to Minow, the last approach challenges the presumed norm which divides 
work and family duties. It also challenges the framework of difference analysis. The 
131 
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distinction between the private and the public becomes problematised. The 
consequences of this approach is that the various relationships involved are 
acknowledged. She observes that if difference is related to relationships between 
people and social institutions, difference is no longer the problem of the "different 
person". Minow argues that solutions to dilemmas of difference cannot work if they put 
the responsibility for redressing negative meanings of difference on the person who is 
treated as different. The norms formulated by institutions should not make people who 
differ from them, feel inferior. 
Three approaches 
Minow134 identifies three approaches that have been followed in situations of difference: 
the "abnormal-persons" approach; the "rights-analysis" approach and the "social 
relations" approach. 
The "abnormal-persons" approach divides the world into two classes of persons, normal 
and abnormal. Different legal treatments apply depending on what class one belongs 
to. Individuals with "normal" competence and capacity enjoy rights and are held 
responsible for their acts because they are able to reason and act accordingly. 
Individuals with "abnormal" competence and capacity may be subjected to legal 
restraints on their autonomy and their rights may be denied. They need legal 
protections to guard them and others from the effect of their incapacities. The 
"abnormal persons" approach does not recognise variations and distinctions among 
"abnormal" persons, because it focuses on them compared to "normal persons". 
Minow135 argues, for example, that different legal treatment based on mental 
competence and incompetence rests on the view that "all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike". 
The "rights analysis" approach departs from the point that legal rights apply to every 
134 Minow (1990) Making all the difference. Inclusion, exclusion and American law 86. 
135 Minow (1990) Making all the difference. Inclusion, exclusion and American law 86. 
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individual. 136 The fact of personhood and citizenship entitles each individual to be free 
from state interference and to be treated the same as others by the state. Notions of 
inferiority based on race, gender, or ethnicity can no longer be defended. In this 
approach the same legal rights enjoyed by "normal" persons should be available to 
those labelled "abnormal", unless it can be proved that the differences between the 
groups are based on "demonstrable evidence" rather than prejudice. This approach 
advocates new rights, programmes and protections designed to benefit the "mentally 
incompetent". The special treatment is justified because it could address continual 
deprivation of such persons' basic rights, or it could be an entitlement founded on their 
special needs. 
Finally, instead of assuming that autonomy is the essential dimension of personhood, 
the "social-relations" approach assumes that there is a basic connection between 
people. 137 It challenges the method of social organisation that constructs human 
experience in fixed, immutable categories (such as the categories and differences used 
to define and describe people on a group basis). According to Minow, this approach is 
"suspicious" of the attribution of difference located in the specific person who does not 
fit, rather than in relationships between people and social institutions. This approach 
assumes that people exist in relationships. Difference is understood as expressions of 
relationships. 
"Difference" is meaningful only as a comparison. A comparison draws a 
relationship; a short person is different only in relation to a taller one. As 
a relational notion, difference is reciprocal: I am no more different from 
you than you are from me. 138 
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Minow argues that it is important to realise that the statement of difference distributes 
power. Differences are named by "those with the power to name and the power to treat 
themselves as the norm". The "social-relations" approach demands analysis of 
difference in terms of the relationships that construct it. This approach entails a 
particular, normative evaluation of legal assignments of difference. Differences should 
only be sustained if they do not express or confirm unfair and harmful distribution of 
power. The "social relations" approach recognises that it is impossible to really take the 
perspective of the other. In trying to see the perspective of another, one may easily 
attribute a kind of unitary difference within that very group. 
Minow139 draws our attention to the fact that differences are quite often reified. By 
reification she means the way in which abstractions silence experience and distance 
people's sense of understanding of and participation in their own experiences. She 
submits that the "social-relations" approach, although new to law, can offer new insights 
and is essential to legal transformation. 
Recovering rights 
Minow echoes the argument that the liberal approach to law and rights neglected the 
community in favour of the individual. Yet, she still believes that rights can contribute 
significantly to society, and that especially people on the "margins" can benefit from 
rights. 140 She argues that we should "reimagine" rights as instruments for illuminating 
the various relationships that we are involved in. She believes that rights, for example, 
can redress assigned differences without repeating the historical patterns of family 
relationships. Traditional family law enforced gender-based roles and embraced a 
particular notion of family autonomy which prevented the legal system from invading 
139 
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(1990) Making all the difference. Inclusion, exclusion and American law 114. 
Critical Race Scholars reacted against Critical Legal Scholars for rejecting rights. They 
argue that rights can be helpful for people who have traditionally been excluded. See 
amongst others Williams (1991) The alchemy of race and rights and (1995) The rooster's 
egg; Crenshaw & others (eds) (1995) Critical race theory: The key writings that formed the 
movement; Delgado (ed) (1995) Critical race theory: The cutting edge; West (1993) 
Prophetic reflections: Notes on race and power in America; De Keseredy "The left realist 
perspective on race, class and gender" in Schwartz & Milovanovic (1996) Race, gender, 
and class in crimininology 49-69. 
218 
the private sphere of the family, or the sphere of power reserved to the head of the 
family. Apart from the protection of children against serious physical or psychological 
harm, there was a public neglect of children that was justified by the theory that only 
parents were responsible for their children. 141 The public neglect of children can be 
seen as a manifestation of liberalism's impoverished view of politics and of public life. 
Violence against women similarly remained a hidden issue. 142 Minow argues that the 
introduction of "formal" equality into family law quite often had negative consequences. 
She observes that "one person's freedom can be another person's disaster". 143 
Freedom means different things to different individuals. To introduce formal equality 
and freedom where each party is in a direct relationship with the state, does not provide 
real equality but only exposes the difficulties of freedom in a world of relationships. 
Minow notes how the introduction of legal rights to the family context highlights the 
injustice of treating people the same if they are situated differently. The history of 
domestic violence shows the dangers in obscuring the private sphere, where family 
members are subjected to the unrestrained authority of others, from the public sphere 
and from public intervention. (Here, Mouffe's 144 arguments that the liberal notions of 
freedom and equality must be extended to all spheres of potential domination of others 
come to mind as well as the argument that the private-public dichotomy must be 
reformulated. The public-private divide should be seen in another way as a divide 
between two physical spheres, and room should be made for public moments within the 
private realm and vice versa.) 
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Minow145 states that the traditional absence of state power in the private sphere 
suggests something "powerful" about boundaries. It shows that both sides of a 
boundary are regulated, even if the line was supposed to distinguish the regulated from 
the unregulated. The analysis of family law itself can provide an angle of inquiry about 
the failure of traditional liberal rights to acknowledge the threats of private power to 
liberty and equality. Minow comes to the conclusion that rights can be revitalised if they 
are located within relationships. 
Minow says that we need to reclaim and reinvent rights by exposing and challenging 
the hierarchies of power and violence. She highlights Robert Cover's146 point that law 
embeds interpretations of political texts in institutions that exercise the state's monopoly 
over legitimate violence. The very act of focusing on community through a language of 
rights may expose the divisions within the community and beyond it. Rights can then 
be understood as "a kind of language that reconfirms the difficult commitment to live 
together even as it enables the expression of conflicts and struggles". 147 She observes 
that legal language can never reflect experience because it "constrains" and "limits" 
meaning. 
Perhaps people can work through legal interpretation to communicate 
disjunction, misunderstanding, even the right to avoid conversation. Such 
work requires context as well as theory, actual settings and ongoing 
relationships in which discourse is part of a way of life. Beyond our talk 
of rights we have each other, and the steady burden of learning to live 
together and apart. 148 
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According to Mi now the "social relations" approach can provide guidance for alternative 
legal treatments of difference. This approach emphasises the basic connectedness 
between people, and the injuries that result from social isolation and exclusion. It 
focuses on an understanding of difference as a function of comparison between people 
and rejects the way distinctions are drawn by people in power in order to harm the less 
powerful. The "social relations" approach focuses on relationships between people, 
within which each individual develops a sense of autonomy and identity. The focus on 
relationships in the context of rights is sometimes criticised as being contradictory, but 
Minow says that it is only contradictory if a conceptual framework of "either/or" solutions 
are accepted. Relational strategies are not inconsistent with rights and an emphasis 
on connections between people and between theory and practice can synthesise what 
is important in rights with what rights miss. She argues that rights must be reconceived 
as a language for describing and making patterns of relationships. It can be understood 
as "recognised rituals" by everyone and can secure attention in a continuing struggle 
over boundaries between people. Rights cannot provide an ultimate language, but one 
of many languages for the creation of collective and individual lives. 
In the South African context, the issue of difference has never been more important. 
Boundaries and categories are inevitable and even necessary, and could be important 
points of connection. The differences that we assign are expressions of ourselves 
which are human made and mutable. In the search for equality the fact of difference 
must be acknowledged with the realisation of our own participation in the meanings of 
difference. An "ethical" interpretation of equality requires these acknowledgments and 
realisations. Below I shall turn to Jennifer Nedelsky's perspective. Her argument that 
we should approach "rights as relationships" and not as "boundary-like structures" adds 
to the perspectives of Jantje van den Oord and Martha Minow. 
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Rights as relationships - Jennifer Nedelsky 
Nedelsky149 discusses how boundaries are central to the conceptual and institutional 
framework of the American constitution. She argues that the American constitution 
functions as a "boundary-like structure", especially in regard to property. 150 Much of 
constitutional protection can be understood as an attempt to protect individual 
autonomy. Autonomy151 in this regard must be protected from the intrusion of the 
collective. Nedelsky sees individual autonomy not as a static human characteristic but 
as a capacity that can be developed. If we want to inquire into autonomy, it is better to 
focus on how to structure relationships so that they can foster and not undermine 
autonomy, than to focus on the boundary metaphor. Nedelsky argues that the function 
of boundaries is to structure relationships, "indeed to structure them in ways that 
enable an autonomous self to emerge" .152 New metaphors and myths must be 
developed that focus on forms of human interaction and responsibility. If we let go of 
the boundary metaphor, the structure of legal conceptions of autonomy and freedom 
will disintegrate. Because there is no consensus on the basic meaning of law or of the 
values it protects, new metaphors are a genuine option. 
We are in a period of flux where our presuppositions are in doubt. It is 
therefore possible to exercise some deliberate choice about the frame of 
reference through which we see the world. We can try to transform our 
own language, push it in the direction of the barely articulated 
"intimations" that have reached us. Disintegration entails promise. If we 
149 
150 
151 
152 
"Law, boundaries and the bounded self' (1990) Representations 162-189. 
See Nedelsky (1990) Private property and the limits of American Constitutionalism. 
See also Nedelsky "Reconceiving autonomy: Sources, thoughts and possibilities" (1989) 
1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 7-36; "Reconceiving rights as relationships" (1993) 
1 Review of Constitutional Studies 1-17; "Meditations on embodied autonomy" (1995) 2 
Graven images 159-170; "Embodied diversity and the challenges to law" (1997) 42 McGill 
Law Journal 93-117. 
Nedelsky "Law, boundaries and the bounded self' (1990) Representations 171. 
222 
can let go of our wall of rights, the reintegration is likely to be far fuller 
and more promising. 153 
In Nedelsky's view, that there are some critical problems with rights that we ought to 
take seriously. These problems fall into two categories: justifying the 
constitutionalisation of rights, on the one hand, and "rights talk" in general, on the 
other. Nedelsky prefers a "dialogue of democratic accountability" to the model of rights 
as trumps. She also suggests an approach to rights as relationship. It is problematic 
to view rights as limits to democracy where there is no consensus on the content of 
these rights. There are disputes about whether natural rights are the source of our legal 
rights, what would count as basic rights and whether we should use the term "rights" 
at all. She feels it is useful to retain the term 
[B]ut if we are to invoke rights to constrain democratic outcomes, we must 
do so in a way that is true to the essentially contested and shifting 
meaning of rights. 154 
Nedelsky advises that we should take note of the changes that have taken place in 
both the popular and legal understanding of rights. She argues that if we acknowledge 
the mutability of basic values, the problem of protecting them from democratic abuse 
is transformed. The terms "democracy" and "individual rights" and the nature of the 
tension between them should be reconsidered. Constitutionalism's balancing of the 
tension between democracy and individual rights is not adequate. We should realise 
that rights are actually only "terms" for capturing and giving effect to what judges 
perceive to be the values and choices that "society" has embedded in the "law". In this 
framework rights are as much collective choices as laws passed by the legislature. 
Constitutionalism is then no longer about the question of how to protect rights from 
democracy. The question is rather why should some rights limit other rights, or why 
should some collective choices (rights) limit other collective choices (the outcomes of 
153 Nedelsky "Law, boundaries and the bounded self' (1990) Representations 184. 
154 Nedelsky "Law, boundaries and the bounded self' (1990) Representations 185. 
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ordinary democratic processes). Nedelsky phrases the problem as follows: "we need 
a new way of understanding the source and content of the values against which we 
measure democratic outcomes". 
I started the discussion on Nedelsky with a theme that runs right through her thought, 
namely her reaction against the conventional formulations of rights as limits to 
democracy and her argument that we should think in terms of relationships. An example 
that she uses is autonomy: In the conventional formulation, rights are seen as barriers 
that protect the (autonomous) individual from intrusion by other individuals and the 
state. Rights define the boundaries that protect individual autonomy from intrusion by 
others. Nedelsky points out that what makes autonomy possible is not separation, but 
relationships. If we accept that the community is a source of autonomy the relation 
between the individual and the community and the state shift. Constitutional protection 
of autonomy is then no longer the protection of the individual against intrusion but "a 
means of structuring the relations between individuals and the sources of collective 
power so that autonomy is fostered rather than undermined". 155 
With relationship as starting point, we can move beyond "rights as limits to democratic 
outcomes". The focus on rights as limits, barriers and boundaries must be shifted to a 
"dialogue of democratic accountability". For this we need an institutionalised process 
of articulating basic values and ways of continually asking whether our institutions of 
democratic decision-making are consistent with democracy and other values. A focus 
on relationship makes us aware of our context and accordingly of the fact that values 
and beliefs and rights change over time. In this framework rights do not "trump" 
democratic outcomes. Instead, an ongoing dialogue about the content and values of 
rights and democracy is set up. 
Nedelsky identifies three general critiques of rights talk: (1) rights are undesirably 
individualistic; (2) rights obfuscate the real political issues; (3) rights serve to alienate 
and distance people from one another. All these critiques can be addressed by 
155 Nedelsky "Law, boundaries and the bounded self' (1990) Representations 187. 
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focusing on rights in the context of relationships. 
According to Nedelsky we should reconceptualise rights as a means of setting up a 
dialogue of democratic accountability. She says that this will enable us to redefine the 
kinds of justification necessary for constitutional constraints on democratic decision-
making and help to provide a conceptual framework that will assist us in designing 
ways of dealing with rights in democracies. This reconceptualisation and redefinition 
of constitutionalism requires an understanding of rights as structuring relationships. 
Until now I have focused on the perspectives of Jantje Van den Oord, Martha Minow 
and Jennifer Nedelsky. We heard Van den Oord's structural (with deconstruction as 
instrument) analysis of the relationship between the inside (equality) and the outside 
(difference) and her approach to equality as a social right. After Van den Oord, I 
repeated Minow's warning that we must be cautious when we talk about differences. 
With reference to legal examples she repeated the point made earlier by Van den Oard 
relating to boundaries, to the inside and the outside. What is striking about Minow's 
approach is that even though she does not use the deconstruction jargon and labels 
she is very much aware of language and the power of language. The social-relations 
approach that she follows, takes account of the philosophy of deconstruction. After 
Minow I turned to Nedelsky's emphasis of relationships and critique of the traditional 
boundary-like approach to rights. The perspectives of these three authors highlighted 
that we should be cautious of boundaries (inside and outside, equality and difference, 
classical rights and social rights) and rather focus on relationships and contexts. 
I shall now consider Frank Michelman's argument of "republican constitutionalism". 
Again we shall hear echoes of deconstruction, of the significance of public space and 
relationships. To a certain extent I shall repeat the debate between a liberal and a 
communitarian and civic republican approach to law and politics that I discussed in Part 
1 " ... visions of public space". An added dimension to this debate as discussed by 
Michelman is its application to a case decided by the US Supreme Court. As I have 
already mentioned Michelman's perspective ties the other perspectives together 
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because he makes the link between visions of public space and equality clear. The 
other authors have built up to this, and Michelman makes the link explicit. The 
intersection between public space and equality (and justice) is an ethical intersection 
that gives body to an ethical interpretation of equality. 
Republican constitutionalism - Frank Michelman 
Michelman 156 considers how the decision in Bowers v Hardwick57 could have been 
different if the court took notice of a "republican-inspired" standpoint. He makes three 
claims: that the Supreme Court's analysis and decision in Bowers v Hardwick are 
strikingly resistant to obvious claims of political freedom; that judicial constitutional 
analysis ought to be receptive to such claims; and that constitutional analysis is rooted 
in underlying sensibilities and understandings regarding the larger aims and methods 
of constitutionalism. He argues that American constitutional understanding and analysis 
might benefit from reflection upon civic republicanism and that it might invigorate a 
constitutional discourse that would prevent decisions like the one in Bowers v 
Hardwick. 
Michelman notes the claims by critics of communitarianism and republicanism that they 
are "solidaristic doctrines" that presuppose a degree of moral consensus that is 
nonexistent in modern society. The same critics argue that communitarianism and 
republicanism support a majoritarian doctrine of popular legislative supremacy that is 
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fundamentally incompatible with modern constitutionalism. He argues, however, that 
republican constitutional thought does not necessarily reflect any such static 
communitarianism. He contends that a reconsideration of republicanism's deeper 
constitutional implications can remind us of how the renovation of political communities, 
by including those which have been excluded, can enhance everyone's freedom. To 
him, republican constitutionalism involves "a kind of normative tinkering" that entails the 
"ongoing revision of the normative histories that make political communities sources of 
contestable value and self-direction for their members". A reconception of these 
histories will also be needed to extend political community to persons that have been 
excluded. He says that contemporary liberals have less to fear from "lurking social 
solidarism" than from a constitutional jurisprudence that prevents the community from 
self-transformation. 
Michelman argues that what ought to alarm liberals from the Bowers decision is not a 
judicial affection for moral majoritarianism, but the decision's embodiment of an 
"excessively detached" and "passive" position toward constitutional law. He calls the 
jurisprudence of the decision in Bowers "backward looking" and "authoritarian" because 
it equated public values with the formally enacted preferences of a recent legislative, 
or past constitutional majority, or with the teachings of a historically dominant 
orthodoxy. Michelman notes that Justice White's opinion in Bowers wears its 
"positivistic constitutional theory on its sleeve". The judge believes that it is not for the 
court to "impose" its "own choice of values" on the people. The judge believes that the 
court is the "servant", not the "author" of a prescriptive text and accordingly cannot 
inquire into meaning, reason or value. Michelman asks why the Supreme Court should 
not be an organ of politics if that is what it would have taken to secure liberty and 
justice for Hardwick. The court's reason is that for the court to act politically would 
amount to a judicial usurpation of power that belongs to "the people", acting through 
their elected representatives. Michelman responds: 
But again, why? Why by right to others? Why ought popular-majoritarian 
preference rather than judicial argument ultimately determine the 
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question of law controlling Hardwick's liberty?158 
He replies the answer is of course democracy, but argues that the answer entails more, 
like deliberation on what democracy is. If such a deliberation does not happen, 
democracy conveniently answers to the need for authority. 
When the social determination of disputed questions of value is 
imaginable only as a battle of preferences or as the exertion of an 
arbitrary, dominant will, then law - the adjudicative act - tends to be 
understandable only as the unquestioning and uncreative (which is to say 
necessarily wooden or unintelligent) application of the prior word of some 
socially recognized, extra-judicial authority. 159 
Michelman advocates a republicanism that entails a close consideration of certain 
implications of historical republican constitutional thought that can point us towards an 
account of the relations among law, politics, and democracy. He argues that American 
constitutionalism rests on two premises regarding political freedom: "first, the American 
people are politically free insomuch as they are governed by themselves collectively, 
and, second, that the American people are politically free insomuch as they are 
governed by laws and not men" .160 The problematic relationship between the 
"government of the people by the people" and the "government of the people by laws" 
is evident. Both the formulas of "self-rule" and "law-rule" express a demand that the 
American people are bound to respect as a primal requirement of political freedom. 
"Self-rule" demands the people's determination for themselves of the norms that are to 
govern their social life, while "law-rule" demands the people's protection against abuse 
by arbitrary power. 
He considers a possible way of thinking through this tension by conceiving of politics 
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as a process in which "private regarding 'men' " become "public regarding citizens" and 
thus members of a people. Michelman refers to this political process as 
"jurisgenerative". Jurisgenerative politics is historically recognisable as an idea of 
"republican lineage". He believes that republicanism signifies the sort of belief in 
"jurisgenerative politics" that must play a role in any explanation of how the 
constitutional principles of self-rule and law-rule might coincide. 
Michelman 161 explains that in republican thought the "normative" character of politics 
depends on the independence of mind and judgement, the authenticity of voice, and 
in some versions of republicanism, the diversity of a plurality of views that citizens bring 
to "the debate of the commonwealth". 162 He argues that republicanism has always 
realised the importance of both good politics and a strong legal order. He observes a 
"republican attachment" to rights. 
Yet republican thought is no less committed to the idea of the people 
acting politically as the sole source of law and guarantor of rights, than 
it is to the idea of law, including rights, as the precondition of good 
politics. 163 
Michelman sees plurality164 as the social condition that defines modern American 
politics. He argues that modern (American) politics cannot be made jurisgenerative 
without plurality as a virtue. Michelman develops a "dialogic constitutionalism" that 
responds affirmatively to social plurality where courts can play an active and generative 
role. 165 He argues that we must reclaim the idea of "jurisgenerative politics" from its 
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ancient context of hierarchical, organicist and solidaristic communities, for the modern 
context of equality, liberty and plurality. 
Michelman seeks to clarify certain conditions of republican constitutionalism's 
possibility in a modern, liberal society. He wants to uncover beliefs we must hold 
regarding ourselves, our social relations, and specifically our capacities for "dialogic 
self-modulation". He states the problematic experience of the tension between popular 
self-government and a government of laws, and derives from it a normative idea of 
"dialogic constitutionalism" as consistent with this problematic experience. A political 
process can validate a societal norm, like plurality, as self-given law only if participation 
in the process results in some shifts or adjustments in relevant understandings on the 
part of participants; and if there exists a set of prescriptive social and procedural 
conditions under which one's understanding is not considered or experienced as 
coercive, or invasive, or otherwise a violation of one's identity or freedom, and if those 
conditions actually prevailed in the process supposed to be jurisgenerative. 166 
Michelman supports a certain view of the self: 
Such a self necessarily obtains its self-critical resources from, and tests 
its current understandings against, understandings from beyond its own 
pre-critical life and experience, which is to say communicatively, by 
reaching for the perspectives of other and different persons. 167 
He argues that such a conception of political freedom might make plurality a virtue. The 
legal form of plurality is indeterminacy. Legal indeterminacy in that sense is the 
precondition of the dialogic, critical transformative dimension of legal practice. But the 
generative indeterminacies are products of action by those who enter the dialogue and 
seek to disrupt it from the margins. 
So the suggestion is that the pursuit of political freedom through law 
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depends on "our'' constant reach for inclusion of the other, of the hitherto 
excluded - which in practice means bringing to legal-doctrinal presence 
the hitherto absent voices of emergently self-conscious social groups. 168 
Michelman then makes the crucial observation that much of the normatively significant 
dialogue in the United States occurs outside the major, formal channels of electoral and 
legislative politics. In fact, in modern society these formal channels cannot possibly 
provide for most citizens much direct experience of "dialogic engagement". Most 
dialogic engagement occurs in various other arenas of public life in the broad sense, 
some political, and some not. He argues that encounters, conflicts, interactions and 
debates that arise in town meetings, civic and voluntary organisations, social and 
recreational clubs, schools, public events and street life and so on are all arenas of 
potentially transformative dialogue. 169 He notes that the daily experience of social life 
and policy that takes place in "private" can affect people's lives more profoundly than 
government action. These experiences must be seen as sources and channels of 
republican self-government and jurisgenerative politics. These arenas of citizenship 
encompass not only formal participation in public affairs but real presence in public and 
social life at large. Michelman argues that such a non-state centred notion of republican 
citizenship is historically American and characteristic of the contemporary civic 
revivalism of the time. He argues accordingly that a notion of republican dialogue that 
is not exclusively and immediately tied to the coercive exercise of centralised 
majoritarian power, can contribute to active citizenship. 
For Michelman the decision in Bowers v Hardwick is one of "unjustified denial of due 
citizenship", by the denial of liberty, and specifically the aspect of liberty known as 
privacy. The US Supreme Court accepted the explanation of the meaning and purpose 
of the challenged law. The meaning of the law is to punish the engagement by 
homosexual partners in certain forms of sexual intimacy. The purpose of the law is to 
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give expression and effect to a legislative majority's moral rejection of homosexual life. 
Michelman states that such a purpose is deeply suspect under the modern republican 
commitment to social plurality. Homosexuality has not only come to be experienced, 
claimed and socially reflected and confirmed as an aspect of identity demanding 
respect, but is also challenging established orders. The effects of a law like the one in 
Georgia on homosexuals is denial or impairment of their citizenship. He argues that 
participation in the various arenas of social life is central to modern republican 
constitutionalism. The sodomy law is a public expression that endorses and reinforces 
majoritarian denigration and suppression of homosexual identity, but it also denies 
citizenship by violating privacy. 
Michelman refers in this regard to the critique of pro-abortion supporters of the 
Supreme Court for affirming women's rights of choice on a constitutional principle of 
privacy. The same argument was used to say that a constitutional principle of privacy 
would be a poor basis on which to ground judicial invalidation of laws, such as 
Georgia's penalising homosexual acts. It is said that to base such a decision on privacy 
would reinforce the idea that homosexuality is merely a form of conduct and would fail 
to recognise it as a continuous aspect of identity that demands public expression. 
Michelman, however, argues that these critiques of the constitutional privacy doctrine 
are relevant as long as privacy stands for an attitude of hostility towards public life and 
a need for refuge from and protection against public power. He notes that an approach 
which differs from this strategy of carving a private space to defend against the public 
can produce a reoriented understanding. A republican slant can lead to an appreciation 
of privacy170 as a political right. He explains that just as property rights become, in a 
republican perspective, a matter of constitutive political concern, (as underpinning the 
independence and authenticity of the citizen's contribution to the collective 
determinations of public life), the privacies of personal refuge and intimacy become a 
matter of constitutive political concern. He argues that Justice Blackmun's dissenting 
170 See Benhabib (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt 212 where she puts 
forward Hannah Arendt's concept of privacy. Benhabib argues that the reconstruction of 
the public world can only take place with a parallel reconstruction of the private world. 
232 
opinion in Bowers begins to articulate the republican appreciation of the political 
significance of privacy, by explaining the value of intimate association as formative and 
supportive of personal identity, of self-understanding, and thus of diverse ways of life. 
Michelman argues that Cornell's idea of "recollective imagination" can be applied to 
republican constitutional theory. He argues for constitutional interpretation as a 
"Machiavellian practice of return-to-the-founding-principles" in which the first principle 
of the founding turns out to be the constant value of (re)foundation (renewal, 
renovation) itself. 171 The problematic character of the constitutional construct (the 
dichotomy of self-rule and law-rule) allows the constitution to ground our identity as a 
political community by also inviting us to self-revision through debate over its meaning. 
Although a judicial constitutional intervention "is not equivalent and rather contrary to 
actual democracy, actual democracy is not all there is to political freedom". 172 
An "ethical" interpretation of equality, inspired by the philosophy of deconstruction, will 
incorporate and combine the insights of Van den Oard, Minow, Nedelsky, and 
Michelman. In the discussion of the various perspectives on the interpretation of rights 
and equality I hoped to illustrate the following: In the first place the connections 
between the various perspectives, secondly the connections between these 
perspectives and the perspectives on deconstruction that I discussed earlier, the 
connection between equality and public space and the significance of these 
perspectives for an ethical interpretation of equality. The connections between the 
various perspectives are that they all focus on interpretation of and approaches to 
equality. They all adhere to the deconstructive insight that equality will never be fully 
achieved in a present system. They are true to deconstruction's double-bind search 
for equality and justice. The various perspectives recognise the problem of distinction, 
whether it is between the inside and the outside, equality and difference, individual and 
relationship, private and public and seek to rephrase these distinctions. They all focus 
on the importance of context and relationships. The public appears as a phantom 
171 In Part 3 I shall discuss Arendt's and Derrida's reflections on the problem of founding. 
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through all the perspectives and comes to the fore for the first time in Nedelsky's, but 
then explicitly in Michelman's perspective. I argue that the latter focus on public space 
ties all the other perspectives together. I shall summarise the various perspectives as 
follows: They present perspectives on the interpretation of rights that adhere to the 
significance of a public space for equality. They problematise traditional distinctions 
and boundaries and turn to context and relationships. Although only Van den Oard 
explicitly applies and recognises deconstruction, I argue that the others expose the 
spirit of deconstruction that is relevant for an ethical interpretation of equality, namely 
the limit of present systems to fully encompass equality and justice. They also adhere 
to the deconstruction of the autonomous separate individual or subject. The fact that 
they recognise the significance of a public space in their perspectives on equality 
contributes to the intersection between public space, equality and justice that I rely on. 
In the light of the above my conclusion is that these perspectives contribute to the 
formulation and application of an ethical interpretation of equality. 
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Equality - South African perspectives 
In this section I highlight the "approach" to the interpretation of equality presently in 
South Africa. I realise that there are writers who differ with the approach that I put 
forward here and that there are many more nuanced positions. I am putting forward a 
general observation of what I consider to be the state of the South African approach to 
equality. 173 I focus on an article by South African writers, Albertyn and Kentridge and 
a visiting Canadian judge, L'Heureux-Dube. Both articles appeared in The South 
African Journal for Human Rights. 174 The Albertyn-Kentridge article constituted an 
influential early voice on equality. The authors argued for "substantive" equality that 
must be achieved by following a "purposive" approach to interpretation. By now the 
notions of "substantive" equality and "purposive" interpretation are well known and not 
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new at all. But I repeat the Albertyn and Kentridge arguments briefly before I continue 
to discuss the first few equality decisions of the Constitutional Court, where it 
developed its approach to equality. These decisions reflect an approach to equality 
similar to that advanced by Albertyn and Kentridge. I briefly refer to the discussion on 
"substantive" equality in Canada by L'Hereux-Dube. My concern with the substantive 
approach is that although substantive equality goes a step further than formal equality, 
it has again become formalised and conceptualised. In other words, substantive 
equality has become the new formula, the new tool, the new instrument that will attempt 
to equalise difference by formalising difference. 
The equality clause m the interim constitution and m the final 
constitution 
The preamble of the interim constitution expressed the 
[N]eed to create a new order in which all South Africans will be entitled to a common 
South African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional state in which there 
is equality between men and women and people of all races so that all citizens shall be 
able to exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms. 
The peculiar afterword of the same constitution visualised 
[A] future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-
existence and development opportunities for all South Africans irrespective of colour, race, 
class, belief or sex. 
Equality was also taken up in the constitutional principles that served as a guide both 
in the interpretation of the interim constitution, and to the writers of the final 
constitution. 
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The preamble of the final constitution provides for 
ff)he foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the 
will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law. 
Section 9 of the final constitution protects equality as a fundamental right. 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, 
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit 
unfair discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is 
established that the discrimination is fair. 
The equality clause in the interim constitution, section 8, was not entirely dissimilar. 
(1) Every person shall have the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law. 
(2) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and, without derogating 
form the generality of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular: race, 
gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture or language. 
(3)(a) This section shall not preclude measures designed to achieve the adequate protection and 
advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. 
(b) Every person or community dispossessed of rights in land before the commencement of this 
Constitution under any law which would have been inconsistent with subsection (2) had that 
subsection been in operation at the time of the dispossession, shall be entitled to claim restitution 
of such rights subject to and in accordance with section 121, 122, 123. 
(4) Prima facie proof of discrimination on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) shall be 
presumed to be sufficient proof of unfair discrimination as contemplated in that subsection, until 
the contrary is established. 
237 
The 1996 constitution provides that any right may be limited only if the limitation 
complies with section 36. 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account al relevant factors, including 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the constitution, no law may 
limit any right entrenched in the bill of Rights. 
The limitations clause in the interim constitution, while less extensive in scope, was 
none the less the clear forerunner of section 36. An important addition to section 36 
was human dignity as one of the principles according to which the justifiability of a 
limitation has to be tested. Section 33 of the interim constitution only mentioned 
freedom and equality. 
The constitutional protection of equality and non-discrimination 
Albertyn and Kentridge175 argue that equality serves as a guide to the interpretation of 
all other rights. They note that equality and freedom underpin the vision of democracy 
embodied in the constitution. They viewed these two rights as mutually supportive, but 
argue that there are many instances where equality may limit individual liberty and 
where freedom may limit equality. Equality and freedom must therefore be balanced to 
ensure and promote their legal, political and social underpinnings. 
They ask the question whether equality should be understood and read as "formal" or 
"substantive" equality and describe "formal" equality as equal treatment of individuals 
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regardless of their actual circumstances in contrast to substantive equality (the 
understanding they support) which requires effective economic and social equality that 
take regard of differences. According to them a purposive approach would reveal that 
the constitution provides for substantive equality. They argue that a formal 
understanding of equality will ignore the value commitments in the constitution. 
Albertyn and Kentridge make the following analysis of section 8, (the equality provision 
in the interim constitution): 
Section 8( 1) guarantees to every person the right of being "equal before the law'' and 
to "equal protection and benefit of the law". They argue that this clause provides for 
substantive equality. 
Section 8(2) provides for equality through affirmative action. They note that this section 
makes the commitment to substantive equality explicit. In other words substantive 
equality permits treatment which is differentiated according to the needs of the 
recipient. 
In regard to the relationship between sections 8(1) and 8(2) they argue that section 8(1) 
is concerned with equality in all its manifestations whereas section 8(3) is concerned 
with specific forms of unfair discrimination. According to Albertyn and Kentridge a 
"purposive", "substantive" reading of section 8(1) would avoid reading the phrases 
contained in this section as separate. They say that the two phrases must be read as 
widely and flexibly as possible without giving it rigid and fixed meanings. Section 8(1) 
must be interpreted to give effect to the values of the constitution. An interpretation of 
section 8(1) must "take account of a history of inequality and oppression and the need 
for reparation and reconstruction" .176 
According to them section 8(3), that prohibits unfair discrimination, is not simply a 
negative formulation of the right to equality but a provision for a mechanism whereby 
specific denials of equality may be challenged. In other words the section provides 
176 Albertyn and Kentridge "Introducing the right to equality in the interim constitution" (1994) 
10 South African Journal on Human Rights 160. 
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"substantive" and not only "formal" protection. Albertyn and Kentridge177 note the 
constitution's explicit reference to "unfair'' discrimination. They support an interpretation 
of "unfair'' that does not only distinguish between different kinds of discrimination but 
that also distinguishes between "permissible" and "impermissible" discrimination. They 
say that a "simple" prohibition of discrimination does not distinguish between 
discrimination against members of subordinate groups and discrimination against the 
privileged. Although the discrimination may take the same form in both instances and 
will cause harm in each case, the kind of harm will be different. In their view the 
inclusion of "unfair'' accommodates the idea that discrimination may have different 
qualities in different contexts and requires that the specific context is taken into 
account. That which is unfair in one context may be justified in another context. 
They support the two phase approach of interpretation and observe that the justification 
of infringement on equality will be tested at two stages, once under the definitional 
stage, under section 8(3) and a second time at the limitation stage, under section 33. 
Albertyn and Kentridge178 argue that the two stages of justification could be understood 
by saying that each stage presents different kinds of justification. The inquiry under 
section 8(3) is aimed at identifying discrimination which is unfair because it finds no 
justification in the "political morality" embraced by the constitution. The inquiry under 
section 33 considers whether discrimination is permissible because it serves a 
"legitimate social purpose" and passes the proportionality test. 
They point out that direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited. Direct 
discrimination occurs when a person is disadvantaged simply on the basis of race, sex, 
ethnicity, religion, disability and so on, or on the basis of some characteristic specific 
to the members of a particular group. Indirect discrimination occurs when apparently 
neutral policies are applied in such a way that they adversely affect a disproportionate 
number of members of a specific group. The explicit prohibition of both direct and 
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indirect discrimination in section 8(3) and (4) should guide the courts to adopt a wide 
approach to discrimination. 
They mention that section 8(3) prohibits discrimination on one or more of the listed 
grounds and note that the listing of grounds should not derogate from the generality of 
the prohibition on discrimination. This section should be interpreted as widely as 
possible to entrench the principle of anti-subordination. 
They argue that section 8(4) gives horizontal application to the equality clause. Section 
8(4} places the burden of proof on the state in the case where discrimination occurs on 
a listed ground to show that the discrimination in question is not unfair. Where 
discrimination is alleged on an unlisted ground the burden of proof is on the applicant 
to establish unfairness. The function of section 8(4) is to require justification of any form 
of discrimination on the listed grounds. The respondent must prove that although the 
discrimination is unfair, it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality. 
The language of equality 
Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dube179 describes the engagement with equality as "learning 
to speak the language of equality". She acknowledges that equality is a term that in a 
vacuum means nothing, which has no universally-recognised, inherent or intrinsic 
content. She observes that in Canada, and in South Africa, people speak the language 
of substantive rather than formal equality. She argues that when interpreting equality 
we must "revisit" the "underlying assumptions" to see where the language we use is 
inconsistent with concrete circumstances. 
She refers to a few decisions where the Canadian Supreme Court accepted substantive 
equality. In Weatherall v Canada (Attorney General), 180 the court upheld a policy which 
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prohibited pat-down searches of women prisoners by male guards, but did not provide 
parallel protection for male inmates. She says that the court accepted that such contact 
with a member of the opposite sex would have a much more traumatic effect on women 
than it would on men. The court accommodated the difference between men's and 
women's "historical" and "present day" experiences of violence. In R v Turpin, 181 the 
court stated that a "broader social, economic and political" context should be examined 
in order to determine whether differential or identical treatment in a specific case results 
in inequality. In Egan v Canada (Attorney General), 182 the court accepted that in some 
cases discrimination must be assessed by focusing on the specific context. In order to 
appreciate whether state action has a discriminatory impact on a group of individuals, 
it is essential to examine both the nature of the group adversely affected and the nature 
of the interest involved. 
According to L'Heureux-Dube, women in Canada had some success with discrimination 
complaints brought under provincial human rights legislation. 183 She mentions Janzen 
v Platz Enterprises Ltd, 184 where the court had to consider whether sexual harassment 
was a form of sex discrimination within the meaning of the Manitoba Human Rights Act. 
The employer argued that sexual harassment was "gender neutral" and not a form of 
"categorical" discrimination against women. The Supreme Court, by focusing on the 
social context, concluded that men have the power to harass sexually and that women 
experience the greatest risk of harassment. 
She also discusses Brooks v Canada Safeway Ltd, 185 where the court determined that 
the exclusion of pregnant women from an employer's accident and sickness plan is a 
form of sex discrimination. The court argued that the plan disadvantaged pregnant 
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women solely because of their pregnancy, a condition unique to women. Because 
pregnancy is to the benefit of all in society, the costs of pregnancy should not be 
imposed solely on women. She further notes R v Lavallee, 186 where the Supreme Court 
decided that the defence of self-defence was available to a woman who killed her 
husband after he had repeatedly threatened to kill her. The court noted that the criminal 
law must take into account the differing experiences and perspectives of those affected 
by the law. The judge questioned the appropriateness of the traditional "reasonable 
man" standard. 187 L'Heureux-Dube argues that this decision is important for two 
reasons. First, because it rejects the view of sexual equality based on sameness and 
replaces it with the recognition that sometimes different people must be treated 
differently in order for substantive equality to prevail. Secondly, because it shows the 
need to "re-examine" past and present laws, institutions and assumptions by employing 
the language of substantive equality188. She argues that if equality is seen as a basic 
component of justice and therefore an essential characteristic of our commitment to 
human rights, the right to equality must be protected and acknowledged in all contexts. 
Equality cases under the South African constitution189 
The cases below were all decided on the equality section of the interim constitution, but 
the approach to equality that was developed in regard to the interim constitution will be 
applied similarly to section 9 of the final constitution. 
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President of the Republic of South Africa and another v Hugo190 
Hugo was imprisoned at a time when the former president, Nelson Mandela, (in the 
Presidential Act 17 of 1994) pardoned certain categories of prisoners. One of these 
categories was all mothers in prison on 1 O May 1994 with minor children under the age 
of 12 years. Hugo, a widower and the father of a son under the age of 12 applied for 
an order declaring the Presidential Act unconstitutional on the grounds that it 
discriminated unfairly against him on the basis of gender. 
The court a quo argued as followed: The phrase to discriminate means to make an 
adverse distinction with regard to; discrimination seems to be fundamentally unfair, it 
is difficult to visualise the notion of discrimination which is not unfair; what a respondent 
must prove in order to discharge the onus of unfairness is that it is not unreasonable 
to discriminate; an adverse distinction was made between Hugo, a single parent and 
any incarcerated mother, whether or not a single parent; the Presidential Act 
discriminated against Hugo; the state did not prove that the discrimination was 
reasonable and fair. 
The majority in the Constitutional Court held that there was discrimination against Hugo, 
but that it was not unfair. Mokgoro, in a separate judgment, held that there was indeed 
unfair discrimination, but that it was justified in terms of section 33. O'Regan also gave 
a separate judgment. Didcott and Kriegler gave dissenting judgments. Goldstone, for 
the majority, accepted that the appellants relied on a generalisation, namely that 
women are the primary caretakers of children, and that it will often be unfair for 
discrimination to be based on that particular generalisation. He said that the fact that 
the individual who was discriminated against by the particular action did not belong to 
a class who had been historically disadvantaged, did not mean that the discrimination 
was fair. He stated that at the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a 
recognition that the purpose of the new constitutional and democratic order is the 
190 President of the Republic of South Africa and another v Hugo 1997(6) BCLR 708 (CC) at 
729. 
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establishment of a society in which all human beings will be given equal dignity and 
respect regardless of their membership of particular groups. Goldstone argued that the 
court followed a substantive approach to equality by focusing on the differences 
between the genders. 
We need . . . to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which 
recognises that although a society which affords each human being equal 
treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot 
achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in all 
circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each case, therefore, will 
require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine 
whether its overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of 
equality or not. A classification which is unfair in one context may not 
necessarily be unfair in a different context. 191 
The court accepted that the President acted in good faith and did not intend to 
discriminate unfairly and had in mind the benefit of children. The court noted that these 
facts were not enough to show that the discrimination was not unfair. To determine that 
impact is unfair, the following factors should be regarded: The group who has been 
disadvantaged; the nature of the power in terms of which discrimination was effected 
and the nature of the interests which have been affected by the discrimination. 
The court considered the presidential pardon to be in the public interest. It argued that 
because male prisoners outnumber female prisoners a release also of single parent 
fathers would have implied the release of a very large number of prisoners. This would 
have caused a considerable public outcry. It therefore would have been unacceptable 
and impossible for the President to release fathers on the same terms as mothers. It 
argued that the rights of fathers were not restricted or limited in a permanent manner, 
191 President of the Republic of South Africa and another v Hugo 1997(6) BCLR 708 (CC) at 
729. 
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their freedom was curtailed as a result of their conviction and not as a result of the 
presidential act. This meant to the court that men's rights of dignity or sense of equal 
worth were not impaired. The court concluded that the impact on the fathers was not 
unfair and the respondent had no justified complaint. 
In her separate judgement O'Regan emphasised two factors that are relevant to the 
determination of unfairness: the group which has suffered discrimination and the effect 
of the discrimination on the interests concerned. In her view, the more vulnerable the 
group adversely affected, the more likely the discrimination will be held to be unfair. 
Similarly, the more invasive the nature of the discrimination, the more likely it will be 
held to be unfair. She argued that even though it will be better for equality if the 
responsibilities of child-rearing are shared fairly between fathers and mothers, the 
reality at present is and will be in the near future that mothers will bear the primary 
responsibility. The disadvantage for women does not lie in the President's order, but 
in the social reality. She focused on the fact that the President's reliance upon women's 
greater share of child-rearing responsibilities in order to offer an advantage to some 
women, has not caused any significant harm to other women. 
Kriegler, in a dissenting judgement, argued that Hugo had suffer unfair discrimination. 
According to him, the relevant section of the presidential pardon was inconsistent with 
the prohibition against gender or sex discrimination and because it had not been shown 
to be fair, it was invalid. In his view the notion relied upon by the President, namely that 
women are to be regarded as the primary care givers of young children, is a root cause 
of women's inequality. 
One of the ways in which one accords equal dignity and respect to 
persons is by seeking to protect the basic choices they make about their 
own identities. Reliance on the generalisation that women are the primary 
care givers is harmful in its tendency to cramp and stunt the efforts of 
both men and women to form their identities freely. 192 
192 President of the Republic and another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) at 743. 
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Another aspect Kriegler mentioned is that no data had been presented stating how 
many male prisoners would have been released if the pardon treated the sexes equally. 
He focused on the fact that the President relied on an "inherently objectionable 
generalisation" for the benefit of a particular group of women prisoners. Kriegler argued 
that there was no suggestion in the Presidential Act of compensation for wrongs of the 
past or an attempt to make good for past discrimination against women. The primary 
justification provided for the President's proclamation was the "interest of children". He 
identifies two criteria that must be satisfied for a generalisation such as that relied upon 
in the pardon to be vindicated. There must be a strong indication that the advantages 
flowing from the perpetuation of a stereotype compensate for "obvious and profoundly 
troubling disadvantages"; the context would have to be one in which discriminatory 
benefits were apposite. In terms of the first criterium, he argued that women as a group 
do not benefit by the perpetuation of the stereotype and in terms of the second he 
noted that the fact that women suffered discrimination generally does not mean that 
they suffered in the penal context. He concluded by arguing that on occasion 
sex/gender distinctions can and should be made but such distinction must shown not 
to discriminate unfairly, or must be justifiable under the limitations clause. 
Is the majority in Hugo following an "Instrumental aesthetic"? 
Pierre Schlag 193 identifies two dominant "aesthetics" of American legal thought, namely 
the "analytical" and the "instrumental" aesthetic. He shows how these two aesthetics 
have enabled American legal thinkers to presume simply that rights have a generally 
recognisable ontology. The "analytical" aesthetics enacts a "rhetoric of order" where 
every legal conception has its proper place. The "instrumental" aesthetic enacts a 
"rhetoric of progress" where the inadequacies of the present can be redressed through 
change, reform, progress and so on. He places each of these aesthetics in a historical 
period. The "analytical" aesthetic flourished in the late nineteenth century in the 
attempts of legal formalists, doctrinalists, analytical positivists and proponents of 
193 
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scientific jurisprudence to systematise law into an orderly science. The "instrumental" 
aesthetic flourished in mid to late twentieth century American legal thought. Where the 
"analytical" aesthetic strives to impose and maintain order by providing a stable, all-
encompassing, objectivist frame, the "instrumental" aesthetic seeks to produce change, 
reform and transformation. He notes that the metaphors and images of the 
"instrumental" aesthetic are motion oriented. Rights in the "instrumental" aesthetic are 
seen as the sources, the instruments, or the ends of change. They are symbolised as 
energy sources (antecedents, motivations etc), trajectories (paths, vehicles, 
connections etc) and as end goals (prizes, trophies, conclusions), and as all three at 
once. 194 
It is interesting to read the words and phrases of the postamble of the interim 
constitution and the preamble to the final constitution in the light of the above. The 
postamble refers to "a historic bridge"; "a future founded on"; "reconstruction of 
society"; "secure foundation"; "reparation" .195 Similarly the preamble of the final 
constitution contains metaphors of "healing"; "foundations"; "improving" and 
"building" .196 In my view, although these metaphors could lead to an "instrumental" 
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National Unity and Reconciliation 
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided 
society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future 
founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-
existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of 
colour, race, class, belief or sex. 
The pursuit of national unity, the well being of all South African citizens and 
peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the 
reconstruction of society. 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of 
South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated 
gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in 
violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. 
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding 
but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for 
ubuntu but not for victimisation. 
Preamble 
... Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; 
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which 
government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally 
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reading and interpretation of the constitution, they need not do so. The metaphors of 
motion describing change, progress and transformation could rather be interpreted as 
signifying an openness. The constitution could be read and interpreted as a bridge, if 
the conditions associated with the metaphor are accepted. For example, a rift is a 
condition for a bridge, and a bridge can only exist as long as the rift exists. Following 
that argument, transformation and change could be attractive metaphors as long as a 
definite concluded end goal is not visualised. An ethical reading, having regard to the 
radical alterity of the other, can never strive for a definite visualised future. Because the 
unknown cannot be known, and the ethical space for the "event" must be kept open, the 
metaphors we use when describing our own utopian vision must be open and flexible. 
The interpretation and application of rights, such as equality, must take place in the 
same vein. Because complete and pure equality can never be achieved within the 
present system, a space for the future event must be kept open. 
The approach that is followed when we deal with equality in the present system will 
influence future visions and possibilities. By reinforcing a harmful stereotype on the 
grounds of addressing previous disadvantages and subscribing to the (by now 
formalised) approach of substantive equality, the Constitutional Court moves within an 
"instrumental" aesthetic. The political aspiration of addressing past inequalities in the 
present could ignore future consequences. The court does not experience, realise or 
take account of radical alterity or radical difference which is impossible to know and 
define and address. It adheres to a comfortable difference. The Constitutional Court 
formulates that equality does not mean that all people should be treated the same, 
without recognising the fact of difference, but does not accept the radicalness and 
impossibility of their own observation. Kriegler, in the Hugo judgment, seems to be 
more aware of the difficulties of difference and the harmful effects of relying on 
generalisations. He does not only address the case before him, but recognises the 
effect and consequences of the judgment on broad society. The majority decision 
protected by law' 
improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person; and 
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place 
as a sovereign state in the family of nations. 
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reinforces current stereotypes. Kriegler's dissenting judgment criticises the past and 
present status quo and opens possibilities of equality for the future. The dissenting 
judgment plays an important political role in the sense that deeply rooted socialised and 
cultural constructions of inequality are questioned. Sachs, in his analysis of the 
patriarchal view of marriage in Harksen, 197 followed a similar inquiry. 
Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North198 
In this case the court acknowledged that the guarantee of equality lies at the very heart 
of the constitution. Fraser approached the court to declare section 18(4)(d) of the Child 
Care Act 7 4 of 1983 inconsistent with the interim constitution because it did not require 
the consent of a father of an illegitimate child for the adoption of the child. The court 
agreed that the section contravened the guarantee against unfair discrimination. The 
court argued that the provision discriminated unfairly between some matrimonial unions 
and others, as well as against the fathers of certain children on the basis of their 
gender and marital status. 
An important aspect of the decision is that the court realised that a "blanket rule" 
governing the rights of parents to veto or consent to an adoption would be undesirable. 
It noted that, for example, the consent of the father of a child born as a result of its 
mother being raped, or from an incestuous relationship, need not be obtained before 
adoption. The court further decided that a father who had "a very casual encounter on 
a single occasion" with the mother also should not have the automatic right to refuse 
his consent to the adoption of a child born from such relationship. The court .argued that 
in the case where both parents have been involved with the child and have given equal 
love and support both parents should consent to adoption. The value of this decision 
is that the court accepted that whatever rule or provisions is made, the relevant context 
of the people involved should be taken into account. 
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Harksen v Lane199 
In this case the plaintiff argued that section 21 of the Insolvency Act violated amongst 
others the equality guarantee in section 8 of the interim constitution. 
The court argued that where someone relies on section 8 to attack a legislative 
provision or executive conduct on the ground that it differentiates between people, or 
categories of people, in such a way that it creates unequal treatment or unfair 
discrimination, the first question is whether the provision indeed differentiates between 
people, or categories of people. If the court finds such differentiation, the next step is 
to see if there is a rational connection between the differentiation in question, and a 
legitimate governmental purpose. If the rational connection is proved, the differentiation 
does not amount to a breach of section 8(1 ). 
However, if there is no rational connection between the differentiation and a legitimate 
government purpose, the provision in question violates the provisions of section 8(1 ). 
The court would then proceed to the limitations clause, section 33, to see if the violation 
could nevertheless be justified. 
Even when there is a rational connection, the court would turn to section 8(2) to 
determine whether despite the rational connection, the differentiation none the less 
amounted to unfair discrimination. 
To determine whether differentiation amounted to unfair discrimination under section 
8(2) a two stage analysis was followed. First, it must be determined whether the 
differentiation amounted to "discrimination" and if it did, whether it amounted to "unfair 
discrimination". The interim constitution provides for two categories of discrimination. 
The first is differentiation on one of the grounds specified in section 8(2). The second 
is differentiation on a ground not specified in subsection (2) but analogous to such 
ground. The court decided that discrimination on an unspecified ground is 
differentiation based on attributes or characteristics which have the potential to impair 
199 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC). 
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the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect them adversely in a 
comparably manner. If the discrimination is on a specified ground, unfairness will be 
presumed, in terms of s 8(4), but if it is on an unspecified ground, unfairness will have 
to be established by the complainant. 
In order to determine whether discrimination is unfair the following factors should be 
considered: 
(a) the position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered in the 
past from patterns of disadvantage; (the court added that this should be taken into 
consideration whether the discrimination in the case is on a specified ground or not); 
(b) the nature of the provision or power and the purpose achieved by it; 
(c) any other relevant factors. 
If the discrimination is held to be unfair one will proceed to the final leg of inquiry as to 
whether the measure can be justified under section 33, the limitations clause. 
The court decided that section 21 of the Insurance Act does not violate the provision 
of section 8(1) or (2) of the interim constitution. O' Regan J agreed with the majority 
decision that there was a rational connection between the differentiation and the 
purpose of section 21 and that section 8(1) was not violated. However, in terms of 
section 8(2), she decided that section 21 constituted unfair discrimination. She 
concluded that section 21 does not meet the justification test of section 33 and is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the interim constitution. 
Sachs J argued that section 21 of the Insolvency Act affronts the personal dignity of the 
persons involved in a marriage relationship and perpetuates a vision of marriage 
rendered archaic by the values of the interim constitution. He said that section 21 was 
patriarchal in origin and promoted a concept of marriage in which, independently of the 
living circumstances and careers of the spouses, their estates are merged. The 
underlying premise of this section is that "one business mind is at work in marriage, not 
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two". This reinforces a stereotypical view of the marriage relationship which in the light 
of the values of the constitution is demeaning to both spouses. The judge notes that the 
spouses vowed to support each other in sickness and in health, "not in insolvency and 
solvency". 
Van der Walt and Botha200 raise other interesting questions which were not considered 
by any of the judgments in Harksen. They argue that section 21 of the Insolvency Act 
includes the definition of a spouse, a wife or husband by virtue of law or custom as well 
as a man living with a woman as his wife or a woman living with a man as her husband, 
but it does not include same-sex partners. They argue that this could constitute unfair 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. According to Van der Walt and 
Botha, although both the majority and minority judgments accepted that there is a 
rational connection between the differentiation and the purpose of section 21, it could 
be argued that section 21 is indeed arbitrary. If section 21 is inconsistent with section 
8(1) of the interim constitution, the further question would be whether it can be justified 
under section 33. They argue that O'Regan and Sachs offered good reasons why the 
limitation would not be reasonable and justifiable: It is unreasonable because it 
promotes an outdated patriarchal view of marriage and relationships that are 
inconsistent with the constitutional protection of human dignity. It is unjustifiable 
because it places a disproportionate burden on the solvent spouse in the attempt to 
protect the interests of the insolvent's creditors. 
Van der Walt and Botha201 argue that the judgments of O'Regan and Sachs reveal 
serious difficulties in the majority's approach. They foresee that the standard articulated 
by Goldstone, "unless supported by a thoroughly contextual approach and a more 
critical understanding of power, may give rise to a new conceptualism and 
conservatism". They note that the judgements of Goldstone, and O'Regan and Sachs 
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reveal "fundamentally different assumptions" about the nature of power, the division 
between the public and private spheres and the contexts(s) in which fundamental rights 
disputes should be adjudicated. They argue that Sachs objects to the majority judgment 
because it fails to pay sufficient attention to the social, historical and political context 
within which section 21 of the Insolvency Act operates. The power relations which 
underlie and are perpetuated by section 21 are ignored. 
Van der Walt and Botha argue that the majority considered an "inappropriate" context 
in view of the facts of the case. 202 According to them, O'Regan, like the majority "clung 
to an individualist concept of power" and did not pay sufficient attention to the ways in 
which current beliefs and attitudes are themselves inscribed in power relations. They 
say that Sachs was conscious of the fact that seemingly neutral statutory distinctions 
may both reflect and perpetuate social values which are not in accordance with the 
value of an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom 
as entrenched in the constitution. Van der Walt and Botha emphasise Sachs's warning 
that 
[A]n "oppressive hegemony" can be "established by the accumulation of 
a multiplicity of detailed, but interconnected, impositions, each of which, 
decontextualised and on its own, might be so minor as to risk escaping 
immediate attention, especially by those not disadvantaged by them. 
They say that this "should be taken to heart by judges and impressed on the minds of 
all law students". 203 
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Freedman204 gives three reasons why it will be very difficult for the applicant on whom 
the onus rests to show that there is no rational connection between the differentiation 
made by the law and the governmental object. In the first place, it is extremely unlikely 
that in a modern democratic society a government, although having a legitimate 
objective, chooses irrational means to achieve it. Secondly, the courts are unlikely to 
find that differentiation is not rational, either out of "judicial sympathy for the difficulties 
of the legislative process or from a belief in judicial restraint generally". Thirdly, he 
argues, it will always be possible to define the legislative purpose in such a way that 
the statutory classification is related to it. According to Freedman it will therefore be 
rare that the courts will find a law that is not rationally connected to a legitimate 
objective. 
He argues that the test to show discrimination will be relatively easier. He places the 
test for unfairness at the "heart" of the Constitutional Court's equality analysis. He 
identifies two categories of fact that should be taken into account when assessing the 
discriminatory impact of a law: the nature of the group and the nature of the interest 
adversely affected. He notes three consequences: First, that it will no longer be 
acceptable to single out historically disadvantaged or socially vulnerable groups for 
more burdensome or less advantageous treatment simply on the basis of their 
differences from those in a position of relative privilege; secondly, special treatment 
may be required to meet the needs of those groups who have previously been 
disadvantaged; and thirdly, it is only by examining the broader social, economic and 
political context within which a law applies that a court can determine whether it 
perpetuates inequality. 
Freedman205 argues that the test for unfairness adopted by the Constitutional Court 
clearly indicates the important purpose of "eradicating entrenched and systematic forms 
of social disadvantage". He is of the opinion that the courts must fulfil an "institutional 
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role" and that it limits the extent to which the judiciary can eradicate social 
disadvantages. According to him the "adjudicative model" is designed to deal with 
"discrete wrongs and not with systematic inequality". He argues that judicial review 
must focus on the effect of a particular law and the fate of particular groups and should 
not "attempt to restructure the overall distribution of benefits in the community". He 
concludes by saying that the task of addressing the unequal social position of 
disadvantaged groups is a complicated "political" task for which the courts are "ill 
equipped" and should best be left to the legislature. 
I strongly object to the narrow view of judicial review and the role of the courts taken by 
Freedman. Although the limits of any legal redress to social upliftment and 
reconstruction should be accepted, the courts still have an extremely important political 
and social role to play. 206 If the constitution is seen as an instrument of change and 
transformation, or as a bridge between a divided past and a democratic future, the 
courts, which are the primary interpreters of the constitution, must adhere to the 
political imperative of creating a democratic society based on freedom, equality and 
human dignity. In S v Lawrence, 207 the court ignored this important social and political 
function when it upheld the prohibition on the selling of liquor on Sundays. By 
upholding this prohibition, the court failed to address the ideological, political and moral 
content of the prohibition. Freedman's view of judicial review is reflective of how 
traditionalist and formalist South African lawyers still are. Karl Klare208 noted this and 
compared South African lawyers' belief in the distinction between law and politics with 
that of American lawyers. His critical analysis of the Makwanyane209 case shows how 
the court came to a "progressive" decision by following a 
"conservative/traditionalist/formalist" approach. 
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City Council of Pretoria v Walker 210 
In City Council of Pretoria v Walker11 the Constitutional Court had to consider whether 
the practice of the City Council of Pretoria that differentiated between people living in 
different geographical areas with regard to the paying of services amounted to unfair 
discrimination. In the process of the restructuring of local authorities, two formerly black 
townships were amalgamated with the area which formerly comprised the "old city" of 
Pretoria. Historically the provision of services and the recovery of service charges in 
these two formerly black areas had been on a very different footing from that in the 
former municipal area of Pretoria. There were no meters in the former townships and 
a flat rate for services was charged. This situation persisted after the amalgamation. 
A target date of June 1995 was set for the implementation of a new uniform system but 
the date was not met. Walker, the respondent, who was a resident in a formerly white 
area adopted a practice of paying no more than the flat rate charged in the former black 
townships. This resulted in a build-up of an outstanding balance on which the city 
council instituted action. Walker raised unfair discrimination in defence. The Supreme 
Court found that the city council's conduct had been unconstitutional. The city council 
appealed to the Constitutional Court. 
Langa J acknowledged that the dispute should be seen in the light of changes which 
have come about as a result of the adoption of a new constitutional order. He argued 
that the council treated the respondent, together with the other residents of old Pretoria 
differently in the following manner. First, the residents of Mamelodi and Atteridgeville 
were treated differently because they were expected to pay a flat rate while a higher 
rate based on consumption was used in old Pretoria. Secondly, because it 
differentiated between old Pretoria and those parts of Atteridgeville and Mamelodi 
where meters had already been installed; and thirdly because the council took legal 
steps to recover payments from residents of old Pretoria only and failed to take similar 
action against defaulters in Mamelodi and Atteridgeville. 
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The court was satisfied that there was a rational connection between the different 
manners of differentiation and their objective. It found that the measures were 
temporary and designed to provide continuity in the rendering of services by the council 
while phasing in equality in terms of facilities and resources. The court then went on 
to consider whether the differentiation constituted unfair discrimination. In assessing 
whether the differentiation amounted to unfair discrimination, Langa J said that the 
wording of section 8 and the constitutional and historical context of the developments 
in South Africa are relevant factors that had to be considered. He noted that not all 
differentiation amounted to unfair discrimination and that it must be determined whether 
the differentiation constituted a violation of the right to equality. 
Langa J referred to the four previous judgements of the Constitutional Court212 that 
dealt extensively with the equality provision in the interim constitution and analysed the 
concept of discrimination. This was the fist occasion where the court had to consider 
the difference between direct and indirect discrimination and whether such difference 
had any bearing on the section 8 analysis as developed in the four judgements. Langa 
J accepted that the facts of this case constituted indirect discrimination and argued that 
there was no reason for distinguishing between direct and indirect discrimination. He 
indicated that the discrimination was on race, one of the listed grounds in section 8(2). 
The council therefore had to prove that the discrimination was not unfair. He 
considered various factors: the position of the respondent in society, the nature and 
purpose of the power, the flat rate, the issue of cross-subsidisation, the selective 
enforcement. The court took note of the fact that the respondent did not belong to a 
group that had been disadvantaged in the past by racial policies and practices, but that 
the respondent did belong to a racial minority which could in a political sense be 
regarded as vulnerable. Members of such minorities who are vulnerable to 
discriminatory treatment must look to the Bill of Rights for protection: 
212 Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC); President of the Republic of South 
Africa and another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC); Harksen v Lane NO and others 1997 
(11) BCLR 1489 (CC) and Larbi-Odam and others v Members of the Executive Council 
for Education and another (North-West Province) 1997 (12) BCLR 1655 (CC). 
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When that happens a court has a clear duty to come to the assistance of 
the person affected. Courts should however always be astute to 
distinguish between genuine attempts to promote and protect equality on 
the one hand and actions calculated to protect pockets of privilege at a 
price which amounts to the perpetuation of inequality and disadvantage 
to others on the other. 213 
In this light the court found that the practice of charging different rates for residents of 
formerly black areas and residents of old Pretoria did not amount to unfair 
discrimination, as the differentiation was the only practical solution in the circumstances 
of the case. With regard to the policy of selective enforcement of debt the court came 
to a different conclusion. 
The court's reference to historical factors such as the existence of a culture of non-
payment in Attridgeville and Mamelodi is significant. The reason for the culture of non-
payment is partly the history of resistance against apartheid structures in the past 
where services in these areas were non-existent or very poor. In old Pretoria the 
services were of a high standard. The context did not encourage a culture of non-
payment. The council had to confront the problem of preventing a culture of non-
payment in old Pretoria and at the same time converting the culture of non-payment in 
Mamelodi into one of payment. The city council argued that the policy adopted by the 
council was to enforce payment in old Pretoria, if necessary by means of suspension 
of services or legal action and to encourage payment in Atteridgeville and Mamelodi 
but not to take legal action against them while the installation of meters was still in 
progress. 
Langa J argued that section 8 of the interim constitution was a guarantee that "at least" 
at the level of law-making and executive action, "hurtful discrimination" will not be a part 
of South African life. Although a city council may differentiate by taking note of, for 
example, the financial position of their debtors the policy it relies on must be "rational 
213 1998(3) BCLR 257 (CC) par 48, 280 
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and coherent". Although section 8(3) provides for special measures in order to address 
the inequalities of the past the council did not argue that the policy of selective 
enforcement was a measure adopted for the purpose of addressing the disadvantage 
experienced in the past by the residents of Atteridgeville and Mamelodi. Langa J stated 
that "[T]he reasons given for the policy were pragmatic". This comment can be seen as 
a rejection of "pragmatic" instrumental, policy based decisions in favour of principle 
based decisions. 214 He stated that: 
No members of a racial group should be made to feel that they are not 
deserving of equal "concern, respect and consideration" and that the law 
is likely to be used against them more harshly than others who belong to 
other race groups. 215 
The majority of the court concluded that the council's conduct of selective enforcement 
of debt amounted to unfair discrimination within the meaning of section 8(2) of the 
interim constitution. Since the respondent's challenge was directed at the conduct of 
the council which was not authorised, either expressly or by necessary implication, by 
a law of general application, section 33(1) was found not applicable. 
The order finally made by the court is interesting. The court found that the course 
followed by the respondent was inappropriate to the extent that his reliance on the 
breach of the section 8 right is not a defence to the council's claim. It was found that 
the High Court's order of absolution from the instance with costs was not appropriate 
relief. The effect of the decision was that even though the council's conduct amounted 
to unfair discrimination, Mr Walker was not in the right to react by not paying. This case 
214 
215 
Dworkin (1977) Takings rights seriously and (1986) Law's empire distinguishes between 
"rules", "policy" and "principle". He associates "policy" with the pragmatism that was 
brought about by American Realism. Dworkin focuses on the application of principles. His 
view of "law as integrity" and "constructive interpretation" is based on the notion of 
"principles". He argues that when a judge makes a decision she must not merely find the 
correct rule (like the conventionalist or positivist judge) or apply the relevant policy (like the 
pragmatist) judge, but through constructive interpretation find the principle that provides 
the best "fit" and the best "justification". 
1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) at par 81, 290. 
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is a good illustration of the multiple factors that come into play at the intersection of the 
public, the constitutional protection of equality and justice (the ethical). The court's 
approach reflects a "principled" based approach and not a "pragmatic" instrumental 
approach. In other words the court's approach is reflective of political and public action 
and speech. The court was not ruled by the necessity and tangibility of the economy 
of present politics and policies. 
I would like to put this judgement in the formulation of "legal interpretation as 
recollective imagination". In this case the political contexts of the past, the present and 
the future were taken into account. The court had to enact memory, but also had to 
reimagine the future. The past policies of the apartheid government, whose services 
to people living in the townships were very poor if not non-existent, had to be 
addressed. The council had to confront a culture of non-payment. The fact is that where 
non-payment might have been justified in the past, in the present we need each and 
everyone to pay for services, to contribute to the public good. Walker was not in the 
right by contributing to the culture of non-payment. The court, however, found that the 
council was in the wrong to follow a policy that discriminated unfairly against some 
persons. In the light of the present and future context and circumstances, the court 
found that the actions of the city council amounted to unfair discrimination. The court's 
order reflects the impossibility of the situation. At the end, the decision remains 
undecided. Although the court accepted that the policy of the city council amounted to 
unfair discrimination, Walker was also in the wrong. Walker, although the court found 
that he was vindicated on a political and moral level, was ordered to pay the 
outstanding balance. If this case was only about aspects of instrumental/policy 
considerations, one could say that the city council was the "winner", but if we situate 
it in the public realm, no one walked out as a winner. The court's decision highlighted 
the necessity of a relationship and of interaction between the city council and the 
public. 
In a dissenting decision, Sachs J argued that although Walker was treated differently 
he was not discriminated against "in any manner whatsoever", alternatively that if the 
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council's conduct could be classified as discrimination against him, it was not unfair. In 
his view the selective enforcement was based on the identification of objectively 
determinable characteristics of different geographical areas and there was no indirect 
discrimination on the grounds of race simply because whites lived in one area and 
blacks in another. He stated that the mere coincidence in practice of differentiation and 
race, without some actual negative impact associated with race, is not enough to 
constitute indirect discrimination on the grounds of race. In order to prove 
discrimination and unfair discrimination some element of actual orpotential prejudice 
must be immanent in the differentiation. He said that in the light of our history of 
institutionalised racism and sexism, there might be sound reasons for treating direct 
differentiation on the grounds specified in section 8(2) as prima facie proof of 
discrimination without further evidence of prejudice being required. In the case of 
indirect differentiation there must be some element of prejudice whether of a material 
kind or to self-esteem. With reference to section 8(3), the affirmative action clause, he 
argued that 
The value system clearly enunciated by section 8 read as a whole would 
be inverted if the spectre of indirect discrimination was automatically 
raised each and every time a measure had some differential impact, even 
if only tangential and psychological, on the advantaged groups in society. 
In our still fragmented and divided country, with its legacy of racial 
discrimination and its deeply entrenched culture of patriarchy, and with 
its practices and institutions based on homophobia or on a lack of 
attention to the most elementary rights of disabled people, almost every 
piece of legislation, and virtually every kind of governmental action, will 
impact differently on the groups specified in section 8(2) of the 
constitution. There are strong policy and practical reasons for holding that 
something more than differential impact is required before indirect 
discrimination under section 8(2) can be inferred216. (my emphasis) 
216 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) at par 112 and 116, 301-303. 
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Sachs J argued that the real issue before the court was not about money but about the 
"rights and responsibilities of citizenship" and about the "path of achieving a negotiated 
integration of the community into a new united Pretoria". He concluded by saying that 
the fact that the complainant could not succeed in terms of section 8(2) did not mean 
that he could not have found any remedy at all under section 8. If the complainant 
based his claim on non-acceptable criteria of an arbitrary character which infringed his 
rights to equal protection and equality before the law, he could have sought a remedy 
based on a violation of section 8(1) of the constitution. The question before the court 
would then have been whether the law had been impartially applied and administered 
and not whether the complainant's dignity had been attacked. 
In the Walker case the court had the opportunity to apply the equality test set out in 
Harksen. It was also the first case where the court had to decide on the difference in 
approach to direct and indirect discrimination. The political and historical context 
played a crucial role in the assessment of this case. The court again affirmed the 
substantive approach to equality, that differentiation will not necessarily amount to 
discrimination that is unfair. In some cases differential treatment will be the only way 
of achieving equality. The difference between the decisions of Langa and Sachs is 
reflective of the ambiguities and undecidability within the constitutional guarantee of 
equality and of its application. Even though Langa concludes that section 8(2) had 
been infringed, the order made by the court could not bring the relief that the 
complainant wanted. Sachs, by denying infringement of section 8(2), takes account 
more radically of the political and historical contexts. His references to "rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship" put the whole issue into one of political reconstruction 
of the past. He argues that the fact that the complainant's dignity was not infringed and 
no prejudice could be proved, does not mean that section 8(1) had not been violated. 
Sachs' approach here is consistent with his approach in Harksen, where he argued that 
the hidden structures of inequality should be brought to light. The Walker case 
confronted the court with difficult questions with no easy answers. It is these difficult 
questions which par excellence highlight the undecidability of the law. 
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It is too early to come to any final conclusions about the South African approach to 
equality. The South African Constitutional Court is still young and in an initial phase of 
developing approaches to equality. As I already stated my concern is that the 
Constitutional Court, lawyers and legal scholars might accept the present "substantive" 
approach as enough and adequate to deal with equality and difference. The fact that 
it seems as if the Constitutional Court has more or less formalised their approach 
(relying a great deal on the early Albertyn and Kentridge article) troubles me. I 
discussed the perspectives on deconstruction and the perspectives on the 
interpretation of equality to show the multiple possible approaches that can be followed 
and should be investigated. Off course I choose deconstructive perspectives because 
they support my vision of an ethical interpretation of equality. In the next section I shall 
investigate two feminist perspectives to see how they can contribute to an ethical 
interpretation of equality. 
An ethical interpretation of equality and the TRC 
In this section I have described the present approach to equality in South Africa as it 
was developed by Albertyn and Kentridge and later on followed in decisions of the 
Constitutional Court. Even though substantive equality is a better approach to equality 
than the formal approach, in my view, it can easily become formalised and 
instrumentalised again. My greatest concern is that although a substantive approach 
to equality is supposed to be more aware of difference, it will again reduce difference. 
An alternative to both the formal and substantive approach to equality is an ethical 
interpretation of equality. An ethical interpretation of equality regards difference as 
radical difference that can never be identified fully and known fully. It is, however, 
concerned with difference, it seeks to accept difference and not to reduce it or violate 
it. An ethical interpretation of equality subscribes to the view of justice as the limit of 
any system, in other words that justice can never be achieved fully in the present and 
that justice is in the beyond. In the same way equality in the present will also be 
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incomplete. This does not mean that the ideals of equality and justice are negated. An 
ethical interpretation of equality insists on, on the one hand, striving for equality and 
justice whilst, on the other, accepting the impossibility of achieving it fully. 
In the light of the discussion on perspectives on equality until now we can note the 
following important characteristics of equality: Central to an ethical interpretation of 
equality is difference. The distinction between the "inside" and the "outside", the 
drawing of boundaries should be undermined constantly. We should be aware of the 
power involved when we decide on difference. An ethical interpretation of equality asks 
that we focus on the relationships of which we are part when we consider the right to 
equality and difference. We should regard the significance of public space when we 
interpret equality. 
As I have already stated, an ethical interpretation of equality is dependent on the 
ethical intersection between public space, equality and justice. In the next part, " ... 
landscapes of justice" I shall focus on the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission as an event. I shall state why I regard the TRC as a manifestation of the 
ethical intersection between public space, equality and justice. I would, however, like 
to make a short comment on the TRC and an ethical interpretation of equality now. The 
TRC insisted on adhering to equality, in other words they aimed at treating each and 
everyone (victim and perpetrator) equally. Since the initial talks that led to the creation 
of the TRC the issue of equality has been controversial. There were people who argued 
that individuals who committed crimes and violated human rights as members of the 
resistance could not be placed on an equal footing with the perpetrators who 
represented the apartheid regime and their forces. 217 The TRC response was that since 
the primary aims of the commission was reconciliation, unity and truth it was of the 
utmost importance that people trusted the TRC and that the TRC acted fairly. The TRC 
treated perpetrators from all sides equally. Each and everyone had equal opportunities 
217 I shall refer to Asma I, Asmal & Roberts (1996) Reconciliation through truth. A reckoning 
of apartheid's criminal governance in Part 3. See also Liebenberg "The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: Context, future and some imponderables" 
(1996) 11 Suid-Afrikaanse Publiekregl South African Public Law 335-353 and Kollapen 
"Accountability: The debate in South Africa" (1993) 37 Journal on African Law 1-9. 
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to share their side of the story. But, in its report, the TRC recognised apartheid as a 
crime against humanity. This means that the TRC, when it had to consider the various 
stories, had to take the concrete contexts and specific circumstances into account. In 
other words, the TRC had to regard difference. This does not mean that the TRC 
treated the individuals representing opposite groups in an unequal fashion. But, the 
TRC had to look at the background context. In this respect, in my view, the TRC argued 
along lines similar to an ethical interpretation of equality. Equality was not approached 
in a formal and rigid way. Difference, concrete contexts, specific circumstances and 
relationships were regarded highly. Our courts (legal scholars and the community in 
general) can benefit from investigating the TRC's approach to equality. In comparison 
with some of the equality decisions taken by the Constitutional Court the TRC's 
approach to equality was refreshing and different. The TRC did not only contribute to 
the reconstruction and transformation of public space, but also had an impact on our 
views on equality and justice. 
Another aspect that I want to highlight is the two requirements for amnesty. An amnesty 
applicant had to give full disclosure and had to prove a political motive in the sense that 
the deed had to be performed on orders from a recognised political party, organisation 
or movement. The latter requirement once again focuses on the concrete context of an 
applicant. The commission did not follow a blanket amnesty as was followed in other 
countries. The TRC did not follow a general universal equalising approach. To refer 
back to terms that I have used earlier, one can say that every individual was regarded 
as a "concrete other" and not as a "generalised other". 
Another significant feature of the TRC was the presence of women. I have argued 
above that women have traditionally been excluded from public spaces. South Africa 
was not different in this regard. I also stated earlier that for "real" transformation and 
not mere evolution it is not enough to have women fulfilling traditional male roles. We 
need to disrupt and undermine present value systems and mind sets with other voices. 
I stated that I do not subscribe to an essentialist position that believes in one existing 
women's voice or essence of women. However, women or the feminine can undermine 
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and disrupt present value systems and mind sets. In the context of the TRC we saw 
many women and heard many women telling their stories. Krog tells us that although 
most of the stories told before the TRC were told by women, they told stories about 
what happened to men: their husbands, partners, lovers, brothers, fathers and so on. 
The TRC made provision for special hearings on abuses against women. The fact that 
the Women's Hearings were not a huge success in the sense that very few women 
came forward to tell their stories is troublesome. In light of the present rape statistics 
and cases of women's abuse the fact that women did not come forward to tell how they 
were abused by the forces of apartheid and in the ANC camps tells us something 
powerful about the present culture and attitude against women that must be addressed 
in our processes of reconstruction and transformation. Nevertheless, the presence of 
women telling their stories contributed to the presence of an ethics of care in the TRC. 
I shall elaborate on this in Part 3. I argue that the TRC did not primarily focus on 
traditional concepts of justice, but supplemented justice with a care perspective. 
Rehabilitation and reparation as one of the primary aims of the TRC illustrated that the 
TRC was not only concerned with formal justice and equality but aimed at changing the 
circumstances of real lives. In this regard the TRC disrupted and undermined present 
formal concepts of justice. In my view the space of the TRC in this regard can be 
described as a "feminine" space. The effect of the TRC's attentiveness to a care 
perspective can be that an ethics of care in future may be accepted as equally as 
significant as the formal concept of justice. The "different voice" must not be 
incorporated in the present system but regarded as a significant reminder of the 
incompleteness of the present system. The TRC not only assisted in the reconstruction 
and transformation of South African public space but contributed to our perspectives 
on equality and justice. 
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Equality: A feminist/gender perspective 
In this section I shall consider the issue of feminism and equality by putting forward the 
perspectives of Drucilla Cornell and Christine Littleton. I refer briefly to Julia Kristeva's 
response to the state of feminist thought in Europe during the seventies and eighties 
because I think it can provide some insight into the current state of feminist thought in 
South Africa. Kristeva identifies three reactions to what she calls linear (chronological) 
time. I shall argue that we are presently experiencing all three reactions. I start of with 
Cornell's ethical feminism (I have already addressed aspects of her ethical feminism 
in Part 1 ). I admit that Cornell's vision of ethical feminism is a highly abstract and 
theoretical position, but I am attracted to it. More than that I think that ethical feminism 
will provide the best insight for the processes of reconstruction and transformation, in 
particular because the theory provides for an affirmation of the feminine (and feminine 
difference) without being essentialist. I shall conclude this section with Littleton's 
discussion of practical approaches to equality and difference. 
"Liberated women want it both ways" 
A newspaper report with the heading "Liberated women want it both ways"218 provided 
me with a starting point from where I could address the issue of a feminist perspective 
on equality. The report is an illustration of the misunderstanding and misgivings held 
by people about "feminism", "women's liberation", and "sexual harassment", to name 
a few. I accept that is it impossible (and undesirable) to refer to one general universal 
feminism. One can but only refer to the various feminisms or the various strands in 
feminism. 
I shall argue for Cornell's concept of "ethical" feminism as a "better way" of 
understanding current sex and gender relations. Ethical feminism relies on 
deconstruction's insights with regard to language, justice and democracy. It focuses on 
218 Langton (1998) The Sunday Times June 28. 
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woman as beyond our current systems of representation. Ethical feminism does not 
seek to replace the current sex-gender system with a new way of being. It seeks to 
problematise and displace current stereotyped understandings and beliefs of "woman" 
and the "feminine". It does not seek to assimilate women and men within the current 
sex-gender system. "Woman" or the "feminine", should remain other to the system and 
should expose the flaws in the present system from a marginal "ethical" position. This 
does not mean, however, that women should not strive for their voices to be heard on 
a theoretical and practical level. They should, but they should use their voices as 
representative of the other and not be appropriated by the power games of the current 
system. 
"Sexual appeal goes with working hard, say Wall Street's babes" 219 
The newspaper report tells us about five women who used to work on Wall Street and 
who were recruited by Jockey underwear manufacturers for their advertising campaign. 
The five women appear in little more than double breasted jackets advertising 
underwear and tights. The reporter argues that they ought to be "role models" for every 
modern US feminist getting to the top in a "cutthroat world long dominated by men" -
getting to the top by wearing nothing but double-breasted jackets. The report tells us 
that the women do not have any regrets at achieving fame on the basis of beauty rather 
than brains. One of the women is quoted saying: "An attractive woman has a certain 
power". 
The issue of sexual harassment in the workplace is raised in the report. It is stated that 
many companies have to pay huge sums of compensation for sexual harassment and 
senior managers are forced to attend "gender sensitivity" courses. The reporter also 
states that women's rights organisations are "predictably" outraged because of the 
advertisement, but argues that the idea that women can be sexually attractive at work 
and yet still demand equal treatment from their male partners is increasingly popular. 
Even young girls are wanting to have it both ways, the report indicates. This state of 
affairs, it is argued, creates great confusion between girls, boys, men and women. The 
219 Langton (1998) The Sunday Times 28 June. 
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report concludes by stating the "reality" that "US males find it increasingly difficult to 
comprehend where feminism ends and sexual harassment begins". 
The problems I have with the report are manifold. Whether I agree or disagree with 
"babes" wearing nothing but double-breasted jackets is not one of them. The whole 
understanding of feminism and approach to the problems of the current sex-gender 
system is seriously flawed. A question that I would like to address is why should women 
compete with men on men's terms; why should women accept the current system as 
something that should be strived for, and why do they? From an ethical feminist 
standpoint women should not want it any of the given ways, they must rather provide 
an alternative, a different voice. 
Various feminist theories through the years have sought various solutions. I am not 
going to describe the phases or waves of feminism - that has been done adequately by 
many scholars. 220 I shall only discuss ethical feminism. Ethical feminism moves in the 
same ethical landscape as deconstructive thought, it radically takes note of 
deconstruction's insights and ethical and political imperatives in its theory. 
220 Kristeva "Women's time" in Keohane et al (1981) Feminist theory; Adam "Feminist social 
theory needs time. Reflections on the relation between feminist thought, social theory and 
time as an important parameter in social analysis" (1989) 37 The Sociological Review 
458-473; Fuss (1989) Essentially speaking: Feminism, nature and difference; Nicholson 
(ed) (1990) Feminism/Postmodernism; Benhabib & Cornell (1987) Feminism as critique; 
Benhabib, Butler, Cornell & Fraser (1995) Feminist Contentions: A philosophical 
exchange; De Beauvoir (1949) The second sex; Fox-Genevese (1991) Feminism without 
illusions; Harris "Race and essentialism in feminist legal theory" in Heinzelman & 
Wiseman (eds) (1994) Representing women: Law, literature and feminism 106-146; Olsen 
"The sex of law" in Kairys (ed) (1997) The politics of law. A progressive critique 453-467; 
Dalton "Where we stand: Observations on the situation of feminist legal thought" (1988) 
Berkely Women's Law Journal 1-13. 
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"Ethical feminism" - Drucilla Cornell 
"Better to love like Dido, than to found the Roman empire" 221 
According to Drucilla Cornell ethical feminism seriously takes note of the belief that the 
feminine should not be identified with the experience of any given historical group of 
women. 222 The challenge for ethical feminism is to affirm the feminine without relying 
on an essentialist or naturalist theory of woman. 
If there is to be feminism at all, as a movement unique to women, we 
must rely on a feminine voice and a feminine "reality'" that can be 
identified as such and correlated with the lives of actual women. Yet all 
accounts of the Feminine seem to reset the trap of rigid gender identities, 
deny the real differences among women (white women have certainly 
been reminded of this danger by women of colour), and reflect the history 
of oppression and discrimination rather than an ideal to which we ought 
to aspire. To solve this dilemma, we must return to the significance of the 
feminine. 223 
Cornell argues for the possibility of a new "choreography of sexual difference" that must 
be brought about by an "allegorical" account of the feminine. The feminine must be 
prized through the retelling of myths. These accounts must describe the feminine as 
221 
222 
223 
Cornell "The doubly-prized world: Myth, allegory and the feminine" (1990) 75 Cornell Law 
Review698. 
Western feminism has (and still does) negated the experience of non-western women. 
The postcolonial discourse is of great importance in this regard. See amongst others 
Bhabha 'The other question: Difference, discrimination and the discourse of colonialism" 
in Barker (ed) (1986) Literature Politics & Theory 148-172; Spivak (1988) In other worlds 
in general, specifically "Feminism and critical theory" and "A literary representation of the 
subaltern: A woman's text from the third world" 77-92 and 241-268; Spivak "The Rani of 
Sirmur: An essay in reading the archives" (1985) History and Theory 24 7-272. See also 
hooks (1992) Black looks: Race and representation; hooks (1988) Talking back: Thinking 
feminist, thinking black; hooks (1992) Yearning: Race, gender and cultural politics. 
Cornell "The doubly-prized world: Myth, allegory and the feminine" (1990) 75 Cornell Law 
Review645. 
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beyond any of the current stereotypes of women. The ethical perspective in ethical 
feminism demands an utopian perspective of the "not-yet". Ethical feminism does not 
state things as they are, but as they should be. The "not-yet" and the "should be" are 
recollected in allegory and myth. 
Cornell224 identifies four approaches to the affirmation of the feminine, namely the 
approach of West and Kristeva, the liberal approach, MacKinnon's approach and the 
deconstructive approach (ethical feminism). She discusses the theories of Robin 
West225 and Julia Kriste~~ who both rely on mothering as metaphor for the 
feminine. 227 The important difference between the two is that West relies on a naturalist 
or a biological view of the feminine, where Kristeva, being a Lacanian feminist, makes 
use of psycho-analysis. 228 She finds Kristeva's theory less essentialist than West's. 
West, who argues that women, because of their biology, value intimacy and 
connection, rather than autonomy and separation, attempts to develop a 
phenomenology of "women's unique and shared" experience. Cornell argues that the 
psycho-analytic framework that Kristeva relies on rejects West's biologism. Kristeva 
leaves open the possibility that men too can care and love. Kristeva's account does not 
identify two realities, one male and one female. 
Cornell experiences difficulties with relying on mothering as a basis for feminist theory. 
She argues that although the maternal is not an unimportant metaphor for the feminine, 
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See Van Marie (1996) Rekonstruktiewe feminisme: 'n Ondersoek na die reg as "manlike" 
struktuur en die moontlikheid van transformasie met spesifieke verwysing na pornografie. 
LLM dissertation 
See West "The difference in women's hedonic lives: A phenomenological critique of legal 
feminist theory" (1987) 3 Wisconsin Women's Law Journal 81-140; West "Jurisprudence 
and gender" (1988) 55 The University of Chicago Law Review 1-72; West "Pornography 
as a legal text" (1989) For adult users only 108-130. 
(1980) Desire in language. 
I discussed the theories of West and Kristeva in my LLM dissertation (1996) 
Rekonstruktiewe feminisme: 'n Ondersoek na die reg as "manlike" struktuur en die 
moontlikheid van transformasie met spesifieke verwysing na pornografie. 
See Gallop (1982) Feminism and psychoanalysis. The daughter's seduction. See also 
Cornell "What takes place in the dark" in (1993) Transformations 170-194. 
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the feminine should not be limited to it. She notes the danger of reifying the historical 
experience of a group of women into a second nature that is attributed to all women. 
Another problem is that women themselves disagree on the experience of mothering, 
what it is and what it means to female identity. 
Cornell turns to Lyotard's writing on the differend. 
The differend is that which has been shut out of traditional legal 
discourse and the social conventions of meaning. The suffering of women 
can be understood as the differend. The harm to women literally 
disappears because it cannot be represented as a harm within the law. 229 
She explains that it is impossible to give expression to the differend in a present legal 
system230 by turning a woman into a litigant and translating her suffering into the 
prevailing norms of the system. The current discourse through the performative power 
of language should be expanded in order to create an openness for another feminine 
"reality". A third approach identified by Cornell (the approach that supports ethical 
feminism), is the "deconstructive allegory of woman". Deconstruction's undermining of 
language as a pure form and its scepticism towards "mirror writing" and metaphysical 
language is crucial for feminist theory. The impossibility of meaning without a pregiven 
context has consequences for descriptions of the feminine and of woman. By relying 
on essentialist views of "woman", stereotypes are reinforced and "woman" is reinstated 
in her "proper place": 
[T]he deconstructive project resists the reinstatement of a theory of 
female nature as a philosophically misguided bolstering of rigid gender 
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identity within the dichotomous structure of the logos. Deconstruction also 
demonstrates that there is no essence of Woman that can be eidetically 
abstracted from the linguistic representations of Woman. The referent 
Woman is dependent on the systems of representation in which she is 
given meaning.231 
Cornell argues that the other side of the essentialist version of the feminine is the 
liberal reaction that insists that women should be recognised as individuals and as 
legal persons and not reduced to specified gender identity. In this approach there is no 
shared female identity, only "individuals who happen to be women". The "ethical" 
feminist reaction to this approach is that this strategy to join forces with the dominant 
discourse undermines the possibility of recognising the unnoticed suffering of women. 
How can the feminine be affirmed without relying on essentialist stereotypes? Cornell 
supports the psycho-analytical approach that describes the feminine as a disruptive 
force of the gender system in which it is given meaning. In this approach the feminine 
is not celebrated because it is the feminine but because it stands in for the 
heterogeneity that undermines the "logic of identity". She says that this position does 
not claim to show what the feminine or woman really is, but demonstrates how the 
feminine is produced within a particular system of gender representation. The feminine 
acts as a disruptive force of the given gender identity and hierarchy.232 
Another approach discussed and opposed by Cornell is the radical feminist theory of 
Catherine MacKinnon.233 MacKinnon views any affirmation of the feminine as co-option 
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within the male dominated sphere. 234 She stands for a "feminism unmodified". For 
Cornell her central error is that she reduces feminine reality by identifying the feminine 
totally with the world as it is constructed by males. Cornell argues that feminism will 
always be modified as women experience their realities differently. Ethical feminism 
wants to affirm a different way of being. It is not about gaining power for women but 
about the redefinition of all our fundamental concepts. For example, in MacKinnon's 
theory, the body becomes the barrier in which the self can hide and defend itself 
against invasion. Cornell argues that the feminine self, as it is celebrated in allegory 
and myth, lives the body differently. 
The body is not an erected barrier, but a position of receptivity. To be 
accessible is to be open to the other. To shut oneself off is loss.235 
I fully agree with Cornell when she notes that the struggle for empowerment as the 
ultimate political goal of feminism shows how profoundly we remain under the sway of 
masculine symbolism. Empowerment is not and should not be the ultimate goal in all 
relationships. MacKinnon believes that all women are forced to be "losers" under the 
current system. Cornell argues that we should seek to find a way beyond winning and 
losing. The vision Cornell and French feminists like Cixous236 and lrigaray237 hold, is 
one where there is space for "feminine desire". They view the body238 as a point of 
connection rather than a barrier. 
We must give Woman body if we are to translate the Feminine into an 
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ideal which represents a better way of human being. 239 
Truth does not inhabit fiction 
Cornell focuses on Derrida who illustrates how Lacan again locates woman within the 
system. Lacan, in spite of his own analysis that woman is the other to the system, wants 
to contain the feminine by proclaiming her truth. Lacan defines the woman as the "lack 
of the phallus". He perceives this as a fact and thinks that he got to the bottom of 
woman. He "indulges in essentialising fetishes". 240 Derrida explains that for Lacan, 
"truth inhabits fiction". Derrida recognises the need to describe woman but accepts that 
descriptions can never be explanations. We cannot separate the "truth" of woman from 
the "fictions" in which she is represented. 
Therefore we cannot know once and for all who or what She is, because 
the fictions in which we confront Her always carry within the possibility of 
multiple interpretations, and there is no outside referent, such as nature 
or biology, in which this process on interpretation comes to an end. As a 
result, we cannot "discover" the ground of feminine identity which would 
allow us to grasp her Truth once and for all. 241 
This does not mean that woman can be reduced to "lack". Cornell refers in this regard 
to Duras, who seems to accept mourning as the only basis for female solidarity. She 
notes that Derrida affirms "the power to dance differently". The feminine should open 
the space for women (and men) to enhance and expand their reality. This requires a 
certain understanding and telling of history. 
Your "maverick feminist" showed herself ready to break with the most 
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authorised, the most dogmatic form of consensus, one that claims ... to 
speak out in the name of the revolution and history. Perhaps she was 
thinking of a completely other history: a history of paradoxical laws and 
non-dialectical discontinuities, a history of absolutely heterogeneous 
pockets, irreducible particularities, of unheard of and incalculable sexual 
differences; a history of women who have - centuries ago - "gone further" 
by stepping back with their lone dance, or who are today inventing sexual 
idioms at a distance from the main forum of feminist activity with a kind 
of reserve that does not necessarily prevent them from subscribing to the 
movement, and even, occasionally, from becoming a militant for it. 242 
According to Cornell, Derrida's emphasis on the break with history and the break with 
the story of revolution opens the possibility of breaking with the notion of the feminine 
as opposition. To push beyond the limit of the "reality" and of perceived categorisations 
is inherently ethical and political. Again, this does not mean that there is no room for 
the revolution in feminist theory. The task is to "bring the dance and its tempo into tune 
with the revolution". We must always be reminded that there is more to the story of 
woman than meets the eye. Therefore, one should be careful not to attempt to 
introduce a new concept of representation of woman to replace previous ones. 
Because there is no ultimate concept of woman, the "truth" of woman as absence 
should also be denied. Truth does not inhabit fiction and there is not a complete cut 
between the "imaginary" and the "real". 
Cornel argues that the utopian ideal, inherent in deconstruction, assures us that "we 
are not stuck with the way things "are" "now", because the way things "are" "now" 
carries within the beyond to the current system of gender representation". 243 In this 
regard myth, allegory and the imaginary are important for reclaiming and retelling of 
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women's stories. Helene Cixous244 appeals to mythical figures in her writing in order to 
find a way beyond the current system of gender representation and patriarchy. Cornell 
says that through "recollective imagination" we remember (recollect) the memories of 
the past, but simultaneously we reimagine new ways of being for the future. Ethical 
feminism reminds us of the world "doubly-prized". By this, deconstruction's insistence 
on the double-bind, the in between is adhered to. The feminine should act as disruptive 
force of the current system but at the same time open the space for a future where 
women's stories can be told. The feminine should be affirmed neither as a present 
"reality" or as lack or absence. 
Woman (truth) will not be pinned down. In truth woman, truth will not be 
pinned down. That which will not be pinned down by truth is, in truth -
feminine. This should not, however, be hastily mistaken for a woman's 
femininity, for female sexuality, or for any other of those essentialising 
fetishes which might still tantalize the dogmatic philosopher, the impotent 
artist or the inexperienced seducer who has not yet escaped his foolish 
hopes of capture. 245 
I support Cornell's vision of ethical feminism. I think that for the processes of 
reconstruction and transformation of South African public life, equality and justice an 
ethical feminist perspective can be of great value. But I realise that other feminist 
perspectives will also influence the processes of reconstruction and transformation. In 
this regard we can note Julia Kristeva's246 identification of three feminist reactions (or 
perspectives) to linear (chronological) time. She describes them in terms of historical 
generations and she refers specifically to the experience of European feminist 
movements. One reaction aspires to gain a place in linear time by political demands, 
struggles for equal pay and so on. Another reaction is to refuse linear time and to place 
herself outside the linear time of identities. Such a feminism rejoins the mythical 
244 (1986) The newly born woman 63. 
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memory and cyclical temporality. A third reaction is a mixture of the two attitudes, 
namely insertion into history and the radical refusal of the subjective limitations 
imposed by linear history. 
In South Africa, although there were signs of earlier liberal feminist movements, we are 
experiencing all three of Kristeva's reactions at present. The South African constitution 
protects the equality of women. Two laws, one for the prevention of family violence247 
and the other to allow abortion248 on demand, were promulgated during the past few 
years. Equality and non-discrimination, women's rights, women's liberation and 
women's empowerment are very popular political slogans at present. South African 
women have multiple reactions to all the recent changes. Some follow the liberal 
feminist approach of demands for formal equality, equal pay etc. These women want 
to be treated the same as men for the same pay. Other women accept sex and gender 
differences and argue for equal treatment with regard to their differences. I think it is 
necessary that the heterogeneity of the South African community must be taken into 
account in terms of class and race differences. The "reality" is that not even these 
approaches can be clearly separated. The third approach identified by Kristeva is close 
to "ethical" feminism which demands a double handed approach. South African women 
should adhere to the ethical incentive in ethical feminism. They should not accept the 
current system as a given, but should try to change it from within. At the same time they 
must not be co-opted by the system and have their different voices appropriated. 
Feminism should expose the limit of the current system of sex and gender 
representation. Transformation does not mean the assimilation of men and women in 
the present system. It does not mean that women and men can move comfortably 
between traditional stereotypes. It does not mean that women (or men) can have it 
"both ways". Ethical feminism demands that we disrupt, problematise and break with 
stereotypes, or at least emphasise the problems inherent in all closed systems. 
247 The Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. 
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Equality, equivalence and sexual difference 
Cornell249 defends a vision of equality based on the "minimum conditions of 
individuality". These are bodily integrity, access to language in which differentiation of 
oneself from others can be articulated and the protection of the "imaginary domain". 
She notes that feminist theory has experienced an ongoing and seemingly 
irreconcilable tension between freedom and equality. This tension has come to light 
particularly in the areas of pornography, abortion and sexual harassment. There is a 
tension in feminist equality theories between formal and substantive equality. This 
tension has divided feminists on issues of difference and equality, and sexuality and 
equality. Cornell argues that MacKinnon's substantive theory of equality rests on the 
theoretical acceptance of male dominance. As was stated above, MacKinnon re-
encodes the unconscious structure of gender hierarchy. According to Cornell her theory 
is dangerous because it re-invests a limited concept of femininity. By striving for 
equality with men (rather than equality of personhood) MacKinnon undermines the full 
power of the appeal to equality. Cornell argues that formal equality with its appeal to 
likeness and denial of difference fails to help women in circumstances where difference 
matters. 
Cornell argues for a programme of legal reform that could synchronise the values of 
equality and freedom. 250 Such a programme of legal reform must recognise the 
equivalent evaluation of sexual difference. This recognition could go further than the 
difference/equality divide that has hindered the progress of equality jurisprudence. 
It is not the "fact" of sexual difference but the degradation of our "sex" so 
as to mark a lesser form of being that has presented the barrier to 
equality. 251 
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According to Cornell, women should demand their equivalent worth, thereby enhancing 
an equal chance for freedom. Law should not deny the minimum conditions of 
individuation. Such a programme of legal reform assumes no theoretical description of 
women as the truth and therefore does not encode any particular figure of woman as 
the basis of the demand of equality. Respect for others in public space is demanded. 
Cornell asks why women should enter the "preservational economy of law". She 
observes that the reality is that we have inevitably already been entered into it. But we 
should demand to enter differently, on the basis of equivalent evaluation of our sexual 
difference. 
Luce lrigaray argues in this regard that without changing "the general grammar of our 
culture, the feminine will never take place in history."252 She views sexual difference as 
one of our greatest hopes for the future and is cautionary towards present claims to 
equality. She argues that present claims to equality could produce a greater split 
between people. According to lrigaray, women should seek justice in terms of their 
identities. Cornell argues that women should not be regarded as women before the law. 
They should instead demand equivalent evaluation by the law of their sexual 
difference. Such an evaluation is an "ontological intervention" in that it goes against 
what we have been designated to be. It is also a demand for transformation, "a demand 
for the end to our dereliction". 253 
"Reconstructing sexual equality" - Christine Littleton 
Christine Littleton254 uses the term "phallocentrism" to describe the history of male 
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oppression of women. She argues that "phallocentrism" entails more than the inequality 
of women. 
It has also created a self-referencing system by which those things 
culturally identified as "male" are more highly valued than those identified 
as "female," even when they appear to have nothing to do with either 
biological sex. By this process, "to be a man" does not simply mean to 
posses biologically male traits but also to take on, or at least aspire to, 
the culturally male. Similarly, social institutions within a male-dominated 
culture can be identified as "male" in the sense that they are constructed 
from the perspective of the culturally male.255 
Littleton says that she wants to "capture" the perspective which this culture wants us 
to aspire to and by which it justifies its dominance through the term "phallocentrism". 
She argues that equality is inherent to the system that feminists are trying to resist, but 
notes that equality, like any other "social construct," can be "deconstructed". Littleton 
argues for the "reconstruction" of sexual equality by challenging social institutions 
created by the dominant culture (phallocentrism). 
She identifies two models of sexual equality, a "symmetrical" model and an 
"asymmetrical" model. Within the "symmetrical" model she makes a further distinction 
between "assimilation" and "androgyny". She defines the assimilation approach as 
based on the belief that "women, given the chance, really are or could be just like 
men". 256 Androgyny, in her view, also subscribes to the view that men and women are 
alike, but attempt to find a "golden thread" or "middle position" that can accommodate 
both sexes. Littleton says that she is uncomfortable with the attempt at finding a "middle 
position" because she distrusts the ability of any person, especially a court, to value 
women enough to find the "middle". Within the asymmetrical model she distinguishes 
between "special rights", "accommodation", "acceptance" and "empowerment". The 
255 Littleton "Reconstructing sexual equality" in Smith (ed) (1993) Feminist jurisprudence 110. 
256 
"Reconstructing sexual equality" in Smith (ed) (1993) Feminist jurisprudence 112. 
282 
"special rights" model subscribes to differences between men and women and provides 
for women by "special treatment". She says that accommodation agrees to differential 
treatment with regard to biological differences, but argues that cultural (or hard to 
define) differences should be treated under an equal treatment or androgenous model. 
Littleton supports the acceptance model and argues that acceptance does not regard 
differences as problematic per se, but focuses on the ways in which society justify 
inequality. 
The focus of equality as acceptance ... is not the question of whether 
women are different but, rather, on the question of how the social fact of 
gender asymmetry can be dealt with so as to create symmetry in the 
lived-out experience of all members of the community .... the function of 
equality is to make gender differences, perceived or actual, costless 
relative to each other, so that anyone may follow a male, female or 
androgenous life-style according to their natural inclination or choice 
without being punished for following a female life-style or rewarded for 
following a male one. 257 
She argues that the approach of empowerment rejects difference as a relevant subject 
of inquiry. The dominance approach of MacKinnon, for example, subscribes to the view 
that male domination and female subordination are the cause of differences between 
men and women. 
According to Littleton current equality analysis is "phallocentrically biased" in three 
respects: it can not be applied in the context of "real" difference; it places the difference 
in women, rather than in relationships; and it fails to question the assumptions that 
social institutions are gender neutral. She argues that "equality as acceptance" 
provides a better answer to the above three concerns. Equality as acceptance does not 
stop at the discovery of difference, but attempts to understand the "cultural meaning" 
of the difference and seeks to achieve equality "despite" it. She argues that equality as 
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acceptance locates difference in relationships and not in women. Equality as 
acceptance acknowledges that social institutions are not gender neutral and exposes 
that men and women stand in asymmetrical positions to social institutions, in other 
words, that women are frequently disadvantaged by seemingly neutral practices. 
Littleton notes that the approach of accommodation accepts the present norm as 
legitimate and thereby supports the practice of describing women as deviant from the 
norm. She illustrates the difference between acceptance and accommodation with the 
following story. A feminist lawyer once walked up to a podium to deliver a speech. The 
podium was not high enough for her to reach the microphone. While arrangements 
were being the feminist lawyer noted made that the podium was "built for a man". 
Littleton observes that "accommodation is a step platform brought for her to stand on. 
Acceptance is a podium whose height is adjustable."258 She argues that the model of 
equality as acceptance responds to the feminist critique of equality as well as the 
feminist critique of society.259 She concedes that no reconstruction of equality can claim 
to be totally free from phallocentric bias, but the acceptance model still attempts to 
reconstruct equality. According to Littleton such a reconstruction "can increase equality 
and invite later, freer reconstructions by shifting the frame and moving the margin into 
the picture."260 
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Conclusion 
landscape of difference 
In this section I addressed various perspectives that all contribute to an ethical 
interpretation of equality. I started off with perspectives on deconstruction. I highlighted 
certain aspects of the philosophy of deconstruction that provide an inspiration for the 
ethical in ethical interpretation. I looked at Drucilla Cornell's renaming of deconstruction 
to "the philosophy of the limit". To understand deconstruction as "the philosophy of the 
limit" clarifies its significance for legal interpretation, and ethical interpretation in 
particular. I used Samuel Critchley's formulation of what deconstruction is not as a 
further step to show the relationship between ethical interpretation and deconstruction. 
Danie Goosen's explanation of deconstruction as the event highlighted the affirmative 
aspects in deconstruction. Deconstruction, by being open to the "event", is future 
orientated and is never caught up in the limitations of the present. Derrida's description 
of deconstruction as justice brings the ethical dimension in deconstruction to the fore. 
Justice (and similarly equality and democracy), can never be achieved in a present 
system, but this does not mean that justice must be rejected or forgotten. Justice must 
be strived for as a future ideal that regulates our present actions. Cornell's formulation 
of "legal interpretation as recollective imagination" shows the necessity of a 
deconstruction of the present. The law should be interpreted by focusing on 
remembering (memory) and by imagining (the future). 
Secondly I discussed the perspectives of certain legal writers on the interpretation of 
rights and equality. Jantje van den Oard highlights the undecidable aspects of law and 
of any content or interpretation of equality. Her insistence on the disruptive element of 
difference is significant for the interpretation of equality in the South African context. 
Her approach to equality is an example of where the philosophy of deconstruction was 
applied to the concrete issue of legal interpretation. The argument put forward by her 
that equality should be interpreted as a social right is of great relevance for South 
Africa. Inequality in our country cannot be addressed by a formal, abstract approach 
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to equality. We need to redress the concrete circumstances of individuals that were 
unequal in the past. In most cases the achievement of equality will entail the betterment 
of concrete things, like food, housing, health care and education. The approach to law 
as the "undecided" reflects an awareness of the problems and the difficulties that are 
experienced in the attempt to achieve equality. Van den Oord's approach does not 
provide a quick fix, a naive problem free answer that negates the impossibilities and 
tragedies entailed in the attempt to achieve equality. This approach acknowledges the 
radicalness of difference and of the other. In this approach the other is not merely seen 
as the other of myself, but as the other that can not be known and not be incorporated 
into a definition and an institutionalised approach and abstract theory. 
Martha Minow also acknowledges the fact of difference. Her warning that we should be 
aware that every distinction or every identification of difference is made from the 
assumption of normality will be reflected in an "ethical" interpretation of equality. Her 
insight that the assignment of difference is made from a certain position of power and 
that it accordingly reflects a hierarchical distinction is of great significance to our own 
context. Minow shifts the emphasis from the difference itself to the relationship where 
difference is identified and assigned. To deal with difference in terms of relationships 
will expose the underlying power relationships. Minow's statement of traditionally 
unstated assumptions helps us to be more aware of the dynamics involved when 
addressing issues of difference and equality. Her argument that it is not enough for 
individuals to have a change of heart, but that institutional change must take place, 
reflects the need for transformation on two levels, the transformation of systems as well 
as the transformation of individuals. Rights are often criticised from the perspective of 
white male critical scholars. Minow's belief that we cannot reject rights, reflects the 
argument of Critical Race Scholars261 that for people who have been excluded and 
marginalised, and still are, rights can be helpful. Her argument that rights should be 
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recovered, reclaimed and reimagined is significant for "ethical" interpretation. 
Nedelsky tells us that we should structure rights as relationships and not as boundaries 
or limits. Her approach to rights reflects the problems of the American approach to 
rights. She shows that the view of the self as an autonomous, independent, isolated 
and separate self is not a true reflection of how individuals experience themselves. This 
false concept of the self gives rise to the approach to rights as boundaries or limits. If 
one acknowledges that individuals experience themselves as embedded and embodied 
in certain relationships and that relationships are a source of individual autonomy, the 
approach that is followed to rights will be more accurate as well. Nedelsky's argument 
that we should understand and interpret rights as relationships is of great value to our 
approach to rights. She argues that we should attempt to set up a "dialogue of 
democratic accountability" in which we can reflect on the real value of democracy, 
rights and so on. Nedelsky's view relies on reconstructed and transformed public 
spaces that can enable such democratic dialogue. The strong distinction between the 
private and the public is problematised in this approach because seemingly private 
individuals must assert their rights in the context of public relationships. This argument 
lies at the crux of an "ethical' interpretation in so far as the existence of public space 
is a precondition for such an interpretation. 
Michelman's vision of a "law's republic" is also significant for "ethical" interpretation. His 
argument does not only provide for the reconstruction and transformation of public 
space and politics, but also for constitutional transformation. He draws a clear link 
between the political and the legal/constitutional. The tension between self-rule and 
law-rule, which reflects the American experience, is also a cause of tension in our own 
society. His focus on a "jurisgenerative politics" should be applied in our own context. 
His emphasis on plurality as a value will be incorporated in an "ethical" interpretation. 
Michelman's observation of the value of public action that takes place outside the 
formal political spaces is of great value to our context. South African public spaces will 
only be truly reconstructed and transformed if people act outside the formal political 
structures. The perspective that the concept of privacy can be expanded to a political 
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right can be transformative of both private and public life. One should be cautious, 
however, that this concept does not simplify the right to privacy for institutional 
purposes, in other words privacy, like difference, can never be fully known and 
identified. His argument that constitutional interpretation is a "Machiavellian practice" 
that entails constant renewal and renovation is crucial to "ethical" interpretation. 
I noted significant connections between the various perspectives and argued that they 
present the deconstructive insight of the limit of present systems to fully capture 
equality and justice. They all focus on the problematic aspects of distinctions and turn 
to context and relationships in their consideration of equality and difference. I argued 
that all of these perspectives are attentive of public space and therefore significant for 
the ethical intersection of public space, equality and justice and ethical interpretation. 
Thirdly I put forward some South African perspectives. I noted that the "substantive" 
approach supported by certain writers and followed by the Constitutional Court has 
been caught up again in its own formalisation and conceptualisation. Of course, the 
formalisation and conceptualisation were inevitable. The aim of this thesis is to expose 
the limit of a legal system or approach to equality to achieve equality or justice fully. I 
ask myself how will an "ethical" interpretation escape the inevitability of closure 
(formalisation, instrumentalisation). The fact that I do not have an answer for this 
question worried me at first, but then I realised that the virtue of an "ethical" 
interpretation lies exactly in its incapability of providing a self-assured, fool-proof 
answer. Perhaps the most that an "ethical" interpretation of equality can "do" is to serve 
as critique of the present system and to nurture the ideal of equality and the ideal of 
justice. I do no reject the substantive approach to equality. It could be a way of 
addressing inequality by accommodating more than formal requirements. I am cautious 
about the relationship of substantive equality to difference. I fear that the substantive 
approach treats difference as something that can be known and conceptualised and 
placed in compartments. An "ethical" interpretation insists that the other is a "radical" 
other that can never be fully known. An "ethical" interpretation of equality can never 
achieve full presence, in other words, it resists being formalised in a specific test. An 
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"ethical" interpretation of equality, however, is not an abstract disembedded and 
disembodied position. It is always situated in a context, but the contexts vary 
continuously. 
The context that will enable an "ethical" interpretation to have any value must be a 
context where humans can appear to each other, in other words, a public context, a 
space where the content of the action and speech, the content of the discourse, can be 
described as "public". Hannah Arendt distinguished between labour, work and action. 
The condition of labour was ruled by necessity, the condition of work was ruled by 
tangibility, and the condition of action characterised by human appearance and 
plurality. Where the realm of labour was part of the cyclical life process and work 
always came to an end in a finished product, the realm of action was the realm of 
durability and immortality. Arendt argued that with "the rise of the social" the realm of 
action and its durability have disappeared. In the "social" realm human plurality 
disappears because it is ruled by necessity and tangibility, there is no concern for 
durability and immortality. I fear that the substantive approach to equality as formulated 
and followed by the Constitutional Court at present is similarly ruled by the concern of 
necessity and tangibility. An "ethical" interpretation of equality requires the continuous 
reconstruction and transformation of public space where human plurality can come to 
the fore and where the ideals stretch beyond the daily economies of politics and 
policies. 
Finally I focused on two feminist perspectives on the law and equality. "Ethical" 
feminism adheres to deconstructive insights and rejects any attempt to give a closed 
or final definition to the feminine. Difference similarly does not fit a certain description 
or formulation. Women should strive for equality in their own way(s) and not be 
assimilated within the present system. Christine Littleton's term, phallocentrism, that 
exposes the reality of cultural constructed maleness is of importance for ethical 
feminism and ethical interpretation. 
The various perspectives on equality in this section must be linked to the visions of 
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public space in the previous section. I argue that these perspectives can only have real 
meaning in a reconstructed and transformed vision of public space. The vision of public 
space that I support acknowledges the reality of difference, plurality and heterogeneity. 
The vision of public space will inspire and direct the approach to equality. A 
"deconstructive" public that continuously undermines its own self-presence nurtures an 
approach to equality that is open for the event and for the coming of the other. The 
intersection between the public and equality is aimed at the future, waiting for a 
democracy to come, equality to come, justice to come. An ethical interpretation of 
equality is situated where public space intersects with equality. The final dimension of 
the intersection, the stories which are told, heard and experienced will be the focus of 
Part 3 " ... landscapes of justice". 
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3 
... landscapes 
of justice 
Introduction 
"landscape" as image, the ethical intersection, and the TRC 
In the introduction to this thesis, " ... landscapes of democracy, equality and justice" I 
explained my reasons for relying on "landscape" as image. I said that "landscape" as 
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image might be able to capture aspects of the possibilities and impossibilities and the 
happiness and the tragedies which are integral to my exploration of democracy, 
equality and justice. I also rely on "landscape" as image to illustrate my argument of an 
ethical interpretation of equality. In this section I follow "landscape" as image for my 
discussion on justice. I think that the ways of interpreting landscape are useful for my 
consideration of justice. I shall come back to this below. 
In Part 2 I discussed aspects of deconstruction. I emphasised Drucilla Cornell's 
renaming of deconstruction as the philosophy of the limit because of the implications 
for justice. We saw that the renaming of deconstruction to the philosophy of the limit 
illustrates a certain vision of justice, namely justice as the limit to any present system. 
I accept this vision of justice. In other words when I use the word justice, I mean 
something that is not present yet, that is outside the present system, that is in the 
"beyond". I have explained throughout the text that the fact that justice is not attainable 
in the present does not have nihilistic implications. Justice is an ideal that serves as 
inspiration in all our actions. It is in this spirit that I discuss landscapes of justice in this 
section. 
I have identified an intersection, that I call an ethical intersection, between public 
space, equality and justice. The reason why I identified this ethical intersection is 
because it is integral to my argument of an ethical interpretation of equality. In other 
words all three aspects of this intersection, public space, equality and justice, form part 
of an ethical interpretation of equality. An ethical interpretation of equality is thus an 
interpretation that takes aspects of public space, equality and justice into account. I 
have already discussed two of the features of the ethical intersection, namely public 
space and equality. In regard to public space I investigated various visions. The 
motivation for the investigation was to find guidance for the reconstruction and 
transformation of South African public spaces. I used some liberal visions as reference 
point and turned to three responses to the liberal visions. Although I find Habermas' 
interest in public discourse encouraging, I said that I am not totally satisfied and 
comfortable that his approach will be suitable for our context. I said that, in my view, 
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Mouffe's vision of radical democracy and her emphasis on antagonism and the political 
could be explored for the South African reconstruction and transformation of public 
space. But, I was mostly drawn to Arendt's vision of action and speech and followed her 
vision of public space in the Part on equality. In my discussion of the third feature of the 
ethical intersection, justice, I shall again follow Arendt's vision of public space. 
In the previous part I turned to certain perspectives on equality. Again the motivation 
was to see how our approaches to and interpretation of equality can benefit from other 
perspectives. I described the current approach to equality in South Africa as a 
"substantive" approach. My critique of the present substantive approach is that it might 
become a new formalism. My fear is that difference will, as in the formal approach, be 
negated or at the least reduced to a formula or test. The meaning of "ethical", in an 
ethical interpretation of equality, is exactly the openness for difference and for "radical" 
otherness that cannot be reduced. The practical effect of this meaning of "ethical" and 
of an ethical interpretation is that it is impossible to achieve equality fully or to 
recognise, accommodate and accept difference fully. The same argument that holds 
for justice, applies to equality. As justice is only possible in the "beyond", equality that 
is totally realised will never be achieved in a present system. This is exactly the 
implication of an ethical interpretation of equality. Again, this does not mean that we 
should not strive for equality and even fight for equality in the present but an ethical 
interpretation makes us aware of the shortcomings of our present attempts to achieve 
equality. One more thing that I have already mentioned in Part 2 but that I want to 
repeat here is that I do not have a certain vision of equality. Equality in my view is an 
abstract concept that becomes concrete only in specific contexts. I therefore subscribe 
only to a certain interpretation of equality, an ethical interpretation of equality. 
The reason for repeating and summarising some of the main arguments up to this point 
is because I shall now turn to the example of the ethical intersection that I have been 
talking about. To appreciate the value of the example fully it is necessary that my 
understanding of the ethical intersection, the three features of the ethical intersection 
and an ethical interpretation of equality is clear. I argue that the TRC is an illustration 
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of my conception of an ethical intersection. In others words I say that the TRC is true 
to the features of public space, equality and justice. The first feature, public space, is 
obvious. I have indicated throughout the text that the TRC is a good example of a 
public space, it was a public event for many reasons. The interim constitution initially 
provided for the setting up of the TRC, it was created by an act of parliament, 1 and most 
importantly almost all of the hearings took place in public spaces throughout the 
country. 
Why is equality a feature of the TRC? I want to identify reasons on three levels. On the 
first level equality is a feature of the TRC because the process itself attempted to treat 
each and everyone equally. Each and every person who was living in this country 
during the time March 1960 to May 1994, whether she was part of the struggle against 
apartheid or part of the regime who enforced apartheid, victim or perpetrator, had an 
equal opportunity to come forward. (I have noted that this was a point of critique of 
some commentators who argued that it was not proper that victims and perpetrators 
were treated equally). 2 Below I shall explain why I think the TRC, in doing this, did not 
subscribe to a formal concept of equality. Even though they treated each and everyone 
equally, they did not necessarily treat them the same. In other words they took concrete 
contexts and circumstances into account. The fact that they recognised apartheid as 
a crime against humanity is an indication that they did not perceive equality as 
sameness. In this regard I think the TRC's approach is along the same lines as an 
ethical interpretation of equality. On the second level I argue, following Arendt's vision 
of action and speech, that equality is a feature of the TRC because it is a distinctive 
part of plurality. I have discussed Arendt's argument that two features of plurality are 
distinctness and equality. 3 The TRC as a public space provided for humans to act, in 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
See Asmal, Asmal & Roberts (1996) Reconciliation through truth. A reckoning of 
apartheid's criminal governance; Liebenberg "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in South Africa: Context, future and some imponderables" (1996) 11 Suid-Afrikaanse 
Publiekreg /South African Public Law 123-159; Kollapen "Accountability: The debate in 
South Africa" (1993) 37 Journal of African Law 1-9. 
See Part 1 " ... visions of public space". 
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other words to appear in their plurality. The second reason why equality is a feature of 
the TRC is therefore connected with public space as a feature of the TRC. The third 
reason why equality is a feature of the TRC is related to justice as a feature of the TRC. 
One of the aims of the TRC was to assist in the achievement of equality for all the 
people living in South Africa. The aim was that as a result of the TRC we should be 
closer to the possibility of achieving equality. In this regard the feature of equality is 
connected to the feature of justice. The most important aim of the TRC, but also of the 
transition from the old to the new, is to move from an unjust past to a just future. 
I have now illustrated how the three features of the ethical intersection relate to the 
TRC, or in other words why I say that the TRC is an example of the ethical intersection 
between public space, equality and justice. I want to repeat that the significance of the 
ethical intersection is that it is integral to my argument of an ethical interpretation of 
equality. My task in this part is to say more about the concrete example of the ethical 
intersection, namely the TRC. It should be clear that my interest in the TRC is to show 
how, as an ethical intersection, it can enhance my argument of an ethical interpretation 
of equality. How should I approach the TRC and the many writings, commentaries and 
critiques that appeared since 1995 and are still appearing every day?4 I should state 
See amongst many others Bronkhorst (1995) Truth and reconciliation: Obstacles and 
opportunities for human rights; Brandon (1995) Do sleeping dogs lie?: The psychological 
implications of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa; Boraine & Levy 
{eds) (1995) The healing of a nation?; Boraine & Levy (eds) (1994) Dealing with the past: 
Truth and reconciliation in South Africa; Batman & Peterson (1996) To remember and to 
heal: Theological and psychological reflections on truth and reconciliation; De Kock & 
Godin (1998) A long night's damage: Working for the apartheid state; Ackerman "Tales 
of terror and torment: Thoughts on boundaries and truth-telling" (1997) 63 Scriptura 425-
434; Maluleke "Dealing lightly with the wound of my people? The TRC process in 
theological perspective" (1997) 25 Missionalia 324-343; Gobodo-Madikizela "Healing the 
racial divide?: Personal reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1997) 27 
South African Journal of Psychology 271-272; Olckers "Gender-neutral truth: A reality 
shamefully distorted" (1996) 31 Agenda 61-67; Owens (1996) "Stories of silence: Women, 
truth and reconciliation" (1996) 30 Agenda 66-72; Liebenberg "Die Waarheids- en 
Versoeningskommissie in Suid-Afrika en die implikasies daarvan vir 'n Suid-Afrikaanse 
historikerstreit en eietydse geskiedskrywing" (1997) 22 Journal for Contemporary History 
98-114; Verwoerd "Continuing the discussion: Reflections from within the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission" (1996) 8 Current Writing66-85; Braude "The archbishop, the 
private detective and the angel of history: The production of South African public memory 
and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (1996) 8 Current Writing 39-65; Lalu 
"Journeys from the horizons of history: Text, trial and tales in the construction of narratives 
of pain" (1996) 8 Current Writing 24-38; Motala "The promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, the constitution and international law" (1995) 28 CILSA 338-362; 
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from the start that my aim is to reflect on a few of the various responses to the TRC. For 
me the value of the TRC, for an ethical interpretation of equality in particular, lies in 
how people understand and interpret it. I am interested to see how, and if at all, people 
reflect on the features of public space, equality and justice. 
In regard to the interpretation of the TRC it is now necessary to return to "landscape" 
as image of justice. I have noted in the introduction that context influences our 
understanding and reading of texts, just like Sienaert5 notes that the way we choose 
to see a landscape, is always influenced by the "conventions of perspective" with which 
we are familiar. 6 1 have noted Sienaert's argument that the dynamic and transformative 
potential of an image can only be experienced if its inherent multiplicity is continually 
exposed. This argument is also relevant in the context of the TRC. We should highlight 
the inherent multiplicity of the TRC so that its dynamic and transformative potential can 
be exposed. Below I shall refer to some of the metaphors that are used in our language 
6 
Gauntlett 11 "Towards the truth: The GBC's submissions to the TRC" (1998) Consultus 
34-39; Whittle "The legal profession and the truth" (1997) De Rebus 506-507; Kollapen 
"Accountability: The debate in South Africa" (1993) 37 Journal of African Law 1-9; 
Liebenberg "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: Context, future and 
some imponderables" (1996) 11 Suid-Afrikaanse Publikeregl South African Public Law 
123-159; Sarkin "The trials and tribulations of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission" (1996) 12 South African Journal on Human Rights 617-640; Dugard "Is the 
truth and reconciliation process compatible with international law?" (1997) 13 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 258-268; Braude "Memory and the spectre of 
international justice: A comment on AZAPO" (1997) 13 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 269-282; Moellendorf "Amnesty, truth and justice: AZAPO" (1997) 13 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 283-291; Du Plessis "Observations on amnesty or indemnity for 
acts associated with political objectives in the light of South Africa's transitional 
constitution" (1994) 57 Tydskrifvir Hedendaagse Romeins Hol/andse Reg 473-481; Loots 
"Die waarheidskommissie: Nurnberg-verhore of bevordering van nasionale eenheid" 
(1996) Tydskrifvirdie Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 154-160. See also the cases of Azanian 
Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and others v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
others 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC); Truth and Reconciliation Commission v Du Preez and 
another 1996 (8) BCLR 1123 (CC). 
I have discussed Sienaert's discussion on landscape as image in the work of Breyten 
Breytenbach in the introduction," ... landscapes of democracy, equality and justice". See 
Philip (ed) (1993) Breyten Breytenbach. Painting the eye 15. 
See Introduction" ... landscapes of democracy, equality and justice". 
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of transformation. I shall also note Antjie Krog's 7 and Piet Meiring's8 use of landscape 
in their responses to the TRC. 
In this part I shall focus on three landscapes, a broader theoretical landscape, a 
specific South African landscape and a landscape of care. In the theoretical landscape 
I focus on four authors whose perspectives are all in some or other way related to the 
ethical intersection, an ethical interpretation of equality and the TRC. The first two 
authors, Bonnie Honig and Melissa Orlie, reinterpret the theories of Hannah Arendt and 
Jacques Derrida. I start of with Bonnie Honig's9 reading of the Arendtian and Derridian 
interpretations of the American Declaration of Independence. Arendt and Derrida differ 
from each other: Arendt emphasises the performative aspect of the Declaration, and 
Derrida acknowledges the inevitability of the constative. Honig, however, argues that 
their differing views can be negotiated. Arendt's and Derrida's interpretations of the 
American Declaration of Independence and Honig's negotiation of their readings 
provide an interesting angle on interpretation that can be followed in our interpretation 
and understanding of the TRC. When we read the final report of the TRC we shall have 
to acknowledge both the performative and constative aspects. In other words, the TRC 
report will have unfixed (performative) and fixed (constative) moments. I then discuss 
Melissa Orlie's10 deconstructive focus on two aspects of Arendt's theory of action -
promising and forgiving - that are significant for our interpretation of the TRC. Orlie 
argues that promising and forgiving are only possible because of the unpredictability 
and spontaneity inherent to action. I view the TRC as an excellent example of public 
space in the Arendtian sense, in other words I am saying that the TRC was a space 
where action took place. Because of the spontaneity inherent to action victims were 
9 
10 
(1998) Country of my skull. 
(1999) Chronicle of the Truth Commission. A journey through the past and present - into 
the future of South Africa. 
"Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on the problem of founding a republic" 
(1991) 85 American Political Science Review 97-113; Arendt (1963) On revolution; 
Derrida "Declarations of independence" (1986) 15 American Political Science Review 7-
15. 
"Forgiving trespasses, promising futures" in Honig (ed) (1995) Feminist interpretations of 
Hannah Arendt 337-356; Arendt (1958) The human condition. 
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able to forgive their perpetrators, and perpetrators (and actually every person involved 
in the TRC and aspiring to transformation in South Africa) were able to make promises. 
The last two authors, Robert Gordon and Martha Minow, discuss various responses to 
mass atrocities. Robert Gordon11 makes a distinction between narrow agency, broad 
agency and structural approaches (he supports the latter). In my view the TRC can not 
be placed squarely in any of these approaches. The TRC occupies an "in between" 
space. Martha Minow12 searches for a path between "vengeance and forgiveness" as 
a response to mass atrocities. The TRC fulfilled such a space. She identifies the 
necessity of following a contextual enquiry into the concrete circumstances of each 
case. 
In the next section, South African landscape, I reflect on some of the various authors 
who wrote on the TRC. I repeat that my focus on the TRC is not the process itself -
whether it followed the correct procedures, for example; or the various acts of human 
rights abuse; the granting or refusal of amnesty; or the recommendations of the 
reparation committee. The relevance of the TRC for my argument are the features of 
the ethical intersection, namely public space, equality and justice, and accordingly of 
an ethical interpretation of equality. 
I shall reflect on the responses of a writer, activists, a poet, a pastor, a researcher and 
a lawyer.13 I want to see how the various responses can contribute to my argument of 
11 
12 
13 
"Undoing justice" in Sarat & Kearns (eds) (1996) Justice and injustice in law and legal 
theory 35-75. 
(1998) Between vengeance and forgiveness. Facing history after genocide and mass 
violence. 
I focus on the following publications that I regard as the most important. These are all 
books - for the argument that I am developing I wanted to focus on a comprehensive work 
of an author. In my opinion an author's particular point of view is better illustrated in a 
specific work. With the exception of Brink, I focus on books published by the various 
authors. Asmal, Asmal & Roberts (1996) Reconciliation through truth. A reckoning of 
apartheid's criminal governance; Krog (1998) Country of my skull; Meiring (1999) 
Chronicle of the Truth Commission. A journey through the past and present - Into the 
future of South Africa; Jeffery (1999) The truth about the Truth Commission; Dyzenhaus 
(1998) Truth, reconciliation and the apartheid legal order and Brink "Stories of history: 
Reimagining the past in post-apartheid narrative" in Nuttal & Coetzee (eds) (1998) 
Negotiating the past. The making of memory in South Africa 29-42. 
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an ethical interpretation of equality. Before I say more about the various authors I need 
to make a remark about language. Language is central to any process of understanding 
and interpretation. In the reading of the various responses to the TRC the type of 
language employed will reflect much of an author's view. 
Andre P Brink argues as follows in regard to language and interpretation: 
The past cannot be corrected by bringing to it the procedures and 
mechanics and mind-sets that originally produced our very perception of 
the past. After all, it is not the past as such that has produced the present 
or poses the conditions for the future (this was the fatal delusion of 
Naturalism), but the way we think about it. Or even more pertinently, the 
way in which we deal with it in language. 14 
I start of with Andre P Brink's 15 reflection on truth and memory. He uses Margaret 
Atwood's16 story of Grace Marks to illustrate his view on truth and memory. The telling 
of stories is significant in Brink's assessment of the process of the TRC. He notes the 
special relationship between memory, imagination and story. In an earlier work, 17 Brink 
focused on the importance of stories, memory and imagination for history. 
It seems to me that in situations such as this what matters are not the 
specifics of the inventions ... but the fact that they are resorted to at a 
given moment in an individual's life, or at a specific historical juncture ... 
Whether Ouma Kristina's stories contain any grain of "historical truth" or 
not is immaterial in this regard. The fact that her response to a historical 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Brink "Stories of history: Reimagining the past in post-apartheid narrative" in Nuttal & 
Coetzee (eds) (1998) Negotiating the past. The making of memory in South Africa 33. 
"Stories of history: Reimagining the past in post-apartheid narrative" in Nuttal & Coetzee 
(eds) (1998) Negotiating the past. The making of memory in South Africa 29-42. 
(1996) Alias Grace. 
(1996) Sandkastele /Images of sand. See also (1998) Duiwelsk/oof. 
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(or political, or social, or personal) challenge is couched in stories ... 
poses, it seems to me, a much more complex problem to the reader, as 
it did to the writer in the first place. 18 
He continues 
History may remain an enigma, as Atwood suggested: but it is only 
through story that the nature and context of each specific enigma can be 
approached. 19 
The first book published on the TRC was the one by Kadar Asmal, Louise Asmal and 
Ronald Suresh Roberts. 20 All three authors share a legal background, all three were 
inspired by the African National Congress (two of them are members) and all three 
were outside South Africa during the time 1960-1990. The big difference between this 
book and the others is that it was written before the proceedings of the TRC had 
actually begun. The authors discuss the importance of the TRC's process for 
reconciliation and truth. An important theme is apartheid as a crime against humanity. 
The subtitle of the book "A reckoning of apartheid's criminal governance" gives an 
indication of their framework. The authors accordingly feel strongly that victims and 
perpetrators can not be placed on an equal footing. I shall reflect on the significance 
of this view for an ethical interpretation of equality. They place emphasis on the notion 
of "never again" and argue that 
[T]he South African exercise of facing the past will be far more than a 
legalistic exercise or a bureaucratic fact-finding mission. It must ask how 
living, breathing, political institutions could have so distorted and abused 
18 
19 
20 
"Stories of history: Reimagining the past in post-apartheid narrative" in Nuttal & Coetzee 
(eds) (1998) Negotiating the past. The making of memory in South Africa 40. 
"Stories of history: Reimagining the past in post-apartheid narrative" in Nuttal & Coetzee 
(eds) (1998) Negotiating the past. The making of memory in South Africa 41. 
(1996) Reconciliation through truth. A reckoning of apartheid's criminal governance. 
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their duties to secure humane values. It must lay bare the immoral 
' 
anatomy of apartheid and never again allow truth to be hostage to the 
few. 21 
They anticipated that 
[A]fterwards we will be blessed with a complex, perhaps contradictory, set 
of narratives about our past. And our task, necessarily a ceaseless one, 
will be to reconstitute our political reality into something that is coherent 
but self-questioning, ethically decisive but not self-righteous. 22 
Antjie Krog23 delivers a personal response to the TRC process, stories and events. She 
is a poet who was involved in the struggle against apartheid in the past. Krog reported 
on the TRC for SABC radio as Antjie Samuels. The fact that I have quoted her 
frequently in this thesis should already be an indication of my own reflection on Krog's 
narrative. In her telling of the events of the TRC she is influenced by her own concrete 
circumstances. She writes from the perspective of a woman - a white, Afrikaans 
speaking, South African woman. Her multiple response to the TRC and to truth and 
memory is a reflection of the multiple responses to the TRC. She does not attempt to 
bring the process to closure but emphasise the value of the TRC in relation to the 
ideals of reconciliation, healing and justice. 
The word "Truth" makes me uncomfortable. 
The word "truth" still trips the tongue. 
Your voice tightens up when you approach the word "truth", the technical 
assistant says, irritated. "Repeat it twenty times so that you become 
21 
22 
23 
Asmal, Asmal & Roberts (1996) Reconciliation through truth. A reckoning of apartheid's 
criminal governance 213. 
Asmal, Asmal & Roberts (1996) Reconciliation through truth. A reckoning of apartheid's 
criminal governance 215. 
(1998) Country of my skull. 
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familiar with it. Truth is mos jou job! [Truth is your job, after all!] 
I hesitate the word, I am not used to using it. Even when I type, it ends up 
either as turth or trth. I have never bedded that word in a poem. I prefer 
the word "lie". The moment the lie raises its head, I smell blood. Because 
it is there where the truth is closest. 
The word "reconciliation", on the other hand, is my daily bread. 
Compromise, accommodate, provide, make space for. Understand. 
Tolerate. Empathize. Endure ... without it, no relationship, no work, no 
progress is possible. Yes. Piece by piece we die into reconciliation. 24 
Krog is embedded in the landscape of her country and follows the metaphor of 
landscape in her narrative. 
As I stand half-immersed in the grass crackling with grasshoppers and 
sand, the voices from the town hall come drifting on the first winds 
blowing from the Malutis - the voices, all the voices of the land. The land 
belongs to the voices of those who live in it. My own bleak voice among 
them. The Free State landscape lies at the feet at last of the stories of 
saffron and amber, angel hair and barbs, dew and hay and hurt. 25 
Piet Meiring26 is a theologian from the NG (Dutch Reformed) Church and academic at 
the University of Pretoria who was approached by the Chairperson of the TRC, 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, to serve as a commissioner on the TRC to represent the 
Afrikaner community. In his work on the TRC he gives a historical account of the 
process and events of the TRC. Similar to Antjie Krog, Meiring gives a personal 
account of the process. Himself being a theologian in the Christian faith, he follows a 
24 
25 
26 
Krog (1998) Country of my sku/136. 
Krog (1998) Country of my sku// 210. 
(1999) Chronicle of the Truth Commission. A journey through the past and present - Into 
the future of South Africa. 
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religious approach to the TRC. He employs the metaphor of "trek"27 and journey 
through the South African landscape in his telling of the TRC process. 
And thus the journey came to an end for the time being at least. The trek 
of two and a half years through the past and present of our country was 
behind us. It was a long and arduous journey, though dark valleys of pain 
and suffering, of shame and guilt. It was, however, also an inspiring route 
over peaks of bravery and generosity, of reconciliation in places where 
it was least expected. . . . The footsteps of thousand victims and 
transgressors, and eventually of the entire South African community who 
joined in the trek, will stretch across the landscape.28 
Anthea Jeffery29 is a research consultant to the South African Institute of Race 
Relations. In a previous publication30 she investigated the conflict between the ANC 
and the IFP in Kwa-Zulu-Natal. As the title of the work on the TRC indicates, Jeffery 
attempts to tell the "truth" about the truth Comission. Her work is different from the other 
accounts as she does not consider the value of stories or narrative or the processes 
of healing that was an inherent part of the TRC. Jeffery is highly critical of the TRC, of 
the content of its findings and its methods of investigation in particular. I do not 
subscribe to her view of the TRC at all. Not because she is critical of the TRC nor 
because she categorically states that truth was distorted, but because of her own style 
and method in analysing the TRC. She gives an instrumental, legalistic account, totally 
devoid of the concrete context. She negates the one aspect without which the TRC 
could never have come to light, the human one. She seems totally unaware of the fact 
that this process was meant to address human stories, atrocities and abuses against 
27 
28 
29 
30 
"Trek" refers to the "Great Trek" of 1938 that was a migration of Afrikaner Boers (farmers) 
who left their farms in the Eastern Cape to explore the country in the North. 
Meiring (1999) Chronicle of the Truth Commission. Ajourney through the past and present 
- Into the future of South Africa 369-370. 
(1999) The truth about the Truth Commission. 
(1997) The Natal Story: 16 years of conflict. 
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humans. Jeffery's response is a perfect example of what in Brink's perspective (quoted 
at the beginning of this section) we should not be doing, attempting to reflect on the 
past by bringing to it the procedures and mechanics and mindsets that originally 
produced our very perception of the past. 
Finally, I briefly discuss the perspective of David Dyzenhaus, 31 legal academic at the 
University of Toronto, with regard to the TRC's focus on the legal community during 
apartheid. Dyzenhaus is an ex-South African who taught at the University of the 
Witwatersrand before he moved to Toronto. He was the first witness to give testimony 
at the TRC hearings into the legal profession. His response contributes directly to the 
issue of legal interpretation, and to an ethical interpretation of equality. Dyzenhaus 
argues that lawyers in the past could have prevented many of the atrocities of 
apartheid. 
Law, as we have seen, can make a difference, even under the very 
compromising conditions of apartheid South Africa, and this goes a long 
way to show that legal order or legality places constraints on the powerful 
which at bottom are political and moral constraints - the constraints of 
commitment to a community of free and equal citizens. 32 
The various texts reflect on the TRC from various perspectives. Brink provides an 
academic-intellectual and literary perspective. He uses other texts, Alias Grace by 
Margaret Atwood, and one of his own literary works (Images of sand)33 as points of 
comparison to the TRC stories. Brink's angle is on the relationship between the TRC 
and memory. Asmal, Asmal and Brooks deliver a political and ideological critique on 
the apartheid order and show how the TRC can "reckon" with it. Their response, 
although they have been affected by apartheid, is of an academic nature and not 
narrative. Krog plays a dual role. She reports and gives facts, she tells a chronological 
31 (1998) Truth, reconciliation and the apartheid legal order. 
32 (1998) Truth, reconciliation and the apartheid legal order 182-183. 
33 (1996). 
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story of the events and the hearings, but she also reflects on the process. She creates 
a literary and 1poetic text, a narrative of the events. Meiring's text is in this regard similar 
to Krog's; he gives a historical account of the events, but simultaneously expresses his 
own experience and thoughts. Of all the authors Krog and Meiring had the closest 
involvement with the TRC, Krog in reporting and Meiring as a Comissioner. Brink, Krog 
and Meiring, in their responses to the TRC, break with conventional methods of 
analysis. Their language and style accommodate the uniqueness of the TRC as event. 
They are intensely aware of the human element and do not revert to instrumental, 
objective, cerebral methods and style. Jeffery's response, in her search for the "truth" 
of the Truth Comission, stands in contrast to the responses of Brink, Krog and Meiring. 
The analysis of the legal system during apartheid by Dyzenhaus differs from the other 
writings in the sense that his focus is a legal one and that he deliberately writes for an 
international and South African audience. 
Finally in the section on Landscape of care I shall make a short comment on certain 
aspects of truth, reconciliation and care. In my view, there is still too much emphasis 
on the traditional concept of justice in the South African discourse. I have referred to 
Gilligan's34 distinction between "an ethics of care" and "an ethics of justice" in Part 1 " ... 
visions of public space". This distinction can be applied to the event of the TRC and to 
the various responses to it. In the TRC discourse, and the report in particular, the 
concept of "restorative justice" is identified as a significant part of their concern with 
justice. The report also refers to "caring". I would like to see that this broader concept 
of justice goes beyond the event of the TRC and becomes part of our visions of public 
spaces, equality and justice in every day life. Where justice is an ideal that should be 
strived for, care is something that can daily be encompassed, recognised and 
employed in our actions. The various responses to the TRC can also be analysed in 
terms of their emphasis; whether the authors take a care perspective or a justice 
perspective. In a care perspective the other is perceived as a concrete other with 
specific, concrete needs. In the justice perspective the other is seen as a generalised 
other with general universal needs. The stories told in the public space of the TRC 
34 (1982) In a different voice. 
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were told by concrete people. It is necessary not to see their experiences as one 
general universal "grand" narrative. I am interested to see to what extent the TRC's aim 
of reparation is inspired by an ethics of care. 
Before I start with the theoretical perspectives, let us first view some of the metaphors 
used in the South African landscape of transformation, reconciliation and justice. 
Landscape of constitutional language - On bridges, roads and 
foundations 
With the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990, South Africa's "long walk to 
freedom" was set in motion. Of course, for many activists this struggle "originated" 
many centuries ago, but FW de Klerk's speech on 2 February 1990 and the events 
following it, made the struggle, the "revolution", official. Negotiations followed, imbued 
with political bargaining and compromise. One of the most important processes was the 
creation of a new constitution. An interim constitution came into effect in 1994, with 
specific provisions for the writing and creation of a truly democratic constitution. The 
postamble of the interim constitution35 made special reference to "National Unity and 
Reconciliation". 
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society 
characterised by strife, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the 
recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development 
opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex. 
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require 
reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society. 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa 
35 Act 200 of 1993. 
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to transcend the dMsions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human 
rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of 
hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. 
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not 
vengeance, a need for reparation, but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not 
victimisation. 
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in 
respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed 
in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, parliament under this Constitution 
shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a date after 8 October 
1990 and before 6 December 1993, and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and 
procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at 
any time after the law has been passed. 
Wrth this Constitution and these commitments we, the people of South Africa, open a new 
chapter in the history of our country. 
Nkosi sikele' iAfrika. God seen Suid-Afrika 
Morena boloka sechaba sa heso. May God bless our country 
Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afrika. Hosi katekisa Afrika 
The metaphors chosen to describe our "revolution", to tell our stories of change and 
transformation are significant. How we read, understand and interpret the symbolic 
language will affect how we actually think about reconciliation, equality and justice. The 
understanding and expectations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are 
intertwined with the language and metaphors chosen to describe the process. The 
metaphor of the constitution as a "bridge" should be explored. 36 The question arises, 
if the constitution is a bridge, what is the TRC: part of the structure of the bridge, or 
maybe a toll gate?37 Officially the image provided for the TRC is a "road". A condition 
for a bridge is an abyss, in other words, for a bridge to have a function, to exist, there 
must be something, a divide that must be crossed. The constitution, it is argued, 
serves as a bridge between a "historically divided past" and a "democratic future". The 
36 
37 
See Mureinik "A bridge to where? Introducing the interim bill of rights" (1994) 10 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 31. 
I am thankful to Prof Andre van der Walt who came about with the idea of a toll gate 
during one of our weekly group discussions. 
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significance of this metaphor is that the divide can never be erased. In order to 
understand and interpret the bridge, one must cross and cross it again - future 
understanding relies on past and present experience. The constitution as a bridge 
could be a constant reminder of the "crisis". The metaphor of a bridge could illustrate 
the function of the constitution as an "in between". This understanding of the 
constitution as a bridge enhances the notion of legal interpretation as recollective 
imagination. Every act of interpretation requires acknowledgement of the past, the 
present and the future. Memory and recollection will play a significant role in every act 
of interpretation. 
One of the most important events with regard to memory in our country is the Truth and 
Reconciliation Comission, "the road to reconciliation and truth". Our reading of the TRC 
will effect the future of political, social and economic life. It will affect the reading and 
understanding, interpretation and application of the constitution, and entrenched human 
rights even more. 
The preamble of the final constitution refers to images of building, developing, 
establishing, and laying of foundations. 
We, the people of South Africa 
Recognise the injustices of the past; 
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land; 
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and 
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity. 
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the 
supreme law of the Republic so as to -
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; 
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which 
government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally 
protected by law; 
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person; and 
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place 
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as a sovereign state in the family of nations. 
May God protect our people 
Nkosi Sikele'iAfrika. Morena boloka setjhaba sa heso. 
God seen Suid-Afrika. God bless South Africa. 
Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afurika. Hosi katekisa Afrika. 
The laying of foundations is a problematic metaphor if interpreted literally. If this image 
and the other images in the Preamble are understood to be in a constant state of 
motion and as dynamic images, their effect on the reading and interpretation of the 
constitution can be fruitful. Here, Derrida and Arendt's different and similar views on the 
American Declaration of Independence can contribute to a more nuanced 
understanding. 38 The images of the preamble cannot be separated from an 
understanding of the TRC. If we understand the processes of healing and reconciliation 
through the telling of stories and the creation and recreation of memory as ongoing, 
fluid processes, it will be easier to recognise the similar metaphors and images of the 
constitution. 
Antjie Krog's39 and Piet Meiring's1° use of landscape in their responses to the TRC 
contribute to the fluidity of the TRC process. Krog is personally involved and situated 
(embodied and embedded) in the landscape. Her description of landscape enhances 
her narrative style. By doing this she places the TRC in the fluid and openended 
landscapes of justice. Meiring makes use of the idiom of journey41 (trek) to describe the 
process of the TRC. The TRC undertook a long journey through the South African 
landscape. (It is interesting to note that although the journey is a metaphor the TRC 
actually travelled through the country in order to have hearings all over the country. On 
one level the TRC thus also physically undertook a journey). The images of landscape, 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Honig "Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on the founding of a republic" 
(1991) 85 American Political Science Review 97-113. 
(1998) Country of my skull. 
(1999) Chronicle of the Truth Comission. A journey through the past and present- into the 
future of South Africa. 
See also Lalu "Journeys from the horizons of history: Text, trial and tales in the 
construction of narratives of pain" (1996) 8 Current Writing 24-38. 
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journey and road (that I mentioned earlier) all create a vision of the TRC as continuous, 
constantly changing and never ending. Desmond Tutu in the foreword of the TRC 
report42 also refers to landscape. Like we need to follow multiple interpretations in an 
approach to landscape, we need to follow multiple interpretations in regard to the TRC. 
Landscape as a way of describing the TRC makes its significance for an ethical 
interpretation of equality clearer. 
42 The report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Comission (1998) foreword. 
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Theoretical landscapes 
In this section I turn to four theoretical discussions which all contribute to my 
investigation and interpretation of the TRC. The first two authors, Bonnie Honig and 
Melissa Orlie, reinterpret the theory of Hannah Arendt by reading her together with or 
through the philosophy of deconstruction. Honig compares Arendt's and Derrida's 
reading of the American Declaration of Independence and comes to the conclusion that 
although their readings differ, they can be "negotiated". As I shall elaborate below, this 
negotiation of the two readings has significant implications for the TRC. Orlie follows 
a deconstructive reading of Arendt's theory of action. She places emphasis on the two 
features of action, namely promising and forgiving. In her view Arendt's theory of action 
gives effect to performative, openended, unfixed actions and performances. In the TRC 
a lot of promising and forgiving took place. This was possible because the TRC was a 
public space where action could take place. Robert Gordon and Martha Minow 
investigate various responses to mass atrocities. I address their views because they 
shed some light on the nature of the TRC. In my view the TRC does not fit in any of the 
identified approaches but occupies an "in between" space. The TRC does not fit in any 
specific approach because it was a public space where action took place, where there 
was opportunity for promising and forgiving. Because the TRC occupied an in between 
space, an interpretation will involve both performative and constative moments, and 
accordingly a negotiation (in between reading) of the two. 
Rereading Arendt 
The central question in Arendt's thought is: On what can one rely in the politics of an 
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era that is under the constant threat of the deluge?43 Honig44 describes the question as 
where to find authority for politics within modernity. This is also the central question of 
our time. How do we account for politics, for the law, for ethics in a postmodern era 
where the belief in objectivity, morality and truth has been undermined and displaced? 
Where do we find legitimacy for our current politics, legal system and so on? Where 
do we find an authoritative voice amongst the multiple voices heard in the TRC? 
Arendt, like others who experienced the "radical evil" of totalitarian regimes, was 
shocked by the events of the Second World War. These events influenced her future 
interests and thinking. Her correspondence with Karl Jaspers45 was dominated by 
questions that arose from her experience as a German Jew who had to go into exile 
during the Second World War. Whether Arendt totally rejected modernism is in dispute. 
Some commentators46 argue that Arendt rejected all modern assumptions. Others 
described her as a "reluctant modernist". 47 What is certain, is that Arendt rejected the 
instrumental approach to politics. Through the distinction between labour, work and 
action and her critique of "the rise of the social", she illustrated the loss of political 
action and the decline of a public space where humans can appear. 
Most visions of public space48 also seek to provide possible answers for the absence 
of political authority and the recovery of public space. If one rejects the traditional 
positivist, instrumental, liberal approach, where does one turn to? In Part 1 we saw the 
visions of Habermas, Mouffe and Arendt. In Part 2 I discussed the philosophy of 
deconstruction in the search of new visions of equality (but indirectly also politics, 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Kohler & Saner (eds) (1985) Hannah Arendt. Karl Jaspers. Correspondence 1926-1969 
xvi. 
"Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on the problem of founding a republic" 
(1991) 85 American Political Science Review 97-113. 
Arendt studied under Jaspers in Heidelberg from 1926-1928. She completed her doctoral 
thesis under him. They became great friends and corresponded for many years. 
See Canavan (1992) Hannah Arendt. A reinterpretation of her political thought. 
Benhabib (1996) The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt. 
See Part 1 " ... visions of public space''. 
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ethics and justice). Here I want to address the question to what extent deconstruction 
can guide our visions of public space, equality and justice, and our interpretation of the 
TRC in particular. I often feel uncomfortable with the extent of disembodiment and 
disembeddedness in deconstructive philosophy. Can we find a position where the 
valuable insights of deconstruction, specifically with regard to the ethical, are followed 
together with a perspective of care that is rooted within a specific context and history? 
In other words, is it possible to give "body" to deconstruction? Will the notion of a 
bodied deconstruction be seen as a reversion to modernism, to project thinking, to 
"economical" thinking? On the other hand, the disembedded and disembodied position 
of deconstruction can be experienced as too close to Rawls'49 "original position" and 
"veil of ignorance". I believe we should seek for a space other than the formalist, 
instrumentalist, positivist, liberalist position and also other than the postmodern, 
deconstructive position of disembodiment and disembeddenness. This space should 
adhere to the notions of imagination, stories and a perspective of care. Honig's 
negotiation of Arendt and Derrida reflects, in my view, on a theoretical level an in 
between space than can also take account of the imagination, stories and a perspective 
of care. The TRC is a practical illustration of such an in between space. 
I have already said that Arendt's vision of politics and democracy provides a powerful 
way of structuring South African political and ethical life. Certain shortcomings in her 
theory could be addressed by the ethical moments in deconstruction. Similarly 
Derrida's theory of deconstruction that guides our visions of public space, equality and 
justice can be supplemented by aspects of Arendt's theory. 
49 Rawls (1972) A theory of social justice made use of these two images to illustrate his 
hypothetical position where people will gather in order to agree upon the basic principles 
of justice. This position has been criticised by communitarians, feminists and 
postmodernists as accepting only the traditional, liberal, male view of the self. Rawls in his 
later book (1993) Political liberalism altered his earlier reliance on the autonomous 
indMdual. See Benhabib (1992) Situating the self 145-177 and Mouffe (1993) The return 
of the political 41-59 for their critique on Rawls. 
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"On the problem of founding a republic" - Bonnie Honig 
Honig50 is of the opinion that although the impasse between Arendt and Derrida is not 
easy to bridge, it is not non-negotiable. 51 Arendtian and Derridian views, even though 
diverse, are inescapable moments in our interpretation of public space, equality and 
justice, and accordingly of the TRC. 
Honig looks at Arendt's and Derrida's views on the problem of politics in modernity. She 
notes that for Arendt the problem of politics in modernity lies in the disappearance of 
political authority in modernity. Arendt constructs a replacement through a "fabulist" 
account of the American Revolution. Honig notes that Arendt is ambiguous about the 
disappearance of authority. On the one hand it opens new possibilities of innovative 
(performative) political action, but on the other hand it illustrates the absence of 
tradition and religion without which the task of founding and maintaining lasting 
institutions seems impossible. She says that the question for Arendt is whether a 
politics of foundation is possible in a world where traditional guarantees of stability, 
legitimacy and authority are absent. 
Honig explains that according to Arendt we should not try and find an absolute in which 
to ground and legitimate the political realm. An absolute undermines the contingency 
which is a necessary feature of the public realm. It also undermines the human 
achievement of founding because it makes it dependent on something external to the 
human world. She says that Arendt views an absolute as "a truth that needs no 
agreement" and accordingly compares it to "despotic power". For Arendt unique 
50 
51 
"Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on the problem of founding a republic" 
(1991) 85 American Political Science Review 97-113. 
This view is in contrast with Cornell "Gender hierarchy, equality, and the possibility of 
democracy'' (1993) Transformations 156-169 who argues that Arendt's understanding of 
the polis perpetuates the gender hierarchy which accordingly makes her own ideal of 
politics impossible. Arendt, according to Cornell, gives us a conception of politics that is 
inseparable from the subordination of women. She argues that Derrida opens a space for 
a redefinition of gender so as to provide a concept of participatory democracy and civic 
friendship uncontaminated by the erasure of women. I would rather argue with Honig that 
the differences in Arendt and Derrida when read together can help us to formulate a more 
powerful account of politics, community and legal interpretation. I am in no way seeking 
to synchronise the theories of Arendt and Derrida or trying to create a new theory by 
incorporating their views. 
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political action is not the constative (the absolute) but the performative (human) 
utterance. 52 
Honig observes that the act of foundation requires for Arendt no appeal to a source of 
authority beyond itself. The source of authority is found in the act of foundation. 
It was the authority which the act of foundation carried within itself, rather 
than the belief in an immortal Legislator, or the promises of reward and 
threats of punishment in a 'future state', or even the doubtful selfevidence 
of the truths enumerated in the preamble to the Declaration of 
Independence, that assured stability for the new republic. 53 
Honig explains that Arendt gives an account of an alternative form of authority which 
she finds inherent in the performative Declaration of Independence. This alternative 
form of authority does not exist in a shared belief in gods or myths but in a "common 
subscription to the preexisting authoritative linguistic practice of promising". 54 The 
community that Arendt envisions here is not a strong homogeneous community, but one 
bound together by common linguistic practices whose members understand and 
subscribe to performative practices. 
Honig observes that there is a paradox in Arendt's reliance on action and promising. 
Action, which consists partly in the activity of promising, on the one hand takes place 
in a contingent world where its meaning and consequences are always undetermined 
if not indeterminate. On the other hand promising also serves as a "control mechanism" 
and establishes "islands of stability". (This same paradox is also present in her vision 
52 
53 
54 
Arendt (1958) The human condition 245-246; Honig "Declarations of independence: 
Arendt and Derrida on the founding of a republic" (1991) 85 American Political Science 
Review 100. 
(1963) On revolution 199; Honig "Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on 
the founding of a republic" (1991) 85 American Political Science Review 101. 
Honig "Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on the founding of a republic" 
(1991) 85 American Political Science Review 97-113. 
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of the public realm. This is why she views the public as an in between space. The TRC 
also reflects this paradox and is an illustration of an in between space). Honig then 
argues that if action is really as contingent and unpredictable as Arendt says it is, 
promising will not by itself be able to provide the stability Arendt expects it to. The 
stability is coming from somewhere else, possibly from something external to action's 
purely performative speech act. Honig relies here on Derrida's account of the 
Declaration of lndependence.55 Derrida states his view as follows: 
The "we" of the declaration speaks "in the name of the people". But this 
people does not yet exist. They do not exist as an entity, it does not exist, 
before this declaration, not as such. If it gives birth to itself, as free and 
independent subject, as possible signer, this can hold only in the act of 
the signature. The signature invents the signer. This signer can only 
authorize him or herself once he or she has come to the end, if one can 
say this, of his or her own signature, in a sort of fabulous retroactivity. 
That first signature authorizes him or her to sign. 56 
Honig says that for Derrida the signers lack authority to sign until they have already 
signed. They appealed to a constative because they did not overestimate their own 
power. To guarantee power and secure their innovation they had to combine their 
performative with a constative utterance. 
Another "subjectivity" is still coming to sign, in order to guarantee it, this 
production of signature. In short, there are only countersignatures in this 
process. There is a differential process here because there is a 
countersignature, but everything should concentrate itself in the 
simulacrum of the instant. It is still "in the name of' that the "good people" 
of America call themselves and declare themselves independent, at the 
55 
56 
Derrida "Declarations of Independence" (1986) 15 New Political Science 7-15. 
Derrida "Declarations of independence" (1986) 15 New Political Science 1 O; Honig 
"Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on the founding of a republic" (1991) 
85 American Political Science Review 104. 
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instant in which they invent (for) themselves a signing identity. They sign 
in the name of the laws of nature and in the name of God .... He comes, 
in effect, to guarantee the rectitude of popular intentions, the unity and 
goodness of the people. He founds natural laws and thus the whole game 
which tend to present performative utterances as constative utterances.57 
Honig says that founding and promising or signing, to have meaning, must have a last 
instance. "God" is the name that Derrida gives to this last instance, which is the 
inevitable aporia of founding. No act of founding or promising or signing is free of this 
aporia. Honig explains this aporia as a "gap that needs to be anchored", which is a 
structural feature of language. She argues that Arendt is aware of this aporia as a 
structural feature of all performatives but insists that this gap can and should be held 
open. Arendt differs from Derrida because she does not see the need to fill this gap as 
a systemic, conceptual or linguistic need. This is clearly illustrated by their various 
reliance on performatives and constatives in the American Declaration of 
Independence. Where Arendt sees the performative and constative combination of the 
Declaration as incongruous, Derrida argues that this undecidability is necessary: 
One cannot decide - and that's the interesting thing, the force and the 
coup of force of such a declarative act - whether independence is stated 
or produced by this utterance. We have not finished following the chain 
of these representatives of representatives, and doing so further 
complicates this necessary undecidability. ... This obscurity, this 
undecidability between, let's say, a performative structure and a 
constative structure, is required in order to produce the sought-after 
effect.58 
Honig notes that for Arendt the Declaration's constative moments are moments of 
impurity and that there is no undecidability for her. In her view constatives are violent, 
57 Derrida "Declarations of independence" (1986) 15 New Political Science 11. 
58 Derrida "Declarations of independence" (1986) 15 New Political Science 9. 
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despotic and disempowering because they are not the products of shared public 
agreement (action and speech). She says that Arendt misses Derrida's point that in 
every system (linguistic, cultural, political) there is a moment that the system cannot 
account for. 59 
Honig60 argues that Arendt fills this moment with a fable, her fable of the American 
revolution and founding. For Honig it is appropriate from a Derridean perspective that 
Arendt fills this gap with a fable because Derrida himself refers to the signing as a 
"fabulous retroactivity". She says that Arendt was critical of the American founders 
because of their inability to conceive of a beginning that was not rooted in the past. The 
historical event is for Arendt the inspiration of the fable, but it does not bind it. She 
dismisses the constative nature of the declaration and insists on the pure performative 
nature of the declaration as a sufficient guarantee for the authority of the new republic. 
The fable takes the place of the constative for Arendt's theory of a non-foundational 
politics possessed of legitimacy, authority, stability and durability. However, Honig is 
critical of Arendt's fabulist account in the sense that her fable hides the violence and 
ambiguity that marked the original act of founding. Honig says that the effect of Arendt's 
fable is the same as all other fables, to prohibit further inquiry into the origins of the 
system and to protect it. 
Negotiating the impasse 
Honig61 believes that in spite of Arendt and Derrida's apparent irreconcilability the 
impasse between them may be negotiated. She says that this could be done if instead 
of dismissing the constative moment of founding, as Arendt does, we could respect 
Arendt's rejection of the anchoring of political institutions in an absolute, while at the 
59 
60 
61 
This is the same mistake Stanley Fish makes in his analysis of the legal system. In his 
account only evolution is possible and not transformation because the system cannot 
change from itself. See Cornell (1992) The philosophy of the limit 155-169. 
Honig "Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on the founding of a republic" 
(1991) 85 American Political Science Review 107. 
Honig "Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on the founding of a republic" 
(1991) 85 American Political Science Review 108. 
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same time acknowledging that all acts of founding are, as Derrida claims, secured by 
a constative. For Honig, by doing this, we do not deny the constative moment of 
founding, nor do we succumb to its claim to irresistibility. 
According to Honig, resistibility is at the centre of Arendt's new conception of authority 
for modernity. Arendt regarded an absolute in politics as impermissible because it is 
irresistible. In other words an absolute is not the outcome of action and speech but a 
demand that must be obeyed. Absolutes (constatives) are thus anti-political. Resistibility 
is therefore a condition for Arendt's politics. Arendt was critical of the New World's 
failure to prevent absolutes and accordingly irresistibility in politics. 62 Honig says that 
Derrida recognises the fact that we will never totally prevent absolutes and irresistibility 
in politics. He therefore recognises both performative and constative moments in 
politics. The fact that he recognises both is also a commitment to resistibility. 63 
Honig notes that in her theory on authority Arendt relies on the close connection in 
Roman thought between the concept of authority and a practice of augmentation. The 
concept of Roman authority suggests that the act of foundation inevitably develops its 
own stability and permanence. Authority in this context is a kind of necessary 
"augmentation" by virtue of which all innovations and changes remained tied back to 
the foundation which, at the same time, they augment and increase. 64 
Honig observes that Arendt's commitment to political action is important for two 
reasons. The one is related to Arendt's motif of self-realisation. Human beings who are 
denied the opportunity to exercise their world-building capacities, live impoverished 
lives, which are less than human, without freedom and without happiness. (This is at 
the centre of her distinction between labour, work and action). The other reason 
62 
63 
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Arendt (1963) On revolution 39; Honig "Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida 
on the founding of a republic" (1991) 85 American Political Science Review 108. 
Honig "Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on the founding of a republic" 
(1991) 85 American Political Science Review 108. 
Arendt (1963) On revolution 202; Honig "Declarations of independence: Arendt and 
Derrida on the founding of a republic" (1991) 85 American Political Science Review 110. 
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concerns her new conception of authority for modernity. Arendt wanted to know how to 
prevent "foundationalism". For her authority which is based on such an irresistible 
"foundationalism" is unsuited to modern politics because it prohibits the practices of 
augmentation and amendment and encourages a withdrawal from active politics. In 
regard to the American Declaration of Independence, for Arendt the "very authority of 
the constitution resides in its inherent capacity to be amended and augmented". 65 
Honig says that Derrida identifies this same structure of amendment and augmentation 
which he calls "survivance". By "survivance" he means a kind of preservation through 
augmentation. According to Honig: 
[A]s with Arendt, survival is not produced by the maintenance of a present 
into a future in the way that a fixed moment seeks to preserve the 
presence of what is past. For Derrida, this maintenance is an 
augmentation that takes place by way of translation, by way of a 
translation that is called for and heard in the original text. 66 
According to Honig Derrida's account of the text, like Arendt's, calls out to be amended, 
to be translated, "it is not present yet". 67 Translation necessarily means augmentation 
because it does not merely copy or reproduce but is a "new linguistic event" which 
produces "new textual bodies". It does not simply preserve an original text through 
repetition but "dislodges the constative yearnings of the original and finds there the 
point of departure for a new way of life"68. For Derrida, this augmentation is "what 
survival is". This augmentation is the same as Arendt's practice of authority, which 
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responds to the text or document that seeks to preserve the past moment of founding 
by augmenting it with another event. Although the commitment to augmentation may 
derive from a reference to a beginning that is in the past, the practises of augmentation 
and amendment make that beginning our own construction and performative. 
Honig69 comes to the conclusion that since, on Arendt's account, the practice of 
authority consists largely in the commitment to resistibility, the practice of authority turns 
out to be a practice of deauthorisation. Accordingly, Derrida's own project of 
deauthorisation becomes a part of a practice of authority, not simply an unauthorised 
assault on the institutions of authority from an outside point. Honig notes that for Arendt 
and Derrida the moment of intervention is the moment of politics. The difference 
between them is that for Derrida politics begins with the entry of the irresistible absolute, 
while for Arendt politics ends with the entry of the antipolitical absolute. Derrida's 
political intervention is the impossible superimposition of the constative on the 
performative. Arendt's intervention consists of her insistence that acts of founding can 
and should resist the urge to anchor themselves in an absolute. 
The notion of resistibility as a condition for politics is significant for the South African 
context. The previous years of apartheid symbolised precisely a preservation of 
absolutes and irresistibility. But even though we experienced transition from an 
authoritarian past to a democratic present we must listen to Derrida's acknowledgement 
of the constative and the performative. In the interpretation of the TRC we must realise 
that the process was not purely performative. As I have already mentioned the TRC 
was created by an act of parliament and there were certain legislative provisions 
(constatives) that had to be abided by. But at the same time there was also space for 
unanticipated action, promising and forgiving, through the telling of stories 
(performative moments). The TRC was an in between space, a political (and off course 
public) space that reflected resistibility and irresistibility an acknowledgement of 
constative and performative moments. 
69 Honig "Declarations of independence: Arendt and Derrida on the founding of a republic" 
(1991) 85 American Political Science Review 111. 
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Living responsibly and freely: Action, promising and forgiving - Orlie 
In an essay titled "Forgiving trespasses, promising futures", 70 Melissa Orlie provides 
a deconstructive account of Arendt's theory on action. She focuses on two features of 
action, namely promising and forgiving. In the context of political resentment about 
things that happened in the past, promising and forgiving are significant. Orlie says that 
Arendt made helpful suggestions about the question of why and how resentment about 
our own and others' injuries might be overcome in the realm of political action. Orlie 
identifies the following question as an important one to ask in the context of 
resentment: What does it mean to live responsibly and freely in the context of 
responding to the past and present collective and individual harms of our society? 
Following Arendt's view on action, Orlie says that we live responsibly and freely when 
we put our identities in question and refuse merely and passively to "reinscribe" social 
rule. 
To live responsibly and freely- to act extraordinarily and to reveal who we are 
- requires that we disrupt and unsettle social rule because when we do not, we 
reinforce and expand the "necessities" that not only harm others, but also 
constrict the power of our own action. 71 
According to Orlie, cycles of resentment might be broken by disrupting social rule (in 
other words by acting responsibly and freely) and seeking forgiveness for the atrocities 
of the past. But seeking forgiveness is not enough. Promises that the same things will 
never repeat themselves in future must also be made, "for promises institute and 
sustain the political spaces where we answer to one another''. 72 Responsibility therefore 
implies incalculability and unpredictability ("action" in Arendt's terms) and freedom 
requires that we are responsive to the harms that invariably accompany the "good" we 
70 Orlie "Forgiving trespasses, promising futures" in Honig (ed) (1995) Feminist 
interpretations of Hannah Arendt 33 7. 
71 Orlie "Forgiving trespasses, promising futures" in Honig (ed) (1995) Feminist 
interpretations of Hannah Arendt 339. 
72 Orlie "Forgiving trespasses, promising futures" in Honig (ed) (1995) Feminist 
interpretations of Hannah Arendt 339. 
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would do. In this regard Orlie refers to Butler's73 formulation of living ethically, to "begin, 
without ending, without mastery, to own - and yet never fully to own - the exclusions 
by which we proceed."74 
She says that the correlative in Arendt of Butler's "exclusions by which we proceed" are 
the "trespasses [against other humans] that occur as we position ourselves in the 
world". These trespasses flow not from our intentions per se, but from our identities as 
they are conditioned and constituted by social rule. According to Orlie how we should 
respond to the collective trespasses is a problem of responsibility and a problem of 
freedom. She notes Arendt's75 suggestion that the problem of responsibility and the 
problem of freedom are intimately related. In Arendt's view we are irresponsible and 
unfree when we behave predictably. Responsible and free action entails acknowledging 
our trespasses and opening them to creative and unpredictable action (promising and 
forgiving). 
Forgiving and promising can be seen as ethical and political practises of "overcoming" 
resentment. Orlie asks whether political forgiveness can be expressed with a simple "I 
forgive you"? She says that this formulation is inadequate because it presupposes an 
"I" and a "you" fully present and self-made. A "you" alone caused the harm and wounds 
no more than an "I" has the authority or power to excuse them. 
Political forgiveness is a more provisional, reciprocal release but, like any 
.. 
political action it may have boundless, unexpected, even miraculous, 
effects. By breaking cycles of reactive resentment and beginning 
something new, Arendtian forgiveness opens futures and, if only 
momentarily, frees from the consequence of previous activities both the 
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See Butler (1993) Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of sex. See also Butler 
(1990) Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. 
(1993) Bodies that matter 53. 
(1951) The origins oftotalitarianism 139-146. 
323 
one who forgives and the one forgiven. 76 
Orlie's deconstructive account of Arendt's theory of action is, in my view, another 
attempt at a negotiation between Arendt (action) and Derrida (deconstruction). She 
highlights the "deconstructive" moments in action, namely spontaneity and 
unpredictability (the hospitality towards the event). In Arendt's formulation promising 
and forgiving can take place because of the spontaneity and unpredictability inherent 
in action. In a deconstructive account promising and forgiving can take place because 
of the openness to the event. To live responsibly and freely in this context means to put 
our identities in question and to disrupt social rule. This connects with the notion of 
resistibility as a condition for politics. The questioning of one's identity also recalls 
Drucilla Cornell's understanding of transformation as the transformation of individuals 
themselves. We disrupt social rule when we open ourselves to transformation (in 
deconstructive terms be open to the event) and act in an unpredictable manner. In the 
context of the TRC many moments of spontaneity and unpredictable action took place. 
In many cases we did not expect a victim to have the capacity to forgive, in many cases 
we were surprised. Because the TRC was a public space where action could take 
place, individuals acted in a spontaneous and unpredictable, and transformed manner. 
Individuals in many cases in the TRC lived responsibly and freely and resisted the 
predictability of social rule. The TRC as a public (political) space of action accepted 
resistibility against absolutes (for example prescribed social rule) as a condition. In the 
interpretation of the responses to the TRC it will be interesting to see whether a 
response emphasises the constative moments, the performative moments or both. In 
other words whether a response situates the TRC in a public space where people acted 
responsibly and freely (in an unpredictable and spontaneous manner). 
76 Orlie "Forgiving trespasses, prom1smg futures" in Honig (ed) (1995) Feminist 
interpretations of Hannah Arendt 349. 
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Making the future by redesigning the past - Robert Gordon 
Robert Gordon77 analyses the legal responses of liberal politics to epochal injustices. 
He says that every new government that comes to power must deal with injustices of 
the past. He shows how the legal responses chosen by a new regime express a relation 
of the new society with its history. These responses come embedded in a history and 
tell a story that "stitches" together the society's past and future. Many of these 
responses try to tell the story of injustices as things that happened and which distorted 
history, or were a deviation from history's "normal" path. The response of a new 
government is often to propose to undo injustice by telling a story of what went wrong 
and how to get back on the normal path. Gordon78 argues that the way of classifying 
these modes of response in terms of a relation to the past as either backward or 
forward looking, is misleading. Examples of such classifications are the distinctions 
between justice and policy, adjudication and administration, righting of past wrongs and 
prevention of new ones, and corrective compensation and social engineering. He 
suggests a different set of categories which he calls narrow agency, broad agency and 
structural approaches. 
Narrow agency attributes injustice to bad actors, broad agency to bad groups and 
structural approaches to bad structures. The narrow agency approach frames injustice 
as wrongs done by specific perpetrators to specific victims. This approach wishes to 
restore life to normal and address the past injustices by either the limited and negative 
retributive sanction of the criminal process or the corrective remedy of the civil suit for 
compensatory damages. 
The broad agency approach aims at corrective or compensatory justice from 
collectives. It sometimes uses judicial proceedings, for example the Nuremberg trials. 
77 
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"Undoing historical justice" in Sarat & Kearns (eds) (1996) Justice and injustice in law and 
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On the other hand, broad-agency arguments are often not aimed at legal redress in 
courts, but at official or unofficial actions effecting moral redress. Broad agency actions 
to undo collective injustices can thus entail compensation or return of property, but also 
apologies, acknowledgement of responsibility or harm and official ceremonies of 
remembrance. The aim of this approach is to prevent the repetition of past errors. 
Gordon79 uses the example of the Chilean Truth Commission's investigations into the 
period of military rule to investigate the abuses of the Pinochet regime. One of its main 
tasks was to record as accurately as possible the fate of every dead or missing person 
who might have been the victim of the regime and the probable cause of death or 
disappearance. 
Another way of dealing with the past through the broad agency approach is for the new 
government to try and cancel past sins by forgiving and forgetting, by granting pardons 
and general amnesties and by maintaining official silence through the absence of 
references and records of the unjust period from public discourse and education. 
The structural approach attributes injustice to bad structures rather than bad agents 
and attempts to undo the injustices by reforming the structures. This approach seeks 
explanations rather than a search for bad agents and attribution of blame. The 
remedies are directed at altering institutions, systems and incentives rather than 
exacting punishment or liability. Gordon80 argues for a "particular-type of forward-
looking response" - a restructuring response where the policies are directed not at 
individuals, but at institutions, cultures and social structures. He is cautious of the 
social engineering strategies designed to rearrange the social system so that its 
organisations will lack the capacities and incentives to repeat the injustices. 
It is impossible, in my view, to locate the TRC in any one of Gordon's categories. In the 
most general sense, the obvious place would be the broad agency approach. However, 
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we must admit there are moments of narrow-agency where specific perpetrators are 
exposed. The question is whether there are elements of a structural approach within 
the work of the Truth Commission. In my view there is room for a reading of the TRC 
which does not rely on a victim- perpetrator dichotomy and that addresses "structural" 
reform in regard to political and social policies of the future. In this regard transition and 
transformation as aims of the TRC come to the fore. The fact that one of the aims of the 
TRC was that it should assist our processes of transition and transformation shows a 
structural element. The aim of reparation can also be placed in such a structural 
approach. After looking at Gordon's analysis of the various responses to mass 
atrocities I want to emphasise the TRC's "in between" position. Just as it cannot be 
seen as purely performative or constative it also can not be placed in one of Gordon's 
specific approaches. 
Between vengeance and forgiveness - Martha Minow 
Martha Minow81 argues that the twentieth century will be remembered for its mass 
atrocities. She describes various responses to these atrocities: In Argentina and 
Rwanda the response was a legal one in the form of prosecutions, which were in any 
event found to be inadequate. In East Germany public access to secret police files was 
provided. In Czechoslovakia officials of the old regime were screened and removed 
from office. In Canada land restitution took place. In Brazil the names of those involved 
in committing the atrocities were published. In Germany and Switzerland certain 
reparations were made. In Scandinavia and some Latin America countries other than 
Brazil therapy was provided to those affected by the atrocities. In Chile and South 
Africa truth Commissions were created by the state to investigate the human rights 
abuses. In many places public monuments and museums were built as a response to 
81 (1998) Between vengeance and forgiveness. Facing history after genocide and mass 
violence. 
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the violations of human rights. Individuals responded by addressing the topic in art, 
poetry, drama and public education. In Chile, Greece and Uruguay amnesty was given 
to the perpetrators. In South Africa amnesty was combined with a process of 
assembling and publishing information about the horrible past. Minow argues that all 
these various alternatives share one common feature: "They depart from doing nothing. 
. . . at best they can only seek a path between too much memory and too much 
forgetting. Yet they also try for a way between vengeance and forgiveness .... Dwelling 
in the frozen space of inability and incapacity is unacceptable, unresponsive to victims, 
unavailing to the waiting future."82 
Minow explains her goal as to "develop and to deepen a vocabulary" for examining the 
various responses. She argues that survivors of violence have various responses to 
their perpetrators. Some want retribution and public acknowledgement; others financial 
redress; others psychological or spiritual healing. Some survivors choose to go on with 
their lives and place the past behind them, others believe that the wrongdoers should 
be punished before life can go on. Minow says that she does not seek precision or 
tidiness in her analysis of the various responses. She believes that any sense of 
completion should be resisted for two reasons. First, because the differences between 
the various contexts will ask different responses. Secondly, because no response can 
be adequate to deal with the atrocities committed. According to her closure is not 
possible and any attempt to closure will be an insult to those who experienced 
violations. Silence, however, is also unacceptable. It can even be an indication that the 
perpetrators succeeded in their violations of humanity. 
Minow describes her investigation into the various responses to mass atrocities as a 
[F]ractured meditation on the incompleteness and inescapable 
inadequacy of each possible response to collective atrocities. It is also 
a small effort to join in the resistance against forgetting. It is an effort to 
82 (1998) Between vengeance and forgiveness. Facing history after genocide and mass 
violence 4. 
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speak even of the failures of speech and justice, truth-telling and 
reparation, remembering and educating, in the service of urging, 
nonetheless, response. 83 
Minow argues that the two general responses from governments to address collective 
violence is to ensure justice and to find the truth. She argues, however, that truth and 
justice are not the only objectives. She identifies two other goals or responses to 
collective violence, namely vengeance and forgiveness. 84 In her view, neither of the 
two, vengeance or forgiveness, is an adequate response. Mi now argues that legal and 
cultural institutions must offer paths that lie between vengeance and forgiveness. 
She argues that one way between vengeance and forgiveness may pursue therapeutic 
goals. Another way is to pursue political goals, to create a culture of human rights and 
democracy. Yet another goal is the promotion of reconciliation. Minow argues that 
reconciliation will assist stability and democracy and restore dignity. She observes that 
responses in art, for example literature, poetry, dramas and exhibition of paintings, 
reject the older paradigm that contrast punishment and forgiveness. 
In her analysis of the various responses she focuses on trials, truth commissions and 
reparations. She argues that the past must be "faced". "To seek a path between 
vengeance and forgiveness is also to seek a route between too much memory and too 
much forgetting". 85 She quotes Milan Kundera's words which she describes as a 
summary of "resistance against totalitarianism": "The struggle against power is the 
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struggle of memory against forgetting".86 She refers to playwright Ariel Dorfman~ 
words: "How do we keep the past alive without becoming its prisoner? How do we 
forget it without risking its repetition in the future?"88 
Minow89 argues that instead of focusing on the development of a theoretical response 
we should take contextual concerns into account. She identifies six kinds of inquiries 
into particular historical and political circumstances: "Does the project of nation building 
or reconstituting a new national community have real promise?"; "What is the 
distribution of minority and majority groups?; "How involved, or potentially involved, are 
international institutions and nongovernmental institutions?"; "How much time has 
passed since the atrocity?"; "Were the atrocities of war, with human rights violations 
committed by all sides?"; "Is the response to genocide or collective violence addressed 
by a successor regime or by members of the very regime that presided over the 
wrongs?" According to her private groups, national stages and international bodies 
should address the various responses in the light of these contextual inquiries. For 
Minow the responses to mass atrocities must lie between vengeance and forgiveness, 
where the past and the future must be "faced". 
Between vengeance and forgiveness lies the path of recollection and 
affirmation and the path of facing who we are, and what we would 
become. 90 
The TRC presents such a path between vengeance and forgiveness. It did not 
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encourage vengeance by taking on the form of a witch hunt. In other words it resisted 
the absolute of inscribed social rule. It did not only follow the approach of narrow 
agency. But it also did not encourage mere forgiveness and forgetting, through, for 
example blanket amnesty. The TRC exhibited moments of action (performative 
moments, spontaneous and unpredictable moments of promising and forgiving) but 
constative moments as well. As an example of public space it was situated in an "in 
between" space. 
Significant for my argument is the TRC as an example of the ethical intersection of 
public space, equality and justice and accordingly an ethical interpretation of equality. 
The views of the various authors highlighting the multiple possibilities of a public space 
such as the TRC contribute to my view of the TRC as an in between space, as an 
ethical intersection of public space, equality and justice. The performative aspects of 
the TRC, (the moments of action, of living freely and responsibly, of acting in a 
spontaneous and unpredictable manner, of promising and forgiving), but also the 
constative aspects, (the moments of narrow agency, broad agency and structural 
aspects) are features of the ethical intersection between public space, equality and 
justice. The emphasis on the ethical aspects of promising and forgiving is also 
significant. We must recall Derrida's reliance on the promise (that I discussed in Part 
2) here. He applies the philosophy of deconstruction to a promise and says that a 
promise is only a promise as long as it stays unfulfilled. A promise takes on the same 
structural effect as justice: It is not attainable in the present and serves as an ideal. In 
regard to the TRC the notion of a promise that can never be fulfilled ensures that the 
TRC remains open and continuous. The promise that was made in the public space of 
the TRC was one of democracy, equality and justice. This promise forms an ethical 
horizon. Like a horizon is always viewed from a distance, the promise of democracy, 
equality and justice will always escape the present experience and serve as a future 
orientated ideal. This vision of an ethical horizon is true to an ethical interpretation of 
equality that strives to achieve equality by taking note of difference while realising the 
impossibility of fully achieving equality or recognising difference. 
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South African landscapes 
The child who was shot dead by soldiers in Nyanga91 
The child is not dead 
the child lifts his fists against his mother 
who screams Africa shouts the scent 
of freedom and the veld 
in the location of the cordoned heart 
The child lifts his fists against his father 
in the march of the generations 
who are shouting Africa shout the scent 
of righteousness and blood 
in the streets of his warrior pride 
The child is not dead 
not at Langa not at Nyanga 
not at Orlando not at Sharpeville 
not at the police station in Philippi 
where he lies with a bullet through his brain 
The child is the shadow of soldiers 
on guard with rifles saracens* and batons 
the child is present at all gatherings and law-giving 
the child peers through house windows and into the hearts 
of mothers 
the child who wanted just to play in the sun at Nyanga is 
everywhere 
The child grown to a man travels all over Africa 
the child grown to a giant travels through the whole world 
Without a pass 
*Saracens: Armoured police vehicles 
91 Jonker (1988) Selected poems 27. 
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The response of a writer 
Andre P Brink's reflections on the TRC appeared in 1998 as part of a collection of 
essays on memory.92 In the introduction editors Sarah Nuttall and Carli Coetzee argue 
that it was the right time for a publication on the ways in which memory is investigated. 
They say that "we are as yet unable to judge which memories and ways of remembering 
will come to dominate in South Africa in the future."93 They note that the various essays 
in the collection address the question how it happens that "certain versions of the past 
get to be remembered, which memories are privileged".94 
Brink is a well-known novelist. He has been addressing political issues in his work for 
many years. Brink95 describes his notion of truth and memory as follows: 
The individual constitutes and invents her/himself through the constant 
editing and re-editing of memory; the confluence of innumerable records 
and recordings of memories determines the publicly sanctioned account 
which debouches into history; facts, as a Kantian Ding an sich, remain 
forever inaccessible except through our versions of them - and these 
versions are dependent on memory (as the testimonies in front of the 
TRC demonstrate with great dramatic impact). And the workings of the 
imagination are at the very least inspired by memory. 
Brink illustrates his view of truth and memory with reference to Margaret Atwood's novel 
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Alias Grace. 96 Atwood tells the well-known story of Grace Marks who, with James 
McDermott, was accused of murdering their employer and his housekeeper/mistress. 
Attwood does not offer a new "correct" version of the story but demonstrates how 
historical mysteries are constructed. Grace can recall various versions of the story of 
the murder. Brink notes that she becomes entangled in a patchwork of versions: 
I can remember what I said when arrested, and what Mr MacKenzie the 
lawyer said I should say, and what I did not say even to him; and what I 
said at the trial, and what I said afterwards, which was different as well. 
And what Mr McDermott said I said and what the others said I must have 
said. 97 
This testimony is significant for the creation of public memory in the workings of the 
TRC. Atwood relies on memory but memory is not an objectively reliable tool. 
The mind ... is like a house - thoughts which the owner no longer wishes 
to display or those which arouse painful memories, are thrust out of sight, 
and consigned to attic or cellar; and in forgetting, as in the storage of 
broken furniture, there is surely an element of will at work. 98 
Brink argues that "history, in the conventional sense of the term is denied or repressed 
in favour of story. And story is located beyond the reach of that kind of morality that 
normally distinguishes truth from lie."99 The reinvention of the past through the 
imagination involves primarily "a peculiar machination of memory". 100 Memory in turn 
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involves both selection and suppression. One approach to this selection and 
suppression can be to compile as many and as diverse narratives as possible thereby 
creating a jigsaw puzzle (Brink) or patchwork (Atwood) of memories. Significantly Brink 
highlights the double bind that will prevent this kind of exercise being complete. "Like 
all narratives, this one must eventually be constructed around its own blind spots and 
silences". 101 He is in favour of an imagined rewriting of history, of an openness to "the 
role of the imagination in the dialectic between past and present, individual and 
society." 102 
Brink refers to three characteristics of "the story" that are relevant: the story as the 
outcome of a process of internalisation and personalisation; the story as the 
construction of a version of the world; and the story as the embodiment of an imagining 
or a complex of imaginings. First, the story explores a situation from the inside where 
the public domain accommodates public narratives of history. Secondly, the story does 
not presume to tell the truth, but merely a version of it. Thirdly, even when the story 
narrates a "real" event it is infused with and transformed by private motivations, hidden 
agendas, prejudices and so on. Brink concludes that the best we can do is to 
[F]abricate metaphors - that is, tell stories - in which, not history, but 
imaginings of history are invented. Myth may have preceded history, but 
in the long run it may well be the only guarantee for the survival of 
history. 103 
Brink's approach to memory and his emphasis on story telling is a valuable contribution 
to the discourse on the TRC. His emphasis on the imagination is significant for an 
ethical interpretation of equality. 
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The response of three activists - Reconciliation through truth. A 
reckoning of apartheid's criminal governance 
In the foreword to Asmal, Asmal and Roberts' book on the TRC, Nelson Mandela 104 
comments on the contribution the publication made to "public debate". This is, for me, 
one of the most important features and effects of the TRC, the fact that it created a 
public debate and accordingly a public "space" for South Africans. The contribution of 
the various writings on the TRC to such a public space is accordingly significant. The 
publication by Asmal and others influenced the nature of the debate because it was 
accessible to the public during the event of the TRC. Whether one agrees or disagrees 
with their views is not the point. The significant fact is that they assisted with the 
creation of a public debate. 
One of the real delights of our new democracy, for me personally, has 
been the vibrant culture of public debate that is slowly emerging. We 
have come a long way since our public intellectual life was blighted by 
apartheid's regime of censorship, described in this book .... The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission is a milestone on the freedom road, and 
this book will illuminate the journey. Like all useful contributions to any 
country's new awakening, it will spark lively debate. 105 
The Asmal publication on the TRC is not a response to the process. It was written 
before the actual hearings started. The authors provide a historical analysis of 
apartheid. Apartheid as a "crime against humanity" and how the TRC can address the 
atrocities of apartheid form the central themes. They tell the reader on the first page of 
the introduction that all three of the authors were outside South Africa for most of the 
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apartheid period. In their view the TRC was not an "instrument of vengeance": 
A spirit of vengeance would destroy the country's new politics of 
nonracialism. It would contradict the ideals of the resistance, specifically 
the nonracialism of the African National Congress, from which all three 
of the authors have drawn inspiration and to which two of us belong. 106 
Although all three authors come from legal backgrounds, they argue that their 
contribution was not aimed only at lawyers. 
We aim to show that the burdens of history comprise an invaluable 
ballast of common sense in charting the new country's course away from 
its inglorious past. 107 
Kader Asmal grew up in apartheid South Africa. The authors write that Albert Lutuli, 
Nobel prize winner and once President of the ANC, was the reason for his political 
involvement. They say that the atrocities of Nazi Germany provided for him an early 
awareness of human rights abuses. He was exiled in Ireland for 27 years where he 
taught law and became Dean of the Faculty of Arts (Humanities) at Trinity College. At 
the time of writing, he was minister of Education. Louise Asmal has a history of civil 
rights campaigning, during which she met her husband, Kader. She was honorary 
secretary of the Irish Anti-Apartheid movement. Ronald Suresh Roberts is a member 
of Trinidad's first post-colonial generation. He grew up in a political and cultural 
environment where resistance against apartheid was prominent. 
They respond to the previous system of apartheid as follows: 
What kind of world was this? In the existential belly of white supremacy, 
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ordinary human relations were suppressed or distorted. The normal likes 
and dislikes of people for one another were controlled by the state and 
disfigured by white supremacist culture; the whole ugly process was 
hidden behind the soothing euphemisms of apartheid, or separate 
freedoms. It was a world that was upside-down. 108 
In answering the question "Why face the past?", they emphasise the need of memory, 
"public debate", "public atmosphere", "public acknowledgement" and "public currency". 
Their understanding of memory as well as their vision of community or nationhood is 
in line with the heterogeneous vision of a reconstructed and transformed South African 
public space. 
In moving away from the discredited governing consciousness of the 
past, we will need to build a new, shared and ceaselessly debated 
memory of that past. Without sustained remembrance and debate, it will 
be difficult to develop a new South African culture with its various strands 
intertwined in constructive friction, rather than in mere conflict and mutual 
strangulation. This talk of shared memory must not be understood or 
mystified. It is not the creation of a post-apartheid volk or a stifling 
homogenous nationhood; nor a new Fatherland. Nor is it merely a 
nationwide equivalent of every individual's mental ability to retain facts 
and arguments at the front of her consciousness. Such analogies 
between individual and collective memory are unhelpful. Rather shared 
memory, in the intended sense, is a process of historical accountability. 109 
They identify a number of goals that would be addressed by the TRC. These included 
the achievement of justice through truth; acknowledging the illegitimacy of apartheid; 
the decriminalisation of the anti-apartheid resistance; the achievement of "genuine" 
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reconciliation and the building of a culture of public ethics; acknowledging the need for 
corrective action; confronting the roots of violence; illuminating the longstanding 
humane values of the anti-apartheid resistance; demonstrating the morality of the 
armed struggle; establishing equality before the law; placing property rights on a secure 
and legitimate footing; enabling privileged South Africans to understand and face up 
to collective responsibility for the past; acknowledging the wrongs done in the past to 
South Africa's neighbouring countries; clarifying the international implications of 
apartheid and the finding of one South Africa. 
And 
The exercises of facing the South African past, no mere horror story or 
exercise in historical voyeurism, is rather, in multiple ways . . . a 
cornerstone of reconstruction. 110 
Justice must come out of the closet. 111 
Their view of the relationship between law and society, and law and politics is reflected 
in their response to arguments that human-rights abuses must be prosecuted. 
It is ironic that the calls for a prosecution-centred approach to past 
human rights abuses - and the contemptuous dismissal of "mere" 
sociological counterarguments - is presented as a form of progressive 
politics. For the idea that a bright line divides law and sociology and 
separates law from politics is itself a recognised reactionary falsehood in 
legal academia today. Those who assert that a wall separates law and 
politics urge, in general, that judges should be oblivious to the social 
consequences of their decisions. It is a view that civilised jurisprudence -
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all law, not only international law- must reject. A preferable starting point 
is that law's highest purpose is to serve societal ends. 112 
In regard to reconciliation they observe certain views that hold that the search for 
memory is in conflict with reconciliation. In this view reconciliation means a "painless 
forgetting". 113 The authors argue that this is a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
concept of reconciliation. They refer to the Oxford Dictionary meaning of "to reconcile: 
1. restore friendship between (people) after an estrangement or quarrel. 2. Induce (a 
person or oneself) to accept an unwelcome fact or situation . . . . 3. Bring (facts or 
statements etc) into harmony or compatibility when they appear to conflict."114 In their 
view reconciliation is 
[T]he facing of unwelcome truths in order to harmonise incommensurable 
world views so that inevitable and continuing conflicts and differences 
stand at least within a single universe of comprehensibility. 115 
The authors quote the words of Nelson Mandela during the Rivonia trial as support for 
their own goal of decriminalising the resistance, in other words, proving that the armed 
struggle was a just struggle, that it was the only choice to make under the regime of 
apartheid. The TRC, in their view, had to acknowledge this in its handling of the various 
abuses. The atrocities of the apartheid government could not be placed in the same 
light as the human rights abuses of the members of the resistance. 
I would say that the whole life of any thinking African in this country 
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drives continuously to ciconflict between his conscience on the one hand 
and the law on the other ... The law as it is applied, the law as it has been 
developed over a long period of history, and especially the law as it is 
written by the National Government is a law which, in our view is immoral, 
unjust and intolerable. Our consciences dictate that we must protest 
against it, that we must oppose it and that we must attempt to alter it. 116 
In the authors' opinion the TRC should not place victims and perpetrators on an equal 
footing. The TRC, however, insisted on treating each and everyone equally. But equal 
does not mean the same. In my view the fact that the TRC undertook to treat each and 
everyone equally does not mean that they treated them the same. The fact that the 
TRC in its report recognised apartheid as a crime against humanity is an indication that 
they took the different circumstances into account. 
The authors argue that South Africa's processes of reconciliation would not only be to 
the country's own benefit, but could contribute to other places where violence was the 
order of the day. In this regard the South African "exercise" of addressing the past is 
more than a mere bureaucratic instrumental mission because it exposes the abuse of 
human values. It did not only seek institutional transformation, but transformation of 
society and individuals in society. 
Since so many kinds of violence are wrapped up in apartheid, South 
Africans have a responsibility to themselves, but also to histories and 
peoples beyond South Africa. If South Africa speaks in a muddled way 
about its past, the intellectual barriers against whole categories of 
violence in faraway places will be weakened, both now and in times to 
come. And also, of course, in South Africa itself. 117 
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They quote Magnus Malan's (Minister of Defence in the previous apartheid 
government) objection to the anti-apartheid resistance of the End Conscription 
Campaign: 
No citizen can decide of his or her free will which laws to respect. 118 
The authors respond by saying 
It was the call of an evil system for the abdication of the moral sense of 
the individual. 119 
Something that worried me about the TRC is that it might attempt to write a new 
history, 120 thereby repeating the same mistakes of the past. I feared that the attempt of 
"closing that chapter" of our history would be another form of violence. A similar 
concern that I had was that the final report of the TRC would have the effect that things 
that should be kept open and in a constant flux would become cast in stone and that 
it would attempt to put forward a unified, homogenous vision of community. The 
possible realisation of these fears and concerns had negative implications for the 
notion of an ethical interpretation that is dependent on a radical openness, difference 
and heterogeneity. In this regard the following view of the authors is positive in that 
they seem to nurture the values of openness, multiplicity and heterogeneity: 
The South African Truth Commission is only one of the structures through 
which we should hope to dismantle the old regime of truth in order to 
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replace it with new and multiple narratives. We must remain aware of the 
dangers of replacing apartheid's false utopian historicism with our new 
orthodoxies. As we construct new historical narratives, it will be in our 
new currency of heterotopias, multiple idealisms, rather than the single-
mindedness of utopia; it will be with an awareness of the pain that is 
inflicted when one ethical choice conflicts with others nearby. 121 
One can react to their statement by pointing out that they might have approached the 
issues of heterogeneity and multiplicity as if they were easy and comfortable ones. One 
could argue that the authors do not acknowledge the weight and tragedies and 
impossibilities that are involved in the creation of any history or society. The tension or 
paradox between unity and disunity, homogeneity and heterogeneity, sameness and 
difference must be acknowledged. However, the authors elaborate on their view by 
saying: 
This exercise should not be confused with the cheap pluralism of live and 
let live; accountability and ethical choice are inevitable parts of this 
process. There can be no indifference towards apartheid, nor towards its 
legacy. Rather, we must be driven by what Edward Said has called an 
"unstoppable predilection for alternatives" to the old order. 122 
Nuttall and Coetzee 123 note that this book offers the most significant counter-arguments 
to the view that past acts of "terrorism" by the resistance must receive equal treatment 
with misdeeds done by the defender of apartheid. They interpret the book as: 
[A] defence of a particular role for the TRC, namely that it should act as 
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a vehicle that will allow South Africans to move to "reconciliation" through 
"truth'', by "reckoning" with apartheid's actors. 124 
With reference to Hitler, who was a "history buff', Asma!, Asma! and Roberts argue that 
to remember the past is not a guarantee that the past will not be repeated. 
Since the devil can quote history to his or her own purposes, a simple 
factual record of the apartheid past, devoid of an ethical basis, would be 
of little value. What matters is not merely the fact that we remember 
history but the way in which we remember it. 125 
I argue in a similar way with regard to the TRC. The contribution of the TRC to the 
reconstruction and transformation of public space and to an ethical interpretation of 
equality depends on how we talk about it and remember it by the stories we tell about 
it. In the light of Arendt's distinction between private (labour and work) and public 
(action), the authors of Reconciliation through truth seem to place the TRC in the realm 
of action. They reject a mere instrumental, institutional, legalised perspective and 
encourage an interpretation of the TRC as an event of action that is ruled by human 
appearance, unpredictability and immortality instead of necessity and materiality. Their 
response to the TRC enhances my own vision of an ethical interpretation of equality 
because they recognise the necessity to focus on different circumstances and contexts. 
They are opposed to a formal (blanket) application of equality. The pointing out of this 
difference between victims and perpetrators is of great significance in the context of the 
TRC responding to atrocities of the past. In future this exposure of difference should 
be remembered every time when we interpret equality. An ethical interpretation of 
equality insists on such an acknowledgement of difference. 
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The response of a poet - Country of my skull 
Antjie Krog's Country of my sku//126 was one of the first publications that responded to 
the actual TRC process. In this book she tells the story of the Truth Commission as she 
experienced it. By mingling her own story with the stories told at the TRC she creates 
an imaginative narrative and demonstrates the power of storytelling. In the publisher's 
note to Country of my skull, emphasis is placed on the personal recollections and 
stories of those who have been silenced in the past. This is the emphasis of Krog's 
narrative: 
Because it has allowed this past to be told through the personal 
recollections of those who testify before it, it has put real flesh on 
rhetorical phrases like "a just war" and "crimes against humanity". The 
people who tell these stories, along with the people who listen to them, 
and like Antjie Krog, the people who report on them, are living South 
Africans. They are struggling to find identity for themselves, individually 
and collectively, within the shadows still cast by their country's brutal 
history. The spotlight is thus not just a harrowing, often liberating 
revelation of the past; it illuminates present predicaments and future 
possibilities too. Many voices of this country were long silent, unheard, 
often unheeded before they spoke, in their own tongues, at the 
microphones of South Africa's Truth Commission. The voices of ordinary 
people have entered the public discourse and shaped the passage of 
history. They speak here to all who care to listen. 127 
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Antjie Krog was born in the Free State province and grew up on the farm Middenspruit. 
She has published eight volumes of poetry and has won several prizes for her work. In 
one of her volumes of poetry, Lady Anne, 128 she delivered a feminist critique on South 
African bourgeois society in a postmodern style. In her first novel, Re/aas van 'n moord 
(Account of a murder), 129 she dealt with the South African political reality in a chilling 
manner. Krog reported on the TRC for SABC radio. 
Krog's narrative on the TRC is 
for every victim 
who had an Afrikaner surname on her lips. 130 
She tells the story in five parts: "before the commission", "first hearings", "politics", 
"reactions", "unwinding''. Krog did not expect the Truth Commission to achieve 
reconciliation or justice, but argued that the value of the commission was in the event 
of storytelling, the narratives. 
It is asking too much that everyone should believe the Truth 
Commission's version of the Truth. Or that people should be set free by 
this truth, should be healed and reconciled. But perhaps these narratives 
alone are enough to justify the existence of the Truth Comission. 
Because of these narratives people can no longer indulge in their 
separate dynasties of denial. 131 
She relates a personal event to show the difficulties that surround truth: 
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A big fire burns in the fireplace. My husband sits in a steamy bath. I soap 
my hands and start washing him limb by limb - slowly, gently, caressingly 
- from his beard to his toes. "I will never forgive you - you have destroyed 
everything," his voice breaks into the towel that I hand out for him. What 
do I say? Do I quote definitions: "Narrative understanding is our most 
primitive form of explanation. We make sense of things by fitting them into 
stories. When events fall into a pattern which we can describe in a way 
that is satisfying as narrative then we think that we have some grasp of 
why they occurred. Nations tells stories of their past in terms of which 
they try to shape their futures". "Stop talking crap," he says ... I have no 
framework in which to address him. . . . "I need to know everything ... I 
need detail ... I need to have language for it in order to pack it neatly 
away. I want the truth. ... The word "truth" is explained by different 
theories: the correspondence theory of truth, the coherence theory of 
truth, the deflationary theory of truth, the pragmatic theory of truth, the 
redundancy theory of truth, the semantic theory of truth, double truth, 
logical truth and the subjective theory of subjective truth. Pragmatic truth 
theorists say that truth has no cognitive value - that we literally should not 
care whether our beliefs or stories are true or false, but rather whether 
they enable us to achieve happiness and well-being . ... It is useless to talk 
about the truth. ... "Rubbish. There is always a basic truth ... What truth 
I don't know you will never tell me. "132 
She takes a similar approach to evil. In a conversation with a colleague they discuss 
the phenomenon of evil. Krog says that it is "too easy" to identify Hitler with absolute 
evil. She sees the "obsession with evil" as a "male thing". In her view, women, because 
they give birth, are capable of another experience. They acknowledge that all people 
have good and evil in them. It is too easy for her to describe Hitler as evil because one 
would deny his humanity and by doing that "you are saying that you are not capable of 
132 (1998) Country of my sku/1196-197. 
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what he did ... And I say you are capable of it." 133 Her colleague responds by saying 
that if one refrains from judging Hitler "you kill off the awareness that you should avoid 
certain ideologies, certain people, because they represent evil ... ". 134 But Krog argues 
that 
[T]here is not a single atom that you can pinpoint and say: this is absolute 
evil and this is absolute good. Good and evil are never absolute. Every 
good is imperfect in its own way and every evil has an underlying 
potential to be good. 135 
A strong feature of Krog's narrative is the emphasis she places on gender. 136 Her own 
perspective is a gendered one; she refers to her own experiences as a woman, the fact 
of being a mother, being a wife, influenced her perceptions and analysis. She places 
a special emphasis on the fact that most stories were told by women about men 
(husbands, sons, fathers). Yet, her account of woman is not an essentialist account 
where she gives a final closed definition of woman or the feminine. She views women 
as a disruptive force to traditional male rational logic. 
She is sitting behind a microphone, dressed in beret or kopdoek and her 
Sunday best. Everybody recognises her. Truth has become Woman. Her 
voice, distorted behind her rough hand, has undermined Man as the 
source of truth. And yet nobody knows her. 137 
Krog perceives the TRC as a special public space. In my view, her approach to the 
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TRC is comparable to public space in Arendt's sense. She places more emphasis on 
stories and human appearance than Asmal. Her text is deeply situated in her own 
context, even more than the text of the activists, who for many years were involved in 
the struggle against apartheid. 
The TRC is where the reality of this country is hitting home and hitting 
home very hard. And that is good. But there will be no grand release. 138 
Krog's response to the TRC is helpful in the search for an ethical interpretation of 
equality. Her vision reflects a vision of a poet-judge, who, because she can take greater 
care with the concrete life story of humans, has greater ability to acknowledge 
difference and otherness and accordingly can make better judgements. Such a vision 
of human otherness, together with a strong public awareness, underlie ethical 
interpretation. 
The response of a dominee (pastor) - Chronicle of the Truth 
Commission 
The foreword of this work was written by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. He tells the reader 
that he suggested Prof Piet Meiring as commissioner because of his credibility and 
influence within the Afrikaner community. Tutu notes that Meiring's book is the second 
book published on the TRC, the second book on the TRC by an Afrikaner. He says: 
Is it some coincidence that both books are by Afrikaners? I hope, so 
fervently, that my Afrikaner fellow-South Africans will be moved by Piet 
Meiring to see the TRC as a remarkable tool to enable us South Africans 
138 (1998) Country of my sku/1129. 
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to come to terms with our horrendous past as efficaciously as possible. 139 
Piet Meiring is a theologian in the NG Church and professor at the University of 
Pretoria. He served on the TRC (as commissioner on the Reparation Committee), to 
represent the Afrikaner community. He uses the metaphor of trek (journey) to describe 
the process of the Truth Commission. Landscape, as in the Krog text, is described in 
order to visualise the events and stories and tears and happiness of the TRC process. 
The journey had been long and sometimes arduous. Since the Truth 
Commission had embarked on its road through the history of our country, 
eighteen months ago, we had achieved a great deal. ... The road reached 
several mountain peaks, pinnacles of success. But the way often led us 
through deep valleys as well, valleys of pain and sorrow, of frustration 
and failure .... But, it was unanimous, the trek had to proceed. 140 
Meiring's trek covers the following roads and landscapes: "the great trek to the past"; 
"via dolorosa"; "on mountains and valleys; embarking on the journey inward"; "fellow-
travellers; the second last leg of the journey". It ends at "the longest journey - from 
person to person, via the heart". Meiring tells a chronological story of the TRC, from the 
day Archbishop Tutu called him ("Hello, Piet, Desmond speaking. Are you sitting down 
... ?")141 , through the hearings, the commission's various "bosberade", 142 to the handing 
over of the report. His account is nevertheless a personal one. He does not attempt to 
give an "objective" view of the process, his story is filled with his own experience of and 
reflection on the process. 
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Meiring's story emphasises the religious moments and aspects of the process which 
were harshly criticised by people involved in the process as well as by people looking 
on. He spends a lot of attention on issues such as the role of churches during apartheid 
and the confessions of members from religious communities. Again he does not hide 
his personal involvement. He writes that after the General Synodal Commission of the 
NG Kerk reported that they would not make an official confession to the TRC: "I was 
disappointed and sad" .143 When members of the church later decided to make 
individual submissions, Meiring was overjoyed. Although he writes from the Christian 
religious perspective (Tutu also represents the Christian religion), other faith 
communities were not neglected during the TRC process. Tutu, in addressing the 
various faith communities during hearings, noted how most people assumed that South 
Africa is a "Christian country". He apologised to other faith communities on behalf of 
fellow South African Christians "for the arrogant way in which we as Christians acted 
- as though ours was the only religion in South Africa, while we have been a multi-
religious community from day one." 144 
Since Meiring was suggested by Tutu to represent the Afrikaner community on the 
TRC, he spends time and space on the role of the Afrikaner community. He tells about 
the interactions with the Afrikaner press, 145 "Afrikaner Broederbond146 and the 
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"Rapportryers". 147 He also refers to the relationship between Afrikaans and English 
speaking South Africans. Meiring recalls a conversation between him and his colleague 
Hugh Lewin where the latter remarked: "You are worried about the Afrikaners. I am 
worried about the English! ... You Afrikaners at least talk about the Truth Commission. 
You are in favour or against it. But many English-speaking persons continue their lives 
as if these things do not affect them at all. It was, after all, not they who had instituted 
apartheid. They are not Boere or Nationalists! And still they benefited from the process 
just as much ... ". 148 He refers to arguments about the Anglo-Boer war and the absence 
of a truth and reconciliation process following it. Beyers Naude, 149 when he delivered 
the annual Langenhoven Memorial Lecture at the university of Port Elizabeth, said that 
"[T]he British should really, after all these years, express their sincere remorse about 
the injustice inflicted on the Boers during the Second War of Independence" .150 Naude 
argued that after a hundred years the wounds of the Anglo-Boer War have not yet been 
healed. He asked whether the history of our country would not have been completely 
different had the British confessed their guilt towards the Afrikaners. In the report of the 
TRC the same argument is made. 151 He went on to say that Afrikaners should be 
generous enough to apologise for the killing of the Zulu warriors at Blood River, they 
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Commission (1998) foreword, par. 65. 
352 
should apologise to the Biko family; Apia should apologise for the murders of white 
farmers in the Eastern Cape. 
Meiring discusses the famous lecture of German philosopher, Karl Jaspers, which he 
delivered at the University of Heidelberg after the Second World War. 152 Jaspers 
addressed the question: "Who is guilty?" Jaspers was married to a Jewish woman. 
They managed to escape from Nazi Germany to Switzerland. Jaspers identified four 
categories of guilt: criminal guilt, political guilt, moral guilt and metaphysical guilt. In 
terms of criminal guilt there were people, politicians, SS officers and others who were 
directly involved in gross human rights violations. These people were charged during 
the Nuremberg trials with specific crimes, and sentenced. Meiring argues that "The 
same applied to our country, where several people on all sides of the struggle were 
guilty of specific offences. Their guilt was not difficult to indicate. In many cases it was 
proclaimed from the house-tops. Many of these people applied for amnesty." 153 The 
second category is political guilt. Jaspers explained that the millions of Germans who 
voted for Hitler and the Nazi-Party had to accept political responsibility. Meiring 
responds: "As was the case in our country. The National Party, who had accepted and 
implemented apartheid as policy, did not come into office by itself. With every election 
held in this country hundreds of thousands of white people - the people who had 
suffrage - sounded a resounding "Yes" at the polls. In many different ways we gave our 
approval to the apartheid policy. And of this we are guilty."154 
Jaspers's third category of moral guilt is the reverse side of political guilt. "This was the 
guilt of people in Germany - and here in South Africa - who had allowed themselves to 
be misled, who enjoyed the benefits of a very unfair system, and did not object to it. 
There were very few white South Africans who could say with a clear conscience today 
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that they did not know anything. Closer to the truth would be : I knew certain things, but 
I pretended to be ignorant; in my newspapers from time to time articles appeared, but 
I chose not to take it seriously; I knew that people were being treated unfairly, but I did 
not want to become involved; my conscience urged me to talk, but I was afraid and kept 
quiet."155 
The fourth category Jaspers called metaphysical guilt which concerns our communal 
guilt. Meiring again: "Collectively we were carrying the guilt of mankind on our 
shoulders! Knowing this made one humble, less prone to judge others. Because who 
of us could guarantee that we, if we found ourselves in the same circumstances and 
were subjected to the same influences as, for example, the SS soldiers, would have 
acted differently? ... The knowledge that all of us were guilty made it possible to forgive 
each other. 156 
This analysis of guilt is similar to Krog's argument concerning Hitler and evil. She made 
the point that it is too easy to describe anyone or anything as "absolute evil" because 
all people possess good and evil features. Although I agree with both Krog's and 
Meiring's (Jaspers') method of problematising the issues of guilt and evil, I am cautious 
of the view that we are all guilty. Such an approach can lead to a vague generalisation 
and universalisation where at the end, because all are guilty, no one is guilty. 157 In this 
regard the emphasis in the Asmal book that the atrocities of the apartheid government 
are not equal to the crimes committed by the resistance should be noted. 
A significant part of the book is devoted to Mei ring's discussion of the Afrikaner press 
during the years of apartheid. 
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On its journey inward - in its search to find answers to all the whys of the 
past - South African media workers needed to reflect on their own role. 
To what extent did the media provide the climate within which the 
injustices of the past could flourish? To what extent were the radio and 
television, 158 the various newspapers, the press magnates guilty of 
distorting the facts? Had there even perhaps been human rights 
violations in the industry? What had happened to the journalists and 
newspapers that consistently wished to put across the other side of the 
coin?159 
The issue of the press is of particular significance for the investigation of public space 
in the past, present and future. In modern society where public space is not necessarily 
situated in a specific geographic space and where public space can appear anywhere 
and at any time, the press can play a significant role in facilitating and creating such 
a space. In some cases a specific media event can be such a public space. The 
absence of public space in the apartheid past can also be explained in the light of the 
absence of public debate in newspapers, television reports etc. Predictably, in the 
ranks of the Afrikaans press there was division about their own involvement with past 
events. 
Hennie van Deventer (group CEO of Nasionale Koerante (National Newspapers)) made 
a personal submission to the TRC in which he wrote that the Afrikaans press had not 
simply been supporters of the previous state of affairs. He said that Die Volksblad 
campaigned for change and supported the 1992 referendum. Ton Vosloo, chief 
executive officer of Nasionale Pers, said: "The Nasionale Pers does not regard itself to 
be guilty of any violation of human rights or other offences and need not make a 
confession or record or an apology." Johan de Wet, editor of Beeld, said: "Beeld would 
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not really be able to report about gross human rights violations in its own ranks." 160 
Meiring writes that Tutu was deeply disappointed that no official submission would be 
coming from the Afrikaans media. 
During the hearings, the SABC was the first to confess that it contributed to the 
violation of human rights. Johan Pretorius, the former editor of TV news, said that the 
historical context had to be taken into consideration. The SABC was often under 
enormous pressure from politicians from all parties, but especially the National Party. 
"I am sorry to say that some NP politicians were the greatest offenders. They 
completely confused publicity value with news value and the other way round, if this 
suited them. They were paranoid about what they considered to be 'exposure to 
subversive elements' and right-wing opponents. We had to manage both them and the 
news and often had to take two steps backwards, to be able to take two steps forwards 
the next day." 161 Two former members of the Afrikaner Broederbond, Sampie 
Terblanche and Louis Raubenheimer, differed about the roll of the Broederbond. The 
former said that it had "wielded power" over the SABC, the latter that in his experience 
the Broederbond had a minimal influence. Zakes Nene, a representative of the Media 
Workers Association, told about the atrocities committed against black media workers. 
Four state agents confessed how the top structures of the media organizations and 
senior journalists were influenced by government during the years of apartheid. They 
confessed how journalists were used by the police. The English press (Times Media 
Limited as well as the Independent Newspaper group) also took the opportunity to 
report about their past. "Despite the mistakes made - particularly in that they had not 
always treated their black colleagues justly - they said that they had done their best to 
consistently criticize the government, to ensure that the voice of opposition in South 
160 
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Africa did not die down."162 
Max Du Preez, former editor of the alternative Afrikaans newspaper, Vrye Weekblad, 
also took the stand. He recounted "one of the blackest moments in our legal history" 
when his newspaper lost a libel case brought by retired police general Lothar Neethling 
and had to close down as a result. Du Preez was also disappointed that the Afrikaans 
press refused to submit an official statement to the TRC. In the light of their statement 
that they had been in favour of reform, Du Preez wanted to know about the dismissal 
of Johan Grosskopf as editor of Beeld when he began to ask "difficult questions"; the 
cover-up of the South African Defence Force's actions in Angola; the "hysteria" when 
a number of Afrikaners went to Dakar in 1987 to talk to the ANG. (It is ironic, and quite 
sad, that Max du Preez who subsequently presented an investigative news programme, 
Special Assignment, was replaced by the SABC in 1999. One would have hoped that 
in a new dispensation the closing down of public debate and silencing of dissenting 
voices would not be repeated.) 
A few weeks after the media hearings, 120 Afrikaans journalists (from Naspers) made 
a statement in which they expressed their disappointment with Nasionale Pers' refusal 
to testify. Meiring notes that: "In a statement the journalists made it clear that although 
they had not been personally or directly involved in gross human rights violations, they 
regarded themselves as morally co-responsible for everything that had been done in 
the name of apartheid, because they helped maintain a system in which these abuses 
could take place". 163 Ton Vosloo responded to this statement by saying that the 
journalists's actions were a "repudiation of great and honourable names in Naspers' 
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long and rich and proud journalistic tradition, and are to be regretted" .164 
On the 4th of December 1996 Piet Meiring, John Allen (press representative of the 
TRC) and Archbishop Desmond Tutu went to see Izak de Villiers, editor of the Sunday 
newspaper, Rapport. It was felt that the perceptions of the average Afrikaner of the 
Truth Commission had to be addressed. The TRC wanted to solve some of the 
problems and misconceptions about itself. Izak de Villiers was not enthusiastic about 
such a meeting because "he did not like the Truth Commission, its chairperson or its 
methods."165 Although he agreed to a conversation, Meiring reports that De Villiers was 
on the offensive from the start. "He made it clear that he did not trust the TRC process, 
that it was nothing other than a political onslaught on the Afrikaner and his (sic) 
history." At one stage of the conversation, De Villiers even said "that apartheid also had 
a good side". This is a sad and dark moment in the reconstruction and transformation 
of South African public space. 
Meiring's response greatly contributes to the discourse on the Truth Commission. His 
chronological account, his personal involvement and his focus on specific themes affirm 
the value of the TRC as a public moment in South Africa's history of transformation. 
Because he was approached to represent a specific grouping (the Afrikaners) he is 
attentive and sensitive to difference and otherness. By employing the metaphors of 
trek, road and landscape he creates a new way (new language) of responding to the 
past, present and future. These metaphors also prevent the danger of coming to an 
end. 
The response of a researcher - The truth about the Truth Commission 
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I already indicated in the introduction that I do not like Anthea Jefferey's book. I do not 
think it contributes at all to the public discourse about the TRC. In a letter in the Sunday 
Independent, 166 Richard Lyster, who was a commissioner, said that he had not read it 
for two reasons. The first is because "the title is a giveaway. It is the sort of title that 
Senator Joseph McCarthy might have given his book, if he was able to string a 
sentence together, about Marxists in the Hollywood film industry. Yet this Oxford 
"academic", purporting to comment seriously on a topic of international importance calls 
her book The truth about the Truth Commission." The second reason is because of her 
last book, which contained "myriad errors, half-truths, misleading innuendoes and sheer 
disinformation" .167 
In the foreword, John Kane-Berman, chief executive of the South African Institute of 
Race Relations, notes certain "Orwellian" moments in the Truth Commission. He 
identifies a "fundamental" problem with the report because it did not tell the "truth". The 
report, in his view, omits and distorts the truth. Omissions were, for example, the fact 
that "multiple" killings were excluded without explanation. The truth was distorted 
because of methods used and aspects of violence that were left out. He stands critical 
towards the commission's redefinition of truth. He praises Jefferey for a "sober 
evaluation" and notes that in all the other accounts the commission has been accepted 
in a positive manner. 
Jefferey is a special research consultant to the Institute of South African Race 
Relations. She comes from a legal background with law degrees from the University of 
the Witwatersrand and from Cambridge and a doctorate in human rights law from the 
University of London. Her previous book168 that focused on the conflict between the 
ANC and the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal is criticised by Richard Lyster, who argues that she 
166 
167 
168 
"Jefferey "truth" book a waste of good trees" (1999) The Sunday Independent September 
5. 
"Jefferey "truth" book a waste of good trees" (1999) The Sunday Independent September 
5. 
(1997) The Natal Story: 16 years of conflict. 
359 
came to "ludicrous" and "entertaining" conclusions. Lyster refers to Prof John Atchison 
of Natal University who in his analysis of this book "suggested that, because of its 
unusual thickness, it would make a good doorstop" .169 
Jefferey170 argues that the TRC acknowledged that its success will be measured by 
looking at the content of its findings as well as the methods used to reach them. She 
identifies the main object of her study to analyse the evidence before the Commission 
and the way in which it was assessed. She follows four questions in her analysis of the 
report: "How factual was the evidence?"; "How comprehensive was it?"; "How 
objectively was it complied and analysed?"; "How well was it contextualised?". Jefferey 
argues that because the TRC had to make its findings on a "balance of probabilities" 
two further questions arise: "Were established legal principles applied?"; "Were the 
probabilities properly assessed?". 
She covers the following aspects in her analysis: the publication of the current TRC 
report; the need for factual evidence; the need for comprehensive findings; the need 
for objective operation; the need for violations to be contextualised; the need to accord 
with established legal principles; findings based on "a balance of probabilities". She 
provides a brief summary of the TRC's main findings. 171 
Jefferey172 discusses the four kinds of truth described by the Truth Commission. She 
notes that the TRC in terms of its founding legislation, had to base its report on "factual 
and objective information and evidence". In her view, the TRC, however, also took 
account of three other kinds of truth. The TRC made a distinction between "factual or 
forensic truth"; "personal and narrative truth"; "social or dialogue truth"; and "healing 
and restorative truth". Factual truth is described by the TRC as "the familiar legal or 
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scientific notion of bringing to light factual, corroborated evidence, and of obtaining 
accurate information through reliable (impartial, objective) procedures". In Jefferey's 
opinion the TRC did not only give regard to factual truth, but also other truths, which 
she finds problematic. She stands critical towards the value of "personal or narrative 
truth" that is concerned with the healing of individuals. The Commission also noted 
"social or dialogue truth" in its work. In Albie Sachs's words: "Dialogue truth ... is social 
truth of experience that is established though interaction, discussion, and debate". 173 
The Truth Comission also accepted the notion of "healing truth ... that places facts and 
what they mean within the context of human relationships, both amongst citizens and 
between the state and its citizens". 174 
Jefferey argues that the TRC, in following a "victim-centred" approach, placed too much 
emphasis on other truths and "detracted from the accuracy of its conclusions regarding 
culpability". 175 For her, the personal beliefs of individuals provide no proper basis for 
conclusions regarding culpability. 
As I already indicated, my objection to this book is not the fact that it contains a critical 
response to the TRC. The TRC can only benefit from critical perspectives in the public 
dialogue about the South African past and memory and future. The absence of critical 
debate in public in the past was to the detriment of each and every member of our 
community. The book lacks what the other books discussed so far thoroughly 
incorporate, namely a situated, embodied and embedded approach. These approaches 
take care of the individuals involved. They do not come to any grand or final conclusion 
concerning the findings of the TRC. Jefferey, in my view, does not follow a critical 
approach. She follows a legalistic approach and is obsessed with procedures, 
evidence, methods and so on. She does not take into account any interdisciplinary 
work, such as political theory, philosophy and psychology. The effect of her response 
and analysis is that the public moment (action) of the TRC is negated. The TRC is 
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placed within the realm of work where material and tangible things (evidence, facts) are 
what matters and where everything comes to an end in finished products. Rather than 
contributing to lively public discourse about the TRC, her approach will again force 
South African society into silence. Jefferey will argue that she follows an "objective", 
neutral approach to the TRC. If one accepts the basic critique raised more than a 
century ago by Holmes 176 and adopted by the Critical Legal Studies, 177 namely that 
neutrality and objectivity do not exist and that the law cannot be separated from politics 
and society, one cannot accept any claim to objectivity and neutrality. Her 
dissatisfaction with the TRC's findings might be inspired by another story. 
The response of a lawyer - Truth, reconciliation and the apartheid legal 
order 
The publication by Dyzenhaus differs from the others in the sense that it focuses on the 
legal hearings of the Truth Commission. The author analyses the rule of law during 
apartheid and criticises judges for not ensuring justice during that time. By doing this 
he makes previously unsaid things public.The most significant aspect of this book for 
my argument is that it focuses on legal interpretation. Dyzenhaus acknowledges the 
fact that politics can not be separated from the law, legal theory and philosophy, and 
ultimately legal decisions. 
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Kader Asmal, in the foreword to the book, notes Tutu's suggestion that the hearings 
into the legal profession 178 were the most important within the Commission's mandate. 
The system of apartheid was unique in comparison with other twentieth century 
atrocities because it was underpinned by the entire legal system. Asmal mentions that 
with the hearings into the legal profession, "potentially arcane jurisprudential debates 
found their way into the pages of the national media with unaccustomed clarity and 
thoroughness."179 Dyzenhaus focuses on judges and is critical of the fact that they 
declined to attend the hearings. The judges based their denial to attend on "judicial 
independence". Asmal argues that the apartheid judiciary was "almost totally 
monopolistic and excluded women."180 In his view the new South African judiciary will 
not be able to move away from the past if they do not acknowledge their "racially 
compromised" pasts. 181 He emphasises the necessity of public confidence in the 
judiciary. 
This [public confidence] is not merely a public relations function, a 
creation of ad-men, something that image consultants can be hired to fix. 
Public confidence in a judiciary reflects far-reaching sentiments of 
belonging, identity and - ultimately - of justice amongst us all. 182 
David Dyzenhaus is professor of law and philosophy at the University of Toronto. He 
previously taught at the University of the Witwatersrand. In his doctoral thesis, 183 he 
investigated South African law from a legal philosophical perspective. Dyzenhaus was 
the first person to appear during the TRC hearings into the legal profession. His 
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analysis of the process of the TRC consists of four sections: "truth, memory and the 
rule of law"; "judicial dilemmas: tales of disempowerment"; memory's struggle"; and "the 
politics of the rule of law". He stresses the importance of the TRC as a public event 
throughout the book: 
The TRC brings to light the details of what happened and forces a public 
acknowledgement both of the general pattern of events and of specific 
acts. It is, for example, only through the public hearings of the TRC that 
white South Africans have been forced to acknowledge that the security 
forces systematically engaged in assassinating their opponents. It is also 
important to surviving victims and their families and friends to have 
publicly aired exactly what was done, and family and friends of those who 
were murdered, some of whom disappeared without trace, need to get a 
public account. 184 
The main tenet of his argument is that judges, even under apartheid law, could have 
ensured justice and protected individual rights. He refers to Chaskalson's argument that 
"[T]he common law heritage of the judges required them to interpret statute law, in so 
far as this was possible, in the light of the principles developed by judges in their 
decisions which deny all forms of discrimination."185 Dyzenhaus argues that this view 
is problematic because statute law always took precedence over the common law. 
Chaskalson suggested that judges were under a duty to resort to common law 
presumptions in cases of alleged ambiguity in statutory language. Dyzenhaus argues 
that it is a controversial suggestion because many judges are hostile to the notion that 
their "moral responsibilities" should effect their interpretation and decisions. He says 
that judges see their duty as judges "to interpret the law as it was in fact intended by 
the legislators to be interpreted". 186 Dyzenhaus mentions his previous description of the 
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interpretative approach of South African judges as the "plain fact approach". 187 He 
describes it as follows: 
Plain fact judges hold that the judicial duty when interpreting a statute is 
always to look at those parts of the public record that make it clear what 
the legislators as a matter of fact intended. In this way, the judges merely 
determine the law as it is, without permitting their substantive convictions 
about justice to interfere. And in South Africa, the facts of the public 
record - both the deeds and the policy of those charged with 
implementing apartheid - were very clear as to what the National Party 
majority in Parliament wanted. Indeed, judges knew from the record that 
judicial decisions which imposed legal constraints on the implementation 
of apartheid statutes would usually be overruled by legislative 
amendments to make the government's intention plain. Thus in cases 
where arguably a statutory provision seemed ambiguous, such judges 
reasoned that their duty as a judge required them to clear up the 
ambiguity, not by reference to a common law presumption, but by 
reference to the public facts of the matter about how the Legislature 
would have wanted the statute interpreted. And that understanding of 
duty was rooted in a particular conception of the rule of law. That 
conception has it that the role of judges in upholding the rule of law 
largely involves judges' seeing to it that the officials who implement a 
statute do so in accordance with the law as it is, as a matter of plain fact, 
intended to be implemented. 188 
Dyzenhaus argues that there were judges who were not caught between the "facts" of 
apartheid statutes and the pull of common law principles. In these judges' view, "their 
duty did not take them beyond what they took to be facts of the matter about legislative 
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intention. "189 
He reflects critically on Chaskalson's remark that the "past ought not to be lamented". 
For him, the question has to do with memory: 
Is it healthier to leave a traumatic past largely behind, dwelling only on 
its positive moments, in order to go to a healthy future? Clearly, those 
who established the TRC answered "no" to this question and so the "no 
use in lamenting the past" stance may seem in direct conflict with the 
rationale for establishing the TRC. 190 
Dyzenhaus notes the suggestion by Kritz and Chaska Ison 191 that an idea of the rule of 
law as "antipolitics" should be preserved during a transitional process. For them the 
rule of law should be conceived as neutrally as possible. Dyzenhaus, however, argues 
that the rule of law as antipolitics is conceivable only within a plain fact interpretation. 
He makes the further significant point that "the antipolitical stance of the conception is 
driven by politics, by the argument that it is politically appropriate that judges adopt that 
conception" .192 Dyzenhaus argues that the notion of bringing legal officials to account 
for the past cannot rely on the politics of memory that depend on a conception of the 
rule of law as antipolitics. 
Just as remembering the past will reveal the politics of the different 
understandings of the rule of law, so a policy of forgetting the past 
(however noble its motivation) will obscure such politics, perhaps 
189 
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permitting the bad old politics to exercise a hold on the future. 193 
Dyzenhaus 194 notes the paradox of the law and apartheid: the law was used as the 
"instrument of apartheid" but simultaneously held out some promise of limiting its worst 
excesses. Two related questions were put to those who were part of the previous legal 
order: "How was it that you implemented without protest, and often with zeal, laws that 
were so manifestly unjust? And how was it that when you had some discretion as to 
how to interpret or apply the law, you consistently decided in a why that assisted the 
government and the security forces? And to those whose skills could have been used 
to resist - if only by criticising - apartheid law, the question was put of why they stood 
passively by or actively supported the regime." 195 
Dyzenhaus echoes the general disappointment that not one judge was willing to appear 
in person in the hearings.196 He repeats Tutu's words that judges faced in the past with 
moral choices generally made the wrong choices. When faced with another moral 
choice, whether to appear before the TRC, they again made the wrong choice. For Tutu 
this meant that they "had not changed a mind set that properly belongs to the old 
dispensation."197 
Tutu's remarks are crucial when we analyse and reflect upon present judicial decisions. 
An "ethical" interpretation relies on a new mind set and a memory that supports the 
political in interpretation. Dyzenhaus shows how the legal hearings illuminated a 
relationship between law and justice that reflects the age-old legal philosophical debate 
between positivism and natural law theories. He says that he does not think that the 
question of the relationship between justice and the law could be settled by three days 
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of hearings but it provided "a rare opportunity" for the relationship to be "reexamined". 
He argues that the legal hearings showed that the relationship between law and justice 
are "inherently political but at the same time morally loaded" .198 He comes to the 
conclusion that law can make a difference, even under the "unpromising" conditions of 
apartheid. Even though there will be many ways of understanding the commitment to 
a "community of free and equal citizens" one can at least 
[R]ule out any legal theory or ideology which attempts to reduce our 
understanding of law to what a plain fact approach determines to be the 
content of the commands of the powerful. For law is better understood as 
the expression of a relationship of reciprocity between ruler and ruled, 
one in which the rulers commit themselves not only to being accountable 
to law, but to making law before which all subjects are equal. That in turn 
suggests that the rule of law is best understood as the institutional 
expression of democracy .199 
Dyzenhaus' account of the TRC hearings into the legal profession during apartheid is 
another significant contribution to the public discourse on the TRC as event. His 
analysis of the rule of law, legal interpretation and the judicial responsibility is of 
particular importance for critical analysis of present decisions. In the search for new 
approaches to interpretation the mistakes of the past must be remembered. 
198 Dyzenhaus (1998) Truth, reconciliation and the apartheid legal order 182. 
199 Dyzenhaus (1998) Truth, reconciliation and the apartheid legal order 183. 
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Landscape of care 
In this section I shall make a few short remarks on the TRC as a landscape of care. I 
have identified justice as a significant part of the ethical intersection between public 
space, equality and justice. I have indicated the understanding of justice that I support, 
namely that justice is unattainable in a present system. Justice serves as an ideal, and 
a promise. I referred to an ethical horizon of the promise of justice. Here I want to join 
in the conversation200 that started after Carol Gilligan's publication (In a different 
voice)201 where she argued that an ethics of justice must be supplemented with an 
ethics of care. My main interest is to consider the application and extension of an ethics 
of care in the context of the TRC. I think that the chairperson of the TRC, Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, followed and maybe even gave preference to an ethics of care. I shall 
address the aims and the work of the Reparation Committee and ask whether the task 
of reparation can benefit by supplementing the aim of justice with a care perspective. 
I have already discussed aspects of an ethics of care in Part 1 as part of a gender 
critique on the liberal visions of public space. I argued that the perspective of an ethics 
of care could assist us in the reconstruction and transformation of our visions of public 
200 
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space. An ethics of care will not replace an ethics of justice but supplement it. I believe 
that it can disrupt and undermine present (male) static visions of public space. I shall 
repeat here what I consider to be main features of an ethics of care. Carol Gilligan 
came about with this view after working with Lawrence Koh Iberg on a research project 
investigating the moral development of children and adults. The outcome of these tests 
were that women scored lower marks than men and stayed at a lower level of moral 
development. Gilligan reacted to this by adding other questions to the prescribed list 
of questions covered. She came to the conclusion that women tended to speak in a 
different voice about morality itself and about moral maturity. She said: 
Since the reality of interconnection is experienced by women as given 
rather than freely contracted they arrive at an understanding of life that 
reflects the limits of autonomy and control. As a result women's 
development delineates the path not only to a less violent life but also to 
a maturity realized by interdependence and taking care. 202 
She also wrote that 
[W]omen perceive and construe social reality differently from men, and 
that these difference centre around experiences of attachment and 
separation .. . because women's sense of integrity appears to be 
intertwined with an ethics of care, so that to see themselves as women 
is to see themselves in a relationship of connexion, the major changes in 
women's lives would seem to involve changes in the understanding and 
activities of care. 203 
An ethics of care takes a different perspective on autonomy and independence than the 
202 
203 
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liberal point of view. 204 Gilligan accordingly also supports a different version of 
community than the liberal version. In Part 1 I noted the distinction, followed by the 
liberal point of view, between "the right" (questions of justice) and "the good" (questions 
of morality). In the liberal model "the right" and questions of justice enjoy preference. 
"The good" and questions of morality in the liberal model are considered to be private 
issues that should be excluded from public life. The Kantian view of the self is the 
philosophy behind the liberal outlook. I have already referred to the Kantian view of the 
self in Part 1. The self in this perspective is perceived as an autonomous, isolated and 
separate individual. In the Kantian (liberal) version of society justice is the most 
important virtue. Justice in this model means mutual respect for equal rights such as 
the right to contract, equal opportunity, free speech, free association and others. The 
main feature of these equal rights is that they all involve only the individual and totally 
ignore the relationships which individuals experience. 205 
A significant challenge posed by Gilligan's theory of an ethics of care is its challenge 
to Western individualism. Annette Baier206 states that 
The most obvious point [of Gilligan's theory of an ethics of care] is the 
challenge to the individualism of the Western tradition, to the fairly 
entrenched belief in the possibility and desirability of each person 
pursuing his own good in his own way, constrained only by a minimal 
formal common good namely a working apparatus that enforces contracts 
and protects individuals from undue interference by others. 207 
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Gilligan made the very important point that in certain cases noninterference can amount 
to neglect, especially for the powerless. The liberal state's noninterference in so-called 
private issues quite often contributes negatively to a situation, like for example where 
the state refuses to intrude into the private sphere to assist victims of domestic 
violence. Another aspect highlighted by Gilligan's theory that I discussed in Part 1 is 
the distinction between the perspective of the generalised and the concrete other. In 
the liberal vision where the perspective of the autonomous individual is followed the 
other is seen as a generalised other. In other words the other is seen merely as an 
other of myself. For justice to be attained every person must allow the other that which 
he wants the other to allow him. I noted in the previous discussion that the features of 
reciprocity and respect are features of the liberal model. In the perspective of an ethics 
of care the other is seen as a concrete other with his/her own life story. The recognition 
of difference is significant for an ethical interpretation of equality. In the context of the 
TRC it was necessary to acknowledge the fact of difference and to bring each and 
every person's concrete circumstances and story to the fore. 
I have viewed the TRC as an in between space and as a practical illustration of the 
ethical intersection between public space, equality and justice. I have elaborated on 
certain visions of public space and indicated that I support Hannah Arendt's vision. For 
this discussion Hannah Arendt's theme of the "web of human relationships" is 
significant. Arendt considered the public realm to be significant exactly because it is a 
space where human interaction could take place, human plurality is displayed and 
humans appear to each other. Humans left the darkness (separation) of the private 
behind when they enter the public, the realm of action, speech and relationships. I 
looked at a few approaches to equality that all support a relational approach to rights 
and reject the liberal vision of the isolated and autonomous individual. The philosophy 
of deconstruction that serves as an inspiration for my understanding of the ethical, 
difference and justice also rejects the notion of the autonomous subject (individual). 
Deconstruction (postmodernism in general) rejects grand narratives and universal and 
general statements. My reason for mentioning this is because the investigation that 
these theories (deconstruction and postmodernism in general) follow is an investigation 
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into the particular or the singular other. The deconstructive concern with the singular 
other is an ethical concern that in my view has similar implications than an ethics of 
care. My concern with the formal approach to equality is that it accepts the liberal view 
of the autonomous individual. It follows the traditional approach to justice (to allow the 
other that which you also expect for yourself). I have raised my fear that the present 
substantive approach to equality is not that much different. The approach to equality 
that I support, an ethical interpretation of equality, accepts the value of the perspective 
of an ethics of care to supplement the notion of justice that always escapes the present 
system and is viewed from a distance. Since I use the TRC as a practical illustration 
of the ethical intersection that is integral to an ethical interpretation of equality I shall 
explain why I think the perspective of an ethics of care was followed in the TRC (at 
least followed sometimes by certain figures). 
This chapter concludes where it began. Reconciliation is a process which 
is never-ending, is costly and often painful. For this process to develop, 
it is imperative that democracy and a human rights culture be 
consolidated. Reconciliation is centred on the call for a more decent, 
more caring and more just society. It is up to each individual to respond 
by committing ourselves to concrete ways of easing the burden of the 
oppressed and empowering the poor to play their rightful part as citizens 
of South Africa. 208 
I have been arguing throughout that the value of the TRC was the public space it 
provided for humans to come together and tell (and share) their stories. I said that 
Martha Nussbaum's209 call (that I discussed in Part 1 and Part 2) for the "literary 
imagination in public life" and for "poets as judges" has a special value for the TRC. 
Although certain formal and institutional aspects and traditional understandings of 
208 
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justice were integral to the TRC, it was primarily a space (an event) where 
reconstruction and transformation took place. In other words where stories were told, 
where human action took place, where people forgave and promised and where an 
ethics of care was followed. I read the various responses, that I discussed above, with 
the perspective of an ethics of care in mind. I already stated that Anthea Jefferey 
follows the typical traditional perspective of justice and did not consider the human 
aspect of the TRC. It is obvious that an ethics of care was absent in her response. The 
other responses, Krog and Meiring in particular, are sensitive to alternative ways of 
approaching justice, also to an ethics of care. Like justice is never fully realised in the 
present we must also realise that an ethics of care is also fallible. The mere fact that 
we can tell and listen to stories, that we take the concrete contexts and specific 
circumstances into account does not mean that all problems will be solved, all wounds 
healed or all people reconciled. The "ethical" of an ethical interpretation is also relevant 
here. We must realise the impossibility of realising equality or justice fully. But this does 
not mean that we can not do anything. A perspective of an ethics of care, while 
realising its shortcomings on the one hand, still strives for the ideals of equality and 
justice on the other. 
Not all storytelling heals. Not everyone wanted to tell his or her story. 
Many, on the other hand, were able to reach toward healing by telling the 
painful stories of their pasts. 210 
The way in which the TRC was structured and how it went about in doing its task made 
it possible for an ethics of care to come into play. Hearings were conducted through out 
the country, the TRC went to the people, taking the first step of human interaction. The 
people who came to tell their stories were accommodated as far as possible. They 
could tell their stories in their mother tongue, translators translated it into English. A 
witness was assisted by relatives or friends when on the stand. The hearings were 
conducted totally differently from traditional court hearings. It was as if all involved in 
210 The report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998) part four, 
Reconciliation, par.6. 
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the process realised that what was at the heart of this event was something bigger and 
greater than the conventional understanding of justice. The presence of Archbishop 
Tutu played a significant role in the manner the hearings were conducted, in the 
amount of care and consideration that was displayed. Tutu went to trouble to make 
people feel comfortable, he sang and he prayed and when he was deeply affected by 
some of the horror stories that were told, he cried. But off course an ethics of care was 
not only present in the concrete conducting of the TRC. 
I think also its aims and objectives can be regarded as inspired by something more 
than conventional justice. If the only aim was a conventional one South Africa could 
have opted for one of the approaches identified by Robert Gordon above. But South 
Africa chose the TRC, an in between space, to address the atrocities of the past from 
many perspectives in order to bring about many effects. One of these was to follow an 
ethics of care in order to restore humanity. In this regard we can recall Cornell's second 
understanding of transformation, namely a transformation of individuals themselves. 
Part of the transformation of individuals in South Africa was to restore their humanity. 
The commission stated its commitment to "restorative justice":211 
We have been concerned, too that many consider only one aspect of 
justice. Certainly, amnesty cannot be viewed as justice if we think of 
justice only as retributive and punitive in nature. We believe, however, 
that there is another kind of justice - a restorative justice which is 
concerned not so much with punishment as with correcting imbalances, 
restoring broken relationships - with healing, harmony and reconciliation. 
Such justice focuses on the experience of victims; hence the importance 
of reparation. 212 
211 
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The investigation that was followed took note of the concrete contexts of each case and 
considered the special circumstances, of each story was listened to without making the 
unique experiences of people general. I want to turn to the issue of reparation and 
consider to what extent an ethics of care is followed in this context. But before I do that 
I want to refer briefly to Tutu's reflections on the TRC and his emphasis on 
relationships and community in particular. 
Tutu, 213 in his personal memoirs on the TRC emphasises the importance of 
relationships. He says 
Our humanity is caught up in that of all others. We are human because 
we belong. We are made for community, for togetherness, for family to 
exist in a delicate network of interdependence. 214 
In respect to the heterogeneous South African society he says: 
[l]nstead of separation and division, all distinctions make for a rich 
diversity to be celebrated for the sake of the unity that underlies them. 
We are different so that we can know our need of one another, for no one 
is ultimately self-sufficient. A completely self-sufficient person would be 
sub-human.215 
Some people might catch onto Tutu's use of the phrase "the unity that underlies them." 
His words could be read as being essentialist and negating the inevitableness of 
radical difference and the radical other. But, I think, one should grant him a more 
nuanced reading. He is not seeking to deny difference and equalise each and every 
one. If the "unity" that he is referring to means the various relationships that connect 
213 (1999) No future without forgiveness. 
214 (1999) No future without forgiveness 154. 
215 (1999) No future without forgiveness 214. 
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different people on different levels I can go along with that. 216 
Tutu relates an experience that he once had while travelling in a plane with a Nigerian 
pilot. 
Coming from South Africa, where blacks did not do such work, I 
experienced a strong feeling of pride in black achievement. The plane 
took off smoothly. Then we hit turbulence. At one moment we were at one 
altitude and the next you had left your stomach up there as the plane 
shuddered and dropped. I was shocked at what I discovered - I found I 
was saying to myself, "I wish there was a white man in the cockpit. Can 
these blacks manage to navigate us out of this horrible experience?"217 
He shares this experience to make the point that we should not "underestimate" the 
"power" of conditioning. 218 Tutu argues that because of this we should be more 
generous in understanding and judging the perpetrators of human rights violations. This 
does not mean that the violations should be condoned, but by taking notice of a 
person's concrete context one is in a better position to judge. Tutu believes that there 
is hope for reconciliation (reconstruction and transformation) because the perpetrators 
"are revealed as human beings." We should strive to encompass the human element 
in all the judgements we make and when we interpret rights. An ethical interpretation 
of equality asks that we should judge and interpret by focusing on relationships and on 
concrete contexts. 
I have already referred to Hannah Arendt's theory of action that illustrates the capacity 
for promising and forgiving and its significance for the TRC. I have also endorsed 
216 
217 
218 
See in regard to a heterogeneous community, multiculturalism and difference Giroux 
(1993) Living dangerously: Multiculturalism and the politics of difference. 
(1999) No future without forgiveness 204. 
hooks (1992) Black looks: Race and representation; Delgado (1997) Critical white studies; 
West "The new cultural politics of difference" in Thompson & Tyagi (eds) (1993) Beyond 
a dream deferred: Multicultural education and the politics of excellence. 
377 
Cornell's vision of "legal interpretation as recollective imagination" which entails the 
paradox of "remembering the future". In regard to ethical interpretation this means that 
the relationship to time, the past, the present and the future is not necessarily 
chronological. The reason, for example, why the past is addressed is to enable us to 
walk into the future, but the walk in the future entails a continuous going back to the 
past. Tutu provides another angle on forgiving, time and the relationship between them: 
In forgiving, people are not being asked to forget. On the contrary, it is 
important to remember, so that we should not let such atrocities happen 
again. Forgiveness does not mean condoning what has been done. It 
means taking what has happened seriously and not minimising it; drawing 
out the sting in the memory that threatens to poison our entire existence. 
It involves trying to understand the perpetrators and so have empathy, to 
try to stand in their shoes, and to appreciate the sort of pressures and 
influences that might have brought them to do what they did .... Forgiving 
means abandoning your right to pay back the perpetrator in his own coin, 
but it is a loss which liberates the victim. 219 
I shall now make a few remarks concerning reparation. One of the three committees 220 
that were set up by the TRC act221 was the Committee on Reparation and 
Rehabilitation. As I have already mentioned, my interest here is to see whether an 
ethics of care is followed in regard to reparation. On the one hand, the whole notion of 
reparation can become part of an instrumental and economical reaction that will defeat 
many of the other aspects of the TRC that made it what it was - an event of public 
space, where human stories were told and human dignity restored. If this is what the 
reparation will amount to the TRC will not be a reflection of an Arendtian public space 
and of action and speech, but will be closer to the realm of labour and necessity, and 
219 
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work and materiality (that what is tangible). On the other hand reparation can be a 
manifestation of an ethics of care. An ethics of care, that may assist people in their 
daily lives, maybe even make it better, is a necessary supplement to my view of justice, 
that justice is never fully realised in a present system. Before I continue I quote from 
the TRC report: 
22. The granting of reparation awards to victims of gross violations of human rights adds 
value to the "truth-seeking" phase by: 
a) enabling the survivors to experience in a concrete way the state's acknowledgement of 
wrongs done to victims and survivors, family members, communities and the nation at 
large; 
b) restoring the survivors' dignity; 
c) affirming the values, interests, aspirations and rights advanced by those who suffered; 
d) raising consciousness about the public's moral responsibility to participate in healing the 
wounded and facilitating nation-building. 
23. Thus the Commission recommends that: 
A structure be developed in the President's office, with a limited secretariat and a fixed life-
span, whose function will be to oversee the implementation of reparation and rehabilitation 
policy proposals and recommendations. The functions of the proposed secretariat will 
require co-operation with a number of ministries which have a long-term mandate to 
integrate services and activities. The secretariat will also apply itself to: 
facilitating mechanisms for financial reparation; facilitating the issuing of death certificates; 
by the appropriate ministry; expediting exhumations and burials by the appropriate ministry; 
facilitating the issuing of declarations of death in those cases where the family members 
request it; facilitating the expunging of criminal records where the political activity of 
individuals was criminalised; facilitating the resolution of outstanding legal matters related 
to reported violations; facilitating the renaming of streets and community facilities in order 
to remember and honour individuals or significant events; facilitating the building of 
monuments and memorials and the development of museums to commemorate events 
of the past. 
The government declare a National Day of Remembrance. 
The President, in consultation with organised business and civil society at large, establish 
a trust fund whose finances will support reparation and restitution initiatives as prioritised 
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by different ministries and civil society.222 
There are many difficult questions and problems involved in the issue of reparation. 
Most of them will be impossible to answer or to solve. I have decided to support the 
principle of reparation. Exactly how the government is going to address reparation is 
still another issue. As I already have indicated I would not like to see the reparation as 
merely an economical response. The symbolism in every act of reparation should get 
a far bigger emphasis and exposure. In this regard we should recall Arendt's and 
Derrida's different readings of the American Declaration of Independence. We saw that 
Derrida, unlike Arendt, does not only recognise the performative aspects of the 
Declaration (and of politics in general), but notices the fact that there will always also 
be constative moments. If I apply this reading to the TRC and to reparation in particular 
I suppose one can say that the reparation will be partly economical (closer to the 
constative moments) and partly performative (closer to the performative moments). 
Another issue in regard to Arendt's theory of the public realm that I have raised is that 
her distinction between the social and the public can not be applied simplistically in our 
times. Economic issues, that might have been purely economic issues (and therefore 
not public in the Arendtian sense) have become political and public issues. (For 
example we can not consider labour unions, because they are involved in the 
negotiation of wages, as having primarily private concerns). What I am saying is that 
the mere fact that one of the aims of the TRC is to address reparations, which will in 
many cases involve material reparations, does not necessarily have a negative impact 
on it as a public event. It can even enhance my understanding of the TRC as an 
illustration of the ethical intersection between public space, equality and justice. This 
222 The report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998) part four, 
Recommendations, par. 22, 23. Meiring (1999) Chronicle of the Truth Commission 209-
210 explains the process of the Reparation and Rehabilitation Commission 209-210. See 
also the summary of the 5 main proposals for reparation: Firstly the most urgent needs 
of victims who were old, ill or living in destitution had to be attended to; Secondly every 
victim of gross human rights violations, or their survivors had to be paid a sum of money; 
Thirdly community services had to be improved; Fourthly symbolic reparation and lastly 
institutional reparation. (244-247) The TRC drew up the proposals but it was the task of 
the government to implement them. Meiring writes (341) that the first reparation letters 
were sent out on 7 May 1998. 
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can be the case if the perspective of an ethics of care is followed in regard to reparation 
and not merely a traditional approach to justice. To what extent can the concrete 
contexts and special circumstances of individuals (concrete others) be accommodated? 
Antjie Krog refers to the old man whose trees were taken away from him. His only 
request was to have his trees back. What is going to happen with his request? 
Perhaps the oldest person ever to testify before the commission is 
William Matidza, born in 1895. Bolt upright, with a trimmed white goatee, 
he walks on to the stage without assistance. He is here, he says, not 
because the police arrested him from time to time for political reasons 
and threw him in jail. Not because he was already eighty the last time he 
was detained. But because all his things have been confiscated. He 
doesn't care about the house and the furniture and the livestock, these 
losses he can deal with - but it's his trees, you see. He wants his trees 
back. . . . He wants reparation for that. The commissioners explain 
somewhat uncomfortably that they don't really have the power, that they 
can only submit suggestions to the President, that it will all take time. 
"Doesn't matter", says Matidza. "I know waiting". 223 
The aim of reparation is not necessarily in conflict with the ethical intersection between 
public space, equality and justice, and accordingly not in conflict with an ethical 
interpretation of equality. Like I have already mentioned it can even enhance an ethical 
interpretation of equality. Reparation will, like the TRC process itself, take place in 
public. It will be a public gesture and public recognition of the past and part of the 
processes of restoration, reconciliation and even reconstruction and transformation. In 
regard to equality a formal approach to equality will be impossible to follow. There is 
no way in which the present government by ways of reparation can bring about formal 
equality. In this context the value of an ethical interpretation of equality can be 
illustrated. The reparation can restore a sense of equality. The various applications 
can be investigated with the radical reality of difference in mind. In other words what 
223 Krog (1998) Country of my sku/1195-196. 
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will mean not much to a white middle class South African can mean a lot to a person 
whose house, possessions and trees were taken away by the government of the past. 
Ethical equality (we must recall Cornell's term of equivalence that I discussed in Part 
2) will mean that all people will have equal moral worth. Humanity and human dignity 
will be restored. The total aim of reparation must be followed with a strong realisation 
of its own shortcomings and incompleteness. In this regard reparation can illustrate the 
deconstructive implications for justice. Justice is an ideal that is strived for in the 
present, but it can never be fully realised in the present. Reparation will illustrate the 
incompleteness of present attempts to achieve equality and justice but at the same time 
it could, by supplementing the ideal of justice with an ethics of care, affect and even 
improve present circumstances. 
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Conclusion 
"The past is another country" 
The past, it has been said, is another country. The way its stories are told 
and the way they are heard change as the years go by. The spotlight 
gyrates, exposing old lies and illuminating new truths. As a fuller picture 
emerges, a new piece of the jigsaw puzzle of our past settles into 
place. 224 
In this part I focused on landscapes of justice. I explained my reason for using 
landscape as image for the text in general, but also for justice in particular. The image 
of landscape has a sense of unfixity and openness. The multiple methods of 
interpreting landscape can be fruitfully applied to the interpretation of justice. I said that 
the vision of justice that I follow is that justice will never be fully realised in the present, 
justice is in the beyond. The role of justice in our daily lives is that it presents an ideal, 
an horizon that should be strived for. 
In the three sections, Theoretical landscape, South African landscape and Landscape 
of care, I described perspectives on the interpretation of texts; on promising and 
forgiving; on responses to mass atrocities; .a few responses to the TRC and the 
significance of an ethics of care for the TRC. At the centre of these discussions stand 
the ethical intersection of public space, equality and justice and accordingly an ethical 
interpretation of equality. My aim was to show why, in my view, the TRC presents an 
example of such an ethical intersection and ultimately why I think it contributes to an 
ethical interpretation of equality. I was specifically interested in the responses to the 
TRC, how people think and talk about the TRC, what language they use. In this regard 
I was greatly influenced by Andre P Brink's observation about language that I quoted 
224 The report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998) foreword, par 
17. 
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in the introduction to this part. Brink argued that we should not repeat the mind-sets of 
the past and said that how we think about the future in language is the true reflection 
of change. 
The arguments of Drucilla Cornell, Hannah Arendt and Anthony Kronman that I raised 
in Part 1 are connected to my reflections on the TRC. In the previous discussion I 
highlighted Cornell's understanding of transformation on two levels, the first level 
meaning the change of a system and the second level the change of individuals. I said 
in this part that the TRC's restoration of humanity and human dignity can be seen as 
part of the transformation of individuals. Together with the discussion of Cornell's 
understanding of transformation I referred to Hannah Arendt's vision of judgement as 
a manifestation of action in modern times where the public realm and political action 
are absent. I then turned to Kronman's description of judgement where he refers to how 
one must employ the imagination when making judgements, trying to place oneself in 
the other person's position. I argued that a combination of these three views tells us 
something important about our own visions of public space and about the processes 
of reconstruction and transformation. The notions of transformation and judgement are 
also significant for the TRC. One of the aims of the TRC was to assist in the 
transformation from the past to the future. It was expected from each and every person 
in our country who was aware of the TRC to make a judgement concerning the TRC. 
It was not only the commissioners and people directly involved in the process that had 
to think about and make judgements concerning the TRC. We all had to go through the 
process of deliberating the various points of view, trying to place ourselves in the shoes 
of others. Trying to understand why and how the atrocities happened. Through this 
process of making judgements about the TRC we all were involved in political action. 
South African suburban homes that, not long ago, were perfect examples of private 
spaces were temporarily transformed into public spaces each and every time the TRC 
was discussed and deliberated, each and every time someone made a judgement 
regarding the TRC. The TRC had an inevitable effect on the South African society. I 
believe that the TRC might have forced the first steps of the transformation of the South 
African society. 
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I have argued that equality was a feature of the TRC on three levels. Firstly, because 
everyone involved in the process, whether victim or perpetrator, was treated equally. 
Secondly, because of the display of human plurality of which equality is a feature it was 
an equal space and thirdly because of the aim of restoration of equality. In regard to 
the significance of the TRC for an ethical interpretation of equality I have already 
indicated that I regard the TRC as an illustration of the ethical intersection between 
public space, equality and justice which is integral to an ethical interpretation of 
equality. I want to make two further points. The first one I have mentioned above in the 
discussion of Asmal's and his co-authors' response. According to them the TRC could 
not treat the victims of apartheid (members of the resistance) equally to human rights 
abusers. The TRC, however, treated each and everyone equally. This does not mean 
that they treated them the same, or that they did not take the different contexts and 
circumstances into account. The fact that the TRC recognised apartheid as a crime 
against humanity in its report is a clear indication that they did not treat the victims and 
the perpetrators the same, equal yes, but not the same. What I am saying is that the 
TRC rejected a formal approach to equality and followed an approach where the 
concrete context influenced the investigation and approach. In my view this approach 
is along the same lines as an ethical interpretation of equality. By describing and 
emphasising the approach to equality followed by the TRC I hope to illustrate the value 
of the contextual interpretation that I support (an ethical interpretation of equality) that 
regards difference. I quote from the report 
Some have criticised us because they believe we talk of some acts as 
morally justifiable and other not. Let us quickly state that the section of 
the Act relating to what constitutes a gross violation of human rights 
makes no moral distinction. It deals with legality. A gross violation is a 
gross violation, whoever commits it and for whatever reason. There is 
thus legal equivalence between all perpetrators .... the same kind of act 
attracts different moral judgements. A venerable tradition holds that those 
who use force to overthrow or even to oppose an unjust system occupy 
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the moral high ground over those who use force to sustain the system. 225 
The other point concerns the relationship between memory, storytelling, the imagination 
and conceptions of time. In Part 2 I discussed Drucilla Cornell's view of legal 
interpretation as recollective imagination and said that an ethical interpretation of 
equality follows the notion of recollective imagination. The notion of recollective 
imagination requires the disruption of chronological (linear) time. In other words in this 
notion the past can be "imagined" and the future "remembered". This disruption of the 
traditional concept of time becomes relevant for interpretation in regard to the 
application of past decisions. To imagine the past means to reinterpret the past, to give 
it new meanings and new applications. Concepts like memory, history, the past and the 
future were often used in the TRC and the conversations on the TRC. Andre P Brink's 
reflection on memory in his discussion of Grace Marks gives a valuable perspective on 
how memory works. In the stories told before the TRC certain versions of the past were 
given, but as the report of the TRC itself states in future these versions might be altered 
and replaced with new memories. The past is imagined continuously in each and every 
story we remember and tell. But at the same time it also remembered. Cornell's phrase 
of "recollective imagination" captures this paradox of remembering while also imagining 
the past. The point of all this is that the special relationship between memory, the 
imagination and time in the TRC will influence legal interpretation, an ethical 
interpretation of equality in particular. 
Inevitably, evidence and information about our past will continue to 
emerge, as indeed they must. The report of the Commission will now take 
its place in the historical landscape of which future generations will try to 
make sense - searching for the clues that lead endlessly, to a truth that 
will, in the very nature of things, never be fully revealed. 226 
225 
226 
The report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998) foreword, par 
52-54. 
The report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998) foreword, par 
18. 
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... continuous 
landscapes 
This is the final part of the thesis. It is followed by the required bibliography, after which 
the journey would seemingly come to an end - for now. Or perhaps not, even for now. 
The journey, the reflection, the conversation, the reading - everything that went into this 
text - goes on. Nothing is coming to an end, or has been solved. The landscape never 
stops. It changes from one type to another, and there is no point where we can say we 
have left the landscape. I am not at the grand finale. I am not about to put forward my 
definitive test for an ethical interpretation of equality. In other words, this is not a 
conclusion. Nor is it an end note. It is not a summary either, because I am not merely 
repeating in briefer form everything that I have said so far. 
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I used the image of landscape for this thesis because I hoped to capture the 
complexities of public space, equality and justice. I wanted to describe an "in between" 
position and to avoid extreme positions. My perspectives on public space, equality and 
justice are founded on a double-handed approach. 
An ethical interpretation of equality acts as an "in between" position. It is a way of 
interpretation that takes into account the ethical intersection of public space, equality 
and justice. The heart of an ethical interpretation of equality is that it radically 
acknowledges difference and otherness, in other words difference is not comfortably 
perceived as unproblematic. Difference is radical difference that cannot be submitted 
to an instrumentalist test or formula. By the same token the other is not seen as the 
"other" of myself, but as the "other that can never be known". 
In my view, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is an embodiment 
or manifestation of the intersection of public space, equality and justice and a concrete 
example of an ethical interpretation of equality. 
Because the future, too, is another country1 
As the title indicates, my aim with this thesis was to reflect on an ethical interpretation 
of equality. One of the reasons was that I grew up in a country where there was severe 
inequality. After the transition to democracy, equality appeared as one of the 
fundamental values of our democratic society. Section 39 of the constitution requires 
that all law must be interpreted in the light of equality (together with dignity and 
freedom). Equality is not only a fundamental value that must guide us in the 
interpretation of all law, it is also a concrete aim that must be strived for in the 
upliftment of the major part of our society. Yet, how do we understand equality? What 
The report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998) foreword. 
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do we mean when we talk about equality? Or when we strive for equality as an ideal 
and envisage an equal society? These questions inspired me to write a thesis on 
equality. My fear is that even though substantive equality has replaced formal equality, 
substantive equality will once again become formalised with the effect that difference 
will be reduced and rejected. 
However, I realised from the start that I could not write a thesis on equality. I do not 
know what equality means. To be honest I do not think that equality exists. I decided 
to describe a certain understanding of equality that I thought to be of value in the South 
African context. This understanding, to my mind, could best be described as an "ethical 
interpretation of equality". 
In my description of an ethical interpretation of equality, I discussed the three elements 
of what I call an ethical intersection of public space, equality and justice. However, the 
ethical intersection is not an intersection of merely any vision of public space, nor 
merely any perspective on equality or landscape of justice. 
I elaborated on various visions of public space and endorsed a specific one. I said that 
South African visions of public space must be reconstructed and transformed. I used 
the two concepts of reconstruct and transform because on the one hand public spaces 
must be positively constructed and created but on the other hand past and present 
conceptions of public spaces must be challenged, undermined and changed. I support 
a heterogeneous vision of public space, where difference is accepted. I am drawn to 
the possibility of a public space where action can take place, human plurality is 
displayed and humans appear to each other. 
In my view the TRC as an event was such a reconstructed and transformed public 
space. The TRC was a reconstructed public space, because physical spaces of public 
gathering were constructed throughout the country. More important than the physical 
spaces, were the public discourse and public dialogue which were created by the TRC. 
The public dialogue and public discourse will have an ongoing reconstructive effect on 
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public space in the future. The TRC might have been a single historical moment, but 
in my view it opened up the possibilities for public space in the future. The TRC was 
an example of a transformed public space because it was representative of race, ethnic 
grouping, language, religion, sex, gender, class and much more. I view it as a 
transformed public space also because things that were banned from public dialogue 
in the past were the centre of the TRC's investigation. Another reason why it was a 
transformed public space is because the rational legalistic model was challenged by 
the telling of and listening to stories. The faceless absent South African became 
embodied, and present. 
I have mentioned in Part 1 how the centenary of the South African War created a public 
space. The fact that people who were excluded in the past, black people and women, 
became part of the public space surrounding the centenary celebrations transformed 
the exclusive event and remembrance of this part of South African history to an 
inclusive source of public dialogue. Even the name of the war changed. In the past the 
war was called the Boer War or the Second Liberation War. The new name, the South 
African War, strives to encompasse each and everyone in South Africa. In my view, if 
not for the event of the TRC, the centenary of the South African Boer War would not 
have been accepted in such a positive way by all groupings. 
I believe that the event of the TRC has altered (reconstructed and transformed) South 
African visions of public space. Obviously, whether and how public spaces will take 
shape in future will depend on the South African public in general and on our 
institutions. The "phantom" of the public will haunt us, but it is in our hands to ensure 
that certain concrete moments of public space are created. 
Sport has always been a public event in South Africa and since 1990 it has become 
more inclusive. Rugby and cricket are not exclusively white sports anymore. More and 
more whites are becoming enthusiastic soccer supporters. Part of this transformation 
in support is because rugby and cricket teams are, not wholly, but nevertheless more 
representative than in the past. Another reason is that there has been a change in 
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attitude. The change in the country from authoritarianism to democracy had an effect 
on the sports arena as public space. Sport has for a long time been a contentious 
public and political event. During the years of apartheid South African teams were not 
allowed to play in countries who objected to the political system of authoritarianism and 
segregation based on race. South Africa in turn refused teams who had black players 
to play in the country. After the release of Nelson Mandela and the first democratic 
election in 1994 South Africa was readmitted to the international sports arena. 
Presently the issue of representative teams is again a contentious political topic. The 
point that I want to make is that something that is seemingly non political and for pure 
private enjoyment like sport was and still is a public space where action and speech 
can take place. People who are not really interested in public issues are drawn into 
public dialogue because of their support for their sports team. On the other hand 
people, like me, who are not interested in sport, but interested in public issues are also 
drawn in. Sport, like the centenary of the South African War, is an example where 
public space appeared in an unlikely and unexpected context. 
Sometime during 2000 local government elections will take place. Local government 
politics can be an excellent public space where each and every individual can 
participate and become part of a broader public debate in the context of practical 
issues that can affect their particular circumstances. Participation in these elections will 
be a great challenge to South Africans to reconstruct and transform public space. 
The context closest to me where I strongly believe public spaces should be 
reconstructed and transformed is the university and law faculties in particular. I would 
like to see that we encourage public discourse and dialogue in our lectures and on 
campus in general. Part of this process is to encourage student participation in student 
politics, but even more importantly, to recreate the curriculum of the law degree and the 
general attitude of the legal mind. Easier said than done, I must concede, but if we want 
to see a change in society a good place to start is by making law students more aware 
of the influence of public space, politics and democracy on the law. The tension 
between legal formalists and critical theorists can be a creative tension if the law faculty 
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can be a public space where action and speech can take place, between the lecturers 
and between lecturers and students. 
The perspectives on equality that I think are best suited to the South African context 
and for an ethical interpretation of equality are those that accept the fact of difference 
and recognise the significance of relationships and public space for equality. I accept 
the concept of justice as the limit to any present system, in other words that justice can 
never be achieved fully in the present and serves as an ideal. It is precisely this 
concept of justice that makes an ethical interpretation of equality ethical: the realisation 
of the impossibility, incompleteness and fallibility of all present attempts to accept 
difference, ensure equality or achieve justice. I repeat a point that I have already made 
several times in this thesis, that the understanding of justice as unattainable in the 
present is not a nihilistic or cynical rejection of justice. I am also not denying that there 
are and always will be moments where justice is served. However, the reason why I 
believe we should insist on the impossibility of justice in the present is to prevent us 
from feeling satisfied that it is possible to attain justice within the parameters of a 
rational human made system. I fear it is such complacency that leads to totalitarian or 
at least undemocratic and very unjust contexts. The belief in the impossibility of justice 
to be achieved fully in the present inspires and motivates us to keep on working on it. 
Another aspect is that we cannot put forward one ideal of justice. Our ideals for justice 
must be, like our society, multiple. In our search for justice difference must also be 
recognised. 
At this point I want to return to my discussion of some of the equality cases that have 
been decided by the Constitutional Court. In regard to the Hugo case2 I have argued 
that the court followed an "instrumental approach" in deciding that a presidential pardon 
to all single mothers with children under the age of 12 did not amount to unfair 
President of the Republic of South Africa and another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC). 
I have discussed this case in Part 2 " ... perspectives on equality". 
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discrimination. 3 The majority of the court applied its approach of substantive equality 
to conclude that the state did not discriminate unfairly against Hugo, a widower and the 
father of a son under the age of 12. This case illustrates something about my fear that 
substantive equality will again become formalised and why I argue for an ethical 
interpretation rather than a substantive interpretation of equality. The court said that we 
cannot insist on "identical treatment" and that each case will require a careful and 
"thorough understanding" of the impact of the discrimination in the particular case and 
that a "classification which is unfair in one context may not necessarily be unfair in a 
different context". This is exactly what we generally understand under the substantive 
approach. But it is striking how the court only focuses on certain particulars and 
contexts. O'Regan in her judgement focused on the group which has suffered 
discrimination. She relied heavily on "social reality" which is that at present and in the 
near future most mothers will bear the primary caretaking responsibility. Kriegler, who 
delivered a minority judgement, argued that to regard mothers as the primary care 
givers is a root cause of women's inequality. What I find encouraging about Kriegler's 
approach is that he emphasised the importance "of both men and women to form their 
identities freely". An ethical interpretation of equality does not accept one social reality 
as the final one. If one takes difference seriously the implication is exactly that 
difference cannot be reduced to a generalisation of sameness, not even to prove a 
political point. One set of the concrete contexts and specific circumstances that was 
ignored by the court is that of the child, Hugo's son. From the perspective of an ethical 
interpretation of equality the state discriminated between the children of single mothers 
and the children of single fathers because not enough attention was given to the 
concrete contexts of the children. In this respect the court also did not follow a 
relational approach, in other words the special relationship between a parent and a 
child was ignored and only the parent's rights received attention. The substantive 
approach followed by the court investigated the past and present context. An ethical 
interpretation of equality follows a future-orientated approach and does not accept a 
present experience as "the reality". An ethical interpretation of equality would have 
I have used Pierre Schlag's ("Rights in the postmodern condition" in Sarat and Kearns 
(eds) (1997) Legal Rights. Historical and philosophical perspectives 263-304) concept 
of "an instrumental aesthetic". 
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acknowledged the concrete context and specific circumstances of Hugo and his son. 
It would have accepted radical difference, in other words not the difference as 
perceived by a substantive approach to equality. An ethical interpretation of equality 
does not presume to know difference fully and to accommodate difference fully. 
In the Walker case4 the court had to consider whether the Pretoria City Council's 
differential treatment of people living in different geographical areas along racial lines 
amounted to unfair discrimination. The court decided that the differentiation in method 
of payment between people living in different areas did not amount to unfair 
discrimination. In making this decision the court considered the difference in concrete 
contexts and specific circumstances of living. The people in Pretoria who payed a 
higher rate lived in far better conditions and received better services than those living 
in Mamelodi and Atteridgeville. In this case, the court acknowledged the difference in 
concrete contexts and did not apply an instrumental predictable approach to equality. 
With regard to the City Council taking legal steps to recover payments from some 
residents and not from others the court found that this practice amounted to unfair 
discrimination. The fact that the court made a different finding in regard to the 
differential treatment in taking steps to recover payments is another positive aspect that 
shows that the court considered the contexts and the difference between the two 
practices. As I have already mentioned the court ordered Walker to pay the money he 
owed to the City Council even though it conceded that it was unfair discrimination to 
take steps against him and not against other defaulters. The court here did not only 
take regard of the past and the present, but was also future-orientated. The decision 
reflects the undecidability of law and the impossibility of justice. I am not labelling the 
court's approach in Walker as an ethical interpretation of equality, but spectres of an 
ethical interpretation can certainly be identified. The court realised the significance of 
public space, equality and justice and interpreted equality in the light of the ethical 
intersection between them. Walker and people in situations similar to Walker were 
treated by the court with a better understanding of equality than Hugo. 
1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC). I discussed this case in Part 2 " perspectives on equality". 
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The actual application of an ethical interpretation of equality must still be tested in 
many concrete contexts and specific circumstances. This is something that I shall 
occupy myself with in future. This thesis was the first step towards an ethical 
interpretation of equality. I want to stress that I do see this not only as an abstract 
theoretical interpretation. In my view an ethical interpretation of equality is not only a 
philosophical and theoretical point of view but something that can be tested in real 
situations. Part of an ethical interpretation of equality will be to challenge the law's 
current belief in fixity. The challenge will be to show that an ethical interpretation of 
equality and accordingly an open-ended approach can have a more substantial effect 
on the concrete contexts and specific circumstances of individuals than a formalised 
approach, and at the end can serve the ideal of justice better. If an ethical interpretation 
of equality was followed in the case of Hugo, his son and himself could have found 
themselves in better, more just circumstances. 
The TRC was the example I used as a practical illustration of the ethical intersection 
between public space, equality and justice. I explained why I regard all three features 
as present in the TRC, and how they are connected. The TRC was a public event and 
an example of public space. It was an equal space. More than that, in my view, an 
ethical approach to equality was followed by recognising the difference between victims 
and perpetrators. The TRC treated all persons equally, but accepted that equal 
treatment does not amount to sameness. By accepting apartheid as a crime against 
humanity the TRC regarded the concrete contexts, specific circumstances and 
difference. But even the TRC inevitably failed in some cases to recognise the radical 
difference that it was confronted with by some of the stories. 
Antjie Krog5 repeats the tale of Lekotse, the shepherd. Lekotse told the TRC how his 
family was affected since the day when the police came to his house, broke down the 
door and violated the privacy of their home. 
Lekotse: My family was affected since that day .... Now my life was 
(1998) Country of my sku/1210-220. 
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affected since that day. It was at night ... 
llan Lax: I want to know about your children first. 
Lekotse: I have ten children, two have passed away ... Now on the day 
of the assault, I was with three children at home ... 
Lax: Can you tell us about the incident that happened. Was it in May 
1993? 
Lekotse: Maybe you're right - you know my problem is, I was a shepherd. 
I cannot write and forget all these days, ... Now listen very carefully, 
because I'm telling you the story now ... They were [at my home] ... you 
know, it's a pity I don't have a stepladder. I will take you to my home to 
investigate ... 
Lax: You indicate that you injured your shoulder. Did you sustain any 
other injuries? 
Lekotse: I was not injured anywhere else ... 
Lax: In your statement you mentioned you were injured in your ribs? I'm 
just helping you to remember. 
Lekotse: Are you not aware that the shoulder is related to the ribs sir? 
Lax: Did you or your son ever make a case against the police? 
Lekotse: We never took any initiative to report this matter to the police, 
because how can you report policemen to policemen?6 
Krog notes how llan Lax, the leader of the testimony, at the beginning of his story 
continually interrupted Lekotse. He did this because of a specific technique employed 
by the TRC when a testimony was given. Krog explains that the leader of a testimony 
had the twofold task of firstly, steering the testimony in a direction that will yield enough 
facts of use to the commission and secondly, of letting the testimony unfold as 
spontaneously as possible so that there can be healing and renewed self-respect. This 
is why Lax started of on a personal note by asking him about his children. But, as Krog 
observes, this technique made the shepherd impatient. He wanted to continue with his 
story about the event that affected the life of him and his family forever. Lax kept on 
6 Krog (1998) Country of my sku/1210-216. 
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interrupting him and at a certain stage the shepherd spoke to close to the microphone 
so that Lax had to ask him to speak more softly. Then Lax indicated that he had to start 
and asked the date. 
This throws the narrator off course again. Surely the precise date on 
which your life was destroyed is irrelevant? It could have been any day, 
the important thing is that it happened. 7 
Lekotse hesitated for a moment and said that being a shepherd he cannot write and 
cannot remember dates. 
But he is a hardened survivor, and he rightly gets firm with Lax: "Now 
listen very carefully, because I'm telling you the story now." He starts with 
a contradiction: "On that day, it was night." And this introduces the 
ambiguity that is maintained throughout the story, not only in the facts of 
the testimony but in the symbols used: day and night, white and black, life 
and death, educated and illiterate.8 
Lekotse gave attention to details in his story: The police broke the door out of the door 
frame, stormed into the house with dogs, insulted the occupants, opened the closets 
and threw the contents on the floor. Lekotse, being a shepherd, said that not even a 
jackal when it gets in among the sheep, behaves like this. 
They were worse than jackals, says Lekotse. And since the jackal is the 
shepherd's greatest enemy, a threat to the flock night and day, he means 
that the security police exceeded his worse expectations of evil. 9 
Krog notes how Lekotse tried to understand the behaviour of others and transplanted 
9 
Krog (1998) Country of my skull 217. 
Krog (1998) Country of my skull 217. 
Krog (1998) Country of my skull 218. 
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himself in the positions of the farmer who allowed the police to do this to him and the 
police. 
What makes his story all the more poignant is the fact that he can 
imagine himself in the other characters' positions, but no one seems able 
to empathize with his own. His empathy, his ability to think himself into 
other positions, goes beyond the night he is describing. It even includes 
the people from the Truth Commission. Perhaps, he is thinking, they are 
struggling to understand fully the destruction that was sown in his house. 
"It's a pity I don't have a stepladder. I will take you to my home to 
investigate ... "10 
Lekotse experienced frustration with the lack of communication between him and the 
Truth Commission. One of the reasons for the lack of communication is because of the 
technique followed by the TRC in leading his testimony. I find it quite ironic that a 
specific technique can be employed with the aim of getting a more spontaneous 
testimony. Lekotse's frustration was highlighted by the last two questions asked by Lax 
about his injury and if they reported the incident to the police. His responses to these 
questions were "Are you not aware that the shoulder is related to the rib" and "How can 
you report policemen to policemen?" Lekotse told the TRC that he requested the police 
to kill them and to bury them all in one grave. He repeated this request again while 
delivering his testimony: "If one of these policemen is around here, I'll be happy if one 
of them comes to the stage and kills me immediately." Krog comments on this request 
with reference to an unpublished interview of the Zulu poet, Masi Kunene, where he 
told American academic, Colleen Scott, that "in the African system there is diversity. 
The ideal is diversity, not symmetry." 11 Krog argues that this notion of diversity is 
echoed in Lekotse's need to understand the actions of the intruders. 
He does not naturally ignore or resist the police. His instincts are to give 
10 (1998) Country of my skull 219. 
11 (1998) Country of my skull 219. 
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them access to the fullness of his world, and he expects to gain access 
to their world. 12 
Krog observes how the police not only refuse Lekotse access to their world, but at the 
same time invades and violates his world, his private space. 
The policemen's intention is not just to invade his private space, but to 
damage the access to it in such a way that it will never be a private space 
again. Although the police penetrate his world, they refuse him access to 
theirs, and their intentions, which would help him to redefine his own 
space .... From the safe shelter which the shepherd has created for his 
family, they are driven out to where it is so cold and inhospitable that the 
best place for his flock becomes the grave. 13 
This story illustrates something significant about the difficulty of difference. If there ever 
was and ever will be an institutionalised process and space aimed at taking account of, 
celebrating and nurturing difference it was the TRC. Yet, it failed. It failed to accept the 
diversity, the otherness of Lekotse's life world and to place itself in his position. It was 
not because of lack of intention that the TRC failed. It is as if the TRC could not 
address the shepherd's difference fully because it was hampered by its own rational 
beliefs and rational life world. The TRC followed a specific technique when leading a 
testimony. This illustrates something about my uneasiness with substantive equality. 
I fear that the use of a technique or a test will prevent us from regarding difference 
without reducing it to something that we know. 
What are the implications of this for an ethical interpretation of equality? Perhaps that 
the shepherds of this world might be better able to perceive the meaning of an ethical 
interpretation of equality than trained legal minds. What this story does tell us is that 
to regard difference is not easy, to have good intentions is not enough, but it also tells 
12 
13 
(1998) Country of my sku/1219. 
(1998) Country of my sku/1220. 
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us that sometimes it is possible. Lekotse followed an ethical interpretation of equality 
by not putting himself above or beyond the people he had to deal with. He showed a 
willingness to share his understanding and to listen to the intentions of others with the 
hope that he may obtain a better understanding of their life world. An ethical 
interpretation of equality poses a huge challenge to formal equality, but also to 
substantive equality as it is applied by South African lawyers, courts and institutions. 
To return to the philosophy of deconstruction, an ethical interpretation of equality asks 
a certain delay, a slowness and a carefulness. 14 Difference should be regarded as a 
reality, but not as a present reality that can be known and identified. Rather, difference 
should be carefully approached from the starting point of diversity. 
I had an experience with one of my Legal Philosophy students this year that reminded 
me once again of my own inadequacy in regard to difference. The student asked me 
before the lecture started whether he can leave after an hour because his lift club is 
leaving at a certain time and should he miss his lift he will not be able to get home. He 
was living quite a distance from the university and there was a moratorium on all taxis 
at that stage because of taxi violence. I said that it is fine with me and started with the 
lecture. After an hour I heard a faint whistling in the distance, but did not really take 
notice of it. I went on with the lecture with the faint whistling remaining in the 
background. When I looked across the faces of the students at a certain stage I noticed 
that Mr Bodiba's, the student who asked me to leave early, face and body was tense 
and I immediately realised that the whistling was his sign to go. I stopped and said, "Mr 
Bodiba, is this your lift?", upon which he sighed a relieved yes and got up. As he 
walked out hastily, I said "you should have told me that you must go", but as I said it 
realised that if I had been sensitive enough to the situation I might have been able to 
recognise the whistling for what it was ... 
I said that I am not going to spell out a definite test for equality. I nevertheless tried to 
start to show what an ethical interpretation of equality is, and how it can make a 
difference to how we perceive difference. 
14 I discussed the philosophy of deconstruction in Part 2. 
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And I wade into song - in a language that is not mine, in a tongue I do not 
know. It is fragrant inside the song, and among the keynotes of sorrow 
and suffering there are soft silences where we who belong to this 
landscape, all of us, can come to rest. 15 
For a while, before we continue the journey through the landscape. 
15 Krog (1998) Country of my skull 217. 
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